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The Ecological Dimension of Natural Selection 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper I argue that we should pay extra attention to the ecological 
dimension of natural selection. By this I mean that we should view natural 
selection primarily as acting on the outcomes of the interactions organisms have 
with their environment which influences their relative reproductive output. A 
consequence of this view is that natural selection is not (directly) sensitive to 
what system of inheritance which ensures reoccurrences of organism-
environment interactions over generations. I end by showing the consequences 
of this view when looking at how processes like niche construction and the 
Baldwin effect relate to natural selection.  
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1. Introduction. The principle of natural selection is the theoretical cornerstone of 
evolutionary theory. In the philosophy of biology, we can delineate four different, but 
related, main discussions of this principle; first, on what the sufficient conditions are for its 
occurrence (e.g., Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Second, on the appropriate means 
of quantifying the influence of natural selection on the distribution of variants in 
populations over time (e.g., Millstein 2009; Otsuka 2016). Third, on whether selection can 
be counted as a cause or is more appropriately interpreted as a statistical summary of 
multiple underlying causes and not a cause of evolution in itself (e.g., Matthen and Ariew 
2002; Ramsey 2013ab; Walsh 2010). Fourth, on whether selection can act on multiple 
levels and what the relevant units of selection are, and if any of these are privileged (e.g., 
Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976; Okasha 2006).  
Another debate, which is related to all of the aforementioned debates, centers 
around the metaphysics of evolution. In this debate we can identify two main camps; a 
molecular, or “gene-centered” metaphysics (e.g., Dawkins 1976, 1982) and an ecological, 
or “organism-centered” metaphysics (e.g., West-Eberhard 2003; Walsh 2015). Standard 
textbook evolutionary biology usually has a “molecular” metaphysics, in that the 
fundamental units of evolution are genes. On an “ecological” metaphysics of evolution, the 
fundamental unit of evolution are organisms.  
Walsh (2015), amongst others (see references below), has recently argued that the 
Modern Synthesis misrepresents the metaphysics of evolution by viewing it primarily as a 
molecular phenomenon, instead of an ecological one. This is largely due to what Walsh 
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calls “the marginalisation of the organism that have taken hold under the Modern 
Synthesis” (Walsh 2015, x). This has been a complaint of many biologists and 
philosophers over the last decades (e.g., Lewontin 1983, Piaget 1978; Odling-Smee et al. 
2003; Oyama 2000; West-Eberhard 2003) and is a central complaint of the proponents of 
an extended evolutionary synthesis (Pigliucci and Müller 2010). Theoretical and empirical 
work taking a more ecological or organism-centered approach to understanding evolution 
and development has also recently gained some traction under the headings of eco-devo 
(ecological developmental biology) and eco-evo-devo (ecological evolutionary 
developmental biology). For example, West-Eberhard (2003), Sultan (2015) and Gilbert 
and Epel (2015) have made a great effort to establish how both evolutionary and 
developmental trajectories are significantly influenced by, and sometimes crucially 
dependent on, particular organism-environment interactions.  
This paper is a philosophical contribution to what an “organism-centered”, or 
“ecological”, metaphysics of evolution might do to our understanding of natural selection. 
I begin from the view that natural selection is primarily an ecological process. By this I 
mean that natural selection is a process where organism-environment interactions are what 
is preferentially selected. Further, natural selection acts on the outcomes of these 
interactions. This is not a novel view and has been suggested before (Lehrman 1970; 
Brandon 1990; Rosenberg 1983). However, I will take this a step further and argue that 
this also means that natural selection is not directly sensitive to which system of 
inheritance ensures the reoccurrence of such interactions, be it genetic, epigenetic, 
behavioral, cultural, or symbolic (Jablonka and Lamb 2014). Natural selection acts on the 
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -4-
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outcomes of organism-environment interactions and the frequency and likelihood of their 
reoccurrence in subsequent generations. 
However, this does not mean that I equate the importance of each system of 
inheritance. A genetic system of inheritance is an important prior condition for there to be 
other systems of inheritance in most, if not all, organisms. Further, most of morphological 
and physiological evolution seem to be primarily under genetic control. The point is rather 
that this happens “unbeknownst” to natural selection. To use some helpful terminology 
from Sober (1984), we can say that there is selection for the ecological interactions that 
yields highest relative fitness in a population, while there is selection of the relevant genes 
that contribute to those interactions because of the high-fidelity-inheritance properties of 
the genetic system of inheritance in reliably producing offspring which have similar 
interactions.  
 
2. Selection on Passive Objects by Environmental Filtration. Let us begin by looking in 
more detail at the “standard” molecular metaphysics of the Modern Synthesis. In most 
textbooks on evolutionary biology, one is likely to find a definition of evolution as the 
changes to allele (or gene) frequencies in a population over time (e.g., Futuyma and 
Kickpatrick 2017). Furthermore, the conditions for evolution by natural selection to occur 
(e.g., Lewontin 1970); inheritance, variation, and differences in fitness, is often interpreted 
in a genetic manner. That is, any variation in fitness, which is due to differences in the 
performance of varying phenotypes in relation to the local (and shared) selective 
environment, is only acted on by natural selection insofar as the genetic underpinning of 
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -5-
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that variation steadily expresses the relevant phenotype over generations. Since the genetic 
system of inheritance is privileged, in the sense that without it there would be (in most 
cases) no organism to be selected for in the first place, it makes perfect sense to define 
evolution as changes in the frequencies of genes in a population. And from this it easy to 
conceive of natural selection as being an agent which sorts different genetic variants based 
on their performance relative to their immediate environment. This rendition of natural 
selection construes it as an environmental process. The metaphor of a sieve or filtration is 
often invoked to describe this process (e.g., Sober 1984). Coupled with the view that the 
only phenotypic variation that matters for biological evolution is that which is the result of 
genetic variation, such metaphors engender a certain passivity on behalf of the organism. It 
essentially relegates the action of selection to be realized by certain (stable or changing) 
environmental configurations. Natural selection acts on those organisms that carry the 
appropriate genetic material to produce a phenotype that performs best (i.e., highest 
realized relative fitness) in relation to the relevant environmental configurations. Such a 
view of evolution by natural selection has been called asymmetrically externalist (Godfrey-
Smith 1996). It is asymmetric in the sense that the configurations of the environment are 
(presumed to be) explainable solely with reference to factors internal to the environmental 
system itself. While, on the other hand, the organisms which occupy these environments 
are explained (in terms of the phylogenetic history leading up to their capacity for 
occupying the environment) by reference to a combination of changes to the biological 
system (i.e., changes in the gene frequencies of the lineage(s) leading up to the relevant 
population) and the environmental configuration which the lineage(s) have experienced 
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over generations. It is externalist in the sense that the environmental configurations are 
what “trigger” the selection of the phenotype, while the changes to the gene frequencies in 
the population is a “structuring” cause of the selection event.1 The role of the organism in 
such explanations is that of a vehicle (Dawkins 1978), one that carries certain passengers 
(genes) to certain destinations (selection events). However, organisms are arguably not just 
an ensemble of genes, and their activity or behavior might influence their reproductive 
success and consequently the evolution of their lineage. How does an externalist and 
molecular (i.e., gene-centered) view of evolution deal with behavior?  
Standardly, in behavioral ecology (e.g., Krebs and Davies 1993) and the 
evolutionary explanations provided by behavioral genetics (e.g., Anholt and Mackay 
2010), organismic activity and behavior is treated as any other phenotypic trait. It is based 
on certain assumptions regarding the dispositional properties of genes in relation to 
behaviors and certain optimality measures (Krebs and Davies 1993). Generally speaking, 
organisms exhibiting behaviors that increase their fitness are selected for, and the 
disposition to exhibit the beneficial behavior in subsequent generations is assumed to be 
under genetic control—and can consequently be treated like any other phenotypic trait. 
The validity of these assumptions is not under question here. The point here is a conceptual 
one. It is about how we conceive of the relation between natural selection and the 
organisms exhibiting the relevant behavior. Let us do a thought experiment. Take an 
 
1 For the distinction between “structuring” and “triggering” causes, see Dretske (1988). For 
an example of its relevance for evolutionary theory, see Ramsey (2016). 
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imaginary species like the tarbutniks from Avital and Jablonka (2000). The individuals of 
this species have completely identical and non-changing genetic make-up. In other words, 
it is a species without genetic variation among the individuals. However, let us assume that 
they can differ in their behavior, i.e. that there is still phenotypic variation. Let us then 
imagine that some individuals forage fruits to supplement their diet, while others obtain 
their nutrients from only eating grass. This then leads to the fruit-foraging individuals 
having a more energy-rich diet, which increases their reproductive output. Let us further 
imagine that the fruit foraging techniques are passed on vertically through parental 
guidance (i.e., learning) and that the transmission of this behavior from parent to offspring 
enjoys a high level of fidelity. If we view natural selection as a process that sorts genetic 
variation, then there is no response to selection in this scenario. However, this seems 
wrong. Surely, natural selection still acts on the individuals that forage fruit to supplement 
their diet if this increases their reproductive output. Thus, there is a response to selection in 
the population—the number of fruit-foraging individuals increases and fruit-foraging 
behavior spreads throughout the population.  
 While in this thought experiment natural selection does not lead to biological 
evolution (in the sense that the gene frequencies in the population remain unchanged), 
natural selection has still occurred. And while it might be true that for natural selection to 
bring about adaptive biological evolution there must selection amongst different genetic 
variants in a population, there is still natural selection amongst the phenotypes of our 
imagined population. The strength and direction of the selection for the fruit foraging 
behavior is dependent on the fidelity and transience of the behavioral inheritance system.  
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Even though there are no organisms like the tarbutniks in the real world and we do 
not know exactly to what extent difference in behavior and capacity for learning is linked 
to and/or governed by genetic variation in a population, the point about the natural 
selection being an ecological process still stands. Natural selection is not directly sensitive 
to what causes the phenotypic variation available for selection to act on, just the outcome 
of different interactions between phenotypes and their environments. This is an important 
consideration for both biologists and philosophers taking a more organism-centered 
approach. These argue that organisms are not merely passive objects of selection, but 
active subjects—or agents—in their own evolution (e.g., Lewontin 1983; Odling-Smee 
2003; Bateson 2004). Let us now turn to these organism-centered views, and in particular 
two processes where the activities of organisms play an important part in shaping 
evolutionary dynamics—the Baldwin effect and niche construction.  
 
3. Organisms as Agents in Evolutionary Theory. Over the course of the last decades 
there has been an increasing tension in evolutionary biology, culminating in an overarching 
debate surrounding whether an extended evolutionary synthesis is needed (Müller and 
Pigliucci 2010, Laland et al. 2014; Wray et al. 2014). A central part of this debate concerns 
the role that behavior, and organismic activity more generally, has on evolutionary 
dynamics. The question of how the activities and behaviors of organisms can alter the 
action of natural selection has a long history. It could, arguably, be said to date all the way 
back to Lamarck (Avital and Jablonka 2000). Alternatively, we can trace it back to the 
introduction of organic selection (also called the Baldwin effect) in the late 19th century 
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(Baldwin 1896a, 1896b; Morgan 1896; Osborn 1896). Organic selection refers to an 
evolutionary process that can turn acquired characters into congenital ones. More 
precisely, it refers to a three-step process; first, organisms can through their interactions 
with the environment systematically produce behavioral, morphological, or physiological 
modifications that are not hereditary, but increase the fitness of the organism that acquires 
them. Second, there is genetic variation in the population producing hereditary characters 
similar to characters that are acquired by the organisms through their environmental 
interactions. Third, this genetic variation is acted on by natural selection and subsequently 
spread in the population over the course of generations. The character was initially 
individually acquired, but is in time turned into a hereditary character (Simpson 1953). 
This process has recently garnered more attention in evolutionary biology. In the works of 
the late Patrick Bateson (2004, 2017a, 2017b; Bateson and Gluckman 2011) this process is 
revisited in light of what we have learned about social learning, transmission and non-
genetic systems of inheritance over the last decades. Bateson refers to the Baldwin effect 
as the adaptability driver (Bateson 2017a). By this he means that, more often than what we 
initially may have thought, behavioral plasticity (behavior which is the result of stimuli or 
interactions with the environment, and not determined by genetic factors) is actually 
crucial in initiating adaptive responses to environmental challenges.2  
 
2 A more general rendition of this view, where not only behavioral but also morphological 
and physiological acquired characters are what initiates evolutionary change, is referred to 
as ‘plasticity-first evolution’ (e.g. Levis and Pfennig 2016).  
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Another example of organismic activity altering evolutionary dynamics can be seen 
in niche construction theory (Odling-Smee 2003). Niche construction refers to cases where 
organisms modify selection pressures by actively altering their environment or their 
relationship to it. The paradigmatic example being the beaver, which significantly alters 
the local environment by building a dam, and consequently altering the selective 
environment it experiences. Both the Baldwin effect and niche construction are central 
elements in the discussion of an extended evolutionary synthesis. The argument for an 
extended synthesis from niche construction theory is that viewing organisms as merely 
passive objects that are filtered by natural selection neglects the active role of the organism 
in its evolution (Odling-Smee 2003). They see niche construction as an evolutionary 
process whereby the activities of organisms counter or direct the action of natural 
selection. Consequently, they argue that niche construction should be seen as a potentially 
equally important evolutionary process as natural selection itself. The same is often said of 
the Baldwin effect. It constitutes a corollary process of selection (viz. organic selection) 
and is often considered to be an evolutionary mechanism or process (Bateson 2017a, 
2017b).  
According to the adherents of an extended evolutionary synthesis, we need to pay more 
attention to the neglected process of niche construction, organic selection and other 
processes where organisms play an active role in evolution. Allowing more processes to be 
considered evolutionary processes is one way we can do this (Scott-Phillips et al. 2014; 
Laland 2015). However, this solution has been met with some skepticism (e.g. Welch 
2017; Scott-Phillips et al. 2014), as it is unclear whether granting something the status of 
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -11-
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an evolutionary process actually increases our understanding of evolution. Another 
problem with viewing niche construction as an evolutionary process that counteracts 
natural selection is that it still treats natural selection as an asymmetrically externalist 
environmental process. If niche construction “counteracts” the action of selection, 
selection must be a process that runs from the environment to the organism. Instead, we 
should start from an ecological metaphysics of evolution (Walsh 2015). 
 
4. An Ecological Metaphysics of Evolution and Organism-Environment Interactions. 
When Walsh (2015) calls for an ecological metaphysics of evolution, he highlights that we 
might have missed a lot in our understanding of evolution by not seeing organisms as 
active (and purposive) agents in their environments. Treating organisms as biological 
agents prior to evolutionary agents is a necessary step in the direction of an ecological 
metaphysics (Walsh 2015). Biological entities are entities that interact with their 
environment. The relationship between the organism and the environment is crucial and in 
a sense prior to both the organism and environment themselves. Without any organisms 
there would be no environments, and conversely, without environments there would be no 
organisms (Lewontin 2000). From an ecological metaphysics of evolution, then, the 
fundamental unit is that of organism-environment interactions. Evolution concerns changes 
in the types of interactions there are. Mostly these interactions change in virtue of changes 
to the organism itself, for example by organism evolving faculties with which they interact 
with their environment in novel ways. Such kinds of changes to organism-environment 
interaction are captured by the theoretical framework offered by the modern synthesis. 
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However, an environment can also change in such a way that organism-environment 
interactions change as a result, and more importantly, an organism can change the 
environment or its relationship to it such that the organism-environment interactions 
change (i.e., niche construction).  
 Natural selection, then, is the process whereby organism-environment interactions 
are preferentially selected. It is concerned with the outcomes of organism-environment 
interactions over the life-history of an organism (or at least to the end of its reproductive 
age) relative to those of its population. The strength of and response to selection is 
determined by the probability that advantageous interactions reoccur in subsequent 
generations. Consequently, advantageous hereditary traits (traits that are passed on through 
genetic inheritance) are more likely to spread than acquired traits whose likelihood of 
reoccurrence is lower. But it is in principle possible for selection to act on advantageous 
organism-environment interactions that are acquired (e.g., as a result of niche construction 
or behavioral plasticity).  
Take, for instance, gastrolith usage. Gastroliths are small stones that are ingested 
and then reside in the gastrointestinal tract of some animals. Carrying gastroliths is 
certainly an example of an acquired trait, as it is something the animal has to acquire from 
its environment to utilize. Usage of gastroliths is quite common among some groups of 
vertebrates and may serve a wide variety of different functions in relation to different 
environments (Wings 2007). For example, some have argued that in aquatic environments 
gastroliths might be used as ballast or for buoyancy control (Rondeau et al. 2005). While in 
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 13 
terrestrial environments some have argued that gastroliths may supply minerals and help 
with trituration and mixing of foodstuffs (Wings 2007).  
If, for instance, an organism enjoys a higher fitness relative to other members of its 
population as a result of having ingested gastroliths, natural selection will favor that 
individual. Further, let us say that this organism learnt to ingest gastroliths by observing its 
parents and continue the habit of ingesting such stones. If in the subsequent generations 
gastrolith ingestion is reliably transmitted through observational learning, and the fitness 
advantage is sufficiently high, natural selection could spread this trait throughout the 
population. Natural selection could also favor those who have a disposition for ingesting 
gastroliths, with or without observational learning, making it an acquired trait with a 
hereditary basis (which is an example of the Baldwin effect). For natural selection, 
however, the basis on which the gastrolith is ingested—be it by way of learning or 
instinct—is irrelevant as long as the stone is ingested. It is the outcome of the interaction—
e.g., the improved trituration of foodstuffs—which is conducive to the fitness advantage, 
not whether or not it is learnt or instinctual, as long as the stone is reliably ingested.3 More 
generally, we could say that the primary way in which genes matter for selection is in how 
conducive they are to the reliability and likelihood of advantageous organism-environment 
 
3 Of course, if all members of a population ingest gastroliths, and some do it instinctually 
while others need to learn it through observation, natural selection will most likely favor 
the instinctual response because the trait itself (i.e., gastrolith ingestion) is presumably 
transmitted with a higher fidelity if it is congenital rather than learned. 
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interactions to reoccur in subsequent generations. Taking this perspective on how natural 
selection acts, let us return to how we should interpret niche construction and the Baldwin 
effect. Are they different selective processes, as it is commonly argued?  
 
5. Niche Construction and the Baldwin Effect Revisited. Both niche construction and 
the Baldwin effect have been seen as distinct evolutionary mechanisms or processes (e.g., 
Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Bateson 2017a, 2017b). Some even go as far as saying that they 
are different selective processes, as when niche construction is interpreted as a process 
where organisms counteract natural selection by modifying selection pressures (Laland 
2015). The Baldwin effect is seen as a distinct selective process which operates on 
acquired traits until there is genetic variation present so natural selection can “take over” 
and consequently turn them into congenital traits.  
 I think these interpretations are misguided, and stem from viewing natural selection 
as a process of environmental filtration concerned with primarily with genes, i.e., from a 
“molecular” metaphysics of evolution. If we instead take the point of view introduced 
above, where natural selection is concerned with the outcomes of organism-environment 
interactions and their relative reoccurrence, niche construction and the Baldwin effect are 
ways in which adaptation can occur and consequently be selected for. Niche construction 
is one way in which an organism can achieve a fitness advantage relative to other members 
of its population, but it is not a process that is counteracting the effects of natural selection. 
As long as the niche constructing behavior reoccurs reliably and the altered ecological 
conditions are reliably transmitted across generations it is no different from any other 
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phenotypic trait in relation to natural selection. Acquired traits, and the Baldwin effect 
more generally, are also not selected initially by a process distinct from natural selection 
(i.e., organic selection). They are selected for by natural selection from their first 
occurrence, it is just a shift in the system of inheritance that is responsible for the 
reoccurrence of the trait. Sometimes, it makes sense to say that an acquired trait has 
become a congenital trait, as for instance when a learnt behavior has become instinctual. 
However, in the case discussed above, the ingestion of gastroliths, it is unclear if it can 
ever fully be a congenital trait, as the key feature of having that trait is to acquire a suitable 
rock from the environment (though the disposition can certainly be congenital). 
 Natural selection understood as a process acting on the outcome of reoccurring 
organism-environment interactions has the benefit of being compatible with the main 
insights of the modern synthesis, while also allowing for other cases to be included as 
ways in which organism-environment interactions can change and be acted on by selection, 
such as niche construction and the Baldwin effect. It explains why the genetic system of 
inheritance is so important—because it is a system which is necessary for the development 
of (most, if not all) phenotypes, and consequently for there to be any organism-
environment interactions at all. While simultaneously explaining how certain behavioral 
innovations, cultural traits, etc. can be selected for by natural selection, without being 
(directly) dependent on genetic variation or inheritance.  
  
6. Conclusion. I have argued that natural selection is standardly understood as a process of 
environmental filtration concerned primarily with genes. Further, I followed Walsh (2015) 
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in arguing that this stems from a gene-centered and externalist (“molecular”) metaphysics 
of evolution. If we instead opt for an ecological metaphysics of evolution our 
understanding of natural selection becomes different. On such a metaphysics of evolution, 
natural selection becomes a process that acts on the outcomes of the advantageous 
interactions an organism has with its environment during its life-history. As long as such 
interactions reoccur reliably in subsequent generations, natural selection will be insensitive 
as to what brings about these interactions, be it through genetic inheritance, social learning, 
cultural transmission, etc. A benefit of this view is that the ecological account of natural 
selection is compatible with the main insights from the modern synthesis, while also 
allowing for phenomena traditionally excluded from the modern synthesis, but emphasized 
by the extended evolutionary synthesis. Finally, the ecological view of natural selection 
can integrate some of these novel phenomena easily, without having to supplement and 
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of oppressed groups, or states of affairs that exclude or denigrate members of oppressed 
groups. Tere appears to be a consensus that microaggressions are “subjective,” both 
among the concept’s scientifc proponents, such as Derald Wing Sue, and its critics, 
such as Scott O. Lilienfeld. Presumably, the claim that microaggressions are “subjective” 
means that there is no perspective-independent matter of fact regarding whether an act 
or state of affairs is a microaggression. Tat is, whether an act or state of affairs counts 
as a microaggression depends upon how it is perceived by some subject. We disagree 
with this consensus, distinguishing between “explanatory” and “hermeneutical” 
microaggression  concepts. We argue that there is no a priori reason to regard 
explanatory microaggressions as “subjective,” and that there are compelling 
phenomenological reasons to regard hermeneutical microaggressions as objective. 
2. Microaggressions and their effects. Te term “microaggression” was coined by 
African American psychiatrist Chester Pierce (1970) as a label for subtle forms of 
hostility or disdain commonly exhibited by White Americans against African 
Americans. Te term was subsequently amplifed by psychologist Derald Wing Sue and 
colleagues (Sue et al. 2007), who generalized the concept to encompass many subtle 
forms of racism. Teir of quoted gloss is that: 
Racial microaggressions are brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and 
environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate 
hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person or group. 
(Sue et al. 2007, 273) 
Te term is now understood broadly, both in critical theory and in psychology, as 
including not only racial slights, but also those related to gender (Capodilupo et al. 
2010; Barthelemy et al. 2016), LGBTQ oppression (Nadal, Rivera, et al. 2010), disability 
(Keller and Galgay 2010; Gonzalez et al. 2015), socioeconomic status (Smith and 
Redington 2010), religion (Nadal, Issa, et al. 2010), or indeed any form of structural 
oppression (Sue 2010c), including intersectional forms of oppression (q.v. Crenshaw 
1989; Nadal et al. 2015; Olkin et al. 2019). A person or social group that is demeaned or 
alienated by a microaggression is called a target. For microaggressions that are acts, the 
agent of the microaggression is generally called a perpetrator or performer. 
A commonly-cited example of a verbal microaggression (e.g. in Sue 2010a;
Lilienfeld 2017) is a remark made by John McCain during his 2008 presidential
campaign against Barack Obama. A woman at a town hall event said to McCain that
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3MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
she doesn’t trust Obama because “He’s an Arab.” McCain replied, “No ma’am. He’s a
decent family man, citizen, that I just happen to have disagreements with on 
fundamental issues… He’s not.” McCain’s reply carries the unfortunate (and probably
unintentional) conversational implicature that being of Arab descent counts in some
way against being “a decent family man” or a “citizen.” As such, it is an ethnic
microaggression. Many microaggressions carry such implicatures, which are referred
to in the microaggression literature as hidden messages (Sue et al. 2007). One of the
challenges for researchers who generalize the microaggression concept to new
domains of oppression is the identifcation of the relevant hidden messages (Johnston
and Nadal 2010). Microaggressions can also be nonverbal acts, e.g. tightly clutching
one’s purse or crossing the street when encountering a Black man. And
microaggressions can be states of affairs, such as the persistence of a problematic
monument. Sue and colleagues (2007) call these latter states of affairs environmental
microaggressions.
Some (e.g. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt and other critics of “campus
culture”) suggest that the proper response to microaggressions is to toughen up or
“grow a thicker skin.” As Regina Rini notes, this may be an appropriate response to mere
insults but it is an insufficient response to microaggressions because microaggressions 
are components of larger patterns of systematic oppression (2018). Te targets of
microaggressions are necessarily oppressed groups or their members. Of course slights
can target privileged social groups or their members (e.g. “White people can’t dance”),
but such slights are not called “microaggressions” because they are not likely to have
the same negative effects.1 Te relevant difference between microaggressions and other
slights is that microaggressions are congruent with oppressive systems, in Liao and
Huebner’s (2020, 10) sense, and therefore are smaller extensions of larger power
structures. Slights that target privileged social groups go against the grain of oppressive
social systems rather than being congruent with them.
Rini’s reply is underappreciated in many skeptical discussions of microaggressions,
including Lilienfeld’s (2017), which raises doubts about whether the acts called
microaggressions are always performed with malicious motivations. Performers’
motivations may be relevant for assigning blame (see Washington and Kelly 2016 for 
1 We recognize standard provisos here: individual persons can be members both of oppressed 
and privileged social groups; e.g. a wealthy queer person may experience structural disadvantage
related to their queerness but privilege related to their socioeconomic class. And oppression
ofen compounds in a non-additive manner for those who are members of multiple oppressed
social groups, e.g. Black women in the U.S. experience specifc challenges faced neither by Black
men nor by White women (Crenshaw 1989).
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4 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
discussion), but not for understanding the effects of microaggressions on their targets. 
Much of the psychological literature on microaggressions should be understood as part
of what Nyla Branscombe and colleagues call the “psychology of the historically
disenfranchised” (1999, 135, 146): empirical investigations that focus on the psychology 
of oppressed social groups rather than, like much of the implicit bias literature, the 
mental states of those who are privileged.
And it is hypothesized that the aggregate effect of microaggressions—perceived or 
otherwise—on their targets is signifcant, and not only because they cause gratuitous
pain or discomfort. Perceived discrimination regarding race, gender, and sexual
orientation predicts psychological and somatic health outcomes (Mays et al. 2007;
Carter 2007; Herek 2009). Racial gaps in health outcomes in the U.S. are not fully
explained by differences in socioeconomic status or self-esteem (Gee et al. 2007a,
2007b). Plausibly, microaggressions play a role in explaining these recalcitrant health
gaps, and many discussions of microaggressions are motivated by appeal to various 
outcome gaps (in health, academic or professional achievement, etc.). Te detailed
mechanism by which microaggressions contribute to such outcome gaps is not known
(Okazaki 2009; Torres et al. 2010), but stress seems to be a mediating factor (Harrell 
and Taliaferro 2003), complicated by in-group identifcation, which seems to have a
protective effect (Crocker and Major 1989; Branscombe et al. 1999). Te scientifc
situation is made more complicated by the multiplicity of experimental protocols 
(Sullivan 2009): since microaggression incidence is measured in a variety of ways, 
experimental inference about microaggressions is complicated in ways that are played 
down in published literature. And in some discussions, “microaggression” may
function as a catchall term referring to any manifestations of structural oppression that
are relatively difficult to measure independently.
So in the interest of promoting a little more clarity, we distinguish two
microaggression concepts. Te explanatory microaggression concept refers,
ex hypothesi, to some factor that explains recalcitrant gaps in desirable outcomes (e.g.
good health, professional success) between members of privileged and oppressed social
groups, such as those that remain afer other factors like wealth, income, and legal
discrimination are accounted for. Microaggressions in this sense may turn out to be a 
variety of diverse factors (they may be “lumpy”; see Feest 2020); we will not know
exactly what they look like until we have a more sophisticated causal understanding of
recalcitrant outcome gaps. But the term “microaggression” functions in some discourse
as a more determinate label for concrete experiences of slights and invalidations. So, let 
the hermeneutical microaggression concept be what is invoked in such contexts.
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5MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
Te hermeneutical microaggression concept is a hermeneutical resource (Fricker 
2007) that helps people to make sense of their lived experiences, and the popularity of
the microaggression concept outside of the behavioral and social sciences is 
probably largely due to its hermeneutical role. It is an open empirical question whether
the explanatory and hermeneutical microaggression concepts are largely
coextensive.
3. Two senses of “subjective.” So are microaggressions objective? Te answer 
depends on whether we are talking about explanatory or hermeneutical
microaggressions. But clarifcation is also in order regarding the terms “objective” and 
“subjective.” Philosophers tend to reserve the term “subjective” for propositions whose
truth values vary according to a perspective (MacFarlane 2014: a “context of 
assessment”). For example, a dress may look blue and black to me, and may look white
and gold (i.e. not-blue-and-black) to you. Tere is a perspective-independent fact about 
what color the dress is, but no such fact about how the dress looks; it looks different to
different people. Let us call such claims alethically subjective, and claims that have
perspective-independent truth values can be called alethically objective.
By contrast, in common parlance a claim is ofen said to be “subjective” if
reasonable people disagree about its truth value, even if the claim has a perspective-
independent truth value. We may call claims that are controversial in this manner
discursively subjective. Te claim that Shakespeare’s works were written by William
Shakespeare is discursively subjective—some folks believe the plays and poems were
written by someone else. But there is a perspective-independent fact of the matter about 
who wrote Shakespeare’s works, so the claim is not alethically subjective.2 Both alethic
and discursive subjectivity are properties of claims rather than concepts or words, but
for ease of expression we will talk about “microaggressions” as subjective or objective,
meaning that classifying an act or state of affairs as a microaggression is subjective or
objective.
Now, obviously claims about microaggressions can be discursively subjective— 
there is ofen disagreement about whether a particular act or state of affairs is a
microaggression. Nevertheless, it is commonly held that microaggressions are also
alethically subjective. Lilienfeld criticizes the microaggression concept on the grounds
2 Another sense of “objectivity” relevant to science is independence from values or normative
commitments, but most microaggressions research is plausibly not objective in this sense since
it presupposes a normative theory of justice and structural oppression. However, discussion of
the value-free ideal in the social sciences is beyond the scope of our argument.
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6 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
that microaggressions are thought to be “necessarily in the eye of the beholder” (2017,
143), and Sue claims that “Microaggressions are about experiential reality” (2017, 171). 
Lilienfeld regards the subjectivity of microaggressions as a source of confusion:
If Minority Group Member A interprets an ambiguous statement directed toward her 
[…] as patronizing or indirectly hostile, whereas Minority Group Member B interprets 
it as supportive or helpful, should it be classifed as a microaggression? Te
[microaggressions] literature offers scant guidance in this regard. (Lilienfeld 2017, 143)
Generally speaking, that a claim is discursively subjective does not imply that it is 
alethically subjective (e.g. the Shakespeare case above is discursively subjective but not
alethically subjective). So even if there is reasonable disagreement about whether a
particular act or state of affairs is a microaggression, that does not imply that the
microaggression is alethically subjective.
Lilienfeld continues:
it is unclear whether any verbal or nonverbal action that a certain proportion of
minority individuals perceive as upsetting or offensive would constitute a
microaggression. Nor is it apparent what level of agreement among minority group
members would be needed to regard a given act as a microaggression. (Lilienfeld 2017,
143)
Such questions are unmotivated. No serious proponent of the microaggression
concept holds that poll results should determine which acts are microaggressions.
While “focus groups” and similar methods are sometimes used to determine which
kinds of acts should be regarded as microaggressions (e.g. the use of Consensual 
Qualitative Research methods in Nadal et al. 2015), researchers do not assume that
intersubjective agreement among participants is a criterion for being a microaggression. 
Rather, “focus group” methods are generally employed as techniques for discovering
new varieties of microaggression while minimizing the role of researcher biases (see e.g.
Nadal et al. 2015, 150–151).
Furthermore, as we argue below, there is no a priori reason to regard
microaggressions as alethically subjective. Regarding explanatory microaggressions, it
is an open empirical question whether outcome gaps are explained by perceived
microaggressions or by microaggressions regardless of how they are perceived by their
targets (i.e. microaggressions ascribed according to an alethically subjective or objective
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -28-
    
       
   
    
 
            
             
        
           
         
           
            
               
                
  
          
           
            
           
       
        
           
 
         
           
         
       
          
  
               
         
       
             
        
           
             
7MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
criterion), or by some other factor. Regarding hermeneutical microaggressions, the
concept fails to serve as an adequate hermeneutical resource unless microaggressions
are regarded as objective.
4. Explanatory microaggressions: measures and constructs. Lilienfeld
observes that most microaggression studies rely on self-report measures, and takes this
to be a consequence of the fact that microaggressions are alethically subjective (2017,
151). For example, many studies of microaggressions against African Americans use an
instrument called the Daily Life Experiences (DLE) scale (e.g. Scott 2003; Seaton et al.
2009; Torres et al. 2010), developed by Jules Harrell. Te instrument consists of 17–20
items describing discriminatory experiences, such as “overhearing or being told an
offensive joke” or “being lef out of conversations or activities” (from Seaton et al.). 
Study participants rate how ofen they have each kind of experience on a scale from
“never in the past year” to “once a week or more.” Teir responses are analyzed (in
various ways, depending on the study) to obtain a quantity representing how ofen 
participants experience racial microaggressions. Te DLE scale is a so-called “self-
report” or “subjective” measure, since study participants more or less transparently
report information in which experimenters are interested for its own sake (in contrast 
to behavioral measures or other indirect measures). Self-report measures are common
in psychological research on “subjective” constructs like subjective well-being
(Alexandrova 2008) or conscious visual experience (Boone 2013), where a “construct”
in psychology is a theoretical term whose quantity can be measured (Stone 2019, 1250
n2).
However, the connection between subjective constructs and so-called “subjective
measures” is not straightforward. An experimental measure will generally differ from
its associated construct in various ways. For example, a Stroop test may be administered
as a measure of cognitive depletion (as in e.g. Richeson and Trawalter 2005). But Stroop
performance is a temporal measure (a relative delay, measured in milliseconds) whereas
cognitive depletion is theoretically something more abstract: it may manifest as a 
temporal delay or as poorer performance or in various other ways. So here a temporal
measure is used to approximate, for the purposes of experimental analysis, the quantity
of a more abstract construct of interest (cognitive depletion).
More to the current point, self-report measures may be used to gather information
about constructs whose values are alethically objective. Consider, for example, the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), a graded measure of visual awareness (Ramsøy and
Overgaard 2004). Study participants are briefy shown an image (ofen for less than 250
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8 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
ms) and asked to classify their visual experience as “Clear Image,” “Almost Clear Image,” 
Weak Glimpse,” or “Not Seen.” One may think that this is a subjective measure for a 
subjective construct, since visual experience is ofen said to be “subjective,” but alethic
subjectivity is a property of claims so we must be precise about what claim is at issue.
Visual experience is subjective in that the content of two visual experiences may differ
for various judges (or one judge at different times) although those experiences are of
the same object in the same conditions. We ofen characterize the contents of such
experiences using clauses with “seem” or “look” as the main verb, and such clauses are
alethically subjective. A dress may look blue to Ali and at the same time look white (i.e.
not-blue) to Leah; the truth value of an utterance like “Tis dress looks blue” may vary
depending on the judge. But the PAS does not measure what the content of a visual
experience is; the PAS measures whether a visual experience of a stimulus occurred for 
a particular observer, and how clear that experience was. Tis is an alethically objective 
state of affairs. Te truth value of “Ali had a clear visual experience of the stimulus” does
not vary according to who evaluates it. If Ali and Leah disagree about the truth of such 
a sentence, then one of them must be wrong (and it’s probably not Ali).
Similarly, instruments like the DLE scale, which purport to reveal rates of
microaggression incidence in a participant’s life through self-report, may be fallible
measures of an alethically objective quantity. We say “may” because much extant
microaggression research does not distinguish clearly between alethically objective and
subjective interpretations of microaggression incidence. Instruments like the DLE scale
may be used either to measure the frequency of a participant’s exposure to demeaning
incidents (an alethically objective quantity), or to measure the participant’s perception
of how ofen she experiences demeaning incidents (an alethically subjective quantity).
Microaggressions in the explanatory sense are some factor that explains recalcitrant
gaps in desirable outcomes between members of privileged and oppressed social groups,
such as those that remain afer other factors like wealth, income, and legal
discrimination are accounted for. It is an open question whether this factor is (1) mere
exposure to demeaning incidents, regardless of how they are perceived by their targets,
or (2) the perception of one’s experiences as demeaning, or (3) something else. Tat is,
it is an open empirical question whether explanatory microaggressions are alethically
objective or subjective. Further empirical study is needed to assess the relative merits
of these hypotheses.
As a matter of verbal hygiene, it seems reasonable to us to treat explanatory
microaggressions as alethically objective, and then to examine whether outcome gaps
are caused by exposure to microaggressions per se or by the perception of events as
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9MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
microaggressions. By analogy, the standard for whether an act is a sexual assault is not
whether the survivor characterizes the act as “sexual assault” or even as harmful. But
the matter of which way to speak can only be settled by the community of speakers (in
this case, the community of social and behavioral scientists), not by fat, and it seems to
us that the matter has not yet been settled.
We wish to be clear that microaggression research employs a variety of methods 
that vary in quality and purpose; the DLE scale is only one instrument among many.
Our main objective here is not to conduct a methodological review (for which see e.g.
Okazaki 2009; Lau and Williams 2010; Wong et al. 2014), but to argue against a
tempting error. It is simplistic to identify a construct with its measure, and it is an error
to freely attribute the properties of a measure to its associated construct. So while it is
true that microaggression frequency is ofen measured using participant self-reports,
we should not infer from this fact that microaggression incidence is alethically
subjective. Existing measurement practices do not settle the question of whether 
microaggressions are “in the eye of the beholder.”
5. Hermeneutical microaggressions: phenomenological considerations. 
Whereas it is an open question whether explanatory microaggressions are alethically
subjective, there is compelling reason to regard hermeneutical microaggressions as
alethically objective. Our argument depends on the commonly reported
phenomenology of microaggression targets. Members of oppressed groups ofen report
experiencing confusion and uncertainty about whether an act directed toward them is
a subtle expression of prejudice, or whether it is no different than an act that would have 
been directed toward a privileged person. Tis feature of microaggressions is
sometimes called “attributional ambiguity” (Crocker and Major 1989). For example, a
woman might be addressed at work by her frst name (e.g. “Stephanie”) rather than by 
her title and surname (say, “Dr. Appiah”). In a context where either form of address is 
acceptable, and where the base rates are not known (i.e. it is not known how ofen
people in general, or people of various genders, are addressed by their frst names vs.
by their titles and surnames), it can be difficult to determine whether the address
expresses a slight.
Here is an argument that we should consider hermeneutical microaggressions to
be alethically objective. Supposing the contrary, that microaggressions are alethically
subjective, there are two possibilities. First, perhaps, as in many matters of taste, it is
appropriate to allow everyone their own perspective. So whoever feels the act of
addressing the woman by her frst name was a gendered slight regards it as a
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -31-
        
            
          
          
           
            
              
             
               
              
 
             
         
            
               
          
          
          
              
         
        
            
  
     
           
 
            
   
     
             
             
        
        
          
10 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
microaggression, and whoever feels the form of address was not infuenced by gender
does not regard it as a microaggression. If microaggressions are alethically subjective,
as we are currently supposing, then there is no perspective-independent fact of the
matter about whether this incident is a microaggression (as in predications of “is tasty”
or “looks blue-ish to me”). A second possibility is that people have their own
perspectives but the target’s perspective is decisive: the act is a microaggression if and
only if the addressed woman feels slighted. In both of these possibilities, it makes no
sense for the woman to wonder whether the act was really an expression of prejudice,
i.e. whether it was really a microaggression. On the frst option, there is no fact of the
matter about whether the act was a microaggression. On the second option, the matter
is decided by the woman’s own perspective, so her judgment settles the question.
However, people who experience relatively subtle microaggressions ofen report
wondering precisely about this. Indeed, it is ofen claimed (e.g. by Sue et al. 2007; Bartky 
1975; Du Bois 1903 and others) that much of the harm of microaggressions is caused
precisely by anxiety and paranoia regarding one’s inability to quickly and accurately
assess whether an act was indeed a microaggression. Only the objectivist view of 
microaggressions accounts for this phenomenology. If we seek hermeneutical justice,
we have reason to adopt concepts that make sense of rather than obscure common
experiences for members of oppressed social groups (Fricker 2007). So we should
regard microaggressions as objective, in that there are perspective-independent facts 
about whether particular acts or states of affairs are microaggressions in the
hermeneutical sense.
6. Conclusion. We argued, against the common view, that microaggressions should 
not be regarded as alethically subjective. For microaggressions in the hermeneutical
sense—considered as a category of items that help members of oppressed social groups 
to make sense of their lived experience—we argue that only an objectivist view
rationalizes the distress commonly experienced due to attributional ambiguity. For 
microggressions in the explanatory sense—considered as the causes of recalcitrant
outcome gaps—we acknowledge that it is an open question whether they are best
regarded as alethically objective or subjective. But we argued against a tempting view,
expressed by Lilienfeld and others, that self-report measures are especially suited for
measuring the value of theoretical constructs that are alethically subjective. People will
continue to question whether particular acts or states of affairs count as
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -32-
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microaggressions, and we contend that those questions have objectively accurate 
responses.
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It is often presumed that empirical considerations provide epistemic objectivity for claims 
about the boundaries and classification of scientific categories. This has seemed especially 
plausible in chemistry. Focusing on the category chemical element, we describe two 20th 
century developments that undermine epistemic objectivism about it. But our second thesis is 
that, in practice, this shortfall is bridged by relying on a little-recognized species of pragmatic 
norm: classificatory norms. We contend this precludes the objectivity, yet ironically affords 
the rationality, of related category and classification claims. 
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1.   Introduction.  
How in practice do scientists determine where to draw category boundaries?  
Compared to many of the questions that philosophers ask about scientific categories and 
classification, that one gets little attention. It is more epistemic (or methodological) than, say, 
widely-discussed metaphysical questions about scientific categories. We are interested in it 
partly because we think addressing it with a focus on scientific practice bodes ill for a range of 
objectivist metaphysical positions. But the epistemic question is interesting for other reasons 
too, and here we’ll restrict our focus to it, and the challenges it presents to a typically 
unexamined epistemic objectivism about scientific categories and classification. 
We focus on practice in chemistry, a domain often regarded as a bastion of classificatory 
objectivity1—in particular, on how views about the category chemical element were (and were 
not) defended during two 20th century episodes. This will allow us to argue for an epistemic 
anti-objectivism that is surprising partly because it still allows for proposals about category 
                                                   
1 Famous examples outside philosophy of chemistry include Putnam and Kripke (Putnam 
1975; Kripke 1980); within present philosophy of chemistry, Scerri is a well-known 
objectivist about chemical element. Note such popular objectivisms are compatible with 
conventionalisms about the Periodic Table of Elements, which have become wide-spread 
(Scerri 2007, 277–78). 
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boundaries to be more or less rational in virtue of the operation of classificatory norms that 
we’ll uncover and describe.   
More specifically, we’ll argue for two theses. First: 
Short-Fall: sometimes, empirical considerations alone fall short of stance-independently 
justifying theories about which conditions are the constitutive ones for a scientific 
category.2  
Our second thesis is related: 
Bridging-By-Norms: in some cases of classificatory short-fall, scientists bridge the 
epistemic gap by relying on classificatory norms.3 
                                                   
2 Philosophers of science have long discussed the extents to which empirical considerations 
leave theory choice undetermined. But there has been scant attention in this literature to 
theories about category constitution in particular, which differ in various ways from the 
theories usually investigated.  
3 A typical classificatory norm is a pattern of classificatory behavior or belief that stems from 
some people preferring, implicitly or explicitly, to behave or believe in such-and-such a way 
under certain conditions. (See Bicchieri (2017) for such a view of norms.) Consequently, 
classificatory norms differ from extra-empirical virtues, which are more like favored 
properties of theories. Unlike extra-empirical virtues, specifically classificatory norms have 
received scant notice or investigation.  
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In addition to arguing for those two theses, we will briefly remark on the prospect for 
reasonable appeals to classificatory norms that allow for some proposed category boundaries 
(and some related classificatory claims) to be more rational than others. But prior to arguing 
for our theses, let us clarify them.  
 
2.   Clarifications of Short-Fall and Bridging-By-Norms Theses. 
By ‘empirical considerations’ we include appeals to observational data, and to theories that are 
widely deemed highly confirmed.  
Regarding a category’s constitutive conditions, we mean those conditions in virtue of 
which (in usual circumstances) a thing satisfying them belongs to that category.4 Some 
metaphysical objectivisms imply that for many scientific categories, which conditions are 
constitutive of belonging is an objective matter. The epistemic objectivism more relevant here 
is about the supposed justifications of theories about constitutive conditions of categories. It 
says that in some and perhaps many cases, the considerations advanced in support of the 
theory suffice to objectively justify the truth of its proposals about which conditions are 
constitutive. We will presume such considerations objectively justify a theory about 
                                                   
4 Using our terminology, the category chemical element is supposed to be a piece of the world 
that science attempts to track with the concept CHEMICAL ELEMENT. 
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constitutive conditions only if the favoring they provide the theory is independent of our mere 
mental stances towards those considerations.  
One can fail to meet that necessary condition on objective justification in obvious ways, 
such as via wishful thinking, where one wants certain considerations to favor the truth of a 
particular theory about category constitution, while having little or no evidence or reason to 
complement that desire. In our chemical cases, wishful thinking isn’t an issue. Something 
much less obvious is going on. Chemists are, perhaps very rationally, relying on widespread 
implicit norms in order to support their theories about the constitutive conditions of chemical 
element. To the extent that relying on such norms involves relying on various mental stances 
of peers within a scientific community (see Bicchieri 2017), it precludes the objectivity of 
justification in question.  
 
3.   Lumpers vs. Splitters, ~1910–1920s. 
The first of the two 20th century episodes we investigate played out in publications and 
meetings from about 1910 into the 1920s, in the wake of emerging details about atomic 
structure. There was a dispute about, roughly, whether and in what way the discovery of 
isotopy should revise Mendeleev’s 19th century view that each place in the Periodic Table 
represents exactly one distinct chemical element. By 1910 that view was widespread, despite 
questions remaining about the exact sequences of elements within the Table (Scerri 2007). We 
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can understand those who then took isotopy to then challenge Mendeleev’s view as splitters, 
and those who defended it as lumpers.  
To see this, consider some context and details. Frederick Soddy is often credited with 
discovering isotopy.5 He first proposed the idea in 1911 and introduced the term ‘isotope’ to 
chemistry in 1913.6 He did not describe isotopy in terms of protons or neutrons, because 
neither had been discovered yet. He based his proposal largely on investigations of decay 
chains that indicated more than 30 different species of element, called “radioelements”, over a 
stretch of the Periodic Table where just 11 elements were so far acknowledged (Choppin et al. 
2013). Each of these radioelements was then said to be an isotope, with “mesothorium” and 
“thorium X” as examples (Scerri 2007, 177). Nowadays we regard each of these as isotopes of 
radium—as mere variants of that element. But when Soddy proposed the existence of isotopes, 
some researchers, especially the radiochemist and discoverer of protactinium Kazimierz 
Fajans, urged that each isotope was its own chemical element (Scerri 2000). Researchers like 
Fajans were thus splitters in the sense that they saw some places in the Periodic Table as 
subsuming or splitting into multiple elements rather than representing just one element each. 
Those who resisted this while nonetheless granting the existence of isotopes, e.g., those who 
                                                   
5 Others are recognized as anticipating aspects of it, including William Crookes as early as 
1886 (Scerri 2007, 176). 
6 As Scerri notes (2007, 312), Soddy got the term from Margaret Todd.  
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grouped isotopes such as “thorium X” and “mesothorium” together as mere varieties of one 
element, can be understood as lumpers. 
An implication is that splitters and lumpers were operating with incompatible theories 
about the constitutive conditions of the category chemical element. It is difficult to pin down 
these theories because they were in flux and usually implicit rather than explicit throughout 
the period of opposition. But we can get far enough to see how the theories support our Short-
Fall thesis.  
What made for the differences between places in the Periodic Table? More than 30 years 
earlier, Mendeleev had thought the answer was a mix of differing atomic weights and 
chemical properties. But by 1910, physicists were using electron scattering experiments to 
investigate the structure of chemical constituents. Subsequently, as Scerri helpfully recounts 
(2007), over the course of the next 13 years several researchers—including Rutherford, 
Barkla, van den Broek, Moseley, and Chadwick—used and developed this and related work to 
motivate a shift, from understanding chemical element identity in terms of atomic weights and 
chemical properties, to understanding it in terms of atomic number equated with (an early 
notion of) positive nuclear charge. In making that idea explicit in its 1923 definition of 
‘chemical element’ (Aston et al. 1923), the IUPAC was stating a view that had been implicitly 
held by many chemists since the work of van den Broek and Moseley 10 years earlier.   
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Summarizing these developments, we can say that between 19137 and 1923 lumpers widely 
recognized the following theory of the constitution of the chemical element category: 
Positive Charge Theory: 
Any thing is a chemical element if and only if: 
(a)   it is a category, a species, of atom,8 and 
(b)   all atoms of this species have the same atomic number, which = nuclear positive 
charge, and 
(c)   only atoms of this species have that atomic number. 
Splitters such as Fajans rejected this when urging that isotopes of the same atomic number are 
each distinct elements in their own right, which effectively denied part (c) of what we’ve 
termed the Positive Charge Theory. 
                                                   
7 This year for the theory rather than 1910 because it wasn’t until 1913 that van den Broek had 
finished disconnecting the identity of atomic number from atomic weight in favor of atomic 
charge. 
8 Although part (a) of the definition now seems unremarkable, there are complications (Scerri 
2000), which were influentially discussed by Paneth (e.g., Paneth 1962a; 1962b). Although 
splitters sometimes appeal to these complications, their position didn’t require them and we’ll 
set them aside here. 
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In light of this opposition, recall our Short-Fall thesis. It says that sometimes empirical 
considerations alone fall short of stance-independently justifying theories about which 
conditions are the constitutive ones for a scientific category. We’ll now argue this was the case 
in the opposition between lumpers who supported the Positive Charge Theory and splitters 
who rejected it. 
Empirical results were certainly relevant. A rapid succession of detected differences 
between radioelement isotopes in decay studies, for example, fueled dispute (Scerri 2007). 
However, no such empirical findings, on their own, stance-independently justified either 
accepting or rejecting (c). This may sound odd, given that by the 1930s virtually all chemists 
were lumpers and today you would earn incredulous stares if you proposed that isotopes of the 
same atomic number are distinct chemical elements. But this paradigm example of 
classificatory consensus owes in part, we submit, to widespread implicit agreement on 
classificatory norms—not just to impressive empirical findings.  
To appreciate this, consider how splitters dug in their heels even when lumpers generated 
impressive empirical results that seemed to favour lumping. One set of such results were 
negative—the inability, despite repeated attempts, to chemically distinguish the isotopes that 
were being discovered (Scerri 2007, 177). Another set were positive—showing extensive 
chemical similarities between isotopes of shared atomic number. As just one example, Fritz 
Paneth and György von Hevesy reported on electrochemical experiments in 1914 that 
“observed voltage was found to be constant, regardless of the proportion of the two isotopes 
[of bismuth] present in the sample” (Scerri 2000, 63). A main way that splitters objected was 
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by contesting the results. Fajans, for instance, disputed the bismuth results and insisted against 
Paneth and von Hevesy that the compared isotopes were distinct elements (Scerri 2000, 65).  
This has the surface appearance of making this moment in the dispute turn solely on an 
empirical matter. But one very probable reason why Fajans contested the empirical results was 
that he roughly shared with his opposition a norm that leant classificatory relevance to the 
results—something like: 
Elemental Relevance Norm: If you are determining whether different isotopes are 
instances of the same chemical element, and the empirically detected differences 
between them seem small or unimportant in comparison to the empirically detected 
similarities between them, then judge that the differences lack elemental relevance and 
the isotopes are instances of the same chemical element.  
It would have been odd for Fajans to contest the empirical results were he not presuming 
something like the view captured in that norm. Why worry (as he did) about reported 
similarities if you’re not basing your classification claims on some judgment about the 
relevance of reported similarities vs. differences?   
Something like the Elemental Relevance Norm also helps clarify the importance that a 
distinction between chemical and physical properties was eventually deemed to have in these 
debates. Even Fajans eventually bowed somewhat to this distinction (Scerri 2000, 64). 
Researchers also began appreciating more classificatory relevance in the distinction. They can 
be understood as doing this via the Elemental Relevance Norm, where the physicalness, so-to-
speak, of differences is presumed to give a reason for counting those differences as small or 
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unimportant in comparison to the many similarities deemed chemical. Seen in this light, the 
role of that norm has probably increased significantly over time, as we’ve retained what is 
effectively a lumper’s view of chemical element despite discovering many further physical 
differences between isotopes of atoms that share their atomic number. Norms like the 
Elemental Relevance Norm allow people to acknowledge that physical differences between 
uranium isotopes, for instance, are relevant—even dramatically important—to a great many 
things (including the energy industry and warfare), without conceding that the very specific 
issue of the constitutive conditions of a chemical category is one of those things.  
The Elemental Relevance Norm also appears alive and well today, as claims that the 
recently increasing number of known chemical differences between isotopes are not yet 
numerous or important enough to challenge lumpers (e.g., Scerri 2007, 279, 327) seem most 
charitably interpreted as implicitly involving reliance on that norm. 
Of course, none of this is to criticize any particular stance on or use of the norm, nor any 
associated relevance assumptions or claims. Indeed, we reckon that reliance on the norm was 
and continues to be quite rational, an issue we return to below. But recognizing the rationality 
or wisdom of a norm’s role is to already grant its operation alongside empirical data, which is 
our point here. In effect, by zeroing in on one dispute about the category chemical element we 
have supported our Short-Fall thesis by elaborating and supporting our Bridging-By-Norms 
thesis. 
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4.   Protons vs. Electrons, ~1930s–Present. 
The second 20th century episode we discuss is not so much an explicit dispute as it is an 
implicit opposition between two theories about the constitutive conditions of chemical 
element, only one of which is explicitly wide-spread. It is an opposition that most experts do 
not even acknowledge, even though their explanatory and classificatory practices generate it. 
It starts from a curious relationship between two underlying views about elements that are 
perhaps as close to unanimous as two views can get.  
The first of these underlying views, and the acceptance of it, are indicated in the fact that 
nearly all experts today hold to a descendant version of the 1923 IUPAC definition of 
‘chemical element’. In light of what was learned about proton counts later than 1923, this 
descendant version defines ‘chemical element’ explicitly in terms of those counts: a chemical 
element is, in the sense in question, “a species of atoms”, where each of these species is made 
up of “all atoms with the same number of protons in the atomic nucleus” (IUPAC 2019).  
Correspondingly, the received theory about the nature of the chemical element category is 
that atomic proton count is the central condition—it is what ontologically makes an atom the 
kind of element it is. In table 1 we’ve summarized this more precisely as the Proton Count 
Theory, using single asterisk marks to indicate parts of the theory that contain revisions to the 
Positive Charge Theory that is associated with the older (1923) IUPAC definition of ‘chemical 
element’. The revisions simply involve referring to proton count rather than nuclear positive 
charge. 
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Table 1 
Three Different Theories about the Constitutive Conditions of the Category Chemical Element 
 
Proton Count Theory 
 
 
Electron Configuration Theory 
 
Proton & Electron Theory 
 
Any thing is a chemical 
element if and only if: 
(a) it is a category, a 
species, of atom, 
and 
(b*) all atoms of this 
species have the 
same atomic 
number, which = 
proton count, and 
(c*) only atoms of this 
species have that 
atomic number. 
 
Any thing is a chemical 
element if and only if: 
(a) it is a category, a 
species, of atom, and 
(b**) all atoms of this 
species have the same 
ground state electron 
configuration, which = 
… 
(c**) only atoms of this 
species have that 
ground state electron 
configuration. 
 
Any thing is a chemical element if 
and only if: 
(a) it is a category, a species, of 
atom, and 
(b***) all atoms of this species 
have the same atomic 
number, which = proton 
count, and the same ground 
state electron configuration, 
which = … 
(c***) only atoms of this species 
have that atomic number, and 
that ground state electron 
configuration. 
 
NOTE.— For simplicity we have not fully elaborated conditions (b**) and (b***), which would 
involve referencing, e.g., the first, second, third, and fourth quantum numbers, the Pauli exclusion 
principle, the Aufbau principle, and the Hund principle (Scerri 2007, 233ff.). 
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The second unanimous (or very nearly so) underlying view, existing alongside the Proton 
Count Theory, is about explanation. As Scerri succinctly puts it, “it is the electron that is 
mainly responsible for the chemical properties of the elements” (Scerri 2007, 160). In other 
words, the main thing that explains—causally or otherwise—most properties and behaviors of 
respective chemical elements is their respective electron configurations. This isn’t to say that 
proton count has zero role to play in such explanations. Number of protons helps determine 
and influence atomic forces and structure, and interacts with electron configuration and 
behavior, and these things also help explain features and behaviors of chemical elements, e.g., 
why atoms of sodium together react as they do with atoms of chlorine. And of course, other 
variables aside from just proton count and electron configuration are also parts of any 
complete explanations of elemental features and behaviors. But the resounding view is that 
electron configurations do most of the explaining, with other variables often being 
negligible—hence the preceding quote from Scerri.  
So when it comes to explanations about elements in reactions, electrons are deemed central. 
But when it comes to element identity, and so the constitutive conditions of the chemical 
element category, the consensus is that proton count is central and there is no reference to 
electrons.  
This is curious because it seems to conflict with a norm that prioritizes explanatorily-
central conditions when theorizing about a category’s constitutive conditions—a norm that 
operates in many other areas of science. It may be that this norm is popular with respect to 
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -49-
 15 
categories of a certain general sort, so we should first clarify this and how the chemical 
element category seems to be of that sort.  
Many categories consist in patterns of linked variables. Disease categories are a vivid 
example, with one disease often being distinguished from others by how it consists in 
recurring (across cases) linkages between two types of variables: characteristic symptoms or 
effects, on one hand, and their causes, on the other. Recent work clarifies that other biological 
categories are like this too (e.g., [Suppressed-for-review]). Although these examples involve 
cause and effect variables, key variables may be of other sorts, that is, with determination 
relations other than causation between them.  
The category chemical element seems a paradigm example of a linked variable category. It 
appears to consist in a set of distinct patterns of linkage—some associated with one element, 
others with other elements—between particular sets of chemical properties or behaviors, and 
the conditions in each case that are mainly responsible for bringing about those properties and 
behaviors. What makes these patterns alike are the sorts of variables involved. Whether we’re 
talking about the element chlorine, or gold, or hafnium, etc., there are certain types of links 
between the chemical properties of those elements, on one hand, and the conditions 
responsible for those properties, on the other. Chlorine displays certain properties of reactivity 
due to conditions involving electron configuration. Gold displays different properties of 
reactivity, but similarly due to conditions involving (different) electron configuration.  
Now here is the associated implicit norm that seems widespread: 
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Main Explanatory Variables Norm: If you are determining which conditions are 
constitutive of a category that consists in patterns of linked variables, then prioritize 
those conditions that are the main explanatory factors for the other variables within the 
patterns in question.  
Were experts spelling out conformity with this norm in the chemical element case, they would 
note what is distinctive about the elements that exemplify the category. Each exhibits patterns 
of chemical properties and behaviors, explained by a combination of variables. What are the 
main explanatory variables? According to them: electron configurations. They then would, 
presumably, propose electron configurations to be constitutive of the category chemical 
element—either fully constitutive or partly constitutive, as represented in the theories stated in 
the middle and right-hand columns of table 1—by referring to those configurations in their 
definition of ‘chemical element’. But as we have seen, they don’t do that. 
Why does it seem experts in chemistry don’t follow the Main Explanatory Variables Norm 
that is common in many analogous cases in science? Why not connect the issues of 
explanation and identity? Two different answers come to mind. 
One is that perhaps appearances are misleading here—that, actually, chemists are following 
this norm. Perhaps we have expressed the norm in too coarse-grained a way to see this. A 
more fine-grained version could distinguish between proximate and distal explanatory 
variables, allowing appeal to more distal variables to abide the norm. Some authors argue, for 
instance, that while electron configurations or structure are the main proximate variables that 
explain elemental properties and behaviors, electronic structure is in turn determined or 
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explained by proton count (nuclear charge) (Hendry 2012, 266). Proton counts may then be 
the main distal variables that explain elemental properties and behaviors, bringing the 
consensus view about element identity into one kind of harmony with the consensus view on 
element explanations.9  
The second type of answer takes appearances at face value, conceding that chemists aren’t 
following the Main Explanatory Variables Norm. But if they aren’t, it is very probably 
because they are following other norms given priority over that one. One likely other norm in 
this case would trade on a seemingly perfect correlation between atomic number and ground 
state electron configuration, along with a penchant for simplicity. This norm grants that 
electron configurations are the main explanatory variables, but emphasizes that each ground 
state configuration always corresponds with exactly one atomic number. And appealing to 
these atomic numbers is simpler than appealing to ground state electron configurations, in that 
reference to proton count is less complicated and more concise than reference to the quantum 
numbers and associated quantum mechanical principles (see table 1) that give the ground state 
electron configurations. This is to recognize three rather than just two linked variables: first, 
the chemical properties and behaviors, second the electron configurations that explain those 
                                                   
9 For discussions of chemistry-physics relationships that may provide other grounds for 
arguing that chemists are abiding the Main Explanatory Variables Norm after all, see Scerri 
(2007).  
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properties and behaviors, and third the simpler atomic numbers that are explanatorily 
negligible but which correlate perfectly with the explanatory electron configurations. The 
norm in question would then imply that when determining constitutive conditions under such 
circumstances, we should prioritize the third variables, the simpler ones—the atomic numbers 
in this case—rather than the main explanatory variables with which they correlate: 
Perfect Correlation Simplicity Norm: If you are determining which conditions are 
constitutive of a category that consists in patterns of linked variables, and in addition to 
one type of variable that is mainly explained by another there is also a third type of 
variable that is simpler than the explanatory variables but correlates perfectly with them, 
then prioritize those simpler correlated variables as constitutive of the category in 
question.10   
This norm is tempting because it buys helpful simplicity at little cost. Indeed, following it in 
practice would seem to come with zero risk of recognizing different element boundaries than 
someone who instead recognizes ground state electron configurations as constitutive. Put 
                                                   
10 Note that this norm is recommending that the simpler variables that correlate with the 
explanatory ones (but which are not themselves explanatory) be prioritized when specifying 
constitutive conditions. Some alternative strategies that view the simpler variables as 
themselves explanatory (or close enough proxies for what is explanatory) would signal 
operation of the Main Explanatory Variables Norm.  
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differently, the three theories in table 1 certainly differ, but are, so far as we know, coextensive 
in application.  
There may also be other norms that tacitly trump the Main Explanatory Variables Norm. It 
has been widely noted that through the years in which a consensus built around defining 
‘chemical element’ in terms of atomic number, the element concept in chemistry was being 
used to capture units that survive chemical change—what survives of sodium and chlorine, 
respectively, for example, when each seems to give way as they combine to form a salt (Scerri 
2000). This may seem to privilege atomic numbers over electron configurations because the 
former survive such reactions while the latter change. Expressing this sort of privilege, for 
instance, Hendry writes that “whatever earns something membership of the extension 
‘krypton’ must be a property that can survive chemical change, and therefore the gain and loss 
of electrons” (Hendry 2012, 266). Perhaps this indicates: 
Unchanging Constituents Norm: If you are determining which conditions are 
constitutive of a category, then prioritize those that remain unchanged in persisting 
category members, over those that change in category members.  
That is probably too simplistic as stated though. Only somewhat sloppy adherence to it would 
in fact privilege the Proton Count Theory over the other two theories in table 1 because an 
atom’s ground state electron configuration—the structure its electrons would take were it in a 
neutral ground state—is a disposition, sometimes retained when the ground state happens not 
to obtain, e.g., during chemical reactions. So if experts really do tacitly rely on the 
Unchanging Constituents Norm in a way that trumps the Main Explanatory Variables Norm, 
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then it would probably be a more sophisticated version that implies a preference for 
unchanging manifest properties rather than unchanging dispositional ones. 
There are surely other plausible candidates for norms that experts have leaned on if they 
indeed have opted against the Main Explanatory Variables Norm. The overarching point is 
that either way, norms are involved. If appearances are misleading and at least some chemists 
have kept elemental explanation and elemental identity connected, it seems they have 
deployed the Main Explanatory Variables Norm; if for some or all chemists the appearance of 
disconnecting these things is instead accurate, then norms seem to help support that 
disconnection. Either of those paths to selecting the widely accepted Proton Count Theory 
over the other theories in table 1 leads through norms in addition to empirical considerations. 
 
5.   Conclusion. 
Our intention in this short paper is to show how classificatory shortfall (our first thesis) with 
bridging by norms (our second thesis) occurs even for a chemical category alleged to enjoy a 
great deal of classificatory objectivity. Uncovering such shortfall bridging in two 20th century 
episodes in chemistry challenges an epistemic strand to that alleged objectivity, given what the 
norms in question and epistemic objectivity were clarified in section 2 to involve. Admittedly, 
this does not constitute an argument that classificatory shortfall with bridging by norms is 
inevitable (for a more general case, see [suppressed-for-review]). But it may surprise many 
that it happens at all.  
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Beyond our main goal of arguing that this happens in surprising contexts, we also briefly 
noted that the rationality of involved classificatory decisions can survive the loss of objectivity 
we’ve documented. To support that as a thesis additional to the two we’ve argued for here 
would require another paper. But the prospects should now seem favorable: given the extent to 
which classificatory norms are shared, can pragmatically aid attainment of goals in a research 
community, and are continuous with the theories in which they are embedded, the 
classificatory decisions they guide can be properly seen as rational in a robust sense despite 
lacking epistemic objectivity. Such rationality may come to seem especially important if the 
problems we’ve posed for an epistemic objectivism about categories are found to also cast 
doubt on more metaphysical objectivisms about them.  
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The “Inch-Worm Episode”: Reconstituting the Phenomenon of Kinesin Motility
Introduction
Philosophical models of how phenomena are “reconstituted” in science tend to emphasize
the importance of explanatory considerations in driving phenomenon reconstitution. On such 
models, phenomena are reconstituted as researchers gain insight into the explanatory 
mechanisms underpinning phenomena of interest (Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010; Craver 
2007), or as researchers recognize that their favored explanans is better suited to explain a 
phenomenon occurring at a “level of abstraction” higher than was initially assumed (Kronfeldner
2017).1 This emphasis is perhaps unsurprising as mechanistic philosophy of science has, by and 
large, focused its efforts on explanation leaving the phenomena themselves construed as little 
more than the target thereof. That said, a number of philosophers following (Bogen and 
Woodward 1988) have considered the ways in which scientists treat phenomena as objects of 
investigation in their own right.2 This paper follows in that tradition, analyzing a case of 
phenomenon reconstitution that occurred entirely within an experimental program dedicated to 
characterizing, rather than explaining, the phenomenon of kinesin movement. 
Research on kinesin—a molecular motor that transports cargo around cells by moving 
unidirectionally along microtubule protofilaments—involves a substantial amount of 
experimental work dedicated to characterizing the phenomenon of kinesin movement. Unlike 
with macroscopic objects whose movements are readily observable, molecular motor movement 
1 Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford University 
Press. Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. C. (2010). Discovering complexity: Decomposition and localization as 
strategies in scientific research. MIT press. philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. Kronfeldner, M. 
(2015). Reconstituting phenomena. In Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki (pp. 
169-181). Springer, Cham.
2 Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97(3), 303-352.. Feest, U. 
(2011). What exactly is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized?. Synthese, 182(1), 57-71. Colaço, D. (2018). Rip 
it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part A, 72, 32-40.
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is a phenomenon that takes place at the nanoscale. Characterizing it therefore presents challenges
that require sophisticated experimental tools. In what follows, I focus on a particular tool, the 
single-molecule motility assay. Like patch-clamp recordings that made possible the 
characterization of the action potential and ion channels, the single-molecule motility assay 
enabled researchers to study the kinetic activities of single kinesin molecules and was an 
invaluable tool in the effort to characterize kinesin movement.
That the appropriate characterization of kinesin movement is that it walks “hand-over-
hand” along microtubules was a guiding idea for researchers using the single-molecule motility 
assay.3 In fact, the hypothesis was first suggested in 1989 in the very article reporting the 
development of this experimental tool. Over the following ten years, data from studies using 
variations on the basic design of the assay were interpreted as supporting hand-over-hand (HoH) 
walking, generating a limited consensus that, indeed, the correct characterization of the 
phenomenon of kinesin movement was that it walked HoH.
However, in 2002, a study involving a particularly interesting variation on this assay 
briefly disrupted this consensus, making a compelling case that kinesin walks in an “inch-worm”
fashion rather than HoH. This study was quickly followed by a number of further single-
molecule studies that re-established an even more robust HoH consensus. However, this is not a 
story of HoH advocates having been correct all along. Rather, the phenomenon of HoH walking 
was importantly “reconstituted” across the 2002 study. 
In section I, I discuss the initial battery of single-molecule studies that were taken to 
support the HoH model of kinesin motility paying particular attention to the empirical criteria—
3 This idea guided researchers using other methods as well, in particular, those using traditional biochemical 
techniques to study the hydrolytic cycle of the kinesin molecule. The interactions between the biochemical and 
single-molecule programs was important in the effort to map the stages of kinesin’s mechanical steps to stages in its 
hydrolytic cycle. Here, I focus on the single-molecule program’s attempts to characterize the molecule’s mechanical 
steps.
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processivity and coordinated head activity—that individuated HoH models as such and informed
researchers’ interpretations of their experimental results. Further, I describe the limitations this 
way of characterizing the phenomenon of HoH walking placed on the probative value of the 
single-molecule assay, leaving researchers to adjudicate between merely conceptually distinct 
HoH models with indirect, theoretical argumentation. Section II discusses an important 2002 
study which exploited the latent experimental significance of ideas forwarded in the context of 
theoretical debate. This study re-drew the lines along which motility models were individuated, 
making torque generation the primary criterion. This new taxonomy enabled these researchers to
design a more probative single-molecule study which lead them to reject HoH and forward an 
“inch-worm” model. Section III discusses the post-2002 studies that further exploited the new 
criterion for individuating motility models and secured consensus that kinesin walks hand-over-
hand—now reconstituted as asymmetric HoH. Section IV concludes the article with a discussion 
of the case in light of extant philosophical models of phenomenon reconstitution. 
As will be seen—and contrary to extant philosophical models—the reconstitution of 
kinesin motility did not occur in the context of attempting to explain the phenomenon, 
mechanistically or otherwise. Rather, it occurred entirely within the context of experimental 
efforts to characterize the phenomenon. More specifically, the reconstitution was driven by a 
recognition that individuating models of kinesin motility in terms of torque generation enhanced
the probative value of the experimental program’s primary investigative tool—the single-
molecule motility assay. With this new taxonomy of motility models in hand, single-molecule 
researchers were able to use their assay to greater effect and establish a consensus that, indeed, 
kinesin walks hand-over-hand—now reconstituted as asymmetric hand-over-hand.
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Section I: “Hand-Over-Hand” circa 1989 - 2002 
By the 1980s, researchers had identified two molecules that function as motors – 
transforming energy into motion – myosin and dynein. In 1985, Vale and colleagues identified a 
third, kinesin, that was responsible for moving cargo such as organelles around the cell interior.4
Once kinesin had been identified and named, researchers turned to characterizing its 
structure and behavior. Bloom, Wagner, Pfister et al. (1988) subjected purified kinesin to 
centrifugation, differentiating two heavy and two light chains. They interpreted their results as 
showing that “bovine brain kinesin is a highly elongated, microtubule-activated ATPase 
comprising two subunits each of 124,000 and 64,000 daltons . . . and that the heavy chains are 
the ATP-binding subunits.”5 Electron microscope studies revealed globular heads at the N-
terminal end of the heavy chains, which Scholey, Heuser, Yang et al. (1989) proposed serve both
to bind to the microtubule and to be the locus of ATP hydrolysis.6 They further hypothesized that
the point of having two heads is that one remains attached to the microtubule while the other 
detaches and moves (Figure 1).
4 Vale, R. D., Reese, T. S., & Sheetz, M. P. (1985). Identification of a novel force-generating protein, kinesin, 
involved in microtubule-based motility. Cell, 42(1), 39-50.
5 Bloom, G. S., Wagner, M. C., Pfister, K. K., & Brady, S. T. (1988). Native structure and physical properties of 
bovine brain kinesin and identification of the ATP-binding subunit polypeptide. Biochemistry, 27(9), 3409-3416.
6 Scholey, J. M., Heuser, J., Yang, J. T., & Goldstein, L. S. (1989). Identification of globular mechanochemical 
heads of kinesin. Nature, 338(6213), 355.
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Figure 1: Kinesin molecule. The light chains (right) bind cargo and the heavy chains (“heads”; left) bind
the molecule to the microtubule. The heads are also the site of ATP hydrolysis.
 Howard, Hudspeth and Vale (1989) (henceforth, HH&V) reiterated this idea suggesting, 
on the basis of their findings using their newly developed technique for studying individual 
kinesin molecules, that it walks “hand-over-hand” along a microtubule. As their single-molecule 
motility assay became a central tool for investigating kinesin motility, it is worth explaining in 
some detail.
In order to develop an assay to investigate the motion produced by a single kinesin 
molecule, HH&V had first to establish that a single kinesin is capable of moving a microtubule 
in the first place. Their experimental design inverts how kinesin movement along microtubules 
may be normally understood—thinking of the microtubule as fixed and the kinesin as moving 
along it. Inverting this picture, these researchers immobilized kinesin molecules “heads-up” on 
glass cover slips in solutions containing progressively less kinesin to see how low they could go 
and still observe movement when microtubules were added. Their hypothesis was that if a single 
kinesin molecule could produce movement, they should observe microtubule movement at very 
low kinesin concentrations. Initially finding that only when kinesin density exceeded a rather 
high threshold did microtubules move, these researchers distinguished two hypotheses—first, 
that kinesin-induced microtubule movement is a highly collaborative affair requiring a number of
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kinesin molecules working in concert and, second, that kinesin denatures when adsorbed onto the
coverslips and only when a sufficient number of molecules are present do a few adsorbed 
kinesins remain in a conformation that can support movement. Clearly, the first hypothesis, if 
true, would be damning for the prospects of developing an assay meant to study movement 
produced by a single molecule. 
Optimistically assuming the latter hypothesis, HH&V pre-treated the coverslips to 
prevent the hypothesized denaturation. Their optimism paid off. They found that they could 
produce microtubule movement with one-third of the kinesin concentration required with non-
treated coverslips. The clincher, however, was the character of the microtubule movement that 
they observed: 
Each moving microtubule rotated erratically about a roughly vertical axis through a fixed
point on the surface . . . presumably as a result of thermal forces, or of torques produced when a
kinesin molecule bound to different protofilaments. When its trailing end reached this nodal point,
the microtubule dissociated from the surface and diffused back into solution.7 
The nodal point, these researchers concluded, was a single kinesin molecule. Thus, they found 
that a single kinesin, immobilized on a glass cover-slip, can move a microtubule and, at the same
time, developed a technique for studying this movement that would prove central to the 
investigation of the phenomenon of kinesin motility.8 More specifically, they found that a single 
kinesin can move a microtubule several micrometers. They reasoned that kinesin can remain 
7 Howard, J., Hudspeth, A. J., & Vale, R. D. (1989). Movement of microtubules by single kinesin 
molecules. Nature, 342(6246), 154. Notice the mention of “torque.” The idea that HoH walking may produce torque
was on the table very early on. As we will see, however, this factor was thoroughly backgrounded in subsequent 
discussions of experimental results taken to bear on the HoH model of kinesin motility.
8 Interestingly, they compare the probative force of their assay with that of patch-clamp recording designed to study 
the activity of single ion channels in neurons: “like patch-clamp recording from ion channels, the study of 
movement produced by single motor molecules provides an assay sensitive enough to monitor the activity of an 
individual protein molecule.” Ibid., 158.
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attached to a microtubule by one of its heads, pushing the microtubule along as the other head 
moved forward, through 200 – 1000 iterations of its hydrolytic cycle. Linking this finding to the 
fact that the molecule has two globular heads, these researchers suggested that the molecule 
works “hand-over-hand” with one head always remaining attached to the microtubule. However, 
they also suggest an alternative possibility. Here is the full quote:
It is possible that kinesin’s two globular heads work hand-over-hand, so that one head is always
bound and prevents the microtubule from diffusing away. Alternatively, the two heads may work
independently . . . If this is so, the time in the reaction cycle during which the kinesin heads are
detached from the microtubule must be so brief, probably less than 1 ms, that the microtubule is
unlikely to diffuse out of reach of the kinesin molecule (my emphasis).9
It's important to attend closely to what “hand-over-hand” meant from the point of view of this 
1989 experiment. The contrast HH&V draw between their alternatives makes clear that, as 
opposed to a model on which the heads work independently and, thus, on which the whole 
molecule (both heads) detaches from the microtubule, the “hand-over-hand” model has it that the
kinesin heads coordinate their activity such that the molecule remains attached to the MT by at 
least one head during its walk. In other words, HoH walking consists in 1) the molecule 
remaining attached to the MT (processivity) by at least one head by means of 2) coordinated 
head activity. These became the empirical criteria that were taken by subsequent researchers to 
individuate HoH models as such and which informed the interpretation of experimental results 
for the next decade.
Over the course of the following decade, two versions of the single-molecule assay 
developed. 1) “MT-gliding assays” in which kinesin molecules are immobilized to glass cover 
9 Ibid., 158
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slips and microtubule movement is observed and 2) “bead assays” in which microtubules are 
immobilized and kinesin-bound beads are observed to move as the kinesin attaches to and walks 
along the immobilized microtubule. Both “geometries” of the single-molecule assay lent support 
to both aspects of HH&V’s HoH hypothesis. 
Not all studies were immediately univocal in this respect, however. In a version of the 
bead assay, Block, Goldstein and Schnapp (1990) immobilized microtubules, rather than kinesin,
on glass cover-slips. Coating silica beads with carrier protein and exposing them to low 
concentrations of kinesin, these researchers were able to observe the beads as single kinesin 
molecules moved them along the immobilized microtubule tracks. Using optical tweezers— 
which split laser beams to trap kinesins—to individually manipulate the moving beads, they 
found that under the forces exerted by the optical trap, the bead would detach from the 
microtubule after, on average, 1.4 μm and be pulled back toward the center of the trap.10 This, 
they argued, provides support for the claim that, “the kinesin molecule might detach briefly from
the substrate during each mechanochemical cycle” (not processive) and referred to their 
alternative model of kinesin motility as a “stroke-release” model.11 
However, a number of influential single-molecule studies over the next 10 years strongly 
supported HoH over the non-processive stroke-release model. In a clever variation on the MT-
10 The invention of optical tweezers was significant for research on kinesin motility in ways beyond those discussed 
here. For instance, since kinesin motility is a phenomenon occurring at the nano-scale, thermal forces are relevant. It
is therefore difficult to discern what observed motion is Brownian motion and what is due to the action of the 
molecule. Having kinesin move cargo against the forces exerted on it by the “trap” ensures that whatever motion is 
observed is due to the molecule’s action. This technique enabled Svoboda, Schmidt, Schnapp et al. (1993) to 
observe abrupt transitions of 8 nm steps, a distance that corresponds to the repeat distance between successive - 
tubulin dimers. They propose “that the two heads of a kinesin molecule walk along a single protofilament—or walk 
side-by-side on two adjacent protofilaments—stepping ~8 nm at a time, making one step per hydrolysis (or perhaps 
fewer, requiring multiple hydrolyses per step)” Svoboda, K., Schmidt, C. F., Schnapp, B. J., & Block, S. M. (1993). 
Direct observation of kinesin stepping by optical trapping interferometry. Nature, 365(6448), 721. 
11 Block, S. M., Goldstein, L. S., & Schnapp, B. J. (1990). Bead movement by single kinesin molecules studied with
optical tweezers. Nature, 348(6299), 348. These researchers also suggested a model on which the molecule is 
always bound by at least one head but “weakly” – just strong enough to remain attached in the face of thermal 
forces, but not strongly enough to remain attached when subjected to the forces of the optical trap.
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -66-
9
gliding assay, Ray et al. (1993) constructed microtubules consisting of 12, 13 or 14 
protofilaments (12-mers, 13-mers, 14-mers). Protofilaments of 13-mers run parallel to the MT 
axis while 12 and 14-mers exhibit right- and left-handed helical organizations (“twists”) 
respectively. Observing the movement of these microtubules induced by single immobilized 
kinesin molecules, the researchers found that the 12 and 14-mers rotated with the pitch and 
handedness predicted by the hypothesis that the kinesin molecule follows the protofilament axis. 
That kinesin movement is constrained in this way—that it “tracks the protofilament”—suggested
that at least one head remains attached to the MT during its walk, therefore lending support to 
that aspect of the HoH model of kinesin movement.12 
In a version of the bead assay, Berliner et al. (1995) attached single-headed kinesin 
derivatives to streptavidin-coated polystyrene beads and found that, unlike intact kinesin or two-
headed constructs, the single-headed molecule moved beads perpendicular with respect to the 
microtubule axis and failed to drive continuous unidirectional movement. This perpendicular 
movement suggested that the single-headed molecules lack the means to maintain their 
association with a particular protofilament track, namely, another head with which to coordinate 
its activity. The absence of perpendicular movement suggested that the opposite is true for two-
headed kinesin, lending support to the idea that the activity of the two heads is coordinated to 
ensure that one head remains MT-bound at all times. This, in turn assures that the molecule 
tracks the protofilament axis as it was found to do in the study described in the paragraph 
above.13
Further support for the HoH model came with the introduction of fluorescent labelling in 
the single-molecule assay. In a version of the MT-gliding assay, Vale et al. (1996) directly 
12 Ray, S., Meyhöfer, E., Milligan, R. A., & Howard, J. (1993). Kinesin follows the microtubule's protofilament 
axis. The Journal of cell biology, 121(5), 1083-1093.
13 Berliner, Elise, Edgar C. Young, Karin Anderson, Hansraj K. Mahtani, and Jeff Gelles. "Failure of a single-
headed kinesin to track parallel to microtubule protofilaments." Nature 373, no. 6516 (1995): 718-721.
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observed the movement of individual fluorescently labeled kinesin molecules finding that the 
labeled two-headed kinesin travels an average distance of 600nm per encounter with a 
microtubule whereas single-headed constructs shows no detectable movement.14 This 
corroborated Berliner et al. (1995)’s finding discussed above, suggesting that the two heads 
working together is required for movement.
Hancock and Howard (1998) immobilized single-headed kinesin onto glass cover slips 
and found that a minimum of four to six single headed molecules are necessary to produce 
movement. They further showed that, even at high ATP concentration, the single-headed 
molecules detached from microtubules 100-fold more slowly than their two-headed counterparts 
“directly support[ing] a coordinated, hand-over-hand model in which the rapid detachment of 
one head . . .  is contingent on the binding of the second head.”15 Thus, their study demonstrated 
a degree of “chemical coordination” between the two heads lending biochemical substance to the
idea that kinesin motility involves coordinated head activity.
While single-molecule studies such as these generated a limited consensus that kinesin 
walks HoH, a number of motility models that met the HoH criteria and were consistent with 
extent single-molecule data were conceptually distinguished in the literature during this time. 
However, without empirical criteria by which to distinguish them experimentally, it was left to 
single-molecule researchers to adjudicate between these models by way of indirect 
argumentation that appealed to data from sources external to the single-molecule program. 
To illustrate, (Figure 3) on page 13 distinguishes five stepping patterns understood to be 
variably consistent with the data to that time. Findings regarding the structure and dimensions of 
the molecule, the lattice structure of microtubules and the sites on tubulin heterodimers to which 
14 Vale, Ronald D., Takashi Funatsu, Daniel W. Pierce, Laura Romberg, Yoshie Harada, and Toshio Yanagida. 
"Direct observation of single kinesin molecules moving along microtubules." Nature 380, no. 6573 (1996): 451-453.
15 Hancock, W. O., & Howard, J. (1998). Processivity of the motor protein kinesin requires two heads. The Journal 
of cell biology, 140(6), 1395.
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kinesin was understood to bind provided fodder for indirect arguments in favor of or against such
conceptually distinguished models. (see Cross, 1995; Howard, 1996; Block, 1998 for reviews).16 
As we see in (Figure 2), microtubules consist in protofilaments arranged in cylindrical fashion. 
Each protofilament consists of alternating tubulin (α- and β-tubulin) heterodimers.
16 Cross, R. A. (1995). On the hand over hand footsteps of kinesin heads. Journal of muscle research and cell 
motility, 16(2), 91-94. Howard, J. (1996). The movement of kinesin along microtubules. Annual review of 
physiology, 58(1), 703-729. Block, S. M. (1998). Kinesin: what gives?. Cell, 93(1), 5-8. For micrographic data 
relevant to these indirect arguments see: Kikkawa, M., Ishikawa, T., Nakata, T., Wakabayashi, T., & Hirokawa, N. 
(1994). Direct visualization of the microtubule lattice seam both in vitro and in vivo. The Journal of cell biology, 
127(6), 1965-1971. Song, Y. H., & Mandelkow, E. (1995). The anatomy of flagellar microtubules: polarity, seam, 
junctions, and lattice. The Journal of cell biology, 128(1), 81-94. Harrison, B. C., Marchese-Ragona, S. P., Gilbert, 
S. P., Cheng, N., Steven, A. C., & Johnson, K. A. (1993). Decoration of the microtubule surface by one kinesin head
per tubulin heterodimer. Nature, 362(6415), 73.
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -69-
12
Figure 2: Microtubule structure.
Several biochemical studies suggested that a tubulin heterodimer can bind only one kinesin head 
(Song and Mandelow, 1993; Walker, 1995; Tucker and Goldstein 1997). This fact, coming from 
outside the single-molecule program, was appealed to in adjudicating between conceptually 
distinct models. For instance, as we see in (Figure 3), an “inchworm model” had been 
distinguished prior to 2002. On this model, one head always remains in the lead with the other 
head trailing behind.17 This model, however, requires each tubulin dimer to have two binding 
sites (or a single, shared binding site) so that the two heads could be brought into proximity with 
one another. This, argued Block and Svaboda (1995), was difficult to square with binding 
patterns gleaned from the aforementioned biochemical studies. They note further that such a 
model involves an implausibly more complicated step consisting of a “two-part cycle comprising
17 Though not a “hand-over-hand” model in what is perhaps the intuitive sense of the phrase, by the lights of the 
empirical criteria that distinguished HoH models as such (distinguished them from e.g. stroke-release models) 
“inchworm” models were a species of HoH. As we will see, it was not until the introduction of a new empirical 
criterion that inchworm models were adequately distinguished from HoH models along empirically tractable lines.
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the successive action of both heads.”18 That is, rather than each 8nm step consisting of a single 
head relocating to the next tubulin binding site, it would involve, first, the lead head moving and,
second, the trailing head moving up from behind to keep pace.
These same researchers also argued that “long stride” seemed implausible on the grounds
that it required the relatively small kinesin molecule to extend a full 16nm to move the centroid 
of the molecule 8nm as had been observed in their motility assays. Since this would require that 
the stalk connecting kinesin’s heads be capable of this kind of extension, Long Stride was 
deemed speculatively possible at best. Cross (1995) seems to have the same worry in mind in 
criticizing motility models that require kinesin to stretch its heads across a protofilament, 
straddling it on either side, and walking along the protofilaments adjacent to it. This would be 
like “two-step I” only with the squares moved over one protofilament to the right. Cross says of 
such a model that it is “barely credible.”19 
Figure 3: Conceptually distinguished motility models the plausibility of which was left to be adjudicated by
indirect arguments based on data coming from outside the single-molecule program.
18 Block, S. M., & Svoboda, K. (1995). Analysis of high resolution recordings of motor movement. Biophysical 
journal, 68(4 Suppl), 237s. 
19 Cross, R. A. (1995). On the hand over hand footsteps of kinesin heads. Journal of muscle research and cell 
motility, 16(2), 92.
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This kind of indirect argumentation was characteristic of attempts to adjudicate between 
the motility models that had been conceptually distinguished in the first ten years of single-
molecule research. While most researchers agreed that HoH was the correct characterization of 
kinesin motility (rather than “stroke-release”), a number of HoH models could be distinguished 
that were consistent with single-molecule data. Thus, a space of merely conceptually distinct 
models existed to which researchers using the single-molecule motility assay had no 
experimental access. They were therefore left with indirect argumentation based on findings 
from experimental sources external to the single-molecule research program. 
Notably absent from most of this indirect argumentation were considerations of torque. 
This, despite the fact that HH&V had mentioned it in the very paper in which they coined the 
phrase “hand-over-hand.” There was an exception, however. In an impressively comprehensive 
review, Howard (1996) did bring the idea that HoH walking produces torque into the discussion 
along with a number of other considerations the experimental significance of which would be 
exploited in a 2002 study that represented a significant challenge to the hand-over-hand 
consensus.20    
Howard (1996)’s indirect argument represents a compelling theoretical analysis. He 
assumes, on the basis of analogy with other known molecular motors, that kinesin has a “two-
fold axis of rotational symmetry” and infers that, therefore, the heads are functionally equivalent 
– “they have the same hydrolysis cycles and make the same motions.”21 He calls this the 
“equivalence hypothesis.” Tracing out the consequences of this hypothesis in conjunction with 
extant experimental data, Howard argued that the most plausible model for kinesin motility was 
20 Howard, J. (1996). The movement of kinesin along microtubules. Annual review of physiology, 58(1), pp. 724.
21 For an intuitive sense of what having a “2-fold axis of rotational symmetry” means, imagine two chairs facing 
each other on either side of a line and equidistant from that line. Rotating one chair 180 degrees with respect to that 
line will bring that chair into the precise position of its mate. Howard assumed that the relation between kinesin’s 
two heads was the same.
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a “rotary model” on which the molecule’s heads pass each other on the same side each step 
(Figure 3) rather than on alternating sides like the way in which our human legs move past each 
other as we walk. 
Figure 3: Each head has the same hydrolysis cycle and the same stepping movement, the
stepping head always passing the MT-bound head on the same side. Notice that state (i) is
identical to state (v).
His argument involves three key ideas the experimental significance of which was only realized 
later. First, taking his equivalence hypothesis in conjunction with the protofilament tracking data 
discussed above, Howard argues against models like the ones labeled Two-Step in figure 1. 
According to such models, the molecule switches back and forth, alternately binding adjacent 
protofilaments with each head. Assuming the equivalence hypothesis, a consequence of which is 
that the beginning of each step finds the molecule in the same 3D conformation, Howard argues 
that if one head, attached to a protofilament (a) were to undergo a conformational change and 
motion so as to bring the other head to an adjacent protofilament (b), then the equivalent 
conformational change in head 2 - required by the equivalence hypothesis - would bring head 1 
to the next protofilament (c). This would induce a rotation in the 13-mer microtubules that was 
not observed in the single-molecule study discussed above. Inter alia, this reasoning leads 
Howard to his rotary model. As for the second key idea, Howard notes a “seemingly 
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unthinkable” consequence of this model. Because of the assumed equivalence between the heads,
the molecule will always rotate in the same direction and “Thus the tail (and organelle) will tend 
to wind up like the rubber band of a toy airplane.”22 Howard suggests that this torsion could be 
accommodated by the torsional flexibility the neck was found to exhibit in an earlier study (Hunt
and Howard 1993).23 That the neck has this torsional flexibility is the third key idea.
The experimental significance of these three ideas—1) the equivalence hypothesis, 2) that
kinesin motility may produce torque which is communicated to the cargo and 3) that the kinesin 
neck is torsionally flexible—later came to be appreciated and exploited in a study that introduced
a new empirical criterion for individuating motility models. Recall, from the late 1980s to the 
late 1990s, the criteria that individuated HoH models as such were that 1) the molecule is 
genuinely processive and that it is so by means of 2) coordinated head activity. From the point of
view of this taxonomy, a number of HoH motility models could be conceptually distinguished 
that were more or less consistent with available experimental data but adjudicating between them
was left a matter of indirect argumentation using data from sources external to the single-
molecule program. As we’ll see, Hua et al.’s 2002 study re-drew the taxonomic lines and, as a 
result, lent further probative value to the single-molecule motility assay.
22 Howard, J. (1996). The movement of kinesin along microtubules. Annual review of physiology, 58(1), pp. 724.
23 Hunt, A. J., & Howard, J. (1993). Kinesin swivels to permit microtubule movement in any direction. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 90(24), 11653-11657.
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Section III: Hand-over-Hand vs. Inchworm 
Hua, Chung, and Gelles (2002) inaugurated an important shift in the empirical criteria by 
which motility models were individuated.24 As mentioned above, their study exploited ideas that 
had been floated in the literature in the context of indirect, theoretical argumentation. First, the 
design of the experiment was a modified version of (Hunt and Howard 1993)’s assay used to 
measure the torsional flexibility of the kinesin neck. However, rather than using native kinesin 
which, in that study, had been found to have a flexible neck, Hua and colleagues used a stiff-
necked, two-headed biotinated kinesin derivative (K448-BIO). This ensured that the connection 
between the microtubule, this molecule, and the glass cover slip on which the molecule was 
immobilized would be torsionally stiff, thus guaranteeing that if torque was indeed generated by 
the walking molecule, as Howard’s model predicted, it would not be taken up by a flexible neck. 
Rather, it would be communicated to the cargo and generate a clearly observable 180-degree 
rotation of the microtubule with each step of the molecule. Their design, therefore, took the 
“seemingly unthinkable” consequence Howard had traced out eight years earlier and cleverly 
turned it into an intervention.
Further, they pointed out that whether the heads of the molecule pass each other on the 
same side, as in Howard’s rotary model, or pass each other on alternating sides, the orientation of
the molecule relative to the microtubule axis would switch as the heads alternate between being 
the leader and being the follower. This, in turn, would generate torque, and induce an observable 
microtubule rotation. In other words, the differences between the intermediate states of rotary 
models and left-right alternate stepping models were immaterial. What mattered for torque 
24 Hua, W., Chung, J., & Gelles, J. (2002). Distinguishing inchworm and hand-over-hand processive kinesin 
movement by neck rotation measurements. Science, 295(5556), 844-848.
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generation was that the molecule begins each step in the same 3D conformation only with the 
heads swapping between leading and following. Hua et al., dubbed these torque generating 
models symmetric hand-over-hand (Figure 3A). By the lights of the criterion of torque 
generation, both Howard’s rotary model and alternate left-right stepping models count as 
symmetric HoH models.
Figure 3: The brackets around the intermediate stages of the steps in A indicate their
irrelevance. Whether the stepping head passes on the same side, as it  does in the diagram, or
passes on alternating sides of the bound head, the molecule will change its orientation as indicated
by the arrows on top of the molecule.
To appreciate the shift in criteria for individuating motility models these researchers 
introduced, consider the sense in which Howard’s rotary model would be considered a species of
HoH model prior to this study. It would count as an HoH model because it sees the molecule as 
remaining attached to the microtubule by at least one head (processivity) and that it does so by 
means of coordinated head activity. The same goes for alternate left-right stepping models. From
the point of view of the new criterion—torque generation—both count as HoH models but for 
very different reasons. First off, they would no longer count as HoH models full stop. Rather 
they would be considered instances of symmetric HoH to be distinguished from an asymmetric 
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HoH model—a distinction I will discuss in more detail shortly. Further, rather than processivity 
or coordinated head activity serving to distinguish them as HoH models (as opposed to stroke-
release), they count as (symmetric) HoH models because they generate torque. This, again, for 
the reason that both models view the molecule as beginning each step in the same 3D 
conformation, rotating its orientation relative to the microtubule axis during its step and, thus, 
generating torque.
It was with respect to torque generation that the distinction between symmetric HoH and 
asymmetric HoH was drawn. Asymmetric HoH models deny that the molecule generates torque 
by denying the equivalence of the heads’ steps. On this model, kinesin alternates between two 
distinct conformations—a different one at the beginning of each step—“in precisely such a way 
as to cancel the 180-degree reorientation induced by head alternation.”25
Finally, and most importantly, after this re-drawing of the taxonomic lines, “inchworm” 
was no longer to be considered a sub-species of HoH as it was by the lights of the pre-2002 
empirical criteria—processivity and coordinated head activity. Now, with torque generation 
serving to individuate models, inchworm was distinguished from HoH along empirically 
tractable lines.  
Armed with this more probative empirical criterion by which to individuate motility 
models, Hua et al. (2002) developed and ran their single-molecule assay, failing to observe the 
microtubule rotations predicted by symmetric HoH models. They therefore rejected that 
characterization of the phenomenon of kinesin motility. This left two non-torque generating 
possibilities: 1) that the molecule walks in an asymmetric HoH fashion or 2) that it walks 
inchworm-style. In a way reminiscent of the indirect arguments discussed above, Hua and 
colleagues argued against the plausibility of asymmetric HoH. In brief, they found it implausible 
25 Hua et al. 847.
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that the differences between 3D conformations at the start of each step could be such that they 
could exactly compensate for the rotation and, in turn, the torque produced by an asymmetric 
walk. Rejecting asymmetric HoH on these grounds, these researchers argued that the correct 
characterization of the phenomenon of kinesin motility is that it walks in an “inchworm” fashion.
So, what led these researchers to reject HoH as an appropriate characterization of the 
phenomenon and adopt inchworm? Note that although their rejection is experimentally 
motivated, they did not experiment for the purpose of gathering evidence to undermine that 
which had already been found in support of the HoH model. That is, they did not gather evidence
to undermine the single-molecule studies that had supported the claim that the molecule is 
processive and that its heads coordinate their activity. Thus, they did not employ a “defeater-
strategy” as in the case of “memory transfer” discussed by Colaco (2019).  Rather, as described 
above, they recognized the experimental significance latent in certain ideas that had already been
floated in the literature. They then constructed a new taxonomy using torque generation as the 
criterion for individuating motility models which, in turn, enabled them to design a more 
probative version of the single-molecule motility assay. It further enabled them to recognize an 
important distinction—that between symmetric and asymmetric HoH models. Their single-
molecule study, they recognized, only bore directly on symmetric HoH models. Their study 
refuted symmetric HoH leaving the refutation of the asymmetric model to be done by indirect 
argumentation. Thus, between their empirical results and indirect argumentation, they rejected 
symmetric and asymmetric HoH models respectively, and defended inchworm as the most 
plausible model for the phenomenon of kinesin motility.
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Section IV: Further Experimental Implications of the New Taxonomy
In section I, we noted the role that indirect argumentation played in adjudicating between 
conceptually distinct models. While such arguments, in addition to the single-molecule data, led 
to a limited consensus, they were not decisive in adjudicating between available HoH motility 
models. However, these more theoretical arguments led to ideas that had latent experimental 
significance. It was just a matter of unlocking it. The empirical criteria in terms of which models 
of kinesin motility were initially individuated— processivity and coordinated head activity—left 
open an experimental dead-space seemingly inaccessible to the single-molecule assay. The key 
granting the single-molecule assay experimental access to the dead-space was torque generation. 
Turning this key generated a new taxonomy, one enabling the development of a more probative 
variation of the single-molecule motility assay.
The studies that emerged in the following two years took advantage of this more 
experimentally tractable taxonomy, re-securing a consensus that kinesin walks HoH—now 
reconstituted as asymmetric HoH. Kaseda et al. (2003) tested the inchworm model’s prediction 
that only one head is hydrolytically active. These researchers used optical tweezers in a bead 
assay to measure the stepping rate of kinesins mutated such that one head hydrolyzes ATP more 
slowly than the other. If both heads are hydrolytically active, they reasoned, their mutant 
molecule should show a “limp” in its stepping pattern as it walks. This is in fact what they 
observed undermining the inchworm models prediction of single-head catalysis.26 That same 
year, Asbury et al. (2003), using optical tweezers in a bead assay, found that kinesin constructs 
with two identical wild-type heads also show a “limp” in their stepping suggesting that the 
26 Kaseda, K., Higuchi, H., & Hirose, K. (2003). Alternate fast and slow stepping of a heterodimeric kinesin 
molecule. Nature Cell Biology, 5(12), 1079.
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molecule alternates between two conformations from step to step thus supporting asymmetric 
HoH walking.27 Yildez et al. (2004) directly observed the movement of kinesin heads tagged 
with a fluorescent dye and found that each head moves 16nm per step and also that the tagged 
heads pause after each movement presumably while the other untagged head moved. These 
findings are inconsistent with the inchworm model which takes each head to move 8nm per 
ATPase cycle and supports an asymmetric HoH model.28 Higuchi et al. (2004) observed a 
difference in the timing of every other step in kinesins with identical mutations in the nucleotide-
binding sites in each head.29 The limping they observed is similar to that observed by Asbury and
colleagues above, but more pronounced due to the mutation.
Each of these studies exploited the reimagined taxonomy of motility models inaugurated 
by Hua et al. (2002). Interestingly, it was no advancement in tool-development that enabled 
researchers to observe kinesin’s “limping” step. The instrumentation necessary to do so—the 
single-molecule bead assay and optical tweezers—had been in place for over a full decade prior 
to its being observed. It was rather a conceptual innovation ushered in by the new taxonomy that 
enabled researchers to look for kinesin’s limping step and appreciate its significance. In fact, 
even if the limping step had been observed prior to this reconstitution of the phenomenon, it is 
not obvious that researchers would have recognized its significance, at least not in the way that it
was recognized afterwards. It was in observing kinesin’s limp against the backdrop of a 
taxonomy of motility models which included the category of asymmetric HoH that its 
significance for experimental work in characterizing the phenomenon of kinesin motility became
apparent. Therefore, although recent philosophical efforts to emphasize innovative tool-
27 Asbury, C. L., Fehr, A. N., & Block, S. M. (2003). Kinesin moves by an asymmetric hand-over-hand 
mechanism. Science, 302(5653), 2130-2134.
28 Yildiz, A., Tomishige, M., Vale, R. D., & Selvin, P. R. (2004). Kinesin walks hand-over-
hand. Science, 303(5658), 676-678.
29 Higuchi, H., Bronner, C. E., Park, H. W., & Endow, S. A. (2004). Rapid double 8‐nm steps by a kinesin 
mutant. The EMBO journal, 23(15), 2993-2999.
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development in driving scientific research are to be applauded, the case of the “inch-worm 
episode” reminds us conceptual innovation remains an important factor. 30
Section V: The “Reconstitution” of Hand-over-Hand Walking
As I mentioned in my introduction, and as the history I have laid out reveals, the story of 
the re-establishment of the HoH consensus is not one according to which HoH advocates were 
shown to have been right all along. Rather, the phenomenon of HoH walking was importantly 
reconstituted across the inchworm episode from HoH to asymmetric HoH. The inchworm 
episode and the reconstitution it inaugurated took place entirely within the context of an 
experimental program dedicated to characterizing, rather than explaining, the phenomenon of 
kinesin motility. This is of particular philosophical interest as standard philosophical models of 
phenomenon reconstitution have it that explanatory considerations drive phenomenon 
reconstitution.
Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010)’s model of phenomenon reconstitution, for instance,
was motivated by their case study of the “Mendelian trait.”31 Classically, the Mendelian trait was 
understood as a macroscopically observable phenotypic trait. Faced with the fact that patterns of 
phenotypic inheritance could not be explained in terms of single genes – “phenotypic traits were 
the products of many genes in a complex organization”—researchers in the middle of the 20th 
century abandoned the phenotypic trait as the central Mendelian unit in favor of a unit at a lower 
level of mechanistic analysis, the enzyme. Thus, the explanandum phenomenon to be accounted 
for in terms of single genes was reconstituted, shifting it down from the phenotypic trait to the 
enzyme, in the effort to develop mechanistic accounts of gene action.
30 Bickle, J. (2016). Revolutions in neuroscience: Tool development. Frontiers in systems neuroscience, 10, 24.
31 Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. C. (2010). Discovering complexity: Decomposition and localization as strategies 
in scientific research. MIT press.
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Craver (2007) discusses a further way in which phenomena can be reconstituted in the 
context of seeking mechanistic explanations. According to Craver, phenomena can be 
reconstituted in the wake of researchers recognizing that they have committed one of two errors 
– the “lumping error” or the “splitting error.”32 Both errors require inquiry into the phenomenon 
to have developed to a point at which researchers have both a characterization of the 
phenomenon and putative mechanistic explanations on the table. Scientists observe they have 
committed the splitting error when they recognize that they have erroneously thought that some 
phenomena of interest are due to two or more distinct types of mechanisms when, in fact, they 
are due to mechanisms of the same type. They may then reconstitute the phenomena such that 
where once they thought of them as two distinct phenomena underpinned by two distinct types of
mechanisms, they now understand them as one phenomenon underwritten by a single 
mechanism-type. The lumping error, on the other hand, occurs when a particular phenomenon is 
thought to be generated by a single mechanism while, in fact, two distinct mechanisms 
underwrite the phenomenon. In light of recognizing this error, scientists may reconstitute the 
phenomenon, considering it now as two distinct phenomena. 
(Kronfeldner 2015)’s model differs from both of the above. She describes how 
phenomenon reconstitution can result not only as a result of researchers gaining insight at the 
level of mechanism, but also by researchers “moving up to a level of greater abstraction.” 33 To 
illustrate, a researcher interested in explaining a particular phenotypic trait of a particular person 
- their height, say - will be unable to do so as it is widely recognized that such traits are the result
of complex interactions between an individual’s genetic inheritance and their ontogenetic 
environment. This does not mean, however, that genes do not explain. By moving up to an 
32 Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford University 
Press. pp. 123-124.
33 Kronfeldner, M. (2015). Reconstituting phenomena. In Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: 
EPSA13 Helsinki (pp. 169-181). Springer, Cham.
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explanandum phenomenon at a greater level of abstraction, e.g. average differences between the 
heights of males and females in a population, researchers can appeal explanatorily to differences 
in genotype, ignoring the complexity introduced by gene-environment interactions. In this way, 
researchers can hold fast to a particular “causal factor” in terms of which they wish to pitch their 
explanations and constitute the phenomena to be explained accordingly. 
All three models have it that phenomenon reconstitution is driven by explanatory 
considerations. The research on kinesin motility discussed throughout this paper, however, 
involves experimental work dedicated solely to characterizing the phenomenon of kinesin 
movement. Developing mechanistic explanations of kinesin movement (not discussed) involves 
researchers determining how the energy released from ATP-hydrolysis occurring in the 
molecule’s nucleotide binding sites results in structural changes throughout the molecule. 
Mechanistic explanation asks after the role played (if any) by thermal forces in bringing the 
heads forward in their stepping pattern. It attempts to determine whether elastic tension on the 
neck linker generated as the molecule stretches during its walk provides energy—in addition to 
that provided by ATP-hydrolysis—that may or may not be necessary for walking.34 These (and 
further issues) are, of course, important for developing mechanistic explanations for kinesin 
motility—for answering the question of how kinesin manages to walk in the way it does. But 
considerations at this explanatory level did not, as we saw, figure into the reconstitution story. 
Again, it took place entirely within the context of experimental efforts to characterize the 
phenomenon—to characterize the way kinesin walks, not the means by which it manages to walk 
that way.
In closing, Colaco (2020) notes “there is a lacuna in the literature regarding how 
researchers determine whether their characterization of a target phenomenon is appropriate for 
34 Ref to Bechtel and Bollhagen “Molecular Motors: Transforming energy to motion.”
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their aims.”35 This paper helps to illuminate that lacuna. In order to experimentally adjudicate 
between alternative characterizations of kinesin motility, single-molecule researchers sought 
empirical criteria by which to individuate them—criteria that distinguished them along lines that 
were testable from the point of view of the single-molecule motility assay. It was determined that
individuating models of kinesin by appeal to torque generation rather than merely processivity 
and coordinated head activity, enabled access to what was antecedently an experimental dead-
space consisting of merely conceptually distinct motility models. The new taxonomy rendered 
that space experimentally accessible to the single-molecule assay. Thus, the “inchworm” episode
illustrates how researchers can recharacterize phenomena to the end of enhancing the probative 
value of their experimental tools.        
  
 
   
                                                   
                                                    
35 Colaço, D. Recharacterizing scientific phenomena. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 10, 14 
(2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-0279-z
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Growing Knowledge: Epistemic Objects 
in Agricultural Extension Work 
  
Abstract: We outline a specialized form of knowledge arising from established communication 
practices between farmers, university researchers, and regulators. The ​grower standard ​ is a 
benchmark concept in agricultural experiments that differs from familiar epistemic objects in 
philosophy of experiment such as controls or background conditions. It is a unique, 
institutionally-structured way in which agricultural experiments are value-laden. Grower standard 
is not a one-size-fits-all standard. It is the product of active interactions between diverse 
agricultural communities of stakeholders within ​agricultural extension​ communication practices. 
Exploring this form of knowledge coproduction, we explore the role extension work plays in 
shaping agricultural science more broadly.  
1. Introduction 
In Kentucky, agricultural experiments on tobacco crops need to be planted by June 20. 
Fungicide experiments on grapevines in Oregon begin when the plants achieve six inches of 
growth. In Missouri, cotton pest management experiments count the nodes above the highest 
first position of white flower (NAWF) to determine when to terminate insect control practices. 
These peculiarities of experimental design each originate from the concept of ​grower standard ​. 
Grower standard is a benchmark concept used in agricultural science. It furnishes the basis for 
comparison between farming practices and agricultural experiments. 
1 
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Some considerations relevant to grower standard are similar to control conditions or background 
conditions discussed in the design of experiments in the natural sciences, while other 
considerations are wholly unfamiliar or are similar to considerations from the social sciences 
rather than the natural sciences. For instance, insecticide is used on cotton plants to minimize 
insect interference with developing cotton bolls. NAWF measures the flowering date of the last 
bolls. Once the cotton plant stops producing bolls, insect control ceases to make an economic 
difference in the overall yield. On the other hand, Kentucky tobacco experiments need to be 
planted by June 20 because that is the latest date that commercial growers can plant tobacco 
and be guaranteed insurance on their crops. Only experiments performed prior to that date will 
provide useful information to growers as farmers are well aware that growing conditions 
following the June 20 cutoff are substantially different than those prior to it. 
 
In this paper, we characterize grower standard as an epistemic object of agricultural science 
and use this characterization to illustrate a unique and institutionally-structured way in which 
agricultural experiments are value-laden. In Section 2, we define grower standard and argue 
that it differs from familiar epistemic objects in philosophy of science. In Section 3, we show that 
one important reason that grower standard differs from these more familiar epistemic objects is 
that grower standard is a product of interactions between research communities and agricultural 
extension workers. We explore the role extension work plays in the shaping of agricultural 
science practices more broadly and describe this role in terms of knowledge coproduction. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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1.1 Agriculture: a glossary 
Agriculture remains an area of research less familiar to philosophy of science (but cf. 
Thompson, 2017). In order to help our readers navigate this new area, we begin with a brief 
glossary.  
● Agricultural practice ​: the stewardship of crops and livestock.  
● Agricultural sciences​: studies of the cultivation of soil for the growing of crops, husbandry 
of animals, management of land systems, global and local seed economics, food 
scarcity, biofuels, and more.  
● Agronomy​: the scientific study of crops, soil, and plant ecology. Its focus is on crops of 
high commercial value for food, fuel, or fiber.   1
● A​gricultural extension​: a formalized system of communication practices established 
between farmers, university researchers, and regulators to exchange ideas about new 
agricultural research, technologies, and practices.  
● Agricultural extension work​: activities that include digital and on-site consulting, attending 
local and regional grower/producer meetings, giving field day presentations, and carrying 
out experiments to improve agricultural practices. By participating in these activities, 
extension workers and farmers exchange information about how to improve production, 
increase crop diversity, provide nutrient support to soil, manage irrigation practices, and 
control pests and diseases.  
1 ​Agronomy is primarily informed by biological and ecological considerations and methods, its 
close connection to agricultural practices means that it is deeply entangled with technological, 
economic, commercial, and sociopolitical concerns. This entanglement is a motivating reason 
for our present interest. 
3 
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● Agricultural extension specialist​: an academic researcher  whose professional duties 2
include both the production of scholarship and the performance of extension work 
(alongside teaching and service). While research and extension work are evaluated as 
separate categories, Extension specialists usually perform both types of work on a single 
research domain.  
2. Grower Standard as Epistemic Object 
2.1 Defining Grower Standard 
An important component of designing agronomy research protocol is to identify and recreate 
what is known as “grower standard,” sometimes referred to as “grower standard practice” or 
“standard grower conditions.” Conditions that specify a grower standard can include fungicide, 
herbicide, and insecticide protocols; fertilization, watering, and harvest methods and timing; soil 
treatments; instrumentation used (e.g., cotton-picker, transplanter, tiller); and pathogen 
containment strategies. What counts as grower standard for a given experiment is particular to 
the crop, region, scale of production, and type of farming practice (e.g., organic v. conventional).  
 
“Grower standard” is regularly referenced in descriptions of experimental design in 
extension-driven agronomy research. Designing experiments to imitate grower standard 
conditions is a distinctive epistemic feature of experiments in agronomy. Grower standard does 
not aim to recreate so-called natural conditions. In plant biology, e.g., laboratory conditions 
2 ​In the United States, extension work is carried out by employees of the Cooperative Extension 
Service (CES), both by ​county extension agents​, who manage activities for a county, and by 
extension specialists ​, who are academic researchers. CES is an 18,000-person agency run by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
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usually imitate native settings for plant development, without an intention that the results of the 
experiment will be used to change that native setting. In contrast, extension-driven agronomy 
experiments aim to improve grower conditions. Experimental conditions are set up as a 
suboptimal baseline from which to improve production, rather than as a neutral background in 
which scientific phenomena occur. This difference suggests a different relationship between 
experiment and world than in natural sciences. 
 
Some aspects of setting grower standard are analogous to fixing variables in experimental 
control groups. For instance, one goal of a recent plant-pathology experiment on grape powdery 
mildew (​Erysiphe necator​) was to determine the efficacy of a new strategy for fungicide 
application in which fungicide was applied after powdery mildew spores were detected by 
molecular assay, rather than according to growth benchmarks or calendar alone (Thiessen, 
2016). In this experiment, the authors derive their results by comparing their protocol to the 
standard application procedure used by ​vignerons​ for treating grape powdery mildew. The 
standard application is described as a control plot and contrasted with the active “detection 
plot”: 
 
Control plot fungicides were initiated at 6 inches of growth or when a risk model 
indicated a high risk for spore release, and detection treatment plot fungicide 
applications were withheld until inoculum was detected or bloom had occurred [.] 
Subsequent applications of fungicides followed manufacturer recommendations for 
reapplication depending on chemistry. [...] After a fungicide programme was initiated, 
additional applications in both the control and detection plots were made using the 
grower's standard fungicide programme. (Ibid., p. 243) 
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The control plots appear to be treated with grower standard protocols as evidenced by the 
author’s description of their own experimental results, stating: “no significant differences in berry 
or leaf incidence between plots with fungicides initiated at detection or grower standard practice 
plots.” (Ibid., p. 238) 
 
We make three further observations on this case in order to thicken our description of the 
grower standard concept. First, the notion of a control is used in at least two distinct ways in 
agronomy. The first is in the way exemplified above, where grower standard practices are taken 
to be a contrast class for experimental interventions. The second way is to define a control as 
an experimental plot that receives no or very few interventions. For instance, in the experiment 
above, Instead of treating the control plots according to grower-standard fungicide programs, 
the researchers could have generated control plots with no fungicide program. Setting a 
no-fungicide control for that particular experiment would not have been particularly informative, 
since the goal of the research was to test a proposed improvement upon current standard 
fungicide practices. 
 
Second, the concept of a grower standard functions in this case in ways beyond merely setting 
a control group for the experiment. These functions are more difficult to categorize if what we 
are relying on is the existing philosophical language for experiment design. In the grape 
powdery mildew experiment, it is evident that the notion of a grower standard guides further 
experimental design considerations. The experiment tests when to initiate a fungicide program, 
but once initiated, grower standard specifies when and how future treatments will be applied. 
This is somewhat similar to the role played by background conditions. 
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However, the protocols that see the agronomic experiment through are often carried out by 
growers themselves. Agronomy experiments are typically carried out on either commercial or 
research farms. They are designed and implemented by researchers, and are maintained by 
farm staff whose backgrounds are in agricultural practice rather than agricultural science. These 
growers are active agents in the maintenance of grower standard practices, and their practical 
knowledge can inform the design of agronomy experiments. 
 
Third, the grape powdery mildew experiment demonstrates quite vividly that grower standard is 
not a neutral backdrop for experimental intervention. Even though there are ways in which 
grower standard sets background conditions for the experiment, the whole aim of the 
experiment is to improve upon current grower standard practices for treating powdery mildew in 
Oregon grapes. In this way, grower standard is conceptualized as a suboptimal baseline upon 
which to build improvements. 
 
This function of grower standard is not easily recognizable in common accounts of the 
epistemology of experiment. We believe this is due to the difference in aims between pure and 
applied scientific experimentation. In pure-science experimentation, central goals of 
experiments are to observe, measure, detect, understand, and control natural phenomena. For 
instance, in the experiment to test the effects of temperature and humidity on the proliferation of 
grape powdery mildew, Delp (1945) concludes: “temperature is the primary factor limiting the 
development of vine mildew” in the regions studied during the experiment. The results of Delp’s 
experiment might be (and indeed, were) taken up by agronomic experimenters or by growers in 
7 
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later efforts to improve growing conditions, but Delp’s experiment was not framed around the 
investigation or improvement of grower standard.  
 
While we do not wish to draw a hard division between pure and applied experimentation, we 
contend that when grower standard functions in an experiment in this baseline-setting way we 
describe, it does so in virtue of the applied aims of an experiment.  
2.2 Grower Standard as Novel Epistemic Object 
We have shown that grower standard is a complex and multi-functional concept within 
agronomy. It plays some familiar and some novel roles within the design and interpretation of 
agronomic experiments. The aim-setting and baseline-setting functions of grower standard 
distinguish it from both experimental controls and background conditions. We take this as 
evidence that grower standard is a novel epistemic object within the epistemology of 
experiment, that is, one that does not fit neatly into existing accounts of the phenomena and 
practices that comprise scientific experimentation or the epistemology of science more broadly. 
Grower standard is not a model, theory, instrument, type of evidence, or form of measurement. 
It also does not fit into the newer categories of epistemic objects suggested in recent accounts 
of the philosophy of scientific practice, such as Ankeny and Leonelli’s repertoires (2016) or 
Currie’s surrogate experiments and inference tools (2018). 
 
Our analysis of grower standard shows that it is not only a novel epistemic object, but a novel 
type ​ of epistemic object within the epistemology of experiment. For present purposes we resist 
the urge to name and characterize the broader category of epistemic object into which grower 
standard falls. However, we believe some generalizations can nonetheless be made about the 
8 
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sort of epistemic object that grower standard is by further investigating relations between the 
functions of grower standard and the network of scientific and extra-scientific influences that 
interact to produce grower standard. In the next section, we discuss the relationship between 
grower standard and agricultural extension work. 
3. Extension Work and the Epistemic Objects of 
Agronomy 
Above, we showed that grower standard provides a non-neutral set of background conditions for 
experiment, that it plays a role in setting the aims and methods of experiment, and that it is not a 
fixed standard but rather a suboptimal baseline to be improved upon through the results of 
experimental intervention. In this section, we show that the existence of grower standard as an 
epistemic object is inextricable from consideration of how it is used by different epistemic 
communities as a locus for interdisciplinary exchange. First, we show that the relationship 
between agronomy and agricultural extension work shapes the methods for knowledge 
production in agronomy. Then we extend existing accounts of interdisciplinarity in the 
philosophy of science to lay the foundations of a framework for understanding the knowledge 
coproduction that occurs through agricultural extension work. 
3.1 Coproducing Knowledge Through Agricultural Extension Work 
Agronomy and agricultural extension work are interconnected by important contingencies of 
history. In the U.S., agronomy research was integrated into the mission of a group of public 
universities designated as the Land-Grant Institutions (LGIs). One component of the land-grant 
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system was to provide people an education that including agriculture, practical mechanic 
competencies as well as liberal arts and classics. The Hatch Act of 1887 created the agricultural 
experiment station program and the later 1914 the Smith-Lever Act formally associated 
extension work with the LGIs when it established the Cooperative Extension Service (See 
Footnote 2) to disseminate findings obtained from the experiment station’s experiments. 
 
The in-practice union of research and extension work means that while grower standard is ​used 
in agronomy experiment, it is ​defined ​and ​ known​ through extension work. Growers know what 
grower standard practices are in practice, in their fields and with their soil. Their tacit knowledge 
may be shared when they show extension workers how they make decisions about when to 
fertilize, spray, harvest or till. Likewise, extension specialists can identify aspects of production, 
such as the importance of knowing that farmers will not take seriously the results of tobacco 
experiments planted in Kentucky after June 20, or understanding the economic impact on 
farmers if late-season insect control for cotton in Missouri is suspended too soon for a grower. 
This is one significant way in which extension work influences the epistemic objects of 
agronomy.  
 
Epistemic objects like grower standard may be understood as a type of agricultural tool. 
Through extension work, agricultural tools can be shared, borrowed, invented, and innovated 
within local family farming communities, and in collaborations with research from multiple 
university extension centers. As with grower standard, farmers and researchers are often 
co-producers of these agricultural tools. These tools shape choices that farmers make about 
their farm and crops. For instance, given access to a mechanical seed corn harvester, a farmer 
might choose field corn whose ears grow at the same height facilitating more efficient picking. If 
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a farmer has been no-tilling her operation, she might choose to plant a cover crop of ryegrass to 
build up the health of the soil, especially if she has fragipan soil (Vollstedt, 2020). Tool-driven 
knowledge of these techniques also shapes the type of extension research that is applied to 
crop production, as well as affecting decisions about which experiments on test fields are 
performed. 
 
We contend that agricultural extension work plays an essential role in defining a new set of 
epistemic categories that are essential to the practice of agricultural science. Hearkening to 
contemporary work on social epistemology in the sciences, we call this process the 
coproduction of knowledge in agricultural science ​. Importantly, the epistemic objects produced 
through this process are of use to both individual researchers and farmers as well as to wider 
populations. Further, these epistemic objects impact all of us by affecting decisions about how 
our food, fuel, and fiber is made. 
 
Focusing on the knowledge-coproduction relationship between extension researchers and 
farmers allows us to shine a light on a central method of knowledge growth in agricultural 
science. We contend that this method can only be understood within the realities of extension's 
institutional and demographic history. As such, our nascent epistemology of agricultural 
extension complements current philosophical work on the contingent and value-laden 
epistemologies of other scientific practices. Because extension is also a formalized federal 
institution, we also see a particularly strong connection with current work that investigates the 
interplay between political and institutional pressures in shaping scientific research (e.g. Brown 
2013, 2013b; Douglas, 2009; Kellert, Longino, and Waters, 2006; Kitcher, 2003, 2011; London 
and Zollman, 2010; Zollman, 2007).  
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Agricultural extension work is fundamentally an exchange of ideas between extension 
professionals and the communities they serve. Our analysis of the concept of grower standard 
shows that this exchange shapes the epistemic categories of agricultural science in an applied 
and interactive way. Agricultural extension has played a unique role in shaping rural and 
agrarian attitudes toward science. These attitudes are complex and varied, insofar as scientific 
innovation has greatly increased agricultural productivity, but also changed the farmer's 
relationship to technology, business, and state interests over the past century. Through 
technological innovation, it has also contributed to a diminishing agricultural. This is fertile soil 
for new philosophical analysis of the relationships between science, agriculture, and society. 
3.2 Knowledge Coproduction in Agricultural Extension 
Transcends Interdisciplinary Exchange 
Extension originates important epistemic objects of agricultural science, such as grower 
standard. But extension work is not just limited to the exchange of research and applied 
scientific knowledge from researcher to farmer and farmer to researcher. Extension work maps 
a space of communication where knowledge grows: it is the epistemic locus where a specific 
and impactful variety of knowledge coproduction among diverse stakeholders takes place. A 
robust characterization of the epistemic objects generated in extension work thus requires a 
deeper understanding of the standpoints of these different stakeholders, their interests, and 
their interactions.  
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It would be impractical to generate a complete taxonomy of stakeholders in extension work and 
agricultural science, but it is worth mentioning some common entries to illustrate the diversity of 
standpoints influencing the generation of epistemic objects like grower standard. We have 
discussed extension specialists and farmers at length already, and we have shown how 
farmers’ interests shape grower standards. Analogous stories can be told about the interests of 
farmers’ suppliers and consumers, as well as about institutional and funding pressures on the 
research programs of extension specialists. Additionally, extension work is also performed by 
county extension agents, whose professional obligations to research differ significantly from 
extension specialists, and whose training and interests likewise differ. These are all 
stakeholders in the shaping of epistemic objects in agricultural science. 
 
Often, the ability to form research questions and pursue research depends on the epistemic 
aims and values of stakeholders within a particular agricultural environment (Bammer et al., 
2013, 29-54; O’Rourke, Crowley and Gonnerman, 2016, 62-64). When philosophers have 
previously studied the production of epistemic objects through the collaboration among diverse 
stakeholders, they have primarily done so through the study of interdisciplinarity. Foundational 
philosophy-of-science work on interdisciplinary exchange frames interactions between 
disciplinarily divergent members of a scientific project as an economic exchange, specifically a 
“trading zone.” (Galison, 1997, 1999) The metaphor is extended into linguistics by arguing that 
just as trading communities with different languages developed pidgin vocabularies to 
exchanges goods, so do scientists in different disciplines generate limited common vocabularies 
for the exchange of ideas, based in interactional expertise (Collins et al., 2007). 
Extension work constitutes and is constituted by an interdisciplinary exchange insofar as it is 
knowledge that is articulated within a framework built from interactions and in-practice 
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experience that both shapes and is shaped by future interactions. However, extension work also 
seems to outstrip the notion of interdisciplinary research, due to the diversity of interests and 
backgrounds across stakeholders. Unlike other loci of interdisciplinary discussion, the boundary 
that is crossed is not just disciplinary. In extension’s attempt to understand the goals and 
purposes of another on their own terms, what is required is more than an understanding of the 
position of the farm, choice of crops, and agricultural goals.  
Within extension work, knowledge is always understood with reference to a particular context 
and in light of the actions of a number of epistemic agents. The circumscription of an epistemic 
object relies on how farmers use standards and tools, how these are developed in industry, the 
purposes for which they are used, and how each of these characteristics are informed by 
research within agronomy. Their use shapes diverse perceptions (within industry, university, 
farmer, and among consumers) and may vary depending on the crops (e.g. cotton, maize, 
wheat); the relationship between farmer, farm, biotech industry, society, and the environment; 
the interpretation of languages relied upon by farmers and scientists; and how research, 
technologies, and applications affect perceptions about “nature” and “cultivation.” That is, an 
epistemic object in extension relies on a number of positionalities within academic research 
knowledge, applied scientific knowledges, technological knowledge, and local ecological 
knowledges. 
Further, within extension, interactions are not limited to agent–agent interactions but include 
agent–object interactions as well. Knowledge coproducing interactions within extension work 
include researcher–farmer; farmer–veterinarian–livestock; agronomist–agrotech–banker; 
farmer–land; farmer–cotton baler–farm financial officer; agronomist–agricultural science 
research standards–university interactions; and many more. These interactions vary depending 
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on the crop, pest, and consumer. For instance, cotton production requires substantial up-front 
costs (e.g. pickers, balers), but may require less irrigation than maize. Maize may require extra 
irrigation around the time of tasseling. Farmers planting maize may also consider whether they 
will sell their crops for ethanol production or food production considering the position of the 
consumer and other local and global markets. In these discussions, both farmers and extension 
researchers are beneficiaries of the knowledge that they coproduce.  
While some philosophers and historians of science have accounted for the clustering of 
cross-disciplinary knowledge creation around instrumentation (e.g. Mody, 2011), few have 
developed an account that encompasses agent–agent interdisciplinary exchange, 
tacit-knowledge exchanges, and what is commonly called “instrumental knowledge.” Because of 
the diversity of expertises and interests involved in knowledge coproduction in extension work, 
any epistemology of extension must incorporate all these sources of knowledge-growth 
interactions under a shared umbrella. This sets the knowledge-making activities of extension 
work apart from other sorts of knowledge-making practices in the natural sciences, and the 
epistemic objects created by this means are likewise distinct. Inherently defined by the 
ineliminable role of extension work, agronomy regularly generates epistemic objects of this 
experimental and interactive sort.  
4. Conclusions 
Knowledge coproduction in extension work and agronomy is not the result of simply applying 
universal rules for deriving knowledge from facts. Instead, it is the result of critical intersubjective 
modes of investigation between farmer and extension worker, and between farm, academy, and 
society. In order to illustrate what knowledge coproduction looks like within extension work, we 
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introduced the concept of the grower standard as an example of a coproduced epistemic object. 
The purpose of this was to show how knowledge is obtained through the activities of extension 
and communication between different stakeholders (e.g. researchers, farmer, industry, state). 
We showed how this form of knowledge coproduction was dependent upon these reciprocal 
channels of communication, and also how it transcends familiar transactional accounts of 
interdisciplinary research.  
Although we have argued that the sorts of epistemic objects that arise from extension work are 
different from those arising in other disciplines, we also see strong connections between our 
work and other contemporary discussions in philosophy of science. In addition to literatures on 
interdisciplinarity and values in science, our account of grower standard as an epistemic 
object—as a tool that shapes and is shaped by the knowledge-making practices among a host 
of stakeholders—has roots in a number of different philosophical accounts of knowledge 
creation, including integrated history and philosophy of science, technosocial philosophy, and 
experimental and perspectival approaches to realism.  
These authors provide motivation for our work by taking seriously the study of the interaction 
between humans, machines, and tools. In their views, and in ours, these interactions are the 
remit of a more widely extended approach to the study of philosophy of science that not only 
recognizes the social aspects of scientific knowledge production but sees them as ineliminable 
to knowledge and its growth. This approach informs the kinds of knowledge coproduction that 
take place within extension. In future work we hope to both jointly and individually pursue the 
relation between our views and these influences.  
In particular, one of us will develop these foundations into a study of the normative constraints 
imposed on knowledge coproduction by the interests of the diverse stakeholders in extension 
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work. This will focus on work on the intersection of history of science, science and technology 
studies, and philosophy of science. Meanwhile, the other aims to compare the particularities of 
knowledge coproduction in extension work to knowledge coproduction in other applied sciences. 
As an applied science that has been historically coupled to institutional channels for 
communication with lay communities, the broader structure of knowledge construction in 
agricultural science is unlikely simply to fall in step with the structure of knowledge construction 
in the natural and social sciences. 
We both think that the aim-setting and baseline-setting functions of grower standard also 
illustrate how deeply the applied aims of an experiment can be integrated with the methods of 
the experiment. Now-outdated views about the value-free ideal of science would suggest that 
this degree of integration makes for bad science, in that the data produced by the experiment 
are inextricable from the epistemic object of the grower standard. In future work, we will show 
that this degree of integration is instead an asset to agronomic experiments. 
 
In this paper, we have provided a proof-of-concept sketch of what an epistemology of 
agricultural extension work might look like through our analysis of (a) grower standard as 
epistemic object and (b) stakeholder-driven coproduction of agronomical knowledge. We argued 
that agricultural science is the result of historical, social, interactive, and highly contingent 
agricultural practices and how the epistemic objects it produces are inextricable from those 
contingent histories. The example of grower standard was meant to elucidate how 
considerations of value are constitutive of an epistemology of experiment in agricultural science. 
We do not see agricultural science as an outlier, but as an archetypical instance of value-laden 
epistemologies in applied sciences. As such, the purpose of our paper was to prepare the 
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ground for future work exploring this new form of value-ladenness in the methodology of 
agricultural science more generally. 
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Variable Definition and Independent Components
Lorenzo Casini*, Alessio Moneta†, and Marco Capasso‡
Abstract
In the causal modelling literature, it is well known that “ill-defined” vari-
ables may give rise to “ambiguous manipulations” (Spirtes and Scheines,
2004). Here, we illustrate how ill-defined variables may also induce mis-
takes in causal inference when standard causal search methods are applied
(Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009). To address the problem, we introduce a
representation framework, which exploits an independent component repre-
sentation of the data, and demonstrate its potential for detecting ill-defined
variables and avoiding mistaken causal inferences.
1 The problem of variable definition
Some choices of variables may lead to less informative, or even false, causal
claims. This problem was pointed out by, among others, Spirtes and Scheines
(2004), Eberhardt (2016), and Woodward (2016). Here is a classic example by
Spirtes and Scheines (2004). Consider the following hypothetical data generat-
ing process (Figure 1). Total cholesterol (TC) is a deterministic function (e.g.,
the sum) of two variables, viz. low-density lipoproteins (LDL) and high-density
lipoproteins (HDL), respectively known as “bad” and “good” cholesterol. The
two cholesterols, in fact, have different causal roles: LDL causes heart disease
(HD), while HDL prevents it. Moreover, assume that HDL and LDL cause,
respectively, a disease called “disease 1” (D1) and a disease called “disease 2”
(D2). Spirtes and Scheins point out that, if only TC, but neither HDL nor LDL
is observed, a manipulation of TC with respect to HD is “ambiguous”, because
it leaves underdetermined the values of TC’s underlying determinants, such that
the effect on HD is unpredictable.
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Figure 1: A structure where the manipulation on TC with respect to HD is
“ambiguous”.
More generally, in applied causal inference, often the variables under study
are, like TC, functions of other variables with heterogeneous causal roles. For
example, in macroeconomics a researcher deals with aggregate variables such as
gross domestic product, foreign sales, total imports, etc., which are sums or av-
erages of other variables, whose individual causal roles may be multifarious and
opaque to the researcher. Often, the researcher is unable to observe the underly-
ing micro-behaviours simply because statistical agencies provide aggregate data,
but do not reveal information on the single units. In other cases, collecting micro
data may be too complex or costly. Treating aggregate variables as if they had a
homogeneous causal role, however, may lead to less informative or false causal
claims, as shown by the TC example. We shall refer to an aggregate variable
incurring such problems as ill-defined. Notice, thus, that whether a variable is
ill-defined is relative to a variable set. That is, it may be ill-defined in a set but
well-defined in another.
The problem of variable definition is often underestimated by the wider pub-
lic. For instance, not sufficient attention has been paid to its consequences for
causal inference by constraint-based discovery methods (Spirtes et al., 2000;
Pearl, 2009). We shall return to this point in the next section, by showing how the
presence of TC in a variable set may lead to wrong causal inferences. To address
the problem, we introduce a representation framework—the “independent com-
ponent” representation—for modelling structures containing two kinds of depen-
dencies, namely traditional causal dependencies between well-defined variables,
and dependencies between ill-defined variables and their determinants (see, e.g.,
Figure 1). Next, we demonstrate the potential of this framework for identifying
ill-defined variables and reducing the risk of mistaken causal inferences.
2 Causal search with ill-defined variables
The last decades have witnessed the development and popularization of constraint-
based discovery methods for causal inference (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009).
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In this framework, a causal structure is represented as a triple 〈V, E ,Pr〉, where
〈V, E〉 is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) consisting of a set V of variables and
a set E of edges among them, and Pr is the probability distribution over V asso-
ciated to the DAG. Pr is assumed to comply with the Causal Markov Condition
(CMC) and, typically, the Causal Faithfulness Condition (CFC). CMC says that
(CMC) For any Vi ∈ V = {V1, . . . , Vn}, Vi⊥Noni|Pari ,
where Pari denotes the set of parents (direct causes) of Vi, and Noni denotes
the set of non-descendants (non-effects) of Vi. In words, each variable is proba-
bilistically independent of its non-effects, conditional on its direct causes. CMC
presupposes that for every pair of variables in V, every common direct cause
of the pair is in V or has the same value for all units in the population (causal
sufficiency). CFC says:
(CFC) 〈V, E , Pr〉 is such that every conditional independence relation true in
Pr is entailed by CMC applied to the true DAG 〈V, E〉.
CFC ensures that there is no causal dependence without probabilistic dependence,
that is, all probabilistic independencies in the DAG correspond to causal indepen-
dencies.
Based on these assumptions, constraint-based discovery methods are designed
to recover the causal structure from data, by identifying conditional indepen-
dencies among variables and then causally connecting variables not found to be
independent. We shall now consider examples of simple data generating pro-
cesses including one ill-defined variable, TC, and show how using constraint-
based methods based on conditional independencies—whilst ignoring that TC is
ill-defined—may lead to mistakes. To anticipate, such mistakes involve apparent
violations of CMC or CFC, which the search methods presuppose. Notice, how-
ever, that our interest here is not in providing novel counterexamples to CMC and
CFC. These violations, in fact, could be avoided by choosing a “more suitable”
variable set for causal inference—in this case, one featuring HDL and LDL
instead of TC. And indeed, a formulation of CMC requiring that variables be
independent of their non-effects conditional on their well-defined direct causes
would not incur any violation. In this paper, however, we do not want to presup-
pose what counts as an ill-defined variable or a suitable variable set. Our goal is
to avoid mistaken causal inferences in virtue of detecting ill-defined variables.
Suppose that, in V = {X, Y, Z}, Y is the non-deterministic cause of both X
and Z, viz. the true structure is X ←− Y −→ Z. If all variables are well-defined,
3
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one can infer some properties of the causal structure by testing conditional in-
dependencies and applying a constraint-based discovery method. In particular,
the independence X ⊥ Z |Y and CFC allow one to exclude X −→ Y ←− Z
from the set of possible structures. Now, let the set of observed variables be
V
′
= {TC,D1, D2}. That is, suppose again that one does not observe or mea-
sure LDL and HDL, but only TC. In this case, too, the true structure is not a
collider. Assuming that the dependencies over V′ are causally interpretable, the
most plausible structure—the one we wish to rationalize in this paper—would be
a common cause, viz. D1←− TC −→ D2. However, since HDL and LDL are
independent, LDL⊥HDL, it follows that D1 and D2 are independent, too, viz.
D1⊥ D2. If the true structure is a common cause, this contradicts CFC, which
would entail a dependence between the effects of the common cause. More-
over, being D1 and D2 dependent on (respectively) LDL and HDL, D1 and D2
become dependent upon conditioning on TC, viz. D1 ⊥/ D2 |TC. For exam-
ple, suppose one knows that one patient’s total cholesterol has increased. Then,
knowing that disease 1 is absent gives one relevant information to predict that
disease 2 is present. If the true structure is a common cause, this conditional de-
pendence would violate CMC, which would entail the independence of D1 and
D2 given their common cause. Based on D1⊥ D2 and D1⊥/ D2 |TC, as well
as TC 6⊥ D1 and TC 6⊥ D2, a constraint-based algorithm (e.g., PC, FCI; Spirtes
et al. 2000) will infer an unshielded collider on TC, viz. D1 −→ TC ←− D2. A
researcher applying the algorithm without knowing that TC is the sum of HDL
and LDL (which are causes of, respectively, D1 and D2) will thus infer the
wrong structure. The reason, ultimately, is that TC is ill-defined in V′.
Similarly, assume that all variables in V are well-defined, but now X causes
Y , and Y causes Z, viz. the true structure is X −→ Y −→ Z. Under CMC,
it holds Z ⊥ X |Y , and under CFC, it holds X ⊥/ Z. Now, consider the set of
observed variables V′′ = {Da, TC,D1}, where Da (not represented in Figure
1), denoting dairies, is a cause of LDL but not of HDL. Again, suppose that
one observes TC but neither HDL nor LDL. Here, too, the true structure is not
a collider. The most plausible causal interpretation of the dependencies over V′′
is a directed path, viz. Da −→ TC −→ D1. However, since Da is a cause of
LDL, which is independent of the cause HDL of D1, it holds Da⊥ D1, which
violates CFC. Moreover, it holds Da 6⊥ D1 |TC, which violates CMC. From
this, one may again wrongly infer a collider on TC, viz. Da −→ TC ←− D1.
Ultimately, the reason is that TC ill-defined in V′′.
These simple examples show how conditional independencies are sensitive to
4
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -110-
the presence of ill-defined variables in fork and chain structures1 but ill-defined
variables are undetectable from conditional independencies only. This may lead
to mistaken inferences (viz. the inference of colliders) if one unreflectively ap-
plies constraint-based algorithms.
3 A novel representation framework
We now introduce a series of definitions, which will allow us to precisely define
the notion of ill-defined variable. First, we introduce a class of data generating
mechanisms inducing the problem of ill-defined variables. We call them “aug-
mented” structural causal models, by which we extend the traditional notion of
structural causal models (Pearl, 2009; Peters et al., 2017) to structures including
deterministic assignments.
Augmented structural causal model An augmented structural causal model
C := (AW ,AI ,Pr) consists of a collection AW of m assignments, a collection
AI of k assignments, and a probability distribution Pr such that:
(i) the collection of AW consists of assignments
Wi := fi(Pari, Si), for i = 1, . . . ,m,
where Pari ⊆ W\{Wi} are called the parents of Wi, and Si are called
noises, or shocks;
(ii) Pr over S = {S1, . . . , Sm} is such that the shocks are mutually indepen-
dent, viz. Pr(S) = Pr(S1) · . . . · Pr(Sm); hence, the Si are also called
independent components;
(iii) the collection of AI consists of assignments
Ii := fi(Deti), for i = 1, . . . , k,
where Deti ⊂ V are called determinants of Ii.
C is defined over a set of variables V = W ∪ I with cardinality n = m + k. We
associate to C a graph GV (see, e.g. the graph in Figure 1, where TC is the only
variable with a deterministic assignment). GV is obtained by creating a node for
1By contrast, no mistake occurs if TC is truly a collider. For instance, the inferred structure
over V′′′ = {Da, TC,Ol}, where Ol (olive oil) causes HDL but not LDL, is Da −→ TC ←−
Ol, as it should be.
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Figure 2: GICV corresponding to the DAG GV in Figure 1.
each element of V, and by drawing a directed edge −→ from each parent in Pari
(if not empty) to Wi, and a modified directed edge =⇒ from each determinant
in Deti to Ii. Henceforth, we restrict our attention to acyclic structures, such
that GV is a modified DAG, to cases where Deti has at least two elements, and to
assignments AW in which the shocks are additive. For simplicity, we also assume
that no pair of variables Ii, Ij in I, Ii 6= Ij , are linked in GV by a bidirected
modified “active” (i.e., without colliders) path Ii ⇐= · · · =⇒ Ij .
By replacing all modified directed edges =⇒ with standard edges −→, GV
becomes a standard DAG, labelled G̃V . By removing from GV the nodes in I and
the edges connecting I to W, we obtain a subgraph of GV , which we denote GW .
Let us now introduce a particular graph associated with C, which we call in-
dependent component (IC) representation, or GIC . GIC contains edges between
shocks and endogenous variables but not among endogenous variables them-
selves. Despite this apparent limitation, the information in GIC shall be key to
the purpose of our paper. Although here we are not concerned with how GIC is
recovered, we should mention that there exist powerful statistical learning tech-
niques, such as Independent Component Analysis (ICA) (Hyvärinen et al., 2001),
which under certain assumptions (viz., non-Gaussianity) infer the dependence
coefficients, and thus identify the absence of dependencies, between shocks and
endogenous variables in C, and thereby recover the edges in GIC .
IC representation Consider C := (AW ,AI ,Pr) , with V = W∪I, card(V) =
n = m+k. An IC representation of C is a DAG GICV = 〈V∪S, E
IC〉 such that EIC
consists of the following edges: (i) Si −→ Wi, for any i = 1, . . . ,m; (ii) Si −→
Wj , for any i 6= j such that there is a directed standard path Wi −→ · · · −→ Wj
in GV ; (iii) Si −→ Ih, for any Si ∈ S and any Ih ∈ I such that there is a directed
modified path Wi =⇒ · · · =⇒ Ih in GV ; (iv) Si −→ Ih, for any Si ∈ S and any
Ih ∈ I such that from Wi to Ih in GV there is a directed standard path followed
by a directed modified path with the same orientation, Wi −→ · · · =⇒ Ih.
Let us illustrate this definition relative to Figure 2, where W = {HDL,LDL,D1,
D2, HD} and I = {TC}. (i) There is a shock for each variable in W. Some
6
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shocks (e.g., SD1) only hit one variable (D1). Other are common to multiple
variables. (ii) For any variable (e.g., HDL), its shock (SHDL) also hits all of its
descendants, if any (D1, HD). (iii) Any shock to a determinant of a variable Ii in
I (e.g., SHDL) also hits Ii (TC). (iv) If V contained a cause of a determinant of
Ii (e.g., dairies, Da, which causes LDL), its shock (SDa) would also hit Ii (TC).
One may also define GIC relative to any subset O of variables in V, namely
GICO = 〈O ∪ SO, E
IC
O 〉. SO is obtained by removing from S those shocks, which
C assigns to variables in W that are not in O, and by adding those shocks, which
C assigns to variables in W that are determinants of variables in I ∩ O. EICO is
obtained by removing from EIC all of those edges, whose tails are not in SO. For
any variable set O, we call “idiosyncratic” a shock to a variable X in GIC
O
that is
a parent of X and of no other variable. We may now define ill- and well-defined
variables:
Ill- and well-defined variables Let C over V = W∪ I contain the assignment
I := f(DetI), card(DetI) ≥ 2. Let DesI denote the set of all descendants of
determinants of I in GV .
2 Assume I ∈ O ⊆ V. Then, I is ill-defined in O if and
only if, for some Desj ∈ DesI , there exists a variable Y such that (i) Y ∈ O,
(ii) Y 6= I , (iii) Y belongs to a (possibly empty) active path from Deti to Desj
in GV (viz. Deti −→ · · · −→ Desj or Deti −→ · · · =⇒ Desj), and (iv) G
IC
{I,Y }
contains no shock SY common to I, Y , for which SY ⊥ Y |I in C. Any variable
in O that is not ill-defined in O is well-defined in O.
For instance, TC is well-defined in {Da, TC} because Da is neither a determi-
nant of TC nor a descendant of a determinant of TC, and vice versa. By contrast,
TC is ill-defined in {HDL, TC} because HDL is a determinant of TC, and
SHDL⊥/ HDL|TC; also, TC is ill-defined in {TC,D1} and {TC,HD} because
D1 and HD are effects of determinants of TC, and (respectively) SD1⊥/ D1|TC
and SHD⊥/ HD|TC. More generally, a variable I is ill-defined in O if and only
if O also contains a variable Y among I’s determinants or their descendants, and
GIC{I,Y } contains no shock SY on I, Y , such that I screens off SY from Y in C.
This lack of screening off intuitively captures the idea that a manipulation of I
with respect to Y is ambiguous. In turn, to explain the lack of screening off, we
need the following Proposition (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 1 Let C over V = W ∪ I contain the assignment I := f(DetI),
card(DetI) ≥ 2. Assume CMC and CFC in GW . Then, for any Deti, Desi, Anci,
2Notice that DetI ⊆ DesI by definition of “descendant”.
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where Desi is a descendant of Deti, and Anci is an ancestor of Deti, it holds
Anci 6⊥ Desi|I , except for a parameter set Θ (characterising the assignments in
C) that violates CFC in G̃V .
3
We can also define a graph GO = 〈O, EO〉 representing the structure over O,
where EO consists of the following edges. First, GO has a modified edge X =⇒ Y
if and only if there is a directed path X =⇒ · · · =⇒ Y in GV , and no variable
between X and Y is in O. Next, let the tail♦ of the arrow X ♦−→ Y indicate that
X is ill-defined in {X, Y }. Then, GO has an edge X ♦−→ Y for any 〈X, Y, Z〉
for which X, Y ∈ O, Z ∈ V, Z /∈ O, and GV features a path X ⇐= Z −→ Y ,
unless GICO has a shock S common to X, Y for which S ⊥ Y |X in C, in which
case X −→ Y is in GO. Furthermore, GO has a standard edge X −→ Y if GV has
a directed path from X to Y featuring standard edges −→ and/or modified edges
=⇒, and no variable between X and Y is in O. Finally, GO has a bidirected edge
X ←→ Y if and only if GV has an active path X ←− · · · ←− Z −→ · · · −→ Y
featuring standard or modified edges, and only X, Y on that path are in O. No
further edges are in GO.
Illustrated in relation to Figure 1, G{HDL,TC,LDL} is HDL =⇒ TC ⇐=
LDL, and G{HDL,LDL,HD} is HDL −→ HD ←− LDL. The two problematic
structures with ill-defined variables from §2, namely G{TC,D1,D2} and G{Da,TC,D1},
are represented as, respectively, D1 ←−♦TC ♦−→ D2 and Da −→ TC ♦−→
D1. Finally, let us define the notions of ill- and well-defined causes:
Ill- and well-defined causes For any X, Y ∈ O, X is an ill-defined cause of Y
in O if and only if G{X,Y } contains the edge X ♦−→ Y . For any X, Y ∈ O, X
is a well-defined cause of Y in O if and only if Y is well-defined in {X, Y }, and
G{X,Y } contains the edge X −→ Y .
For instance, HDL is a well-defined cause of HD in {HDL,HD}.4 By contrast,
TC is an ill-defined cause of HD in {TC,HD}.
4 Identification
We now illustrate the applicability of our framework to detecting ill-defined vari-
ables and improving causal inference. We begin with a condition, under which
3Notice that we do not assume CFC in G̃V . For such a Θ, I counts as well-defined in our
framework, as the manipulation of I with respect to Desi is not ambiguous.
4At the same time, HDL is not a (well-defined) cause of TC in {HDL, TC}, because TC is
not well-defined in that set.
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one may unambiguously identify ill-defined variables.
Proposition 2: Sufficient condition for ill-definedness Consider C over V,
and O = {X, Y, Z} ⊆ V. Assume CMC and CFC in GW . Also assume (i)
X ⊥ Z, (ii) X ⊥/ Y , Y ⊥/ Z, X ⊥/ Z|Y , and (iii) GICO has no idiosyncratic
shock on Y . Then, Y is ill-defined in O with two determinants in V, and GO is
X ←−♦Y ♦−→ Z.
For instance, applied to V′ = {TC,D1, D2}, this condition establishes that TC
is an ill-defined common cause of D1 and D2, viz. D1 ←−♦TC ♦−→ D2, since
D1 ⊥ D2, D1⊥/ TC, TC ⊥/ D2, D1⊥/ D2|TC, and GICV ′ has no idiosyncratic
shock to TC. Proposition 2 is easily generalizable to cases with more than two
determinants.
If one observes no effects of independent determinants of the ill-defined vari-
able, for instance in V′′ = {Da, TC,D1}, the above condition is not applica-
ble. Nonetheless, one may still reduce the ambiguity concerning ill-defined vari-
ables and partially recover the causal structure. To this end, let us assume that
determinism induces dependencies (DD):
(DD) For any I and any Deti ∈ DetI in C, it holds I⊥/ Deti.
In words, there are probabilistic dependencies between variables with determinis-
tic assignments and their determinants. This assumption is only violated by can-
celling paths from determinants to determined variables. Its satisfaction requires
(similarly to CFC) the absence of special parameterizations. For simplicity, we
also assume that O contains no determinants of variables in O, such that EO con-
tains no modified edges =⇒.5 Then, one may identify well-defined variables:
Proposition 3: Sufficient condition for well-definedness Consider C over V,
and O ⊆ V. Assume DD. Assume CMC and CFC in GW . Assume that no
determinant of ill-defined variables in O is in O. Then, a variable X is well-
defined in O if for any Y in O, X 6= Y , one of (i)–(iv) holds: (i) X ⊥ Y ; (ii)
in GIC{X,Y } X is not a child of an idiosyncratic shock, and X, Y are children of a
common shock S, such that S ⊥ Y |X; (iii) in GIC{X,Y } X is the only child of an
idiosyncratic shock; (iv) in GIC{X,Y }, X, Y are children of idiosyncratic shocks, and
there is Z ⊂ O such that X⊥ Y |Z and no Zi ∈ Z is the child of an idiosyncratic
shock in GIC{X,Zi}.
5Of course, there is no a priori guarantee that O contains no determinants. Although one
could easily relax this assumption, and thereby obtain a more general result, this would require a
lengthier proof. For reasons of space, here we prioritize simplicity over generality.
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For instance, Da (which, to recall, causes LDL but not HDL) is well-defined in
V
′′, since (i) Da⊥D1, and (ii) GIC{Da,TC} contains a shock S common to Da, TC,
such that S ⊥ TC|Da, and no idiosyncratic shock to Da, from which one may
infer Da −→ TC. Next, one can identify putative ill-defined variables:
Proposition 4: Necessary condition for ill-definedness Consider C over V
and its associated graph GV . Assume DD. Assume CMC and CFC in GW . Let X
be ill-defined in O = {X, Y } with DetX ∩O = ∅, O ⊆ V. Then: (i) X 6⊥ Y ;
(ii) in GICO X, Y are children of a common shock; (iii.a) in G
IC
O X is child of an
idiosyncratic shock, or (iii.b) in GICO X is not a child of an idiosyncratic shock
and there is a set of shocks S on X such that X⊥ Y |S.
For instance, TC and D1 are such that (i) TC 6⊥ D1. Moreover, in GIC{TC,D1}
they are (ii) children of a common shock and (iii.a) children of idiosyncratic
shocks. Therefore, TC and D1 qualify as putatively ill-defined. Assuming the
absence of bidirected modified paths, G{TC,D1} cannot be TC ⇐= · · · =⇒ D1.
Therefore, only three structures are possible, namely TC ♦−→ D1, TC ←−
♦D1, and TC ←→ D1. The ambiguity may be resolved by enlarging V′′ until
a sufficient set Z of common causes of TC,D1 is found that screens them off,
or (given Z) the dependence between TC and D1 is oriented such that one is
a well-defined cause of the other, viz. TC −→ D1 or TC ←− D1, or enough
effects of determinants of TC or D1 are observed as to remove the idiosyncratic
shock on TC or D1, such that either TC ♦−→ D1 or TC ←−♦D1 holds.
5 Conclusion
The problem of variable definition is known to be responsible for ambiguous
manipulations. Furthermore, we showed that it can lead to mistakes in causal
inference by standard constraint-based causal search methods. To address the
problem, we introduced a novel representation framework suitable for structures
including ill-defined variables, viz. the independent component (IC) representa-
tion. We argued that recovering the IC representation can unambiguously identify
ill-defined variables, under certain assumptions, or at least exclude that certain
variables are ill-defined, and consequently reduce the risk of mistaken causal in-
ferences. Given recent advances in statistical techniques (e.g., Independent Com-
ponenent Analysis) by which one may recover the IC representation, our proposal
holds great promise. Therefore, we strongly invite further research on the subject.
10
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume per absurdum that there exist Anci, Desi of Deti,
such that Anci⊥ Desi|I for any set of parameters Θ in C. This is possible only
if one of (A)–(C) holds: (A) Deti suffices to determine I , such that I renders
Deti irrelevant to Anci, Desi. This requires card(DetI) = 1, contradicting
card(DetI) ≥ 2. (B) card(DetI) ≥ 2 and for some Detj ∈ DetI , there is
no directed path Detj −→ · · · −→ Desi. Then, Detj would act as an ex-
ogenous noise on I , such that the edge Deti =⇒ I would be observationally
indistinguishable from a standard edge Deti −→ I . Holding CFC in W, and
since I behaves like a child of Deti, we would have Anci⊥/ Desi|I , contradict-
ing our starting hypothesis. (C) card(DetI) ≥ 2 and for any Detj ∈ DetI ,
there is a directed path Detj −→ · · · −→ Desi. Then, there exists a parameter
set Θ such that Anci ⊥ Desi|I and, necessarily, for any Deti, Detj ∈ DetI ,
PΘ(I,Desi|Deti) = PΘ(I,Desi|Detj). For instance, assume card(DetI) = 2
and a generalized additive model such that I = f(Deti) + g(Detj) and D =
f ′(Deti) + g
′(Detj) + SD. Then, A⊥ D|I holds only if f(Deti) + f
′(Deti) =
g(Deti) + g
′(Deti). This point generalizes to larger cardinalities. Finally, since
I is a parent of neither Anci nor Desi in G̃V , any parameter set Θ such that
Anci⊥Desi|I necessarily violates CFC in G̃V .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ∗−→ denote one among −→, ←→, and ♦−→. As-
sume per absurdum that (i)–(iii) are true but Y is well-defined. CMC and (ii)
entail that GV contains paths linking X, Y and Y, Z. CFC and (i) entail that
GV contains no path linking X,Z. Then, GO contains only two edges, one con-
necting X, Y , and one connecting Y, Z. Among the possible structures in GO,
X∗−→ Y −→ Z, X ←− Y ←−∗Z, X ←−∗Y −→ Z, and X ←− Y ∗−→ Z
contradict (i), and X∗−→ Y ←−∗Z contradicts (iii). In all other structures, viz.
X ←−♦Y ♦−→ Z, X∗−→ Y ♦−→ Z, and X ←−♦Y ←−∗Z, Y is ill-defined.
The latter two contradict (iii). Thus, GO is X ←−♦Y ♦−→ Z, and DetY has
precisely two elements in V (one causing X and one causing Z); otherwise GICO
would contain an idiosyncratic shock on Y associated to its extra determinant(s),
violating (iii). As a corollary, GICO contains idiosyncratic shocks on X and Z.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) From the definition of ill-defined variable, for any I ∈
V, GV contains a directed path from some Deti ∈ DetI to some descendant Desj
of Deti. Under CFC and DD, I is ill-defined only if O contains some Y on that
path, such that I ⊥/ Y . Hence, if O = {X, Y } and X ⊥ Y , then X is well-
defined. (ii) In GIC{X,Y }, X is ill-defined and not a child of an idiosyncratic shock
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contains no shock S common to X, Y , such that S⊥ Y |X . Since this contradicts
(ii), X cannot be ill-defined. (iii) If X is the only child of an idiosyncratic shock
in GIC{X,Y }, then G
IC
{X,Y } contains a shock common to X, Y . Then, X is ill-defined
in GIC{X,Y } only if O contains a node Deti ∈ DetX , which is not a child of an
idiosyncratic shock. This contradicts the assumption that DetX ∩O = ∅. Hence,
X is well-defined. (iv) Suppose per absurdum that X is ill-defined, entailing a
directed path Deti −→ · · · −→ Y in GV . Since X⊥ Y |Z, some Zi ∈ Z ⊂ O is




(iv). Hence, X is well-defined.
Proof of Proposition 4. Preamble: From the definition of ill-defined variable, and
from DetX ∩ O = ∅, it follows that G{X,Y } is X ♦−→ Y . (i) Under CFC and
DD, the preamble implies X⊥/ Y . (ii) By definition of IC representation, GIC{X,Y }
contains at least one common shock to X, Y due to a latent determinant of X . (iii)
If GV contains a determinant of X not linked to Y by a directed path, then X is
a child of an idiosyncratic shock (iii.a). If, on the contrary, all determinants of X
are linked to Y by directed paths in GV , then X is not a child of an idiosyncratic
shock. Additionally, given X⊥ Y |DetX , it follows that there is a set S of shocks
on X’s determinants, such that X⊥ Y |S (iii.b).
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Abstract: This paper addresses inferences to the explanandum: inferences from the premise 
that an explanandum is plausibly explained to the conclusion that this explanandum (or a claim 
or representation thereof) is adequate or true. These inferences consist in answering why or 
how something occurs to concluding that it occurs. Psychological research and scientific cases 
reveal that inferences to the explanandum are proposed by lay people and scientists, and some 
philosophical accounts permit these inferences. This is problematic, as pseudoscientific claims 
are often believed (or at least espoused) because they are plausibly explained. We should be 

















Philosophical accounts of explanation identify the targets to be explained 
(explananda) and the explanations for them (explanantia). There is also analysis of 
explanatory reasoning, which includes but is not limited to analyses of inferences to the best 
explanation. However, what is less discussed is the defensibility of an inference in the other 
direction: should we infer to an explanandum from plausibly explaining it? 
While this inference is seldom discussed by philosophers, it is no less pressing. 
Consider that individuals’ judgments of explananda are influenced by the explanations that 
are provided for them. A prima facie example of this is the “soy boy” effect. In this case, the 
explanandum is that soy consumption has “feminizing effects on men” (Messina 2010, 
2095). Adherents claim that they believe in this effect in part because they can “explain” it: 
soy contains phytoestrogens, the ingestion of which causes changes in sex characteristics. 
This claim has the proper form for one account of explanation: it sketches a mechanistic 
relation between soy consumption and bodily changes. It also has some degree of empirical 
support: evidence corroborates that soy contains chemicals called ‘phytoestrogens’ and that 
hormonal estrogen can induce these changes in humans. However, there is no evidence that 
soy has this effect in humans (Messina 2010). This case of explaining to support an 
explanandum’s belief-worthiness, whether involving a good faith inference or not, seems to 
have considerable rhetorical power. This raises a question. When provided a plausible 
explanation, should we infer that its explanandum is adequate or true? Should we (say) 
believe that the soy boy effect occurs based on its explanation? 
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 This paper casts doubt on the idea that it is acceptable to infer that an explanandum is 
adequate or true from the provision of a plausible explanation for it – what I call an inference 
to the explanandum. The provision of an explanation serves as such a bad reason to infer that 
its explanandum is true or adequate that, when explaining stands as the sole basis for 
inferences regarding its explanandum, one should infer that this explanandum is explainable 
but should not infer that is true or adequate. My doubt is not based on deficiencies of so-
called “plausible explanations”; I remain skeptical even when explanations match the form of 
mechanistic models (Craver 2007) and have empirical support.  
 In Section 2, I introduce inferences to the explanandum and define ‘plausible 
explanation.’ In Section 3, I discuss different conclusions that may be inferred about an 
explanandum from explaining it. In Section 4, I argue that we should be skeptical of 
inferences to the explanandum. This is because (1) explanantia do not provide evidential 
support for their explananda, (2) the evidence for explanantia need not transfer to 
explananda, and (3) the idea that “bona fide” explaining entails that explananda are adequate 
or true does not warrant inferring to the explanandum. Inferences that conclude with the 
explainability of explananda are, by contrast, acceptable. I conclude by discussing how 
inferences to the explanandum illustrate a drawback of lay, scientific, and philosophical 
predilections for explanation: unsupported claims or outright pseudoscience can garner 
legitimacy from epistemically suspect inferences and subsequently can be exploited for 
unscrupulous aims. 
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2. Inference to the Explanandum 
 An inference to the explanandum consists in inferring from the premise that a given 
explanandum is plausibly explained to the conclusion that this explanandum (or a claim or 
representation thereof) is adequate or true. This amounts to concluding that an explanandum 
is belief worthy (or a cognate epistemic attitude) from explaining it.1 A plausible explanation 
consists in a claim or representation that has the form for a philosophical account of scientific 
explanation as well as some degree of empirical support for its content. For example, if I 
infer from the premise that I can plausibly explain why the soy boy effect occurs to the 
conclusion that it occurs, I infer to the explanandum. This inference juxtaposes an inference 
to the best explanation, or an inference “from the premise that a given hypothesis would 
provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the 
conclusion that the given hypothesis is true” (Harman 1965, 89).  
Let me detail my characterization. First, inferences to the explanandum are inferences 
about the adequacy or truth of the explanandum: they are not inferences concluding 
something else about an explanandum, such as it being predictive or explainable. Second, 
inferences to the explanandum are inferences about specific explananda: if the explanandum 
 
1 I include “a claim or representation” to reflect that ontic accounts of explanation take 
explananda to be in the world and therefore not candidates for being true or adequate (Halina 
2017). I include “adequate” to accommodate accounts of explanation that do not construe 
explananda as candidates for being true.  
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is the soy boy effect, for example, it is an inference about this effect as it is characterized by 
its adherents. It is not a broader, unspecific inference about there being some explanandum 
that is explained. Third, unlike inferences to the best explanation, inferences to the 
explanandum are not about picking the best explanandum from a set of explananda. Rather, it 
is an inference about the particular explanandum and no other.  
Motivation for this paper comes from research on explanation effects. This effect is 
exemplified by Ross and colleagues, who tested whether or not “the process of explaining an 
event increases its subjective likelihood for the perceiver” in subjects who were told that the 
events were fictious (1977, 818), from which they conclude “that providing an explanation 
for an event substantially increases the subjective likelihood of the occurrence of the event” 
(1977, 825-826). Explanation effects are discussed by Lombrozo, who notes that 
“psychological findings suggest that the mere existence of an explanation can influence the 
probability assigned to an explanandum,” and “explaining a hypothetical outcome… 
increases the subjective probability of that outcome” (2011, 545). Some psychologists 
present concerns about “this reliance on explanatory considerations” in reasoning (Lombrozo 
2011, 546). For instance, Kuhn notes that “people… depend on explanations that allow their 
claims to ‘make sense’,” but she emphasizes that explanations “lead to overconfidence, they 
inhibit examination of alternatives, and, most seriously, they may be false” (2001, 1).  
 What do inferences to the explanandum have to do with science? First, some accounts 
of explanatory reasoning permit these inferences. For example, Thagard’s explanatory 
coherence account, according to which “we should accept propositions that cohere with our 
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other beliefs” (1989, 436), indicates that “a hypothesis coheres with what it explains,” and 
“we should accept or reject propositions based on their overall coherence with one another” 
(2006, 142). Explanatory coherence accounts “for a wide range of explanatory inferences,” 
including, it would appear, inferences to the explanandum (Thagard 1989, 435). Inferences to 
the explanandum are also indirectly supported by Hempel’s conception of “explanatory 
relevance”: explanatory information “affords good grounds for believing that the 
phenomenon to be explained did, or does, indeed occur” (1966, 48). While Hempel accounts 
for explanation rather than reasoning, explanatory relevance supports the idea that, in 
general, an explanation’s quality should be measured in terms of the support it lends to 
believing in its explanandum. This idea provides some justification for inferring to the 
explanandum.  
Second, scientists’ judgments of explananda are influenced by explaining them. 
Scientists, on occasion, take mechanisms to “add weight” to what these mechanisms explain: 
“an analogy would be that we are more certain that we actually went to the moon if we 
understand the small scale step-by-step mechanisms that explain how we got there” (Patihis 
2018, 375). Psychologists provide reason to worry that inferences like this are not 
uncommon. When studying explanatory reasoning in science students, Masnick and 
Zimmerman claim that because “individuals are more likely to believe an empirical finding if 
there is a theory or explanation for that finding, … it is unsurprising that the presence of 
explanatory information would increase perceptions of how important or interesting a topic 
is” (Masnick and Zimmerman 2009, 35). This tendency to infer to the explanandum seems 
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greatest with mechanistic explanations (Craver 2007), which is why I focus specifically on 
mechanistic explanation.2 
 
3. Inferences about Explananda 
Given the wealth of evidence that suggests that inferences to the explanandum occur 
amongst lay people, I focus on explanatory inferences amongst scientists. While these occur, 
not all inferences regarding explananda fit my characterization of an inference to the 
explanandum. Therefore, it is prudent to disentangle these inferences. I discuss two cases. 
Each case involves the provision of a plausible explanation. The first case is the plausible 
explanation of a controversial explanandum. The second case is the plausible explanation of 
a putatively unexplainable target.  
 
3.1. Plausibly Explaining a Controversial Explanandum 
What happens when researchers infer that a controversial target phenomenon occurs 
from its plausible mechanistic explanation? Memory transfer is one of the most notorious 
cases of a controversial phenomenon to have been alleged to occur in the history of science. 
This phenomenon was characterized as the transfer of memories from one organism to 
another via the transfer of tissue. A proponent of memory transfer, Ungar, defended that this 
 
2 Equivalent concerns can be devised for other accounts of scientific explanation, but this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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alleged phenomenon occurs because he could provide a plausible mechanistic explanation for 
memory transfer’s occurrence (Colaço 2018, 37). 
Ungar supported that he transferred memories via chemical injection by claiming that 
he had isolated its chemical substrate, which he called “scotophobin” (1974, 599). With this 
substrate isolated, Ungar schematized it as a component of a mechanism for memory 
transfer. He claims that it is “widely held, in spite of the inadequacy and controversial nature 
of the evidence, that some sort of molecular coding would be the most likely explanation of 
learning,” and he claims that “built-in pathways… can be founded, and a fully developed 
molecular coding system which maintains the synaptic connections between the neurons of 
each functionally related pathway” can be schematized (Ungar 1968, 222). Ungar claims that 
“this peptide, called scotophobin, was synthesized and distributed to a number of 
laboratories, which confirmed its dark-avoidance inducing effect,” which suggests that 
schematizing this mechanism and providing evidence for it is reason to believe in memory 
transfer (1974, 599, my emphasis). This is a plea to infer to the explanandum from this 
mechanistic model. 
Ungar’s contemporaries were skeptical about memory transfer. One skeptic, Stewart, 
claims that Ungar’s “conclusions are more likely false than true,” though he notes that the 
“synthesis of the pentadecapeptide [scotophobin] is essentially sound” (Stewart 1972, 209). 
Like other skeptics, Stewart appears to have accepted Ungar’s mechanistic model as 
plausible insofar as he accepted that components of the model were empirically supported. 
Nevertheless, Stewart and others claimed that Ungar provided insufficient evidence to 
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believe in the explanandum. It would appear that the “inadequacy and controversial nature of 
the evidence” was sufficient to keep skeptics skeptical of the alleged explanandum. The 
skeptics won out: the memory transfer project collapsed, despite Ungar plausibly explaining 
this explanandum (Colaço 2018, 37). 
 
3.2. Plausibly Explaining an “Unexplainable” Target 
What about cases in which an explanation is provided for a putatively unexplainable 
target? One alleged inference of this character is in the case of continental drift. Historians 
have argued that continental drift, or the movement of continents over time, was rejected by 
geologists in part because it was not explainable. It was not until the provision of an 
“adequate causal mechanism” in modern plate tectonics, this argument continues, that 
continental drift was accepted (Oreskes 1988, 312). Laudan claims that “the problem with 
drift was not that there was no known mechanism or cause, but that any conceivable 
mechanism would conflict with physical theory” (1978, 230).  
Oreskes challenges these historical claims. She claims that “a theory of drift did not 
fail for lack of a mechanism,” highlighting that researchers had provided explanations that 
were largely rejected (Oreskes 1988, 331). Oreskes argues that “the most likely cause of the 
rejection of continental drift was the evidence put forward to support it” (1988, 332), though 
some geologists rejected it due to the “lack of an adequate driving force for drift” (1988, 
334). This suggests that better evidence for continental drift was desired, though there were 
concerns about its explanation as well. That being said, Oreskes argues that the acceptance of 
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drift came from “not the elucidation of… the mechanism by which they occur, but by the 
availability of a new kind of evidence” (1988, 346).  
On either Laudan or Oreskes’ construal of the case, plausibly explaining continental 
drift resulted in researchers investigating it. However, three features differ the continental 
drift case from the scotophobin case. First, many researchers argued that continental drift was 
unexplainable, while skeptics accepted that memory transfer was explainable. Second, no 
researcher suggests that explaining drift “confirms” its occurrence, as Ungar argued. If 
something was inferred from the mechanistic models of plate tectonics, it was not the 
adequacy or truth of the explanandum. Third, even if an inference about the explanandum 
occurred in the drift case, this inference was wrapped into debates about what counts as 
evidence for the explanandum. Neither historical construal suggests that continental drift was 
believed solely based on its plausible explanation.  
 
4. Whither Inference to the Explanandum? 
The cases in Section 3 show that there are at least two distinct inferences one might 
make about an explanandum from its plausible explanation. The scotophobin case matches 
what I characterize as an inference to the explanandum. By contrast, the continental drift case 
has two differences: it does not involve inferring that the explanandum is adequate or true, 
and it involves inferences about targets that were previously considered to be unexplainable. 
It is these differences that make the latter sort of inference acceptable, while the former sort – 
inferences to the explanandum – are epistemically suspect. 
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Inferences to the explanandum, meaning the inference from a plausible explanation to 
the truth or adequacy of its explanandum, are inferences about which we should be skeptical. 
This is because these inferences, despite their apparently compelling character, do not 
empirically support the explanandum’s truth or adequacy. For one, explanantia are not 
evidence for explananda. Following on Kuhn’s insight (2001), explaining alone provides no 
evidence for the explanandum, even if this “explaining” matches the form of an account of 
explanation and coheres with the characterized explanandum as specified on the explanatory 
coherence account. The study from Ross and colleagues illustrates this limitation of 
explaining: one can plausibly explain explananda that are known to be fictitious without 
making these explananda any less fictitious. Thus, if one argues that an explanation warrants 
believing in its explanandum, it will not be through a plausible explanation serving as 
evidence for this explanandum.3  
Perhaps the empirical support for plausible explanations transfers to the 
explanandum. After all, part of what makes explanations plausible is that they have some 
degree of empirical support. This support, one might argue, is also support for the 
explanandum. The explanatory coherence account corroborates this idea. If the explanans 
 
3 Even the explanatory coherence account indicates that evidence is stronger than 
explanation: “a proposition describing the results of observation has a degree of acceptability 
on its own,” as “it can stand on its own more successfully than can a hypothesis whose sole 
justification is what it explains” (Thagard 1989, 437-438).   
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and explanandum cohere, and the explanans and its evidence cohere, then the explanandum 
and this evidence cohere. Therefore, on this account, evidence that coheres with an 
explanation also supports its coherent explanandum.  
However, evidence for a plausible explanation need not be transitive. Even when 
components of an explanation are empirically supported, this evidence may be neutral to the 
truth or adequacy of its explanandum. The evidence that supports the identification of 
scotophobin does not provide a test of the occurrence of the explanandum in this case: the 
peptide may underwrite a distinct explanandum phenomenon. The “soy boy” case also 
illustrates this lack of transitivity: neither the fact that phytoestrogen is in soy nor the fact that 
hormonal estrogen has this effect is evidence that phytoestrogens function like human 
hormonal estrogen. 
What about cases where the evidence does transfer from explanans to explanandum? 
This no more supports the acceptability of inferences to the explanandum than when 
evidence does not transfer. If the evidence for an explanans is transitive, then this evidence 
confirms the explanandum. The explanation merely serves as a means to connect the 
explanandum with this evidence. The idea of transitive evidence may go some way in 
explaining the putative successes of reasoning strategies like the explanatory coherence 
model: so long as there is evidence that supports the explanandum, this evidence, the 
explanandum, and its explanans cohere, and the explanandum is supported as a result. 
However, this is not an inference to the explanandum.  
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Perhaps the acceptability of inferences to the explanandum is independent of 
evidential considerations. One might have the intuition that something does not count as 
“bona fide” explaining if its explanandum is not true or adequate. This intuition supports the 
idea that the scotophobin case involves unacceptable inferences because of deficiencies of 
the so-called “explanation” rather than issues with inferences to the explanandum in general. 
This intuition hints at two ideas. First, plausible explanations fail to count as bona fide 
explaining, so my examples have no relevance to adjudicating the acceptability of inferences 
to the explanandum, and it is a mistake to refer to them in terms of ‘explanation,’ 
‘explanans,’ or ‘explanandum.’ Second, because the adequacy or truth of the explanandum is 
sin qua non for bona fide explaining, inferences to the explanandum that involve bona fide 
explanations are acceptable because of this relation. Thus, the reader may be sympathetic to 
the idea that, regardless of whether or not they are called ‘explanations,’ one cannot explain 
an explanandum that is false or inadequate. This intuition may lead the reader to be doubtful 
of the explanatory merit of what I call ‘plausible explanations.’ 
While this intuition may be compelling, we should dismiss it. For one, endorsing this 
intuition comes at the cost of descriptive adequacy. The majority of explanations in science 
likely are not “bona fide” in the relevant sense. Even if bona fide explaining entails that the 
explananda are true or adequate, this does not entail that these inferences are acceptable in 
real explanatory practices: even if we assume that only true or adequate explananda are 
genuinely explained, many times in practice, these explananda turn out to be false or 
inadequate. Explanatory claims made by scientists also should be taken seriously because, 
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whether one wants to count them as deficient or not, the explanations put forward in the 
scotophobin and soy boy cases match the form of the mechanistic account and have empirical 
support. This suggests that this intuition is at odds not only with how explanatory claims are 
employed in science but also with philosophical accounts of scientific explanation.  
However, there is a deeper issue with this intuition. Even if we accept that, in 
principle, bona fide explanations are explanations of true or adequate explananda, this alone 
does not warrant an inference to the explanandum. This is because it leaves open the question 
of how we come to know that an explanation is bona fide, and we thus are permitted to infer 
from it to the truth or adequacy of the explanandum. This epistemic issue speaks to why 
Craver suggests that characterizing “the [explanandum] phenomenon correctly and 
completely is a crucial step” in developing explanatory models (Craver 2007, 128). 
Mechanists like Craver take correct models of explanantia to depend on correct 
characterizations of explananda, and not the other way around. This emphasis on settling the 
explanandum before moving on to the explanans is typical in philosophical analysis of 
explanation: “the event or phenomenon in question is usually accepted as a matter of fact,” as 
“in an explanation the purpose of the explanans is to shed light on, or make sense of, the 
explanandum event – not to prove that it occurred” (Hurley 2014, 21). This casts doubt on 
the idea that one could identify bona fide explaining, let alone infer the adequacy of its 
explanandum from it, without first correctly characterizing the explanandum. If a correct 
characterization is required, then an inference to the explanandum is, at best, redundant. 
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Inferences to the explanandum are not justifiable on evidential grounds, and they are 
not justifiable on grounds of the relations between explanantia and explananda. Is this 
enough to rule them out as unacceptable? Perhaps these inferences are acceptable for a 
reason that I have failed to identify, but these deficiencies support my general skepticism 
about inferences to the explanandum. My conclusion is akin to the skepticism many 
philosophers have about inferences to the best explanation. Those concerned with inferences 
to the best explanation claim that there is an “expectation that one should establish the reality 
of one’s posits on non-explanatory grounds” when determining the belief-worthiness of these 
posits (Novick and Scholl 2020, 7). If one cannot establish these posits for reasons aside 
from explanatory power, one should be skeptical that they are belief worthy. This parallels 
my skepticism of inferences to the explanandum: without establishing one’s explanandum 
independently of explaining it, one should be skeptical of it. 
If the sort of inferences exemplified by the scotophobin case are ones about which we 
should be skeptical, what does this mean for the sort of inferences exemplified by the 
continental drift case? The answer is simple: these inferences are acceptable because one 
infers that the explanandum is explainable based on its plausible explanation. This is a 
straightforward inference from the premise that a target is plausibly explained to the 
conclusion that it can be explained. And, if one adopted an epistemic stance towards a target 
based on its perceived unexplainability, then one should change one’s epistemic stance 
towards that target once one infers that it is explainable.  
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Inferring that a target is explainable and inferring that it is true or adequate are not 
equivalent. As we saw in the scotophobin case, skeptics of memory transfer did not deny that 
the alleged explanandum was explainable. Nonetheless, they were skeptical of memory 
transfer, and they ultimately rejected it in light of deficient evidential support. In the 
continental drift case, part of the reason some geologists rejected drift prior the mid-20th 
century, Oreskes argues, was tied to them thinking that there was no possible explanation for 
it, in addition to their assessment of the quality of evidence put forward to support it. Thus, in 
this case, the explanandum was initially rejected (at least in part) because researchers at the 
time were skeptical about its explainability.  
If they are not inferred to be true or adequate, then how should we conceive of these 
targets that have been inferred to be explainable? If a claim about a target is not rejected, but 
researchers are not yet in a position to determine its truth or adequacy, then it is at least 
pursuit worthy in the sense that it is worth investigating “to the extent that it can be shown to 
have a promising potential for contributing… [to] scientific knowledge” (Šešelja and Straßer 
2014, 3115). Thus, researchers can investigate this explanandum with the aim of producing 
evidence for or against its truth or adequacy. They can, for example, generate predictions 
about this explanandum. This is not an inference to the explanandum. Rather, it supports the 
idea that evidence is needed to assess the truth or adequacy of an explanandum.  
While inferences about explainability may help orient us towards new investigations, 
there are examples of active targets of scientific investigation that have yet to be plausibly 
explained. For example, there is the placebo effect, which is accepted despite it lacking an 
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explanation (Price et al. 2008). This idea is not foreign to geology either. Oreskes notes that 
“many empirical scientific phenomena have been accepted before their causes were known,” 
highlighting that unexplained targets are not immediately rejected for being unexplained 
(1988, 324). The idea that one need not prove targets are explainable prior to investigating 
them should not be surprising, given the order in which things occur on the mechanistic 
account: it is critical to correctly characterize explananda phenomena in order to correctly 
model their mechanistic explanations. Of course, cases like the placebo effect lack an 
explanation at this time, but they are not considered to be unexplainable. I take no stand on 
the conditions under which something should be judged to be unexplainable. What matters is 
that, often in science, targets that were considered to be unexplainable are explained, and 
inferring from the premise that a target is plausibly explained to the conclusion that it is 
explainable is an acceptable inference. This is not an inference to the explanandum. 
 
5. Conclusion 
It is important for philosophers to acknowledge that explanations are compelling to a 
fault, and our predilection for explanation is not an unequivocally good thing. I have 
provided reason to be skeptical of the idea that the explanations that we find in science can 
serve as the basis for inferring that their explananda are adequate or true. My conclusions 
cast accounts of explanatory reasoning like the explanatory coherence account in question, 
given that it supports inferences to the explanandum. Further, I have shown that inferences to 
the explanandum ought to be distinguished from inferences about the explainability of 
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explananda, the latter of which are acceptable. Overall, I have shown that it is unwise to 
employ explanations for epistemic tasks for which they are ill suited. 
How do inferences to the explanandum fit into the philosophical discussion of 
explanation? The overarching reason to address these inferences is not that they are accepted 
by philosophers, even if this is the case. Rather, the reason is that they are proposed in both 
scientific and lay reasoning. This fact highlights a serious concern about the rhetorical 
strength of explanation claims in scientific as well as lay reasoning about science or 
pseudoscience, even when the inferences made from these claims are epistemically suspect 
and possibly put forward in bad faith. Whether knowingly or not, individuals can exploit our 
explanatory predilections to legitimize pseudoscience and achieve unscrupulous aims 
supported by the espousal of this pseudoscience, as appears to be the case with the alt-right 
espousal of “soy boys.” We must ask if the philosophy of science inadvertently contributes to 
this situation by focusing on explanation while eliding discussion of its limited epistemic 
implications. For this reason, and despite the rhetorical strength explaining has in science and 
everyday life, we should be skeptical about changing our epistemic stance towards what is 
being explained when an explanation is provided for it. Further, we should be suspicious 
about the provision of plausible explanations as the basis for inferences about the belief-
worthiness of controversial research targets in scientific and lay discourse, particularly in 
cases where evidence for these targets is deficient. 
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g as bridge model 
Devin Sanchez Curry 
 
Abstract: g—a statistical factor capturing strong intercorrelations between individuals’ scores on 
different IQ tests—is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological 
intelligence and its cognitive/neural underpinnings. g idealizes away from those aspects of 
cognitive/neural mechanisms that are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological 
intelligence, and idealizes away from those aspects of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated 
by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of 
the relationship between its two targets, and thereby helps demystify the relationship between folk and 
scientific psychology. 
 




Psychometric g is a statistical factor that captures the remarkably strong positive 
intercorrelations between all of any given individual’s scores on different IQ tests and subtests. 
There are many varieties of IQ subtest, probing verbal ability, analogical reasoning, 
mathematical ability, pattern-matching ability, and so on. The first great finding of the IQ-
testing tradition is that subjects who do better than most people on any given one of these 
subtests are also likely to do better than most people on any of the others (Mackintosh 2011). g is 
thus commonly considered a statistical distillation of what all IQ subtests measure in common. 
The second great finding of the IQ-testing tradition is that g is predictively fecund—among 
psychological constructs, only conscientiousness competes with g as a predictor of educational 
attainment, job complexity, socioeconomic status, and other prominent measures of success in 
life (Gottfredson 1997). Nevertheless, experts are divided about its theoretical interest. 
Some skeptics deny that g measures anything more theoretically interesting than the 
ability to do well on IQ tests, but most intelligence researchers assume that g is a very good 
model (if not a direct measure) of something of theoretical interest. (Researchers variously refer 
to the phenomenon modelled by g as ‘general intelligence’, ‘the positive manifold’, or just ‘the 
g-factor’.) Non-skeptics tend to emphasize one or the other of two target systems purportedly 
modeled by g. According to some intelligence researchers, g is a model of folk psychological 
intelligence—the personal-level capacity that ordinary folks are talking about when they call 
somebody smart. According to others, g is a model of the cognitive or neural substrates of that 
capacity. 
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -140-
3 
 
I’ll argue that g is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of each of 
these targets. I’ll begin by assuming that g isn’t a very good measure of folk psychological 
intelligence. I’ll then argue that it isn’t a very good measure of what’s going on in the brains or 
cognitive systems of (un)intelligent people, either. I’ll go on to argue that g is nevertheless 
explanatorily important insofar as it idealizes away from those aspects of the relevant  
neural/cognitive substrates that aren’t explanatory of the relevant variety folk psychological 
intelligence, and idealizes away from those aspects of the relevant variety of folk psychological 
intelligence that aren’t generated by the relevant neural/cognitive substrates. In that manner, g 
constitutes a high-fidelity ‘bridge model’ of the relationship between its two distinct targets, 
and thereby helps demystify the relationship between folk psychology and scientific 
psychology.  
 
2. g isn’t a very good measure of folk psychological intelligence 
Elsewhere (Curry forthcoming), I have argued for an interpretivist account of folk 
psychological intelligence inspired by Ryle’s (1945) analysis of intelligence-talk and Dennett’s 
(1991) notion of real patterns detected from the intentional stance. On my account, to be 
intelligent (in the sense invoked in folk psychological practices) is to be comparatively good at 
solving intellectual problems that an interpreter deems worth solving. In short: you’re 
intelligent if you behave (in ways that folks deem smart) more successfully than other people, 
and you’re unintelligent if you behave (in ways that folk deem smart) less successfully than 
other people. Since the extant empirical evidence indicates that different lay interpreters, both 
between and within cultures, deem different intellectual problems worth solving (and, indeed, 
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deem different problems to count as intellectual problems), it follows from my definition that 
what it is to be intelligent varies alongside the lay interpreters in question. 
As Sternberg and Grigorenko (2004) and their collaborators in cross-cultural psychology 
have extensively documented, g tracks some—but not all—of the varieties of intelligence that 
have emerged in relation to folk psychological practices around the globe. In particular, g is 
plausibly a decent model of a variety of intelligence that became extremely salient in the folk 
psychological discourses of some WEIRD—Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic 
(Henrich et al. 2010)—contexts in the 20th century, but which is much less salient in other 
cultural contexts. However, skeptical philosophers and psychologists have provided serious 
reasons to doubt that g is a very good measure even of the varieties of folk psychological 
intelligence that have emerged, alongside IQ testing itself, within WEIRD contexts (Block & 
Dworkin 1974). So I’ll henceforth assume that g isn’t a very good measure of what folks are 
talking about when they talk about intelligence in everyday life: it doesn’t straightforwardly 
measure intelligence as conceptualized in WEIRD, IQ-test-influenced settings, and it flat-out 
fails to measure intelligence as conceptualized in many other settings. Nevertheless, my account 
of folk psychological intelligence leaves open the possibility that g is a great measure of the 
neural or cognitive underpinnings of what folks are talking about when they talk about 
intelligence.  
 
3. g isn’t a very good measure of cognitive or neural functioning 
Several prominent psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists are increasingly 
optimistic about unearthing a particular neural or cognitive mechanism (or set of mechanisms) 
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that is fully responsible for the comparatively superior (or inferior) capacity measured by g, and 
thereby discovering intelligence squarely in the brain or cognitive system. I think their 
optimism about reduction is misplaced. To substantiate my pessimism, let’s go through a few 
prominent recent attempts to reduce intelligence to its neural or cognitive substrates. 
 
3.1. Neural correlates 
Jensen (2006: ix), in a refinement of Spearman’s original speculation that g measured a 
kind of “mental energy”, influentially interpreted g as an indirect “measurement of cognitive 
speed” which could be more directly measured via reaction time paradigms which correlate 
strongly with g. Because of this correlation, Jensen was convinced that “intelligence is the 
periodicity of neural oscillation in the action potentials of the brain and central nervous system” 
(2011: 173). In other words, intelligence is nothing more and nothing less than the frequency of 
brainwaves, and IQ testing provides a good (if indirect) measure of this physical feature of the 
brain. Jensen’s simple reductionist theory of intelligence hasn’t held up in the light of PET and 
fMRI research in cognitive neuroscience. For one thing, cognitive neuroscientists have 
demonstrated that a higher frequency of brainwaves isn’t actually straightforwardly correlated 
with greater neural processing power; nor is any other particular pattern in the frequency of 
brainwaves (Haier 2017). It turns out that, despite Jensen’s best efforts, Spearman’s notion of 
mental energy has no neural referent. Nevertheless, more empirically adequate neurological 
theories of intelligence have risen in Jensen’s theory’s stead. 
The best developed among them—Jung and Haier’s Parieto-Frontal Integration 
Theory—goes a long way towards identifying the neural correlates of the cognitive processes 
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recruited when people take IQ tests. There is surely something to Jung and Haier’s suggestion 
that the efficient integrated operation of a parieto-frontal sense-remember-judge-act network 
underlies the variety of intelligence purportedly measured by g. (It plausibly partially underlies 
many other varieties of folk psychological intelligence as well.) But Jung and Haier have no 
proposal as to the cause of this efficiency, which could theoretically stem from a wide variety of 
sources, only some of which could be plausibly construed as the incarnation of intelligence in 
the brain. (More on alternative sources of efficiency anon.) Indeed, in responding to critics, Jung 
and Haier back off of the claim to have provided a reductionist theory of the positive manifold 
modelled by g, and instead insist only that “in our view, it is still too early to rule out a neural 
basis for a general factor of intelligence independent of a neural basis for specific cognitive 
abilities” (2007: 176). In other words, Jung and Haier insist that it is possible that the parieto-
frontal efficiency which underlies successful IQ test-taking is generated by intelligence qua 
mechanism in the brain. They claim to have located that mechanism in a reasonably delimited 
parieto-frontal network. But, in the end, they make no claim to have identified the mechanism 
itself.  
Localization isn’t nearly enough to ground reduction. If researchers hope to reduce 
intelligence to a neural—or, failing that, cognitive—state or process, then they’ll have to identify 
a candidate mechanism that produces that state or carries out that process. To be fair, some 
researchers have done just that. The most plausible candidate mechanism currently on offer is 
working memory capacity. 
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3.2. Working memory 
 Cognitive scientists use the term ‘working memory’ to refer to “a domain-general 
resource that enables representations to be actively sustained, rehearsed, and manipulated for 
purposes of reasoning and problem solving” (Carruthers 2014: 12). When you rehearse a phone 
number in your head while looking for a piece of paper to scribble it down on, you’re using 
your working memory. Working memory capacity is a common measure both of how much 
information can be maintained in working memory and of how well that information can be 
processed. Research on working memory capacity has increasingly shown that it is a critical 
component in much—perhaps even most—complex cognition. As such, researchers have 
become increasingly interested in the hypothesis that intelligence can be explained largely in 
terms of—perhaps even be reduced to—working memory capacity. 
 This hypothesis makes some intuitive sense: solving puzzles almost always involves 
actively sustaining and manipulating information. And, at first glance, the evidence in favor of 
reducing intelligence to working memory capacity is impressive. When you give somebody 
both an IQ test and a test of working memory capacity, the two resulting scores correlate 
positively. In particular, working memory capacity and ‘fluid g’–the factor capturing how well 
people do on IQ tests that are designed to focus on pure reasoning abilities, as opposed to 
reasoning that makes use of what the reasoner knows—tend to have a correlation somewhere 
between .6 and .8 (Carruthers 2014); that is a very strong correlation (indeed, that range is only 
slightly lower than the range of correlations that made g such an important finding in the first 
place). Moreover, much of the parieto-frontal network that Jung and Haier identify as the 
neural correlate of g has also been shown to be active in working memory (Deary et al. 2010).  
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Finally, there is some evidence that increases in working memory capacity yield increases in 
fluid g (Jaušovec & Jaušovec 2012). 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that cuts against reduction. Working memory 
capacity, while quite domain-general, is nevertheless more domain-specific than fluid g: it 
correlates more with tests of verbal ability than with tests of spatial ability, for instance. And 
working memory’s contribution to performance on tests of fluid g seems to be independent of 
the respective contributions of associative learning and information processing speed 
(Mackintosh 2011: 154–155). So there is good reason to doubt that working memory is the sole 
cognitive underpinning of fluid g. Moreover, there is some good reason to doubt that working 
memory is a cognitive underpinning of intelligence at all: some of the researchers responsible 
for discovering the correlations between fluid g and working memory capacity have argued that 
the two are explanatorily distinct phenomena that are nevertheless strongly correlated because 
they share a common underpinning (Shipstead & Engle 2018). But for my purposes we can set 
these complex questions about the weight and interpretation of the extant evidence aside. My 
argument against the reduction of intelligence to working memory capacity is at once more 
abstract and more straightforward: my argument rests on the premise that reduction would add 
nothing to—and indeed subtract something from—our understanding. In particular, reduction 
would hinder our understanding of intelligence while adding nothing to our understanding of 
how cognitive systems work. 
With regard to the latter: working memory capacity is already a reasonably well-defined 
construct that measures the operations of a central and reasonably well-delimited (albeit 
complex and distributed) cognitive subsystem, and thereby plays a clear explanatory role in 
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cognitive science. Stipulating that this construct is a measure of intelligence—without making 
any concrete suggestions for how that stipulation should change our understanding of working 
memory or the functioning of cognitive systems more generally—does nothing to enhance its 
explanatory power. Thus, reduction is justified in this case only if it sheds light on the 
phenomenon being reduced. 
But reduction to working memory capacity can only obfuscate intelligence. Even 
granting that IQ tests measure intelligence well, any attempted reduction of intelligence to 
working memory capacity will hinder our understanding of intelligence in at least two respects.  
First, working memory capacity is super highly correlated, not with g, but only with one 
of its component factors, fluid g, which is derived from minority subset of IQ tests. Most IQ tests 
also measure other component factors, including most prominently ‘crystallized g’: the factor 
capturing how well people do on IQ tests that are designed to focus on reasoning that makes 
use of what the reasoner knows. The calling card of plain old undifferentiated g is that there are 
strong intercorrelations between how well people do on all IQ tests—including relatively pure 
tests of fluid g, relatively pure tests of crystallized g, and a wide range of hybrids. By my lights, 
the heterogeneous nature of the positive manifold should be telling when it comes to 
constructing a theory of intelligence: the fact that both fluid g and crystallized g are statistical 
components of undifferentiated g intriguingly mirrors the fact that folk psychological 
conceptions of intelligence across cultures tend to invoke both fluid reasoning and the use of 
crystalized knowledge (Sternberg & Grigorenko 2004). Meanwhile, the correlation of 
crystallized intelligence and working memory capacity, like the correlation of undifferentiated g 
and working memory capacity, is somewhere between .3 and .6 (Mackintosh 2011)—the two are 
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clearly importantly related, but it is equally clear that a direct reduction of one to the other 
won’t be in the offing. 
Of course, it is possible that fluid g captures the essence of g (and, by extension, of folk 
psychological intelligence), and that crystallized g is more noise than signal. Indeed, the IQ tests 
with the highest g-loadings—that is, that correlate most strongly with g itself—tend to be tests 
of fluid intelligence (like Raven’s Progressive Matrices). But there are problems even with 
reducing fluid g alone to working memory capacity. As Block and Dworkin (1974) have argued, 
there is a strong case to be made that fluid g measures personality, motivation, and 
temperament to a large degree—for example, it seems to measure ambition, patience, and test-
wiseness as well as pure reasoning capacity—and these characteristics aren’t plausibly reduced 
to working memory capacity. Indeed, my account of folk psychological intelligence suggests 
that these character traits measured by fluid g are rightly taken to be part and parcel of 
intelligence: intelligence is the capacity to solve intellectual problems comparatively well, and 
solving problems better than one’s peers takes grit as well as wits (Dweck & Bempechat 1983). 
Nevertheless, I recognize that there remains a reasonable case to be made that, by 
shedding inessential character traits, working memory capacity distills the essence of fluid g, 
which itself, by shedding crystallized knowledge, distills the essence of undifferentiated g. But 
even if this is the case, a second pitfall awaits the attempt to reduce fluid g to working memory 
capacity (and indeed any attempted reduction of a psychometric kind to the workings of a 
cognitive mechanism).  
Even if working memory capacity is the essential cognitive underpinning of intelligence, 
g isn’t a very good model thereof. That’s because the g-factor is, by its very nature, comparative—
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it is an inter- (rather than intra-) individual construct that measures how somebody does on IQ 
tests relative to other people in their age-cohort. It doesn’t measure how smart somebody is on a 
ratio scale; it measures only how much better or worse they perform than the average IQ-test-
taker. g thus can’t directly measure an intrinsic characteristic of any individual’s mind, whereas 
we already have reliable ways of measuring working memory within a single individual on a 
ratio scale. (To my mind, this is a salutary fact about g, since on my definition folk psychological 
intelligence is also constitutively comparative.) As Borsboom and colleagues (2009) have 
pointed out, absent a theory of how to bridge differential and cognitive psychology, 
“intelligence dimensions like the g-factor can’t be understood on the basis of between-subject 
data as denoting mental ability qua within-subject attribute.” Fluid g couldn’t be 
comprehensibly reduced to working memory capacity absent a grand unifying theory of how 
constitutively comparative capacities relate to intrinsic cognitive mechanisms. 
In contrast, it bears repeating that cognitive psychologists already have a decent 
theoretical understanding of the mechanics of working memory capacity in its own right, not to 
mention reliable instruments that measure it on a ratio scale. And theorists can give working 
memory capacity due emphasis as a cognitive underpinning of intelligence without making an 
attempt at reduction. If my argument holds water, then, in attempting reduction, nothing new is 
learned, some of the plausibly explanatorily salient dimensions—crystallized intelligence and, 
arguably, other characteristics—of both folk psychological intelligence and g are erased, and an 
important distinction—between the intrapersonality of the cognitive mechanism of working 
memory and the constitutive interpersonality of intelligence—is obscured. So long as there is a 
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viable nonreductive account of intelligence on the table, reduction carries no explanatory 
benefits and falls into at least two significant explanatory pitfalls. 
And there are several viable nonreductive accounts on the table. For instance, rather 
than measuring a cognitive mechanism itself, perhaps g measures an effect of the interactions of 
several mechanisms. As several researchers have argued, there is good reason to believe that the 
positive manifold is “an emergent property of anatomically distinct cognitive systems, each of 
which has its own capacity” (Hampshire et al. 2012: 1225). At its extreme, this approach leads to 
the conclusion that “g is ‘not a thing’ but instead is a summary statistic” and thus that “the 
search for the neural basis of g is meaningless” (Conway & Kovacs 2018: 59). If viable, this 
approach would avoid both pitfalls of reducing intelligence to working memory: it wouldn’t 
exclude features of the positive manifold on an ad hoc basis, and it would have the flexibility to 
countenance the constitutively comparative nature of the positive manifold. (After all, some 
emergent properties—like the property being taller than somebody else—emerge only in the 
light of a relation that undergirds comparisons. The target of a summary statistic is a perfect 
candidate for just such a constitutively comparative emergent property.) 
 
3.3. Mutualism 
In that spirit, van der Maas and colleagues have vigorously argued that the 
intercorrelations between individuals’ IQ test scores can be explained by reference to the 
dynamic interplay of specialized cognitive mechanisms.  
Van der Maas et al. (2006) analogize g to the results of predator-prey dynamics in 
ecology. According to the Lottka-Volterra model (Weisberg 2013), high correlations between 
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predator and prey populations needn’t be caused by a single underlying factor (a shared food 
source, say) which bolsters both populations. Instead, the correlation can be caused—and in 
nature actually is often caused—by dynamic interactions between the two populations. The size 
of the prey population increases when the size of the predator population is small (because 
breeding outpaces being eaten), and decreases when the predator population is large (because 
being eaten outpaces breeding). At the same time, the predator population grows when the 
prey population is large (because eating causes breeding), and decreases when the prey 
population is small (because there isn’t enough food to go around). These dynamics ensure that 
a strong correlation between the size of the populations emerges over time, without requiring 
any underlying factor to affect both populations. 
Analogously, van der Maas and colleagues have demonstrated that high correlations 
between the performance of distinct cognitive mechanisms, which each undergird performance 
on some IQ subtest or other, needn’t be caused by a particular underlying factor which fuels 
each performance. Instead, the correlations are plausibly caused by dynamic interactions 
between the distinct cognitive mechanisms. Research in cognitive psychology reveals that such 
dynamic relationships between cognitive processes exist. Short-term memory improves the 
development of cognitive strategies, and cognitive strategies improve the efficiency of short-
term memory (Siegler & Alibali 2005). Language production and reasoning are similarly 
mutually beneficial: if you can think through it, then you can put it into words better, and if you 
can put it into words better, then that helps you think through it better (Fisher et al. 1994). And 
so on. These sorts of dynamic interactions between distinct cognitive mechanisms generate 
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positive feedback loops, ensuring that strong correlations emerge over time between how well 
mechanisms function across the cognitive system. 
g is an explanandum, not the explanans, of the mutualistic functioning of cognitive 
mechanisms. If theorists force g into the role of explanans, then they’ll find that it is, at best, a 
low-fidelity model of that functioning: it idealizes away from all of the independently 
interesting, messy and complex mechanistic details. Van der Maas and colleagues (2014) go on 
to infer that g is of theoretical interest only as something to be explained; it is a predictively 
powerful construct, but it doesn’t itself do any interesting explanatory work. 
 
4. g as bridge model 
I think this last inference is mistaken. On my view, g does interesting explanatory work, 
not as a model of mechanisms, but as a bridge model that illuminates the relationship between 
folk psychological intelligence and the functioning of cognitive systems.  
On Weisberg’s (2013) influential account, models are (concrete, mathematical, or 
computational) structures plus construals—scientists’ interpretations of those structures as 
descriptions of target systems. Bridge models are structures that scientists construe as 
describing the relationship between two or more target systems. Bridge models are particularly 
useful as aids to explanations of the relationships between two different levels (or otherwise 
incommensurate varieties) of scientific explanation. Most explanatorily powerful models 
idealize away many irrelevant features of their target systems. In the case of bridge models, this 
means ignoring many (if not all) of the features of each of the target phenomena that aren’t 
directly related to the other target phenomenon. 
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My positive proposal is that the same idealizations and abstractions that render g a low-
fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive underpinnings also 
render it a high-fidelity bridge model. By distilling the common core of IQ-test-taking-ability, g 
idealizes away all of the details of cognitive functioning except the fact that cognitive systems 
produce a positive manifold. At the same time, g also idealizes away the aspects (indeed, whole 
varieties) of folk psychological intelligence that aren’t tracked by performance on IQ subtests. 
Nevertheless, under the proper respective construals, g serves as a low-fidelity model of each of 
these phenomena. In so doing, it doesn’t allow researchers to get a very firm grasp on either the 
folk psychology or the cognitive psychology of intelligence. But, properly construed, it could 
allow theorists to get a firmer grasp on the relationship between these two varieties of 
psychological explanation. In Sellarsian jargon: g, construed as a bridge model, can help fuse the 
manifest and scientific images of intelligence into one synoptic vision. 
As construed by van der Maas, g doesn’t provide a mechanistic explanation, but it does 
capture the fact that cognitive mechanisms dynamically work together to form a general 
substrate for the constitutively comparative problem-solving capacities that constitute the 
relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence. Taken from the other direction, g is, at best, a 
low-fidelity model of folk psychological intelligence: it idealizes away from the multifarious 
cross-cultural differences between folks’ conceptions of intelligence, and from many of the 
messy and complex details within conceptions. Nevertheless, g is a high-fidelity model of those 
aspects of folk psychological intelligence that are realized by the mutualistic network of 
cognitive mechanisms that subserves IQ-test-taking-ability. When properly construed as a 
bridge model, g thereby helps reveal why and how one variety of lay intelligence attribution is 
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genuinely powerfully predictive (and in some senses explanatory) of human behavior. An 
idealization of the attributed suite of constitutively comparative problem-solving capacities 
maps onto a predictively fecund idealization of the dynamic interactions between cognitive 
mechanisms. 
By the same token, treating g as a bridge model is explanatory of its own extremely high 
correlation with certain measures of success in life. g isn’t a great measure of any particular 
aspect of cognitive functioning. Nor is it a great measure of any particular folk conception of 
intelligence. But it does help researchers zero in on those aspects of cognitive functioning—the 
relevant mechanisms and their interactions—that undergird core features of some culturally 
salient folk conceptions of intelligence. In other words, it is a great measure of the features of 
cognitive functioning that many people value when they value intelligence—and thus of the 
aspects of cognitive functioning that lead to certain kinds of success in a society partly 
structured by people’s values.  
Researchers make a mistake when they infer that g must be a great measure of cognitive 
functioning, since it is so predictive of success. On the contrary, we should expect g qua bridge 
model to correlate with success better than any great direct measure of cognitive functioning. 
After all, most folks (and their social institutions) don’t care a wit about rewarding cognitive 
functioning per se—they care about rewarding those people whose cognitive functioning has 
put them in a position to accomplish valued goals. At the same time, we should also expect g 
qua bridge model to correlate with success better than any great direct measure of intelligence 
as it emerges in relation to any given folk conception, since it zeroes in on those aspects of folk 
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psychological intelligence that are actually undergirded by more or less efficient and effective 
cognitive functioning. 
I’ll conclude by drawing a concrete philosophical lesson. Psychofunctionalists have often 
argued that belief attributions must literally describe cognitive functioning, since they are 
predictively fecund (Fodor 1987; Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). There is something to this 
thought: folk psychological beliefs must be undergirded by reliable patterns of cognitive 
functioning. Nevertheless, g, as bridge model, clearly highlights how intelligence attribution is 
predictively fecund without literally describing cognitive functioning. Likewise, the predictive 
fecundity of belief attribution at most shows that, if we were to construct the relevant bridge 
model, we’d find a relationship between some aspects of folk psychological belief and some 
cognitive underpinnings that are responsible for behaviors that can be predicted via belief 
attribution. It can’t show that folk psychological belief is reducible to those cognitive 
underpinnings: intelligence attribution is similarly predictively powerful despite being 
irreducible. Of course, this doesn’t show that psychofunctionalism about belief is false. Some 
reductions of folk psychological phenomena to cognitive phenomena are well-founded. But I 
have argued that, intrapersonally speaking, human cognitive architectures don’t feature 
anything well-labeled ‘intelligence’. It is still an open question, which won’t be settled by 
appeals to the predictive power of folk psychology, whether they feature anything well-labeled 
‘beliefs’. 
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Implementation as Resemblance  1
Abstract 
 
This paper advertises a new account of computational implementation. According          
to the resemblance account, implementation is a matter of resembling a           
computational architecture. The resemblance account departs from previous        
theories by denying that computational architectures are exhausted by their          
formal, mathematical features. Instead, they are taken to be permeated with           
causality, spatiotemporality, and other non-mathematical features. I argue that this          
approach comports well with computer scientific practice, and offers a novel           
response to so-called triviality arguments. 
 
1. Theories of Implementation 
Theories of physical computation address two questions: 
Q1. What distinguishes physical systems that compute from those that don’t? 
Q2. Among physical computing systems, what distinguishes those that compute the same 
thing from those that don’t? 
(1)  concerns the difference between laptops and calculators on the one hand, and rocks and 
tables on the other. (2), by contrast, concerns the distinction between one laptop computing dot 
products and another computing Fourier transforms. An adequate account of physical 
computation should answer both (Sprevak 2019). 
Different answers to Q1 and Q2 are possible. I shall be concerned with ​implementationist 
theories, which hold that a physical system computes if it implements some computational 
system, or 'computation', for short.  Thus: 2
1 Draft of March 5, 2020. Word count: 4947. 
2 What of alternatives to implementationism? On one reading, Piccinini’s (2015) mechanistic account answers Q1 
and Q2 by direct appeal to the notion of a computing mechanism. So construed, the implementation relation plays 
no part in the mechanistic account. This sort of approach is worth exploring, but is beyond the present scope. 
1 
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A1. A physical system computes just in case it implements some computation. 
A2. What a physical system computes is determined by the computation it implements. 
These answers are schematic, however. They say little about what computations are, and 
what implementation amounts to. Different accounts of implementation emerge from different 
specifications of these details. 
This paper introduces a new account implementation, which I call the ​resemblance 
account​. I sketch the account in Sections 2 - 4. Section 5 deals with some background 
metaphysical issues. Sections 6 argues that the resemblance offers an interesting new perspective 
on some old problems in the philosophy of physical computation. Finally, Section 7 deals with 
an objection, and Section 8 concludes. 
A caveat before proceeding. My main aim is advertisement: to show that the resemblance 
account offers a novel approach to physical computation, worthy of further investigation. 
Regrettably, however, this means some issues won’t receive the treatment they deserve. These 
issues must wait for another occasion, and I’ll flag them as they arise.  
 
2. The Resemblance Account 
I propose to begin at the beginning. In his landmark 1936 paper, Turing offers the 
following description of an ​a​-machine: 
 
The machine is supplied with a "tape " (the analogue of paper) running through it, and 
divided into sections (called "squares") each capable of bearing a "symbol" … the 
configuration [of the machine] determines the possible behaviour of the machine. In 
2 
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some of the configurations in which the scanned square is blank (i.e. bears no symbol) 
the machine writes down a new symbol on the scanned square: in other configurations it 
erases the scanned symbol. The machine may also change the square which is being 
scanned, but only by shifting it one place to right or left. (Turing 1936, 231) 
 
As we know, Turing arrived at this conception of ​a​-machines by carefully considering the 
activity of human workers proceeding effectively. The restriction that ​a ​-machines may only 
'observe' one symbol at a time, for instance, is justified on the grounds that human workers can 
only distinguish between finitely many different primitive symbol types. (For, if not, then we 
could distinguish between (tokens of) types which differ to an arbitrarily small degree. But our 
perceptual apparatus is not nearly as sophisticated as this. See Turing (1936, 249 - 252) and Sieg 
(2009) for discussion.) 
The importance of Turing's insight is not hard to appreciate. By linking the 
characterization of an ​a​-machine directly to the activities of actual human workers, Turing's 
analysis sheds light on the computational capacities and limitations of humans working 
effectively. Very roughly, the computational power of ​a​-machines bears on the computational 
power of effective human workers because the former resemble the latter in certain important 
respects: both have certain 'perceptual' limitations, both follow only finitely many instructions 
one at a time, and so on. Indeed, alternative analyses, such as λ-definability or Herbrand-Godel 
general recursivity, were unsatisfactory because they fail to adequately illuminate the basic 
activities of a human working effectively. 
3 
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I mention all of this because it seems to me that Turing's analysis contains the essentials 
of the resemblance account. ​A​-machines bear on the computational powers of human workers 
because, and to the extent that, the former resemble the latter in certain respects. The 
resemblance account generalizes and precisifies this insight. On the resemblance account, 
physical computation is a matter of resembling a computational architecture: 
 
The Resemblance Account. ​ A physical system computes just in case, and to the extent 
that, it resembles a computational architecture. 
 
In the following two sections I flesh out the notion of a computational architecture, and 
explain the notion of resemblance at play. But it should be noted that while I talk of ​the 
resemblance account, really I am scouting a family of views. Different ways of filling in the 
sketch I give deliver different particular resemblance accounts. I will mention the major 
choice-points as they arise. 
 
3. Computational Architectures 
Turing's ​a​-machines are an example of what I'll call a ​computational architecture​. To a 
first approximation, computational architectures are ‘blueprints’ for physical computing devices. 
Blueprints 'specify' which features a system must have in order to count as a computing device of 
a particular sort (I return to the question of what ‘blueprints’ are, and what  'specification' 
amounts to, in Section 5). Turing’s description, for instance, constitutes a blueprint which 
specifies the features a physical system must have in order to ‘counts as’ an ​a ​-machine. 
4 
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Accordingly, a physical system performs ​a ​-machine computations only if it has these features 
too. Anything lacking these features doesn’t count as an ​a ​-machine, hence ​a fortiori​ doesn’t 
perform ​a ​-machine computations either.  
But what are these features? Some concern the physical or mechanical features of the 
device. For instance, Turing's characterization requires that ​a​-machines ​scan ​ the tape, ​write 
symbols, and ​shift​ left or right, that they have a ​read/write head​ and a ​tape​ divided into squares, 
and that latter machine states be ​determined​ by earlier states. Other features are more abstract, 
and concern the patterns or regularities the machine or its components exhibit. Others still 
concern what states of the device represent. The symbols on the tape refer to natural numbers, for 
instance, and a machine as a whole may be taken to represent, in some sense, the function it 
computes. The upshot of all of this is that a physical must exhibit these sorts of features if it is to 
‘count as’ an ​a​-machine, or if it is to perform ​a ​-machine computations. 
However, while Turing’s characterization is illustrative, it is not representative of 
contemporary computer design. For a state-of-the-art understanding of computer architectures (in 
the present sense), we should look to work on computer architecture and engineering. These 
disciplines truck in highly specific descriptions of computational architectures. For instance, for 
a physical system to count as a MIPS (Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipelined Stages) 
microarchitecture, it must exhibit a highly specific set of features.  Some of these features are 3
described explicitly in the microarchitecture description, for instance that the system have a 
datapath with a certain pipelining scheme, certain components for sign extension operations, and 
so on. Others are left tacit, such as the requirement that the system be cast in a silicon wafer, that 
3 See Harris and Harris (2013). 
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it have a certain clock rate, and so on. As in the ​a​-machine case, nothing counts as a MIPS 
microarchitecture unless it has these features. 
Stepping back, it seems to me that three kinds of features are commonly cited in the 
descriptions offered by computer architects and engineers. ​Physico-mechanical features ​concern 
the physical and micro-physical structure of a system: its components and their relationships, 
interactions, and composition. Other features concern the patterns or regularities exhibited by 
various states and components, and I’ll call these features ​syntactic​. Finally, ​semantic​ or 
representational​ features concern what the states or processes of the device represent. However, 
I don't take this list to exhaust the features that may be specified by a computational architecture. 
Indeed, it would be a mistake to try to specify such a list once-and-for-all. Instead, we should 
regard this list as open to addition or amendment, as computer engineers and architects devise 
new sorts of computing systems with new and different sorts of features.  
Computational architectures can be more or less fine-grained. Some omit irrelevant 
details, as when they indicate that one must build a column that supports 500kg, but does not say 
whether it must be made of wood or stone. Others are more exacting, and demand that a five 
meter tall fluted marble column be put here with such-and-such capital ornaments. Similarly, in 
the computational case we might be told that the device is to have a read/write head, but not told 
what it is made of. Other times we are told that the device must be made of silicon, have 500MB 
of L3 cache, have four cores, run at 2.4GHz, and so forth.  
However, the question of which specific physico-mechanical, syntactic, or semantic 
properties are required for computation is best left to computer scientists and engineers. It is a 
6 
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highly non-trivial task designing a computing system, involving a tremendous amount of 
epistemic labour.  Consequently, I doubt that philosophers have much to contribute on this front.  4
 
4. Resemblance 
The next task is to say what it is for a physical system to ‘resemble’ a computational 
architecture. This marks a choice point in the theory. Some philosophers might be content to rest 
with an intuitive, or commonsensical, notion of resemblance. This is fine as far as it goes, but 
there are benefits to working with a more precise account, and here I will offer one. 
To a very rough first approximation, the idea pursued here is that a physical system 
resembles a computational architecture to the extent that it (a) has features ‘specified’ by the 
architecture, and (b) lacks features ​not​ ‘specified’ by the architecture. A physical system 
resembles an ​a​-machine, for instance, to the extent that it has a read/write head, a control unit, 
tape, and so on. (What it is for an architecture to ‘specify’ a feature depends to some extent on 
one's background metaphysics; see Section 5 for more.) 
Recent work on similarity can be used to make this precise.  On this theory, resemblance 5
is always determined relative to a distinguished class of features ​F​, called the feature set. If ​C​ is a 
computational architecture and ​P​ is a physical system, we’ll let  be the featuresFC ⊆ F  
specified by ​C​ and  be the set of features of ​P​. Then we can say that ​P​ resembles ​C ​,F P ⊆ F  
with respect to ​F​, to degree ​n​, just in case  
4 To get a sense of the complexity involved, note that a modest contemporary microprocessor houses approximately 
4.5 billion transistors, and executes upwards of 140 instructions in parallel. 
5 The account presented here follows Weisberg’s ‘weighted feature-matching account’ (2012). For recent criticisms 
and elaborations, see Parker (2015) and Fang (2017). Some philosophers distinguish between resemblance and 
similarity, but here I use the terms interchangeably. 
7 
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F | F | |F | n| C ⋂ F P − | C − F P −  P − F C =  (1) 
For convenience, I’ll write ​Res(F, C, P) = n​. Here  are the features shared by ​CF C ⋂ F P  
and ​P​. are the features specified by ​C ​ which ​P​ lacks. And are the featuresF C − F P F P − F C  
had by ​C​ not specified by A. This equation, in effect, measures the extent to which ​P​ ‘fits’ ​C​’s 
specification.  
This account treats resemblance as a graded notion. I think this is the most basic notion of 
resemblance, and we can use it to define other notions as the need arises. For instance, we can 
say that ​P​ ​perfectly​ ​resembles ​ ​C​ just in case ​Res(F, C, P) = n​ and . Similarly, weF | n| C ⋂ F P =   
can say that ​C ​ and ​P​ ​resemble each other simpliciter​ just in case ​Res(F, C, P) ≥ m​, for some 
predetermined ‘cutoff’ degree of resemblance ​m ​. For present purposes I think it is enough to 
work with the basic notion, but I am open to the possibility that a more refined notion is 
appropriate for thinking about implementation.  
Given this account of resemblance, implementation is in the first instance a matter of 
degree, so that a physical system implements a given computational architecture to a greater or 
lesser degree. Some philosophers might be uncomfortable with this result, preferring an absolute 
notion of implementation instead. But as I just mentioned, given a graded notion of 
implementation we can use it to define an absolute notion if we want. Moreover, there is some 
independent reason for working with a graded notion. Computer scientists often talk about 
different physical systems being better or worse implementations of a given architecture. This 
practice is naturally understood as relying on a graded notion of implementation, and it’s not 
clear how to capture this talk, without distortion, with an absolute notion. 
8 
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One further issue deserves comment. Exactly what degree of resemblance is required for 
implementation? On the one hand, perfect resemblance seems too exacting: it seems useful to 
allow that a physical system may implement an architecture even when they don’t perfectly 
resemble each other. On the other, too low a degree threatens to trivialize the notion of physical 
computation: there are plausibly some simple physico-mechanical properties shared by 
paradigmatically non-computing systems and any computational architecture. With this 
complication flagged, I will simply say that implementation requires a ‘sufficiently high’ degree 
of resemblance, noting that this is just a placeholder for what will undoubtedly be a complicated 
theory of just what a ‘sufficiently high’ degree amounts to. 
 
5. Interlude: Matters of Metaphysics 
So far I've glossed computational architectures as 'blueprints', and I’ve said that 
blueprints ‘specify’ features. But what does all this mean? Presumably we don't wish to add 
'blueprints' as a new fundamental to our ontology, so we'd better find a way to cash them out in 
more familiar terms.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this marks another choice point for the theory. There are different 
ways of cashing out the notion of a blueprint, according to different tastes in background 
metaphysics. Here I'll mention two, but I don’t take these to exhaust the alternatives. In fact, I 
think the resemblance account can be developed in a way that accommodates a wide variety of 
views in metaphysics, and I take this to be a virtue of the account. 
One option takes computational architectures to be highly specific universals. In this 
case, implementation boils down to instantiation, and a computational architecture ‘specifies’ a 
9 
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class of features in something like the way that conjunctive universal ‘specifies’ its conjuncts, for 
instance by having them as parts. So construed, Turing’s description of ​a ​-machines is a 
description of a universal, the instantiation of which is a matter of having a read/write head, a 
tape, and so forth. A physical system will instantiate a computational architecture more or less, to 
the degree that it instantiates the conjuncts that compose the architecture in question. In this case, 
Res(F, C, P)​ is a measure of the degree of instantiation of a given universal. 
Philosophers who balk at universals will prefer a more deflationary approach. Here too 
there are many options available. One treats computational architectures as abstract particulars, 
perhaps in something like the way that some scientific models are said to be abstract particulars.  6
On this account, computational architectures are taken to literally​ have​ certain 
physico-mechanical, syntactic, or semantic features. In this case, resemblance amounts to 
property sharing, so that ​Res(F, C, P)​ is a measure of the degree to which ​P​ has features also had 
by ​C​. And other deflationary approaches are possible too. For instance, we might take 
computational architectures to be linguistic entities -- descriptions, say -- so that implementation 
boils down to some sort of semantic relation, such as accurate description. Degree of 
resemblance then amounts to how well a given computational architecture describes a given 
physical system.  
At any rate, which way you go turns, to a large extent, on your ontological tastes. I take it 
to be a virtue of the resemblance account that it can be developed in a way that satisfies a wide 
variety of ontological palates. 
6 See, e.g., Giere (1988, Chapter 3). A related approach, although arguably more deflationary, is found in 
Godfrey-Smith (2009), who suggests that models are fictional entities. Copeland and Shagrir  mention, but do not 
endorse, a view of computation in this vicinity too. As they explain, their view “recognizes an ontological level 
lying between the realization (or physical-device) level and the level of pure-mathematical ontology ... At this level 
are to be found notional or idealized machines that are rich with spatio-temporality and causality” (2011, 234). 
10 
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6. Triviality Arguments 
So far I’ve motivated the resemblance account by noting that it matches the thought and 
talk of computer scientists. Computer scientists routinely describe computational architectures, 
such as Turing machines, in spatio-temporal terms. I take it to be a point in favour of the 
resemblance account that it reflects this practice. But the resemblance account is also attractive 
on theoretical grounds. In particular, the resemblance account offers a novel response to 
so-called triviality arguments. This section sketches that response. 
It is instructive to recall how triviality worries emerge for standard theories of 
implementation. The most popular theory holds that implementation is a relation between a 
physical system, on the one hand, and an abstract, mathematical computation on the other. In the 
simplest case a computation is a finite automaton, composed of a finite set of states plus a 
transition function. More complicated computations may include inputs, outputs, or states with 
internal combinatorial structure. These details aside, however, the characteristic feature of the 
received view is that computations are exhaustively characterized by their formal, mathematical 
structure. Following Rescorla (2014), I will call this ​structuralism about implementation​.  7
Structuralism holds that a physical system implements a computation if its state 
transitions ‘mirror’ the state transitions of some formal computation. ‘Mirroring’ is typically 
taken to be a structure-preserving map, or isomorphism, between physical and formal states. 
Thus, according to a simple structuralist view, if C = (S, T) is a computation with states S = {S​1​, 
S ​2​, …, S ​n​} and transition function T: S → S, we have: 
7 Chalmers (1996) is representative of this approach. Other proponents include Millhouse (2017), Schweizer (2019), 
Sprevak (2010), and Scheutz (2001), among many others. 
11 
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Structuralism.​ Physical system ​P​ implements computation ​C ​ just in case there exists a 
mapping ​f​ from states of P to S such that: if P is in a state P​i​ for which ​f​(P ​i​) = S ​k​, and 
T(S​k​) = S ​m​, then P goes into state P​j​ for which ​f​(P ​j​) = S ​m​. 
 
Notoriously, however, mappings are cheap and computations are abundant. For nearly 
every physical system P and every computation C, there is a structure-preserving map between P 
and C, in which case nearly every physical system implements every computation, according to 
(SF). This is the core of the triviality worry.  8
In light of triviality worries, few philosophers endorse structuralism in this unalloyed 
form.  Various additional constraints are added to (SF) in an effort to avoid triviality. Some 9
common requirements are that implementing systems satisfy counterfactual conditionals (Block, 
1995; Copeland, 1996); that they exhibit appropriate causal structure (Chalmers, 1996; Scheutz, 
2001); that distinct physical states be mapped to distinct formal states (Chalmers, 1996; 
Godfrey-Smith, 2009); that only appropriately `natural’ or ‘simple’ physical states feature in the 
mapping (Scheutz, 2001; Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Millhouse, 2017); that the physical states have 
representational properties (Shagrir, 2001, 2018; Sprevak, 2010); or that the physical states be 
states of functional mechanisms (Piccinini, 2012, 2015). And others are surely possible. 
All of these tactics are a kind of ‘bottom up’ response to triviality. They attempt to cut 
down the class of implemented computations by constraining which physical systems figure in 
the preimage of the implementation mapping. Only those with the appropriate counterfactual, 
8 See Sprevak (2019) for more. 
9 Schweizer (2019) is a recent exception. 
12 
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representational, etc. features get in. A ‘top down’ response, by contrast, enriches the account of 
the systems in the image of the mapping. To the extent that formalists take computations to be 
formal, mathematical objects, they ​must ​ take bottom up approaches to triviality. The few ‘top 
down’ approaches they can take typically complicate the structure of computations while 
preserving their overall formal, mathematical character. 
Concerning triviality, the resemblance account employs a ‘top down’ response. The 
account denies that computational architectures are exhausted by their formal, mathematical 
features. Instead, they may be replete with physico-mechanical, representational, etc. features. 
Since implementation is a matter of resembling a computational architecture in these respects, 
and since most physical systems ​don't​ have the right arrangement of features, most physical 
systems won't implement many, or even any, computational architectures. For instance, most 
physical systems don't have a read/write head, an indefinitely extensible tape, etc., so most 
systems won't implement ​a ​-machines. Similarly, most physical systems aren't composed of a 
silicon board, have a certain pipelining scheme, and so on, so most physical systems don't 
implement a MIPS microarchitecture.  10
There is some reason to be dissatisfied with ‘bottom up’ approaches; here I’ll mention 
just one. The worry is that structuralism cannot adequately explain ​why​ physical computation 
necessarily involves causal, semantic, etc. features.  From the structuralist’s perspective, 11
computation is fundamentally a mathematical phenomenon, captured by pure mathematical 
computing systems such as Turing machines (construed set-theoretically), DFAs, and the like. 
10 However, attentive readers will note that this response turns, to some extent, on the specific choice of features in 
question. There subtleties must await another occasion. 
11 Another is that structuralism fails to capture the implementation conditions of many computational models; see 
Rescorla (2014). 
13 
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Methodologically, the strategy is to ​start​ with a prior mathematical notion of computation, and 
define a notion of physical computation in terms of it.  But given this outlook, the requirement 12
that physical computation essentially involve causal, semantic, etc. features looks less like a 
discovery about the nature of physical computation, and more like an ​ad hoc​ maneuver designed 
to save the theory from triviality. If computation is fundamentally a mathematical phenomenon, 
as the structuralist holds, and if that account of computation leads to trivialization (as it appears 
to), then what could possibly explain why physical computation ​must ​ be causal, semantic, or 
whatever? 
This explanatory problem doesn’t arise for the resemblance account. Because the 
resemblance theorist denies that computation is essentially mathematical, there is no ​additional 
task of explaining why physical computation must involve causal-mechanical, representational, 
etc. features. Recall Turing's characterization of ​a ​-machines. On that characterization, it is 
constitutive of ​a​-machines that they have a read/write head, that later states be determined by 
earlier states, and so on. From this perspective, ​what it is​ to be an ​a ​-machine is just to have these 
features. But since this characterization comes with causal-mechanical features 'built in', so to 
speak, it is straightforward to explain why a physical system must have these features in order to 
carry out ​a​-machine computations. The reason is simply that ​a ​-machine computations ​just are​ a 
certain kind of causal-mechanical (etc.) process. From this perspective, a causal-mechanical 
requirement isn’t an ​ad hoc ​maneuver designed to save the theory from triviality, but instead 
reflects a basic fact about the nature of ​a​-machine computations, namely, that they are a kind of 
causal-mechanical process. 
12 See Chalmers (1994, 341-342) for an especially clear statement of this approach. 
14 
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7. Medium Independence 
The resemblance account responds to triviality by enriching the character of implemented 
computations. But this maneuver may seem to cut against the idea, widely endorsed, that 
computations are 'medium independent' (Piccinini 2015, ch. 7). This section explains how a 
suitable stand-in for medium independence can be developed within the resemblance framework. 
To a first approximation, a property or process is medium independent if it can be 
realized in different physical media. ​Cooking lentils​ is not medium independent, because it can 
be realized in only quite specific physical media; ​powering a drivetrain ​is, because it can be 
accomplished by otherwise quite different physical systems (internal combustion engines, 
electric motors, etc.). 
Medium independence is closely related to multiple realizability. A property or process is 
multiply realizable, roughly, if it can be realized by different kinds of physical systems. Medium 
independence entails multiple realizability: if a property or process is medium independent, then 
it can be realized in different physical media. Note, however, that the converse fails. ​Being a 
corkscrew​ is multiply realizable, since many different corkscrew designs might do the trick, but 
not medium independent. ​Being a corkscrew​ is a matter of interacting with a specific physical 
medium, namely cork.  
It seems undeniable that computations are medium independent, hence multiply 
realizable. As Ned Block once pointed out, for instance, an AND-gate might be realized either by 
transistors, or by mice, string, and cheese (Block 1995). Moreover, the literature on 
unconventional computation is replete apparent cases in which the same computation (e.g., a 
sorting task) is performed by wildly different physical systems. But it's not clear that the 
15 
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resemblance account can capture this apparent datum. The trouble is that there appears to be no 
single computational architecture, in the above sense, common to the wide variety of computing 
systems hypothesized by computer scientists. There is no architecture, for instance, which both 
silicon and murine AND gates resemble.  13
What should the resemblance theorist make of this? The solution, I think, becomes clear 
once we reflect on the role played by medium independence (multiple realizability) in 
computational theorizing. In general we require a way to describe physical systems that abstracts 
away from (some of) their physical details. So abstracted, we can consider whether, e.g., two 
systems compute the same logical function despite physical dissimilarities. Now, ordinarily this 
role is played by the alleged medium independence (multiple realizability) of computations. But 
if the resemblance account can supply a way to abstract from physical details, it can furnish a 
way to describe physical systems at the desired level of abstraction. And this, I submit, is just 
what is needed for computational theorizing. The rest of this section explains how this might go. 
To begin, while above resemblance is characterized in terms of a single class of features, 
we can also define a notion of resemblance that discriminates between different classes of 
features. If ​F​1​, F​2​, …, F ​m​ are classes of features, then we can say that ​P​ resembles ​C ​ with respect 
to F​i​ (1 ≤ i ≤ m) to degree ​n​ just in case . Moreover, by adding aes(F , , ) n∑
m
i=1
R i P C =   
coefficient to equation (1) we can discount (or boost) the contribution of a particular class of 
features to the overall resemblance score.  Doing so gives 14
 
13 There is, I suppose, a ​disjunctive​ architecture composed of both silicon and murine components. But such a device 
is a metaphysician’s contrivance, not a genuine deliverance of computer science. 
14 Cf. Weisberg (2012). 
16 
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 (2)(|F | F | |F |)x A ⋂ F P − | A − F P −  P − F A   
 
I will write  as shorthand. In general, then, if ℝ (1 ≤ i ≤ m) arees(F , , )R P C = n xi ∈  
coefficients, the generalized resemblance score is given by .es(F , , , ) n∑
m
i=1
R i xi P C =   
By appropriately choosing coefficients we can define a notion of ​pattern resemblance 
between systems. For instance, if ​F​1​, F​2​, F​3​ are classes of physico-mechanical, syntactic, and 
semantic features, respective, with corresponding coefficients ​x​1​, x​2​, x​3​, then by setting ​x​1​ = x​3​ = 
0​ and ​x​2​ = 1​ we can say that P ​pattern resembles​ C to degree ​n​ just in case 
, that P ​pattern resembles C​ simpliciter just in case P pattern resembleses(F , , , ) n∑3
i=1
R i xi P C =   
C to a high enough degree, and so on.  
How does all this help? Medium independence is naturally thought to concern what I've 
called 'syntactic' features. We say that silicon and mouse-and-string systems compute AND, 
when they do, because at a certain abstract level of description they exhibit the same patterns, 
regardless of their physical substrate. The resemblance account can accommodate this fact by 
noting that different AND gates pattern resemble each other. Thus the resemblance account can 
furnish a level of description appropriate for this part of computational theorizing, without 
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8. Summary 
The resemblance account holds that a physical system computes to the extent that it 
resembles a computational architecture. This view is grounded in Turing’s influential approach 
to thinking about computational architectures, an approach which persists in computer science 
today. The view is also motivated on theoretical grounds: it offers a novel and natural response 
to triviality arguments about computational implementation. While I haven’t here attempted an 
exhaustive assessment of the resemblance account, the considerations surveyed here are 
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Anecdotal Experiments: evaluating evidence with few animals 
Mike Dacey 
 
Comparative psychology came into its own as a science of animal minds, so a standard story goes, when 
it abandoned anecdotes in favor of experimental methods. However, pragmatic constraints significantly 
limit the number of individual animals included in laboratories experiments. Studies are often published 
with sample sizes in the single digits, and sometimes samples of one animal. With such small samples, 
comparative psychology has arguably not actually moved on from its anecdotal roots. Replication failures 
in other branches of psychology have received substantial attention, but have only recently been 
addressed in comparative psychology, and have not received serious attention in the attending 
philosophical literature. I focus on the question of how to interpret findings from experiments with small 
samples, and whether they can be generalized to other members of the tested species. As a first step, I 
argue that we should view studies with extreme small sample sizes as anecdotal experiments, lying 
somewhere between traditional experiments and traditional anecdotes in evidential weight and 
generalizability. 
 
1. Animal Anecdotes and the Founding of Comparative Psychology 
Darwin’s views on evolution suggest that continuity across species is the rule. Evolution occurs 
when small changes build up slowly over long periods of time, so we should expect to see cross-species 
continuity in most traits. Nowhere was this result more significant than when it came to the mind. The 
fiercely-held conventional wisdom at the time was that human minds were entirely unlike animal minds. 
To challenge this conventional wisdom, Darwin reports anecdotes about various clever and heroic 
animals. For instance: 
“I will give only one other instance of sympathetic and heroic conduct in a little 
American monkey. Several years ago a keeper at the Zoological Gardens, showed me 
some deep and scarcely healed wounds on the nape of his neck, inflicted on him while 
kneeling on the floor by a fierce baboon. The little American monkey, who was a warm 
friend of this keeper, lived in the same large compartment, and was dreadfully afraid of 
the big baboon. Nevertheless, as soon as he saw his friend the keeper in peril, he rushed 
to the rescue . . .” (1871 pg. 75) 
This anecdotal approach continued in the work of George Romanes, Darwin’s appointed successor on 
psychological topics. Describing similar animal heroism, Romanes says (also reporting the story 
secondhand) that a column of ants “rushed to the rescue” of an individual pinned with a rock, and “This 
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observation seems unequivocal as proving fellow-feeling and sympathy, so far as we can trace any 
analogy between the emotions of the higher animals and those of insects” (1888 pp. 48-49). 
Near the turn of the 20th century, authors such as C. Lloyd Morgan (1894) and Edward Thorndike 
(1911) vocally disproved of the reliance on anecdotes. To be a science on firm founding, they felt, the 
field would need to shift to rigorous experimental methods. The resulting shift, so a common story goes, 
brought comparative psychology into its own as a rigorous science (e.g. Shettleworth 2012). 
It is easy to see what is objectionable about the way Darwin and Romanes use anecdotes. They relay 
the stories secondhand without scrutiny, and leap to a heroic interpretation without considering other 
explanations. There is also a particular worry that work on animal minds will be systematically biased by 
the unconscious human tendency to anthropomorphize; to interpret animal actions in the same ways they 
would interpret human actions (e.g. Dacey 2017). Narrative anecdotes seem particularly ripe for such a 
bias. They often presume intentions behind the action (as when we describe a reach for an object, or a 
glance towards a person), and often elicit emotional reactions and bonds with characters that may threaten 
impartial scientific analysis. 
To put it simply, rejecting anecdotes makes comparative psychology look more like other successful 
sciences (e.g. Thorndike 1911). Scientists across fields shun anecdotes. There are many reasons to do so. I 
attempt to summarize the key concerns about anecdotes below, listed to aid later discussion. These 
concerns overlap, and are not exhaustive: 
1. Anecdotes can be cherry-picked to make a predetermined point. 
2. We lack control over and knowledge of background conditions of anecdotes. 
3. Anecdotes are narrative in structure, rather than providing analyzable data. 
4. Anecdotes are non-repeatable (non-replicable), and so can’t be confirmed independently. 
5. Anecdotes don’t support generalization. 
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Performing controlled experiments can alleviate these concerns. One cannot pick and choose which 
individual responses in any given experiment to report (though one can choose which experiments to 
report, as discussed below). A good experiment is defined by control over the variables that might 
influence behavior. Experiments produce evidence in the form of data, which is cold, dispassionate, and 
suited for statistical analysis. As a result, when done well, experiments are replicable (worries noted in 
section 3), and they can support generalization. 
Summing up, anecdotes are usually opposed to experiments. A common foundation story for 
comparative psychology tells that it came into its own as a science when it chose experiments over 
anecdotes. However, it is not clear whether this foundation story holds up when we look at current 
practice. 
2. Sample Sizes in Animal Labs 
When running laboratory experiments on animals, practical constraints significantly restrict sample 
sizes. Animals must be kept and cared for, and labs can only afford and fit a certain number. Ethical 
concerns often dictate that the number of animals involved should be as low as possible.1 Individual 
experiments usually require time-consuming training, so some subset of the overall groups is chosen.2 
There are also often basic tasks that an animal must successfully perform to even participate in the 
experiment, and those of the original group chosen who fail will be excluded. I take these to be challenges 
intrinsic to the subject of study, and do not intend to criticize the researchers who face them. Nonetheless, 
the implications are stark. Experiments frequently include samples of individual animals in the single 
digits, and sometimes only 1 or 2. Figure 1 shows the number of individual animals included in every 
individual experiment published in four top journals in the field in 2019. Out of 151 experiments in 90 
papers, 50 experiments include data from 10 or fewer animals (nearly 1/3 of the total), and 98 include 
                                                          
1 Both of these issues are especially difficult with primates, and even more so with chimpanzees, as in my example 
below. 
2 Additionally, having been trained on one task may influence later performance on other experiments, so 
sometimes animals are excluded so that they remain ‘naïve’ to the tasks at hand. 
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data from fewer than 20 (nearly 2/3).3 To put it bluntly, these sample sizes would be unacceptable in other 
branches of psychology. 
As an illustrative example of the interpretive challenges raised by sample sizes like these, I will 
focus on Inoue & Matsuzawa’s 2007 paper, “Working memory of numerals in chimpanzees.” This paper 
compares human and chimpanzee performance on a short-term memory task. The authors state their 
conclusions unequivocally: “Our study shows that young chimpanzees have an extraordinary working 
memory capability for numerical recollection better than that of human adults” (pg. 1005). The paper has 
                                                          
3 Thanks to Abraham Brownell for performing this analysis. This data is not meant to present a statistically rigorous 
picture of the field at large, but simply to provide a reasonably representative snapshot. This illustrates the issue to 
those unfamiliar with the norms of the field. These journals are among the top that focus on animal cognition, and 
were chosen in large part to limit potentially subjective inclusion criteria. However, they are not the only such 
journals, and animal cognition studies are often published in more generalist journals as well (for instance, the 
example discussed below was published in Current Biology). Several of these experiments also divided participants 
into different conditions, further limiting the number of individuals observed making specific responses, though we 
did not analyse these divisions. 
 
Fig. 1: A histogram of all experiments published in the journals Animal Behavior and Cognition, Animal Cognition, Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition in the year 2019, sorted 
by number of individual animals in reported data. This includes 151 experiments described in 90 papers; any experiment 
that made an intervention, laboratory or field. 54 papers were excluded, as they did not present new behavioral data (29 
papers), were unable to report the number of animals involved (seven papers), were purely observational field studies (six 
papers), or used only human subjects (12 papers). 
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been cited extensively, and in the media, this conclusion was accepted uncritically (“Chimps Exhibit 
Superior Memory, Outshining Humans,” New York Times 12/4/2007). 
The task was as follows. Participants (human and chimpanzee alike) sit in front of a computer 
screen. The computer quickly flashes several digits in random locations on the screen (all shown 
simultaneously). After a presentation of a few hundred milliseconds (650, 430, and 210 ms in different 
trials), each digit is masked with a small white square. Participants were asked to then tap each masking 
square in order of the digits previously at each location. The researchers measured both response times 
and accuracy. The task is meant to test the ability to rapidly store working memories for the visual scene 
(210 ms is too fast to saccade through the sequence). 
Inoue and Matsuzawa begin the study with 6 chimpanzees (three mother-child pairs; there were 14 
total on-site). While all six were able to learn the basic masking task, only four performed at the level of 
five numerals, which was the number used in the key test (Supplemental materials Table S1). So, the 
experiments include these four animals. The actual data presented, however, only compares one 
chimpanzee at a time against a human average (human n=9 in one experiment, n=12 in another). So for 
each actual comparison, chimpanzee n=1. In fact, the assertion that chimpanzees perform better than 
humans seems to be based on a single chimpanzee, Ayumu, the best chimpanzee performer (see figure 2). 
Based on the data presented in supplemental material (see figure 3), Ayumu matched the human average 
accuracy rate with 650 ms presentation times, but still had a lower accuracy rate than the majority of the 
individual humans.4 So they key claim here seems to be based on a simple size of one. 
Given this reliance on extremely small sample sizes, we must question whether the field has really 
moved on from its anecdotal roots. I suggest that performance of animals like Ayumu is just another kind 
of anecdote; it’s a single animal (or very small number) displaying an interesting behavior. It can be hard 
                                                          
4 All three chimpanzees shown did show faster response times than all humans (response time was measured as 
the latency before the first number was touched). 
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to know exactly what conclusions we can draw from a study like this. At the very least, though. findings 
like this cannot ground general claims like “chimpanzees outperform humans.”5  
This study is a particularly salient example, both in the sense that it reaches the limit case of n=1, and 
in its strong conclusion and broad uptake. But the core concerns here generalize, given the number of 
experiments published with extremely small sample sizes. To be clear, these restrictions result from 
practical issues intrinsic to the field. I do not criticize researchers for this, as I see no reasonable way 
around it (absent massive funding increases and means to address ethical concerns).  
3. The replication crisis and comparative psychology 
In recent years, other branches of psychology have instituted reforms to address prominent and 
repeated replication failures (Romero 2019). Despite the obvious worry that small sample sizes leave 
comparative psychology vulnerable to these same problems, the field has only just begun to respond 
(Beran 2018, Farrar, Boekle, & Clayton 2020). Stevens (2017) notes that comparative psychology makes 
frequent use of within-subjects methods6 that might protect the field compared to social psychology. 
                                                          
5 This is compounded by the fact that Ayumu here is an outlier among even the top performers: only those 
individuals able to perform the basic task were included, and Ayumu’s performance was an outlier among them. 
There are also concerns that the life-history of laboratory animals makes them unrepresentative. 
6 I note that within-subjects statistical analyses may be more likely replicate even with few individuals, but those 
methods do not help the problem of generalizing findings to other members of the species. 
 
Fig. 2: Data from Inoue & Matsuzawa 2007 
(pg. R1005). Two chimpanzees, Ayumu and Ai 
are compared to a human average. 
 
Figure 3: Data from Inoue & Matsuzawa 2007, with 650 ms 
presentation of stimuli before mask (supplemental materials, 
figure S2). This is the same condition as the leftmost data-points 
of figure 2, this page. 
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -183-
DRAFT for PhilSci Archive: 7/30/2020  Mike Dacey 
7 
 
However, he says, there are several reasons to think that comparative psychology is vulnerable to 
replication failures. He makes several recommendations for the field to address these concerns. Some of 
these recommendations have also begun to be implemented. I will focus here on recommendations that 
inform the current discussion. 
One such recommendation is for researchers to pre-register their methods before the test, or for 
journals to adopt the practice of registered reports, in which a journal accepts or rejects a paper based on 
methods alone, before experiments are run. This practice has grown in fields like social psychology. The 
purpose is to prevent fishing-expedition approaches to studies and statistical analyses: These can lead to 
cherry-picking which studies are reported, and P-hacking by, for instance, simply trying various statistical 
analyses until one gets a significant result. In 2018, the journal Animal Behavior and Cognition began 
accepting registered reports (Vonk & Kraus 2018), though the editors report that uptake by researchers 
has been slow (Beran 2020). 
Worries about sample size are more complicated. For instance, social psychology has massively 
increased sample sizes in their studies simply by making greater use of online platforms like Mechanical 
Turk and Qualtrics. Comparative psychology has no such option. And indeed, for reasons noted above, it 
seems impossible to completely avoid small sample sizes. Nonetheless, Stevens does make some 
recommendations that can help. First, different labs can collaborate and combine their subject pool. In 
fact, the ManyPrimates Project was launched in 2019 to facilitate collaboration across labs spanning the 
globe, allowing for larger and more diverse samples in studies of primate cognition (Many Primates et al. 
2019). Secondly, he suggests that researchers can take advantage of facilities like zoos that may have 
larger numbers of animals available. Thirdly, researchers can reconsider their choice of species, either by 
running studies pooling multiple species, or by switching to species that are easily available in the 
community, such as dogs. 
I have little to add on recommendations regarding species choice, but I will take on-board the rest of 
the recommendations I’ve mentioned. While the recommendations aimed at increasing sample size are 
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unlikely to completely address the problem (they simply cannot have an impact like we’ve seen in social 
psychology), they certainly help. Registered reports are also valuable; if papers are evaluated based on 
methods rather than results, it will significantly impact our interpretation of studies will small sample 
sizes in ways I discuss below (section 6). 
Even large-scale changes are not likely to completely address sample size worries in comparative 
psychology. But even if they do in the future, we should still consider how to interpret existing small 
sample studies. Either way, interpretive challenges remain. To face these challenges, we can start by look 
to other research programs that employ very small samples, or even samples of one. To the extent these 
programs are analogous to comparative psychology, they might provide concrete suggestions. 
4. Candidate Analogue One: Cognitive Neuroscience 
Lesion studies in cognitive neuroscience present the first candidate analogue. In many of these 
studies, researchers test a single patient with known brain damage on a battery of tasks aimed at 
delimiting a certain cognitive capacity.7 Studies like this generally focus on two kinds of question. The 
first are questions about the neural underpinnings of a particular cognitive capacity. Here, the goal is 
locating damage, and correlating it with deficits. The second are the so-called dissociations of capacities 
that might otherwise be thought to be expressions of a single system. For instance, if a deficit in 
experiential memory does not also bring with it a deficit in memories for facts, then we have reason to 
believe that the two are separate capacities subserved be separate systems (episodic and semantic 
memory), and moreover, the intact capacity does not require the damaged capacity. 
The evidential value of lesion studies has long been controversial. As a result, there is a substantial 
literature aimed at uncovering the methodological assumptions behind the research (e.g. Caramazza 1986, 
Bub & Bub 1988, McClosky & Caramazza 1988, Glymour 1994, Shallice 2015). The actual damage and 
                                                          
7 As in the Matsuzawa study, these individuals are also outliers; they are chosen precisely because their 
performance is abnormal. 
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deficits observed in individuals vary substantially, and the ‘clean’ cases of a particular deficit are rare. As 
a result, it can be difficult to know what aspects of any study can be generalized. Arguably, these 
concerns, along with improvements in other methods, have driven a reduction in reliance on lesion studies 
in recent decades. However, if one is dealing with lesion studies, the focus on a specific individual is 
arguably (but controversially) an advantage. The very fact that individual deficits vary so much means 
that effects would likely wash out in any cohort study, leaving them impossible to interpret (Caramazza 
1986). 
Even so, there is at least one kind of general claim that these studies do seem to license. These are 
claims about the necessity of one capacity for another, as made in dissociation studies. If Task A can be 
performed by an individual who cannot perform Task B, then it cannot be the case that the capacity 
responsible for performance of Task A is necessary for performance on Task B.8 This inference can be 
transferred. For instance, the fact that Ayumu was able to do so well on the memory task without using 
language suggests that language is not required. Necessity claims are strong claims though, especially for 
a field like psychology, where pretty much everything can vary across individuals. So, the denial of a 
necessity claim may not always be hugely informative. Nonetheless, even if this is a limited result, it’s 
something. 
5. Candidate Analogue Two: Anecdotes in Cognitive Ethology 
Researchers in cognitive ethology will also sometimes report anecdotes, or “incident reports” of 
particular observed behaviors. As with lesion studies, this practice is controversial (Mitchell, Thompson, 
& Miles 1997). In general, data based on repeated observation is preferred, if possible. Even so, incident 
reports reports may describe low-frequency behaviors, that would be difficult to observe frequently or to 
elicit in a laboratory setting. They can also introduce behaviors that researchers had been wholly unaware 
of. Field anecdotes can also arguably provide some evidence about cognitive processes on their own: field 
                                                          
8 This basic inference structure is also employed in developmental psychology, though with larger sample sizes 
(Perner & Lang 1999). 
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observations don’t face any concerns about ecological validity, and anecdotes can often supply richer 
context about the individual behaving and its context than experiment (Mitchell 1997).9 
Nonetheless, incident reports do suffer from the limitations described above, with concerns about 
anthropomorphism and generalizability at the fore. Indeed, the use of anecdotes has been declining in 
primatology (Ramsay & Teichroeb 2019), suggesting that the downside of anecdotes is winning out in the 
minds of researchers. Even if these anecdotes do not provide much evidential value, they have heuristic 
value in generating hypotheses, guiding future observation or experimentation, and identifying behaviors 
worthy of more systematic study (Silverman 1997¸ Andrews 2020).  
6. Anecdotal Experiments 
As a start towards coming to grips with the sample size problem in comparative psychology, I argue 
that we should view studies with extreme small samples sizes as anecdotal experiments. Anecdotal 
experiments have some of the strengths that are usually ascribed to well-designed experiments (they are 
controlled and meticulously recorded), and some of the weaknesses ascribed to standard anecdotes (they 
may not be reliably repeatable, and they do not support straightforward generalization to other 
individuals). They occupy a middle-ground, providing stronger evidence than that provided by a one-off 
observation, but not as strong as that provided by experiments with larger sample sizes. 
To illustrate more specifically, I return to the concerns lodged against anecdotes in section 1. 
Anecdotal experiments avoid the most significant concerns, while the rest could be lodged against these 
studies anyway. I’ll work through each in turn. 
Concern 1: Anecdotes can be cherry-picked to make a predetermined point. 
This worry can be avoided by making use of registered reports, such that papers are accepted based on 
methods, before experiments are done. It remains a worry that existing studies report cherry-picked 
                                                          
9 Mitchell advocates specifically for anthropomorphic anecdotes as a way to conceptualize behavior. I set the issue 
of anthropomorphism aside for now, as I see it as less of a concern here (see next section). 
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experiments, though perhaps not to the degree of full anecdotes: the number of individual behaviors one 
might observe and dismiss in reporting an anecdote is much less than the number of experiments one 
might perform and dismiss. 
Concern 2: We lack control over and knowledge of background conditions of anecdotes. 
This worry does not apply here to any greater degree than it does in psychology generally. A well-
designed experiment controls immediate background conditions, such that we can have a reasonable idea 
of what features of the task the animal is responding to. 
Concern 3: Anecdotes are non-repeatable (non-replicable), and so can’t be confirmed 
independently. 
Anecdotal experiments have records of methods, which make replication possible. However, replication 
problems in other areas suggest that comparative psychology should be concerned about replicability 
(Farrar, Boekle, & Clayton 2020). Perhaps the focus on within-subject tests puts comparative psychology 
in somewhat better position than it might be otherwise (Stevens 2017), but the extremely small sample 
sizes suggest that replicability cannot be assumed. This is a worry either way, and framing these as the 
anecdotal experiments can make it more explicit. 
Concern 4: Anecdotes are narrative in structure, rather than providing analyzable data. 
Anecdotal experiments do rely on data, so seem to pass this test. Nonetheless, we should be careful in 
what we take that data to show. If, as just suggested, we should question the replicability of these studies, 
statistics can mislead. A careful reevaluation of statistical measures can help here (as in social 
psychology). However, absent that, statistics can present a false sense of generalizability. For instance, we 
can statistically show that Ayumu himself reliably outperforms the human sample average in this study. 
What that means about chimpanzees more generally is a different question. 
Concern 5: They don’t support generalization. 
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As with concern 3, this is just to recognize limits already present. It is common to restate an experimental 
finding by simply plugging generics into a literal description of the study. For instance: “Ayumu 
outperformed the average performance of twelve humans in our study” becomes “chimpanzees 
outperform humans.” This move is clearly too quick. If we have good reason to believe that a study 
includes a representative sample of a larger population, we generalize to that population. These 
generalizations should become more tentative as confidence in the representativeness of the sample 
increases. With very few animals, we can’t generalize this way. This is compounded by the fact that the 
animals performing in these experiments, like Ayumu, are often outliers. 
Treating experiments with extremely small sample sizes as anecdotal experiments marks their 
limitations, and helps guide their proper use. There are many important unanswered questions here. We 
would want to know how to determine which experiments are anecdotal and which are not; where is the 
cut-off? Moreover, in light of the interpretive limitations of anecdotal experiments, I have said little about 
what, concretely, we can learn from them. I will offer some brief comments on that topic here. 
The fact that one member of a species is able to perform a task to a certain criterion shows that it is 
possible for some members of that species to do so. However, this doesn’t guarantee any particular 
cognitive mechanism. Though, we can follow work in cognitive neuroscience and conclude that 
successful performance shows that some capacity believed to be absent (say, language) is not necessary 
for performance on the task. They may also provide some evidence for one hypothesized mechanism over 
another if that level of performance is impossible or highly implausible according to the devalued 
hypothesis. Absent such strong claims, one competing hypothesis may still predict better performance on 
a task (this is not the aim of the Inoue & Matsuzawa study). If so, a convincing finding of strong 
performance might provide a small (minute, even) amount of evidence for that hypothesis. Additionally, 
following cognitive ethology, the fact that at least one individual succeeds in a task might motivate new 
hypotheses about the cognitive capacities involved, or identify new areas worthy of further study. These 
are useful conclusions, but they are not often deeply helpful in evaluating models of the actual cognitive 
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processes involved. Psychological models rarely make claims of possibility or impossibility, and one 
cannot conclude a capacity is not necessary for the task unless one is confident the animal does not 
possess that capacity (most of the interesting options are still up in the air). 
Even with these limitations in scope and strength, any generalization from an extremely small 
sample to a species at large must be significantly hedged: these individuals might just be doing something 
completely different than other members of the species.10 But even so limited, there is still value to that 
evidence. Often when it comes to nonhuman minds, strong evidence is very hard to come by, so any 
amount of evidence is worth considering. 
7. Implications and Conclusion 
The basic point of framing extreme small sample studies as anecdotal experiments is to reduce their 
weight in general claims about the nature of nonhuman cognitive capacities. Indeed, I argue that the field 
ought to reduce the evidential weight of individual experiments in general, to help move away from a 
pernicious ‘critical experiment’ framing that still too often pervades. The actual evidential value of 
individual experiments must be assessed on a case by case basis, depending on the kind of model being 
evaluated, and the nature of the anecdotal experiment. This is tough work of course, but it always has 
been. 
There may be other general impacts on the field. This framing could benefit the field by encouraging 
more exploratory research and reporting of more varied behaviors. In effect, experimental comparative 
psychology might look a bit more like field ethology. For example, Stanton et al. (2017) presented 
raccoons with the Aesop’s fable task, in which they can gain access to a treat floating on water by 
dropping stones in to raise the water level. They report that one of the raccoons managed to get the treat, 
not by dropping stones, but by ripping the entire apparatus off the floor and dumping it out. A field that 
                                                          
10 I have ignored worries about ecological validity and differences between captive and wild animals, but they 
would have to be considered in addressing this possibility. 
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relies on registered reports, and recognizes the limitations of data from such small sample sizes would 
likely include substantially more reports of behavior like this. There is value to that, as these behaviors, 
intended by the experimenter or not, do provide insight into the animals. 
Most importantly, though, this framing encourages more honest reporting of the significance of 
studies. Extreme low sample size studies are limited in evidential value. Reporting them as anecdotal 
experiments presents them as such. 
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We can see our world (and possible worlds generally) as naturally dividing up into structure 
and contents. The contents of the world further divide into the properties and individuals 
which are instantiated at and exist in the considered world, respectively. On the other hand, 
the structure of the world provides the way that the contents are organized.  
Call a thesis a ‘Humility Thesis’ if it amounts to claiming that there is some important 
part of the world that we are irremediably ignorant of. Humility Theses are claims of some 
systematic epistemic limitations we have. For example, David Lewis, in his “Ramseyan 
Humility” (2009), argues that we are irremediably ignorant of the identities of many 
properties of things.1 We only come to know them as role-occupants (of dispositions or 
other roles). But given a contingent connection between roles and occupants, different 
properties can occupy the same role at different worlds. Thus, knowledge that the role is 
occupied is insufficient for identifying the property occupying that role. An analogous 
Humility Thesis arises in the case of individuals. Assume that we can know the qualitative 
character the individuals in our world. If individuals are only contingently connected with 
their qualitative properties (in the way role occupants were suggested to be connected with 
their roles), then different individuals could occupy the same qualitative characters in 
different worlds. If this is so, then knowledge that a particular qualitative character is had is 
likewise insufficient to know the identity of the individual which has that character. 
The routes just sketched for these two Humility Theses bear a significant similarity. 
Both aforementioned Humility Theses involve claims about our epistemic limitations 
regarding our knowledge of the identities of contents of the world. The question I want to 
ask in this paper is whether or not there is reason to think that we may be irremediably 
ignorant of the structure of the world. Spatiotemporal structures provide common examples 
of world structures. As such I will limit the following discussion to whether or not we 
should accept a Humility Thesis about the world’s spatiotemporal structure.2 In particular, I 
argue that we remain irremediably ignorant of whether we are in a world with distinct 
regions which are topologically indistinguishable from one another.  
                                                 
1 I discuss Lew is’ arguments in §1. 
2 In w hat follow s I ignore current discussion about w hether or not our w orld isn’t fundamentally 
spatiotemporal, though I believe that my discussion w ill generalize to other types of w orld structures. 
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I begin by briefly reviewing Lewis’s argument for Humility about the intrinsic properties 
of things (‘Ramseyan Humility’ henceforth). I then discuss whether we should endorse a 
corresponding Humility Thesis about the worlds’ spatiotemporal structure (‘Structural 
Humility’ henceforth). I argue that the standard metaphysics of spacetime fall prey to 
Structural Humility. This is significant because avoiding concerns of Humility is touted as a 
reason for adopting a particular metaphysic of spacetime. I conclude with a brief discussion 
of the implications of Structural Humility for this view. 
 
1. RAMSEYAN HUMILITY 
Lewis’s argument for Humility regarding our knowledge of properties begins with two 
arguments for Humility about fundamental properties.3 Fundamental properties can come in 
a variety of categories as well. They can be all-or-nothing properties of various adicities, or 
come in varying degrees such as scalar and vector magnitudes, and so on.  
Advances in scientific theorizing and the discovery of fundamental properties stand in a 
mutual relationship. So much so that a true and complete final theory, T, will provide us 
with a complete inventory of the fundamental properties at work in nature. The final 
theory, T, however, will leave out properties which are instantiated but play no role in 
nature (‘idlers’), and those fundamental properties which aren’t instantiated in our world 
(‘aliens’).4 
The argument for Ramseyan humility can be seen as proceeding in two steps. First, the 
argument shows that any evidence for our fundamental theory T, is just evidence for what 
is called the Ramsey sentence of T. Second, it is argued that the Ramsey sentence of T  
admits of multiple realizations. Since all evidence for T  is only evidence for the Ramsey 
sentence of T  and the Ramsey sentence of T  isn’t uniquely realizable, we have no more 
evidence for T  than any other possible realizer of the Ramsey sentence of T. Allow me to 
unpack. 
Recall T  is our final and complete theory at the limit of empirical enquiry. The 
language of T  contains T - terms which are the theoretical terms implicitly defined by T. 
Then there is the rest of our language which Lewis calls O-language for ‘old language’. O -
                                                 
3 Lew is (2009, pp. 204-5) tells us that the fundamental properties are those that ground objective similarity 
and difference, they provide a minimal base for the rest of the w orld’s qualitative features. For more in-depth 
treatments of fundamental properties see Lew is (1983) and Lew is (1986, pp. 59-63). 
4 Lew is (2009, p. 205). 
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language is what is available to us without the term introducing theory T . The O-language 
is rich enough to describe all possible observations.5  
Recall that all fundamental properties except aliens and idlers will be listed in T ’s 
inventory. Importantly, all of the fundamental properties mentioned in T  are named by the 
T - terms.6 Now the theory T  consists in all of the logical consequences of a sentence 
called the postulate of T . We can write the postulate as T (t1 ,…, tn) where t1 ,…, tn  are the 
theoretical terms introduced by T and all of the rest of the language in the postulate is O -
language. When we replace all of the T - terms with variables, we get T (x1 ,…, xn). An n-
tuple that satisfies T  with respect to the actual world is called an actual realization of T  
whereas one that can satisfy T  with respect to some possible world is a possible realization of 
T . We then get the Ramsey sentence of T  when we prefix T (x1 ,…, xn) with existential 
quantifiers: ∃x1, …, ∃xn, (x1, …, xn).7 Significantly, the Ramsey sentence of T  implies 
exactly those O - language sentences which are implied by the postulate of T .8 Because the 
O - language is rich enough to describe all possible experiences, the predictive success of T  
will be the same as the Ramsey sentence of T . This means that if there are multiple 
possible realizations of the Ramsey sentence of T , no possible observation can tell us 
which one is the actual realization. This is because, no matter which one is the actual 
realization, the Ramsey sentence will be true and our observational evidence only gives us 
evidence for the truth of the Ramsey sentence.9 
What is left to be shown is that there are in fact multiple realizations of the Ramsey 
sentence of T . Lewis offers two arguments for this conclusion: the permutation argument and 
the replacement argument. Both rely on Lewis’s acceptant of a principle of recombination. 
Namely, that we can take apart distinct elements of a possibility and rearrange them, we can 
remove some of the distinct elements, we can reduplicate some of them, and we can replace 
elements of some possibility with elements of others and get a new possibility.10 It is 
                                                 
5 Ibid. pp. 205-6. 
6 Ibid. p. 206. 
7 Ibid. p. 207. 
8 Ibid. p. 207, n. 6. 
9 Ibid. p. 207. 
10 Ibid. pp. 207-8. For an in-depth discussion into formulating a principle of recombination and other principles 
of plenitude see Bricker (MS b). 
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important to note that distinct elements cannot be recombined in any way possible, but that 
they have to be recombined in a category-preserving way.  
The permutation argument starts with the assumption that we have the actual 
realization of T . Then we find the members of the n-tuple that satisfies T  that are 
fundamental and belong to multi-membered categories. Then we permute these within their 
categories to get a new n-tuple that satisfies T . The principle of recombination is what 
allows us to permute these properties to get a possibility. Quidditism, the view that two 
worlds can differ merely by permutation of fundamental properties, gets us that the 
resulting possibility is distinct from the original possibility. Note that the argument from 
permutation only gets us humility insofar as there are actual fundamental properties of 
multi-membered categories that can be swapped. If there are only a small number of 
categories of fundamental properties in T  that are multi-membered, this does not 
guarantee a sweeping Humility Thesis.11 The replacement argument is designed to provide a 
more sweeping conclusion. 
The replacement argument gets us Humility through replacing the fundamental 
properties in T  with fundamental alien and idling properties of the same category. If there 
are alien or idling properties that fall into the same categories as the fundamental properties 
mentioned in T , then recombination entails that there are distinct possibilities where some 
or all of the fundamental properties in T  have been replaced with aliens or idlers of the 
same category. Lewis offers a few reasons to think that there will be enough alien properties 
to replace at least a large majority of the fundamental properties in the actual realization of 
T . The reason I find the most powerful begins by noting that it is a contingent matter what 
fundamental properties are instantiated. And once we’ve appreciated this fact we should 
think that there is a world where more fundamental properties are instantiated than are 
instantiated at this world. And there is a further world with more properties instantiated at 
it than the second one and so on. It’s implausible to think that amongst these worlds with 
more fundamental properties than ours that there won’t be alien properties that are 
members of most, if not all, of the categories in the fundamental properties mentioned in 
T.  Thus, we have good reason to think that there are sufficiently enough alien properties 
                                                 
11 Lew is (2009, 208-12). 
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for the replacement argument to go through. This argument gives us an argument for a 
much more sweeping Humility Thesis than the permutation argument.12  
 
2. HUMILITY ABOUT SPATIOTEMPORAL STRUCTURE 
We’ve seen how Lewis argues for a Humility Thesis about our knowledge of the properties 
our world instantiates in his arguments for Ramseyan Humility. To get to Structural 
Humility we need to proceed differently. One important reason for thinking this has to do 
with the inapplicability of recombination to structure. Lewis’s arguments for Ramseyan 
Humility made use of recombination to swap properties around from within a world or 
swap properties from a different world into the structure of the old one in order to get new 
possibilities. We can’t swap around parts of structures in the same way. Trying to use 
recombination to fill out the possible world structures runs into serious problems. Further, 
the recombination principle that Lewis uses presupposes that there is a structure to 
recombine the elements into. Instead, we need a different principle of plenitude for 
structures. I believe if we accept a plausible principle of plenitude for world structures and 
we accept some plausible views about the nature of the worlds’ geometric structure, then 
we remain irremediably ignorant of important aspects of the worlds’ geometric structure. 
Namely, whether the world we live in contains distinct topologically indistinguishable 
points and how the distinct indistinguishable points are distributed.13  
 
2.1. Metric and Merely Pseudo-Metric Spaces 
First, let’s take a look at two different classes of geometric structures. Metric spaces are 
spaces whose topology is solely determind by a distance function that meets the following 
definition: 
 
D1 d(x,y) = 0 ⇔ x = y    (Identity of Indiscernables) 
D2 d(x,y) = d(y,x)   (Symmetry) 
D3 d(x,y) + d(y,z) ≥ d(x,z)   (Triangle Inequality) 
 
3D-Euclidean spaces count as an examples of a metric space. The metric spaces are part of 
the larger class of pseudo-metric spaces. That is all metric spaces are pseudo-metric spaces but 
not all pseudo-metric spaces are metric spaces. The class of pseudo-metric spaces is the class 
of spaces whose topology is defined by a distance function that replaces D1 with: 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 212-4. 
13 Any distinct points, p and p*, are topologically indistinguishable just in case for any open set, S, p belongs to S 
just in case p* belongs to S. 




D1* x = y ⇒ d(x,y)= 0  (Indiscernibility of Identicals) 
 
In other words pseudo-metric spaces include geometric structures which have distinct 
points at zero-distance from one another. Call the pseudo-metric spaces which have distinct 
points at zero-distance from one another merely pseudo-metric spaces. The metric spaces and 
the merely pseudo-metric spaces are mutually exclusive and exhaust the class of pseudo-
metric spaces. Metric spaces and merely pseudo-metric spaces only differ over whether they 
have topologically indistinguishable points or not. In metric spaces the open sets that fix the 
topology also uniquely determine the points in that space, in merely pseudo-metric spaces 
this is not the case. Moreover, in merely pseudo-metric spaces there will also be distinct 
topologically indistinguishable regions besides the point-sized ones. For any two distinct 
topologically indistinguishable regions, R and R*, there are some distinct topologically 
indistinguishable points, p and p*, such that p is in both R and R* yet p* is in R but not R* 
(or vice versa). 
 
2.2. The Possibility of Merely Pseudo-Metric Spaces 
We are accustomed to thinking in terms of spaces that are metric spaces. In fact, I’d imagine 
most think it is constitutive of being a point that it is uniquely identified by its place in the 
worlds’ geometric structure. The possibility of merely pseudo-metric spaces flouts this 
intuition. So there needs to be good reason to think that merely pseudo-metric spatial 
structures are possible. The best way to go about this requires providing a principled way to 
determine what structures are possible and which ones aren’t. In “Plenitude of Possible 
Structures” (MSa) Bricker provides what I take to be the best method for determining the 
possibility of a class of world structures.  
The method can be summed up as follows: First, we need to determine what structures 
have played an explanatory role in our theorizing about the world.14 Here, playing an 
explanatory role isn’t understood in sociological, but objective terms – the structures must 
have genuine explanatory power.15 Determining these structures provides the base of 
logically possible structures from which we can generalize to other possible structures. 
Next, we need to determine which classes of structures are natural classes. The members of 
                                                 
14 In particular Bricker tells us “[w ]e have w arranted belief that a structure is logically possible if that structure 
plays, or has played, an explanatory role in our theorizing about the actual w orld.” (MSa, p. 5). This just gives 
us a base set of structures from w hich w e w ill determine the w ho class or classes of possible structures from. 
15 Bricker (MSa, p. 6). 
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natural classes of structures objectively resemble each other in ways that members of classes 
that aren’t natural don’t. We determine the natural classes of structures by seeing whether 
or not each of them serve as a principle object of study in some major area of study in 
mathematics – the ones that do are the natural classes.16 This gives us candidate natural 
classes of structures to generalize to as logically possible ones. Finally, not just any 
generalization from the base classes of structures to a natural class will count as a good 
generalization. Only those natural classes that are natural generalizations of the structures in 
our base count as logically possible structures.17 Here, again, we defer to mathematicians to 
see what classes of structures are natural ganeralizations of others. This method gives us the 
following principle of plenitude: 
 
PRINCIPLE OF PLENITUDE OF STRUCTURES 
Suppose S is a class of logically possible structures. Any structure belonging 
to any natural generalization of S is logically possible.18 
 
The argument for the possibility of merely pseudo-metric structures is straightforward. 
First, the class of Euclidean spaces, E , is a prime example of a class of structures that have 
played a role in our theorizing about the actual world. So E is a class of logically possible 
structures. The class of metric spaces, M , is a natural generalization of E , so this means 
any structure in Mc is logically possible. This is the same as saying that M  is a class of 
logically possible structures. Finally, the class of pseudo-metric spaces, P , is a natural 
generalization of M . Because M  is a class of logically possible structures, and P  is a 
natural generalization of M , any structure in P  is logically possible. All of the structures of 
pseudo-metric spaces are in P . This includes all of the merely pseudo-metric spaces. So, 
merely pseudo-metric spaces are logically possible. Moreover, any merely pseudo-metric 
spatial structure is a logically possible one. 
 
2.3. Undetectible Differences 
Recall that Lewis’s argument for Ramseyan Humility is intended to show that although we 
can come to know the properties of things as role-occupants this is insufficient to identify 
                                                 
16 Bricker (MSa, pp. 9-10). Though, they aren’t natural because they are the principle objects of study some 
major area in mathematics. Instead, they are the principle objects of study in some major area in mathematics 
because they are natural. 
17 Bricker (MSa, p. 19).  
18 Bricker (MSa, p. 19). 
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the role-occupier. The points, specifically, and regions, generally, in a geometric structure 
can likewise be thought of as role-occupants of that particular geometric structure. I would 
like to suggest that we can think of the difference between merely pseudo-metric and 
metric spaces in a similar way. The rough thought is that the distinct but topologically 
indistinguishable points in merely pseudo-metric spaces play the same role as the unique 
topologically distinguishable points in metric spaces. To put the idea slightly differently, we 
can’t tell how complex the occupants of the point-roles in the worlds’ geometric structure 
are. This isn’t quite right, but provides us with a useful, albeit imperfect, way of drawing 
out the similarity between Ramseyan Humility and Structural Humility.  
An important feature of merely pseudo-metric spaces is that there is a way to “convert” 
them into metric spaces. Recall that the only difference between a particular metric spatial 
structure and its equivalent merely pseudo-metric structures is that they disagree on 
whether or not there are distinct topologically indistinguishable points. Different merely 
pseudo-metric structures that are otherwise structurally the same as a given metric space 
will only differ on how many distinct indistinguishable points there are and the distribution 
of the distinct topologically distinguishable points. This could be as minimal of a difference 
from the corresponding metric space as there being exactly two points in a merely pseudo-
metric structure that are topologically indistinguishable to all of the points being 
topologically indistinguishable from some other distinct points. Some pseudo-metric spaces 
may uniformly increase the topologically indistinguishable points, so that for each 
distinguishable point in the metric space, there are 2, or 3, or 4, … indistinguishable points 
in the merely pseudo-metric space. Or, the increase could be non-uniform. Nevertheless, 
each of these merely pseudo-metric spaces can be converted into metric spaces by treating 
the pluralities, or fusions, or sets of distinct topologically indistinguishable points in a 
merely pseudo-metric space as single points in a metric space. 
To see this, let X be a merely pseudo-metric space. Let x ~ y just in case d(x, y) = 0 (i.e. 
just in case x and y are topologically indistinguishable in X). So any points stand in the 
equivalence relation ‘~’ if they are zero distance from each other according to the distance 
function, d, defined on X. We can then define a new space X* where X* = X/~. In the 
new space, X*, each of the points are equivalence classes of points in X, represented as [x], 
[y]. We define a distance function d*: X/~ × X/~ → ℝ+ such that d*([x], [y]) = d(x, y). We 
can see that d* is a metric and X* is a metric space. For, we already know that d* will satisfy 
D1*, D2 and D3 of the definition of a metric above, and, further, because x ~ y if and only 
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if d(x, y) = 0, then d*([x] ,[y]) = 0 if and only if [x] = [y]. So D1 will be satisfied. The space 
X* is called the metric identification of X.19 
Through metric identification, it seems like any theory that is cast in terms of a metric 
structure could be cast in terms of a merely pseudo-metric structure. Where the metric 
theory has simple, singular, and distinguishable points filling the roles of the point-sized 
regions, the merely-pseudo-metric theory will have pluralities of distinct indistinguishable 
points or their fusions filling these roles. Further, no matter which way the world turned 
out it seems we would be none the wiser. The pluralities of distinct indistinguishable points 
in the pseudo-metric version of the theory will do the same work in the theory’s predictions 
as will the single distinguishable points in the metric version of the theory. Same predictive 
work, same amount of confirmation. If this is right, then there is an important part of the 
worlds’ geometric structure we will remain forever ignorant of. 
Now, I’d imagine that one might want to object that we would have no reason to posit 
the extra indistinguishable points that the pseudo-metric version of the theory does. This is 
because simplicity dictates that we should accept the simpler of the two versions of the 
theory. Because the pseudo-metric version of the theory makes unnecessary posits, then we 
should prefer the metric version of the theory. I do not find this objection compelling. We 
are interested in what we can know. If the sense of ‘prefer’ here has to do with knowledge, 
then the objector has to tell us how we could know that the world is simpler in this way. 
But, this is just what I’ve argued we couldn’t do. Perhaps they might say that we could, in 
principle, build some detection device that could detect whether or not indistinguishable 
points or regions were present. Assume that one could build such a device. This device 
would have to operate based off of some sort of causal connection with the distinct 
indistinguishable regions that allowed it to detect when multiple regions take the same 
position in spacetime. Even if this were possible, this would still leave undetermined 
important facts about the worlds geometric structure. Any theory, T, by which our 
detection device would work, would have to spell out what the causal conditions were 
whereby it would be able to detect the presence of multiple indistinguishable points. Note 
that theory T will only distinguish topologically distinguishable points by the causal role that 
they play. So we only come to know and identify the points by the causal role they play. 
Now, imagine a different theory, T*, which is identical to T except that whenever the causal 
roles are filled that allows us to detect the presence of distinct topologically 
                                                 
19 For a more thoroughly spelled out version of this proof see Simon (2015, pp. 3-4). 
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indistinguishable points, according to T, in T* that role is filled by pairs of topologically 
indistinguishable points. Our detection device would operate in much the same way, and 
would be able to detect some instances of distinct topologically indistinguishable regions, 
but it would be none the wiser as to whether it was in a T world or a T* world. The thrust 
of the idea here is that if we have a theory that makes some claim about the points and how 
they are distinguished, we can replace it with a theory where pluralities or complexes of 
points of whatever number are playing those exact same roles. Because of this we will 
forever remain unable to know important features of our worlds’ geometric structure.  
It is important to notice that this argument takes seriously the idea that the 
spatiotemporal structure of the world includes something like points. How seriously must 
we take the existence of points to get Structural Humility off of the ground? Not very, I 
think. There are three major contenders in the debate over the nature of spacetime: 
substantivalism, ontic-structural realism (‘structuralism’ henceforth), and relationalism. 
None escape Structural Humility. Let me briefly explain why. Substantivalists of all stripes 
take the worlds’ spacetime to be fundamental, independent thing. This means the 
substantivalist takes regions and the spacetime structure as fundamental. Substantivalists 
will agree that spacetime is made up of points connected in a structure of spatiotemporal 
relations. Since points are genuine objects according to the spacetime substantivalist, the 
world structures that are strictly pseudo-metric will be understood in terms of real, physical, 
distinct topologically indistinguishable points and the threat of Structural Humility will 
loom. Structuralists, on the other hand, don’t take points very seriously at all. For them, the 
spatiotemporal structure is fundamental, and the points are, at best, placeholders in the 
structure lacking intrinsic natures, and, at worst, just places or intersections in the series of 
relations that constitute the worlds’ spatiotemporal structure.20 However, structuralists still 
have to worry about Structural Humility. Roughly, the structuralist maintains the relational 
structure posited by the substantivalist but loses the points.21 So a world with a pseudo-
metric structure, for the structuralist, will have distinct indistinguishable places within its 
structure. How many of these there are, or how they’re distributed will remain forever 
unknown to us. Finally, the relationalist takes the worlds’ spatiotemporal structure to be 
dependent upon the material objects and the fundamental spatiotemporal relations they 
                                                 
20 See Esfeld and Lam (2007) for an overview  about ontic structural realism and a defense of a moderate 
structuralism about spaceime. 
21 For example, see Esfeld and Lam (2008, pp.42-3). 
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stand in. For the relationist the problem arises when we have co-located material objects 
that are constantly adjoined throughout their existence. 
 
3. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: STRUCTURALISM AND HUMILITY 
So far we’ve reviewed how Lewis argued for our irremediable ignorance of the identities of 
many of the properties in the world and I’ve argued that a similar Humility Thesis about the 
geometric structure of the world can be seen to follow from some important ontologies of 
spacetime. The worry was that we are irremediably ignorant of the existence and 
distribution of indistinguishable regions. This kind of Humility afflicted both 
substantivalists and structuralists about spacetime but not relationalists. Before closing the 
paper I would like to briefly note how Structural Humility relates to a kind of strategy that 
has been used to motivate structuralism.  
Structuralism about spacetime is of a piece with a broader ontic structural realist project 
which seeks to downplay the importance of objects and inflate the importance of structure. 
Structure is generally treated as being fundamental and objects are taken to be eliminated, 
reduced to, grounded in, or dependent upon fundamental structure.22 One important 
motivation for structuralism is the following kind of consideration: 
 
EPISTEMELOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL COHERENCE (EOC) 
Our metaphysics should be coherent with our epistemology. Metaphysics 
that posit entities that lead to unknowable gaps between our metaphysics 
and epistemology should be done away with. We shouldn’t deny ourselves in 
principle epistemic access portions of (physical) reality. Only structuralism 
avoids a metaphysics which entails epistemic gaps.23 
 
Other motivations for structuralisms in various areas of ontology exploit similar 
considerations.24 Motivations, like EOC, can just be seen as denials of a particular Humility 
Thesis. In the case of EOC the denial of Humility is broad and global. So, if this kind of 
motivation for structuralism holds water, then structuralism better be able to avoid 
Humility Theses of any variety. However, if what I’ve said above is right, then structuralism 
                                                 
22 See Frigg and Votsis (2011) for a w onderful overview  of the varieties of ontic structural realism. Ladyman 
(1998) and French (1998), depending on how  they are read, can be seen as advocating either an eliminative or 
reductionist approach. MacKenzie (2018) provides a grounding based understanding of ontic structural realism. 
And Esfeld and Lam (2008) and Mackenzie (2013) offer versions of structuralism w here the relation betw een 
objects and structures should be understood in terms of dependence that isn’t grounding. 
23 This formulation roughly follow s Esfeld and Lam (2008, p. 30). See also Esfeld (2004, pp. 614-6),  
24 See for example, Jantzen’s (2011, pp. 435-9) discussion of how  standard or naïve realism falls prey to 
w orries about making our physical theories incomplete w hile structuralism avoids this problem.  
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -204-
 
 12 
cannot avoid Humility across the board – it runs into Structural Humility. As such, 
considerations about of Structural Humility undercut one important motivation for the 
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Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos
Corey Dethier
(Draft – please do not quote without permission)
Abstract
Philosophy of climate science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a
dynamical or “structural” analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses
of climate models. In this paper, I argue that the debate over the analogy can and should be
separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor
sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. I identify the
relevant kind of kind of sensitivity with a kind of safety failure and argue that the resulting set
of issues has different stakes than the extant debate would indicate.
1 Introduction
To make predictions about the future of a system, we need to know two things: the initial conditions,
or, present state of the system; and the dynamics of the system, or, how it evolves with time.
Chaotic systems present particular difficulties because small differences in initial conditions amplify
into large differences in the end state of the system. Is there an analogous dynamical property of
systems? Intuitively, it seems like there might be: small differences in the dynamics amplify into
large differences in the end state of the system.
In a series of papers, a group of philosophers and scientists have argued this analogous dynamical
property and that it spells epistemic trouble for certain hypotheses in climate science. Specifically,
they argue that because most climate models heavily idealize the dynamics of the climate, the
possibility that such models exhibit a dynamical phenomenon analogous to chaos should cause us
to have low confidence in the accuracy of quantitative predictions that rest on them. An opposed
group of critics have argued that the analogy breaks down and that the epistemic conclusions
don’t follow; the possibility of small dynamical errors doesn’t undermine the general warrant for
quantitative climate predictions.
1
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While the mathematical question concerning the alleged analogy with chaos is interesting on
its own terms, the focus on it is misleading from a purely epistemic perspective: a tight analogy to
chaos is neither necessary nor sufficient for the kinds of epistemic error that motivate the debate.
Chaotic behavior involves growth in physical distance with time; such growth is relevant to the
accuracy of a given prediction only when (a) the starting distances are small relative to the desired
level of precision, (b) the later distances large from the same perspective, and (c) the time frame
covered by the prediction the same as that on which the system is chaotic. The type of epistemic
sensitivity relevant to error is better captured by the failure of a kind of safety condition. And while
it is true that there is good reason to worry about safety failures in climate science, the arguments
in question are better seen as explaining known safety failures than as providing evidence for the
existence of unknown ones.
A more detailed outline of my arguments is as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I briefly characterize
the debate over dynamical analogues of chaos and argue that it has misfired insofar as it presupposes
a connection between chaos-like behavior and (the probability of) error. There’s no real connection
here because chaos involves a type of interest-independent sensitivity, whereas the probability of
error is inherently dependent on our interests. In section 4, I provide an alternative notion of
sensitivity that is appropriately interest-dependent. This notion is best expressed in terms of the
failure of a kind of safety principle—essentially, the safety principle fails when a hypothesis is only
justified given an assumption that’s uncertain or risky. Finally, in section 5, I offer a reinterpretation
of the original arguments: what they motivate is low confidence in our ability to substantially
increase the precision of model reports.
2 The debate over dynamical analogues of chaos
The debate over dynamical analogues of chaos has largely focused on a particular minimal condition
on chaotic behavior, what’s known as “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” (SDIC). Roughly
speaking, a system exhibits SDIC if “even arbitrarily close initial conditions will follow very different
trajectories” through the state space that characterizes the system (Frigg, Bradley, et al. 2014, 34).
Trivially, SDIC implies that a model that slightly misrepresents the initial conditions of the system
will misrepresent (some) later states of the system to a much larger degree. In a series of recent
2
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papers, a group of philosophers and scientists associated with the London School of Economics—and
thus termed the “LSE group” by their critics—have argued that “structural model error” (SME)
presents epistemological problems similar to those presented by SDIC (Frigg, Bradley, et al. 2014;
Frigg, L. A. Smith, and Stainforth 2013, 2015).1
To be precise, it’s important to recognize that SME is not supposed to be directly analogous
to SDIC. On the contrary, SME occurs whenever a model misrepresents the dynamics of the target
system (Frigg, Bradley, et al. 2014, 32). The analogy, according to the LSE group, is between the
behavior of non-linear systems relative to SME and to the behavior of SDIC-exhibiting systems
relative to misrepresentation of initial conditions. That is: the existence of small amounts of SME
will lead a model to dramatically misrepresent some later states of a non-linear system in much
the same way that a small misrepresentation of initial conditions will lead a model to dramatically
misrepresent some later states of a chaotic system. In effect, non-linearity induces a sensitive depen-
dence on dynamical equations. The LSE group then draws the further conclusion that since climate
models are (a) heavily idealized and (b) non-linear, we should have low confidence in “decision-
relevant” quantitative climate predictions—though they acknowledge that just how sensitive the
models are to SME is a question the requires further investigation (Frigg, Bradley, et al. 2014, 48).
The arguments of the LSE group have spawned a series of responses (Goodwin and Winsberg
2016; Nabergall, Navas, and Winsberg 2019; Winsberg 2018; Winsberg and Goodwin 2016) from a
group of philosophers and scientists associated with the University of South Florida (who I’ll term
the “USF group” for parallel’s sake). The main contention of the USF group is that the analogy
between systems that exhibit SDIC and what I above termed sensitive dependence on dynamical
equations cannot be made precise for two reasons.2 First, the space of dynamical equations is
topological but not metrical, meaning that there’s no general way to say what it means to be an
“arbitrarily close” equation (Winsberg and Goodwin 2016, 14). Second, and for similar reasons, the
mathematically well-defined property closest to sensitive dependence on dynamical equations shows
only that small dynamical misrepresentations can amplify into large errors in the representation
1Also worth noting are Mayo-Wilson (2015), L. A. Smith (2007), and Thompson (2013), who explore the possibility
of a dynamical analogue of chaos without drawing the same epistemic conclusions vis-a-vis climate science.
2They have also advanced a number of other objections, most notably that the central motivating example of the
LSE group involves methods that are distinct from those used in much of climate modeling (see, e.g., Winsberg and
Goodwin 2016, 12,15). The point is well taken—the example employed by the LSE group is not sufficient to establish
general conclusions—but, as we’ll see, the relevant epistemic worries have nothing to do with the features specific to
that example.
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of later states of the target system not that it will (Nabergall, Navas, and Winsberg 2019, 11-12).
They conclude that there’s no general threat to quantitative climate predictions stemming from
“infinitesimally small” dynamical misrepresentations (Nabergall, Navas, and Winsberg 2019, 21).
Acknowledging, of course, that dynamical misrepresentations do pose epistemic problems in some
cases, they argue that the failure of the analogy means that we should resist the LSE group’s
general conclusions; the epistemic implications for decision-relevant quantitative climate predictions
must be evaluated individually (Nabergall, Navas, and Winsberg 2019, 20; Winsberg and Goodwin
2016, 16).
3 Chaos and error
Both the LSE and USF groups appear to consider the (alleged) epistemic problem to be one
of error.3 In their central thought experiment, for instance, the LSE group present the problem
associated with SME as one of erroneous probabilistic predictions: the agent facing SME-related
problems “regards events that do not happen as very likely, while he regards what actually happens
as very unlikely” (Frigg, Bradley, et al. 2014, 39). Similarly, in their discussion of the primary
motivating case study—a project involving generating “decision-relevant” probabilistic predictions
about the future climate in Great Britain—they worry that:
Trying to predict the true climate with structurally wrong models is like trying to
predict the trajectory of Mercury with Newtonian models. These models will invariably
make misleading (and likely maladaptive) projections beyond some lead time, and these
errors cannot be removed by adding a linear discrepancy term derived [solely] from other
Newtonian models. (Frigg, L. A. Smith, and Stainforth 2015, 3997)
And the USF group is no different. They echo the language of the LSE group in their own discussion
of the motivating example (Goodwin and Winsberg 2016, 1125), and more recently, they’ve stated
that “only strong versions [of chaos] are usually taken to have strong epistemological consequences,
since they are likely to produce error” (Nabergall, Navas, and Winsberg 2019, 7, note 13).
3That said, in their more careful moments, at least, the LSE group can be read as primarily concerned with
particular sorts of tradeoffs between precision and certainty (see, e.g., Frigg, Bradley, et al. 2014, 50). In light of the
arguments presented in this section, I think that the most charitable interpretation is likely to emphasize this concern
over the concern for error. See section 5 for more details.
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To be sure, in the context of the examples employed by the LSE group, introducing chaos while
holding the predictions of the agent fixed at a given level of precision does increase the probability
of error. Introducing sensitive dependence to dynamical equations has the same effect. The USF
group are also right that the effect is only significant for stronger versions of chaos and (we could
add) only significant if the time frames line up in the right way. But these facts don’t imply that
there’s a connection between chaos (or chaos-like behavior) and error in general. If there were such
a connection, the consequence would be that we can’t make accurate and/or precise predictions
about chaotic systems—or (more weakly) that the behavior of such systems are generally harder
to predict than that of non-chaotic systems. But this simply isn’t the case.
The LSE group’s own analogy illustrates the point nicely. The errors in Newtonian predictions
of the trajectory of Mercury are on the order of mere arcseconds per century—that is, a prediction
of where Mercury will appear in the sky a hundred years out will exhibit an error roughly 1/40th the
apparent width of the moon. It’s hard to argue that such small errors are genuinely maladaptive.
And the solar system as a whole is chaotic: eventually—that is, approximately five million years from
now—small differences between present conditions will have grown exponentially larger.4 And yet
we’re nevertheless able to make astoundingly precise (and “decision-relevant”!) predictions about
the locations of various stellar bodies, for the simple reason that the five-million year timescale
is totally irrelevant for predictions in the here-and-now.5 While there are cases in which chaotic
behavior creates genuine problems for predictive accuracy, in other words, it’s simply illegitimate
to draw inferences from either chaotic behavior or the lack thereof to the the existence of such
problems without further information.
The same conclusion is suggested by close attention to more precise definitions of chaotic be-
havior. Consider the common definition of SDIC in terms of Lyapunov exponents. Suppose that
there is a system characterized by a state space X and dynamical mapping f : X → X such that
xt = f(xt−1). This system exhibits SDIC if and only if for all y “arbitrarily” close to x0,
d(xt, yt) > e
λtd(x0, y)
4That is, the “Lyapunov time” of the solar system—the time it takes for distances to grow by a factor of e—is
approximately five million years.
5Well, not totally irrelevant, because the same physical properties that engender the chaotic behavior of the solar
system generate attractors that can affect satellite trajectories; see Wilhelm (2019).
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where λ, the “Lyapunov exponent,” is positive. Essentially: trajectories that are currently “nearby”
will grow exponentially farther apart. If we interpret d(x0, y) as the present uncertainty, then SDIC
entails that uncertainty will grow exponentially with time. It’s a significant step from uncertainty
growing exponentially with time to either a high probability of error at a given time or some sort
of guarantee of inaccuracy. To make this step there needs to be a tight relationship between the
relevant timescales and (as we saw above) there’s no guarantee that the timescale relevant to our
predictions will be the same one that’s relevant to chaos. Similar comments apply to other technical




Pr(x0|x−n)− Pr(x0) = 0
which, in English, says that the probablistic relevance of past events to future events eventually
approaches zero. Chaotic systems “lose” information over time, but the mere fact that information is
guaranteed to be lost eventually doesn’t implicate our ability to make precise or accurate predictions
now.
The explanation for the disconnect between chaotic behavior on the one hand and predictive
inaccuracy on the other is that SDIC defines a notion of physical sensitivity that is independent of
human interests. Until we specify a timeframe and desired level of precision for a hypothesis, we
cannot know what implications SDIC will have for said hypothesis. Since our interests don’t map
onto physical distances in any consistent way—a few centimeters of error is a disaster in a surgical
setting but incredible in astrophysics—SDIC doesn’t have any general implications for either error
or the probability of error. Similarly, we should expect that the failure of a system to exhibit
SDIC—or an SDIC-like property—also has no general implications for error. The contested claims
about the analogy between SDIC and sensitive dependence on dynamical equations therefore has no
clear or direct implications for the epistemology of climate modeling; like the solar system, climate
models could exhibit exponential growth in the distances between alternative trajectories over time
frames on the scale of millions of years. Or they could fail to exhibit any growth in distances
between trajectories but the starting uncertainty could be too substantial to license “decision-
relevant” predictions. Insofar as our concern is something like the probability of error in general,
6
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chaos and chaos-like behavior simply aren’t relevant.
4 Failures of safety
To determine whether the presence of dynamical misrepresentations renders “decision-relevant”
quantitative climate predictions untrustworthy, we need a different, interest-relative, concept of
sensitivity to small errors. My view is that the relevant concept is given by the failure of a kind of
safety condition.
Speaking abstractly, when we’re concerned with whether we should believe some hypothesis,
one relevant desideratum is that the justification for the hypothesis should be safe: the degree
of support for the hypothesis should be (nearly) the same given nearby alternative background
assumptions, where a background assumption is “nearby” to the extent that it has a relatively high
probability on the total evidence available.6 So, for instance: if my evidence for the fact that it
is freezing outside is the reading of my thermometer, then the hypothesis is safer in the situation
where the thermometer reads -5◦C than when it reads -1◦C; the former allows for more leeway in
the background assumptions concerning the accuracy of the thermometer. When the evidence for
a hypothesis rests either fully or partially on a model, the hypothesis is going to more or less safe
to the extent that sufficiently small changes to the assumptions of the model don’t (substantially)
affect the results or outputs of the model. The reasoning here is the same. If the hypothesis is only
supported by the model given precise and risky assumptions, then there’s a relatively high chance
that these assumptions don’t hold. By contrast, if the hypothesis is supported regardless of whether
we use the specific assumptions in question or any one of a number of nearby assumptions, then
the hypothesis is safe.
Intuitively, safety is going to be related to the probability of error at least under conditions in
which there’s some degree of uncertainty about the quality of the evidence. Since humans are not
ideal reasoners, we’re often in situations in which we don’t know how likely some hypothesis is on
our evidence. So, for instance, we might know that we should be confident in P if Q is true, but not
6This notion of safety is essentially the one found in Reed (2000) and Staley (2004), and is tightly connected to
G. E. Smith (2002, 2014)’s discussion of “quam proxime” reasoning. Like other safety conditions, the best way to
define this one precisely is in terms of possible worlds and a distance measure between them, though what we want
is a graded measure that allows for higher and lower degrees of safety. I take it that how this all works intuitively is
clear enough for present purposes.
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either whether Q is true or what our confidence in P should be given relatively likely alternatives
to Q.7 Why might we be in this situation? One common and relevant reason is that our evidence
relies on an idealized model; since the inner workings of models are often “opaque” (Humphreys
2004), we can’t know a priori whether or not the idealizations in question merely serve to simplify
the problem in a harmless manner or, by contrast, whether they substantially affect the output of
the model.8 In other words, we don’t know whether P is safe, whether it would still be justified
given small changes to the background assumptions. If it is safe, then the evidence is trustworthy
and provides good reason to believe that P ; if it isn’t, then the total evidence does not provide
reason to believe that P . If we accept P , therefore, safety and error will be inversely correlated:
the safer the hypothesis, the higher its overall justification, and thus the lower the chance that it
is has been accepted in error.
The foregoing is highly abstracted from the practices of science. Consider, therefore, the deriva-
tion of inverse-square gravity from Kepler’s first law.9 Suppose that Kepler’s first law holds exactly,
meaning that sun is at the focus of each planet’s elliptical orbit and that the distance function
between planet and sun is
d = A
(1− ǫ2)
1− ǫ cos θ
where A is the long arm of the ellipse and ǫ the eccentricity. In combination with some other
information about the nature of ellipses, this equation entails that the acceleration of the planet
is proportional to the inverse of square of the distance (a ∝ d−2). It’s thus possible to derive the
inverse-square law from Kepler’s first law. In the context of the present discussion, however, this
derivation faces two problems. First, there was little evidence available that Kepler’s first law held
precisely (and, in fact, it doesn’t): the difference between an ellipse with the sun at a focus and
7Epistemologists term cases like these instances of “higher-order uncertainty.” There’s disagreement concerning
whether we can rationally have higher-order uncertainty (see, e.g., Dorst 2019; Titlebaum 2015); I won’t take a stance
on that here. My concern is that as non-ideal agents we frequently are uncertain when we would rather not be.
8Isn’t this a case in which we know Q to be false? No, though defending this point adequately here would take
us too far afield. The central idea is that it’s a mistake to read Q as a claim about the truth of the idealized model
rather than as a claim about its (non-literal) accuracy (Frigg and Nguyen 2019), adequacy-for-purpose (Parker 2009),
or reliability (Dethier 2019).
9I’m borrowing this example from G. E. Smith (2002). Smith’s point, which is worth emphasizing, is that the safety
failure present in this example provides the best explanation for why Newton himself didn’t derive the inverse-square
law in this manner, preferring instead the evidence provided by the apsides of the planets (Newton 1727/1999, 802),
relative to which the hypothesis is extremely safe.
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an ellipse with the sun at the center is virtually undetectable with 17th century tools.10 The first
problem with the derivation, then, is that we’re uncertain whether the assumptions built into it
hold precisely.
The second problem is that the derivation is extremely sensitive to small deviations from Ke-
pler’s first law. As just noted, at low eccentricity, there’s very little difference between an ellipse




1− ǫ2 sin2 θ
And this function, in combination the same assumptions about the nature of ellipses, entails that
the acceleration of the planet is proportional to the distance directly (a ∝ d). The derivation from
Kepler’s first law therefore provides extremely poor evidence for the conclusion in the sense that it
relies on a particular assumption holding precisely when the best evidence available only indicates
that the assumption holds approximately.
This case provides an exemplar of a safety failure in a number of respects. Recall: safety failures
arise because the quality of the evidence varies dramatically with small changes in background
assumptions. Here the changes to background assumptions are small not because the two equations
are nearby in any mathematical sense but because the evidence makes both assumptions relatively
likely. And the difference in the quality of the evidence is dramatic because of our particular choice of
how to divide up the hypothesis space: what matters is that d and d−2 make for extremely different
theories of gravitation. If our hypothesis was simply that there is some relationship between distance
and acceleration, there would not be a safety failure to be found. It is also exemplary with regards
to effects: the safety failure makes it likely on our evidence that if we accept the hypothesis, we’re
going to do so erroneously—which is just to say that when the hypothesis fails to be safe, the
evidence doesn’t give us much reason to believe it. (Though, of course, and as evidenced by this
example, other evidence might; see note 9.)
The definition of safety given in this section provides a notion of sensitivity that is appropriately
10Kepler argued for his first law by showing that it held to a high approximation with respect to Mars (Miyake
2015); taking it to hold to a high approximation with respect to the other planets is a relatively risky inductive
move—and one that Newton knew his own theory would show to be invalid (Newton 1727/1999, 817-18).
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dependent on human interests. The class of objects that there is sensitivity to are defined or
identified according to our epistemic abilities: in the modeling context, it’s the class of assumptions
that are empirically adequate by our standards. Similarly, whether or not there is sensitivity to the
differences between these representations depends on our interests and concerns insofar as those
affect how precise we want or need our hypotheses to be. There’s a rough analogy to SDIC or chaos
here in that a safety failure involves a “growth” in “distances” in an interest-dependent sense: the
initial distance is small relative to our ability to distinguish between different scenarios and the
latter one large relative to our desire for precision. But this is connection is not mathematically
precise. In particular, safety failures are not analogous to SDIC in the ways that the USF group
argues present problems for the LSE group.11 There’s no interest-independent distance measure to
be placed on either the different starting characterizations of the system or the resulting equations.
The different distance equations are similar just in the sense that they’re both empirically adequate
in the given situation; the different relationships between acceleration and distance are dissimilar
in the sense that their broader fit in the theory is dramatically different. Further, we haven’t shown
that any nearby deviation from Kepler’s laws (or even Kepler’s first law) will lead to an arbitrarily
different relation between acceleration and distance. All that we’ve shown that there is a particularly
salient alternative that has this effect.
This section has provided an appropriate notion of sensitivity to employ in getting clearer
about the debate over chaos. In the next section, I’ll argue for a reinterpretation of the LSE group’s
arguments in terms of safety failures.
5 Reinterpreting the LSE group
I think that the arguments presented by the LSE group are important, but they don’t show that
the possibility of small dynamical errors should cause us to lower our confidence in various claims
supported by climate models. Instead, they should be interpreted as offering an explanation of
(empirically-ascertained) levels of model precision in terms of small dynamical errors—an explana-
tion that, if true, has important implications for which projects in climate science are likely to be
successful.
11There are other disanalogies as well, besides those at issue in the debate surveyed in §2. For instance, neither
initial conditions nor time has any role in this case, though both are essential to the understanding of SDIC.
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The main motivation behind this interpretation of the LSE group is that the arguments that they
offer are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that we should be less confident in the claims
supported by climate models in general. They are not sufficient because they would need to show
that climate scientists have generally been overconfident in modeling results—but climate scientists
are well aware that climate models can be highly misleading, even in the aggregate (Knutti, Furrer,
et al. 2010). They are not necessary because general considerations about safety failures provide
much less powerful (and precise) evidence for caution about specific climate hypotheses than is
provided by the empirical evaluation of climate models. Evaluation studies provide evidence not
just about the degree of confidence licensed by a given model, but also about where the models excel,
where they struggle, and what assumptions account for these struggles. Any general considerations
about safety failures are likely to simply be swamped by the empirical evidence from this domain.
Of course, the LSE group is well aware of this empirical literature—as evidenced by their prior
work drawing out the implications of it for decision-making (Oreskes, Stainforth, and L. A. Smith
2010; Stainforth et al. 2007). My suggestion is that we should read their arguments concerning
chaos through the lens of this earlier work.12 Specifically, we should view the combination of small
dynamical errors and system complexity as providing an explanation for why climate models are
only able to achieve certain levels of precision and accuracy. In giving this explanation, the LSE
group is stressing that our inability to draw conclusions about local policy from climate models isn’t
a temporary defect of these models. On the contrary, hypotheses about how climate change is going
to affect a town, region, or (small) country are simply too sensitive to small changes in modeling
assumptions, and we’re not likely to reach a point any time in the near future where we have the
ability to determine which of these assumptions are true. That’s just the nature of the system
(a conclusion, I’ll note, that is widely shared among climate scientists; see Knutti and Sedlàček
2013). In other words: hypotheses that we know are unsafe based on our empirical evaluations of
the models are likely to remain unsafe—and thus, as the LSE group explicitly suggests, we need
methods for determining how to make decisions under conditions where the quality of our evidence
is uncertain in precisely this way.
If this is the correct interpretation and the arguments given in prior sections are correct, then
the way that the LSE group has presented their arguments for this conclusion is misleading; the
12Here I’m following Mike Goldsby and Greg Lusk.
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analogy to SDIC is largely irrelevant to whether or not the present and future levels of uncer-
tainty about the dynamics are likely to undermine the evidence for future climate hypotheses. My
experience is that they’re doubly misleading to those unfamiliar with precise definitions of chaos—
many of those presented with the arguments seem to automatically assume that chaotic behavior
means that anything goes. Many of the USF group’s criticisms (particularly those not discussed
above) are aimed directly at this point: the presentation and rhetoric of the analogy to chaos, they
contend, doesn’t align with the more limited conclusions that the LSE group wants to draw (see
Goodwin and Winsberg 2016; Winsberg and Goodwin 2016). As we’ve just seen, however, whatever
the disconnect between the rhetoric and the arguments in the LSE group’s papers, there isn’t a
genuine worry that their arguments might—even if successful—undermine much more than they
intend: on this interpretation, the arguments simply don’t motivate changing our confidence in any
particular results of the models; they motivate “only” changing our confidence that we’ll be able
to get well-justified decision-relevant predictions out of the models any time soon.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the argument just sketched is correct. Nevertheless, the
conclusion is interesting and the arguments itself has the advantages of fitting nicely with the prior
work of the LSE group, not relying on mistakes concerning the relationship between chaos and
error, and not—if successful—implicating far more of climate science than can be plausibly be
justified on the evidence appealed to. We thus have good reason to interpret the LSE group in this
manner, even if the argument ends up being unsound.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve argued that the details of dynamical analogues of chaos are largely irrelevant
to the epistemological questions raised in the recent debate over them. Mathematically interesting
as the alleged analogy may be, a tight analogy to chaos is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
kinds of epistemic error that motivate the debate. The type of epistemic sensitivity relevant to
error is better captured by failure of a kind of safety condition: what’s worrying about dynamical
misrepresentations is that they undermine the evidence provided by the model. Once the irrelevance
of chaos is recognized, it becomes clear that the upshot of the debate is not whether models are
likely to be erroneous but an explanation for why models are not more precise than they in fact
12
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are.
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Abstract
Epidemiological explanation often has a “black box” character, meaning the
intermediate steps between cause and effect are unknown. Filling in black boxes is
thought to improve causal inferences by making them intelligible. I argue that adding
information about intermediate causes to a black box explanation is an unreliable
guide to pragmatic intelligibility because it may mislead us about the stability of a
cause. I diagnose a problem that I call wishful intelligibility, which occurs when
scientists misjudge the limitations of certain features of an explanation. Wishful
intelligibility gives us a new reason to prefer black box explanations in some contexts.
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1 Introduction
Epidemiological explanation often has a “black box” character, meaning the intermediate
steps between some putative cause and effect of interest are unknown. The black boxes of
epidemiological explanation have been variously described as mere predictive heuristics; as
obstacles, or even threats to scientific understanding. Philosophers and epidemiologists
alike have argued that specifying intermediate causes to fill in black boxes improves causal
explanations by making them intelligible, and better targets for public health intervention
(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Hiatt 2004; Russo and Williamson 2007). Specifying
the links between the ends of a causal chain is supposed to confer certainty, understanding,
and reasons to expect a causal relationship to be stable or invariant across populations of
interest.
I argue that adding information about intermediate causes can be an unreliable guide
to improving epidemiological explanation because it may mislead us about the stability of
a causal relationship and may convey a false sense of understanding. I diagnose this as an
instance of a more general problem that I call wishful intelligibility, which occurs when
scientists misjudge the limits of the pragmatic benefit conferred by certain features of an
explanation. To illustrate this, I consider an example of epidemiological explanation
involving the social determinants of health. My argument offers a new reason to prefer
black box explanations in some contexts: not despite, but because of, their lack of
information about intermediate causes. This preference has the consequence that filling in
black boxes is not a necessary source of intelligibility, but a contingent one.
2 Black Boxes and Intelligibility
Specifying the links between the ends of a causal chain is supposed to improve our
understanding of an epidemiological cause, but attempts to account for the intelligibility
1
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produced by filling in black boxes vary considerably. For mechanists like Machamer,
Darden, and Craver (2000, 21), filling in intermediate links of a causal chain between some
cause C and effect E at the preferred level of detail for a given scientific field makes the
relationship between C and E more intelligible. This sense in which filling in black boxes is
supposed to confer understanding on this account is rather vague, leaving open the
possibility that their “intelligibility” is akin to the phenomenological “sense of
understanding” that Trout (2002) convincingly condemns as an unreliable indicator of
explanatory goodness. By contrast, other accounts of epidemiological explanation tether
the value of filling in black boxes to the goal, broadly speaking, of using epidemiological
explanations to design effective public health interventions (Russo and Williamson 2007;
Illari 2011; Broadbent 2011). Following de Regt (2017), I’ll call this pragmatic
intelligibility. I will focus on the pragmatic intelligibility argument, both because it seems
to evade the phenomenological critique and because it bears a more obvious relationship to
the design of public health policy.
One way that filling in black boxes is supposed to confer pragmatic intelligibility is by
informing our inferences about the stability of epidemiological causes; that is, our
expectation that a causal relationship observed in one context will also hold in other
contexts of interest. Because many epidemiological causal relationships are observed in
population studies, the design of effective public health interventions must often attend to
the potential efficacy of such interventions both within and beyond the original conditions
in which a causal relationship is observed (Dupré 1984). Russo and Williamson (2007)
famously argue that filling in black boxes supports epidemiological causal inference in just
this way: that filling in a black box with evidence of a plausible mechanism tells us about
the stability of a cause, and supports an expectation that the causal relationship will hold
in contexts of interest that differ from the one in which it was observed. This feature
would, if true, make such evidence key to the use of epidemiological causes with regard to
2
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the design of public health interventions. In section 3, I will show why this is not
necessarily what we ought to expect.
3 Stability and Intermediate Causes
I agree that stability is one of the most important features of epidemiological inference
relative to the goal of reliable public health intervention. However, I argue that filling in
black boxes can lead us to both under- and overestimate the stability of epidemiological
causes. In practice, this makes filling in black boxes an unreliable guide to the pragmatic
intelligibility of epidemiological explanation.
Because Russo and Williamson take the increase in stability of a cause to mean that it
is expected to hold in conditions different from the ones in which the original experiment
or observation took place, I take it that they have in mind something like Woodward’s
(2010) notion of the stability of causes. On this account, there is a causal relationship
between two variables C and E just in case some intervention on the value of C produces a
change in the value of E that proceeds only through the change in C (Woodward 2000).
Interventionist causal relationships are stable or invariant to the extent that they hold over
a more or less universal set of background conditions, making causal stability a matter of
degree (Woodward 2000, 2010). Although this account is particularly amenable to
epidemiological practice because a Woodward intervention need not be the result of
intentional human manipulation, one does not need to be an interventionist to appreciate
this notion of stability.
Filling in black boxes entails adding links in a causal chain. As Woodward (2010)
points out, however, for any causal chain, the set of background conditions or domain of
invariance over which the entire chain is stable is limited to the extent to which the
stability of all links in the chain overlaps. This means the chain is limited not only by the
3
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domain of the least stable link, but also by the parts of that domain of invariance that are
shared with the other links. Because intermediate causes constrain the stability of the
chain in this way, adding information about intermediate links cannot, by itself, increase
our confidence in the stability of the entire chain.
3.1 Underestimating Stability
With this account of stability in mind, a focus on filling in black boxes can mislead us about
the stability of a causal relationship in at least two ways. First, identifying a single causal
chain from C to E may be misleading with respect to the stability of a cause that produces
its effect by multiple independent pathways. As Mitchell (2002), Fehr (2004), Dupré (2013)
and Howick et al. (2013) argue, specifying a single set of intermediate steps between cause
and effect restricts our assessment of the relationship between C and E to one particular
causal chain, when in fact there may be several pathways from C to E. For instance, a
causal variable like socioeconomic status might cause cancer by way of its effects on stress,
nutrition, access to preventive care, and so on. Multiple pathways between a single cause
and effect may be stable over different background conditions. This means that filling in a
black box with a single causal chain can lead us to underestimate the stability of a causal
relationship by confining our expectation to a single, overly narrow domain of invariance.
3.2 Overestimating Stability
As Fehr (2004) points out, our interest in causal intermediates need not commit us to the
myopia of single mechanistic explanation. However, more sophisticated efforts to fill in
black boxes are still subject to a second set of concerns about stability: namely, that filling
in black boxes can lead us to overestimate the stability of a causal chain when we overlook
the challenges of integrating multiple indirect causes. This is because filling in a black box
4
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is often a process of what Mayo-Wilson (2014) calls “piecemeal causal inference.” The
intermediate steps between a cause and effect in epidemiology are frequently inferred in
independent research contexts. As Baetu (2014), Mayo-Wilson (2014), and others have
pointed out, integrating causal variables that are inferred in different research contexts
increases underdetermination and uncertainty about causation. This problem is
particularly pernicious and complex when it comes to assessing the stability of causal
chains in epidemiology.
At least three features of epidemiological practice contribute to this difficulty. First,
ethical constraints make it the case that many causal inferences in epidemiology cannot be
made on the basis of manipulations or interventions in human populations. This means
many links in a putative causal chain are thought to be stable with respect to humans on
the basis of extrapolation from animal models, or retrospective analyses of so-called natural
experiments. Extrapolation and inferences of external validity are inherently epistemically
risky business (cf. Reiss 2019). Second, causal variables within the same chain are often
measured and described with very different degrees of precision, and at different spatial
and temporal scales in different research contexts. Finally, scientists in different research
contexts often measure causal variables with respect to different background conditions of
interest. For instance, social epidemiologists (e.g. Krieger 2008) are especially concerned to
include possible social determinants of health, like socioeconomic status, as variables in
their analyses, but other researchers interested in intermediate causes of the same effects,
like epigeneticists, may not measure the socioeconomic status of their subjects at all. Even
similar variables described and measured at similar scales are not consistently accounted
for across studies in the same field. For example, “neighborhood” is variously measured by
zip code, census tract, or county (Shavers 2007). When researchers want to integrate causal
inferences to fill in a black box between, for instance, neighborhood and cancer mortality,
these differences limit the extent to which piecemeal causal inference can tell us a causal
5
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relationship is stable with regard to the values of these differently described variables.
These failures to consistently define and co-measure background condition variables are a
problem because they mean that inferences about whether links are stable with regard to
the same background conditions may be much less certain than they appear.
When a black box causal relationship is filled in using intermediate causal inferences
assembled from diverse research contexts, it presents a unique challenge for assessing the
stability of the original causal relationship of interest. Because links in the same causal
chain are often inconsistently described, measured at different scales, and demonstrated
with respect to different background conditions, it is often impossible (or at least
intractable) to assess the extent to which multiple links in a causal chain share a domain of
invariance at all. Integrative inferences about the stability of the entire chain become much
more complex. At a minimum, these factors make it difficult to identify a lowest common
denominator, or least stable link in a causal chain. Failure to attend to these features of
piecemeal causal inference can lead us to overestimate the stability of a causal relationship
or to make an inference about its stability that is not justified by the available evidence.
3.3 Wishful Intelligibility
Since filling in black boxes is at best an unreliable guide to stability, and stability is critical
to the goal of designing epidemiological interventions, it follows that we should not expect
filling in black boxes to confer pragmatic benefit to epidemiological causes by way of
improving our inferences about stability in all contexts. Instead, this assumption may lead
us to be inappropriately confident in our understanding of a cause and in our estimation of
stability in particular. We should not expect filling in black boxes to be conducive to the
goals of epidemiological inference in cases where such goals depend on information about
the stability of a cause; this is a contingent, rather than a necessary, source of pragmatic
intelligibility.
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To mischaracterize the intelligibility of a causal claim is to misjudge the extent to which
we understand it. This may (mis)inform the design of interventions, with serious
consequences for public health policy. Unjustified attributions of pragmatic intelligibility
constitute a special kind of second-order misunderstanding; namely, a failure to correctly
assess the extent of the pragmatic benefit of some particular feature of an explanation
(Steel 2016; cf. Trout 2002). I call this wishful intelligibility. An unqualified preference for
filling in black boxes in pursuit of stability can lead us to wishful intelligibility (for a
similar argument, see Broadbent 2011).
Wishful intelligibility has an obvious affinity with the more general problem of wishful
thinking in the literature on science and values. Broadly speaking, wishful thinking may
occur when certain values or cognitive biases lead us to form an otherwise unjustified or
ill-justified belief; these biases may include but are not limited to a desire for the belief to
be true (see Anderson 2004; Steel 2018). By contrast, wishful intelligibility concerns not
whether a belief or claim is justified in general, but rather, whether we have good reason to
expect that some feature of an explanation is conducive to its use in a specific context.
That is, it concerns a particular set of beliefs: those about the pragmatic intelligibility
conferred by certain features of an explanation.
4 Multilevel Causes of Cancer
In section 3, I argued that filling in black boxes with intermediate causes can be misleading
with respect to the stability of a causal relationship, and that filling in black boxes can be
conducive to wishful intelligibility with regard to epidemiological explanation. Gehlert and
colleagues’ (2008) multilevel model of the social environment as a cause of cancer, from the
University of Chicago’s Center for Interdisciplinary Health Disparities Research (CIHDR),
shows the difficulty of estimating the stability of a piecemeal causal inference. Their work
7
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -228-
is particularly interesting because it purports to have implications for the design of future
public health interventions.
4.1 The Social Environment and Breast Cancer
This multilevel model fills in links in a (putative) causal chain by assembling multiple local
causal inferences from separate studies. A CIHDR study evaluates the social environment
of black women newly diagnosed with breast cancer in “predominantly black
neighborhoods of Chicago,” using interviews and “publicly available data geocoded to the
women’s addresses” (2008, 343). Gehlert et al. (2008, 344) argue that features of the built
environment, such as dilapidated housing and crime, contribute to social isolation. One
example cited, Sampson et al. (1997) is an investigation of the effects of “collective
efficacy” (defined as neighborhood social cohesion) on violence in Chicago in 1995.
The next steps in the chain are the sequential links between social isolation,
psychological states, and stress hormone responses. Here Gehlert et al. appeal to a
combination of human and rodent studies to argue that social isolation affects HPA axis
regulation and glucocorticoid (stress hormone) signaling via epigenetics. Since
glucocorticoid levels have been linked to suppressed immune function elsewhere in the
literature, the authors conclude that stress hormone regulation constitutes a means by
which social isolation can “get under the skin” to cause cancer and promote tumor cell
survival (2008, 343).
This model is a clear case where piecemeal assembly of links between “levels” does not
(by itself) support any inference about the stability of the whole chain. Importantly, each
step is inferred with respect to different background variables, and few, if any, of the same
background conditions are measured for any two links in the chain. Some links, like the
association between social isolation and mammary gland tumors, are manipulated in a
laboratory environment, using model organisms, while others are observed in humans.
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Qualitatively similar links in the chain are differently described: Sampson and colleagues’
study of collective efficacy is performed in the same Chicago neighborhoods as the CIHDR
study of newly diagnosed cancer patients, but using a notion of “neighborhood clusters” to
combine 847 census tracts into 343 clusters, from more than a decade earlier. Setting aside
the fact that these neighborhoods have probably changed over ten years, the extent to
which these neighborhood clusters overlap spatially with the geocoded data used to
measure neighborhoods in the CIHDR project is unclear. Some links, such as epigenetic
regulation of altered HPA axis-related gene expression, are apparently assumed to be stable
across human populations over which they may not have been measured at all. Gehlert and
colleagues borrow links from several research contexts to fill in the black box between
neighborhood and tumorigenesis.
Filling in the black box between the social environment and cancer incidence does not
justify an expectation that the relationship between them will be stable. It does not even
tell us anything reliable about how stable we might expect it to be. Instead, it may lead us
to attribute wishful intelligibility to a social epidemiological cause where it is lacking, and
to misrepresent the limits of (and risks entailed by) this explanation as a potential basis for
public health policy.
4.2 Integration, Stability, and Translation
One might object that the issue in this and similar cases is that we really ought to have
something stronger (or at least better confirmed) in mind with regard to filling in black
boxes (see Illari 2011). However, attention to the specific features of integration that might
justify estimations of stability in such cases is notoriously absent from the
Russo-Williamson account and from other arguments for filling in black boxes (Illari 2011;
Plutynski 2018). We can have good evidence for each link in a causal chain and yet have
relatively little evidence that these links are stable over some shared set of relevant
9
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background conditions (see Broadbent 2011). It is much more difficult to integrate evidence
from diverse contexts to show that each link in a chain is stable with regard to the same
conditions of interest than it is to justify inferences about individual links in a chain. Thus,
assessing the stability of a causal chain can come apart from (and be more burdensome
than) merely providing evidence of a causal chain, or providing evidence of individual links.
Importantly, this does not mean that we ought to be pessimistic about multilevel causal
models or about the so-called ‘social determinants of health’ more broadly. Rather, it
presents an opportunity to negotiate what does make for better and worse attributions of
stability. At a minimum, we might expect that coordination among researchers to improve
standardization and co-measurement of causal variables and background conditions,
together with explicit evaluation and justification of background assumptions across a
causal chain, would improve integration and inferences about the stability of a causal
relationship. Many translational epidemiologists have recently turned their attention to
these and other related features of knowledge integration in epidemiology with the goal of
improving and expediting the translation of biomedical research into public health
interventions (e.g. Ioannidis et al. 2013).
Following O’Malley and Stotz (2011) and others, I take it that the details of successful
knowledge integration in epidemiology will be largely pragmatic and contextually specific,
and most importantly that they will admit of degrees. My main concern is that the wishful
intelligibility of filling in black boxes leads us to overlook these considerations entirely. In
section 5, I argue that black boxes may prevent this sort of oversight in some contexts by
preserving epistemic humility about epidemiological causes.
10
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5 Preferring Black Boxes
So far, I have focused on the extent to which filling in black boxes may confer pragmatic
intelligibility, by way of stability. Now, I will consider the relationship between
intelligibility and black boxes themselves.
Previous endorsements of black boxed explanations in epidemiology have focused on the
utility of black boxes in designing interventions despite ignorance of intermediate links in a
causal chain (Cranor 2017; Plutynski 2018). These accounts often appeal to some version
of the argument from inductive risk, on which, broadly speaking, the ethical consequences
of error play a normative role in determining the amount and kind of evidence necessary to
justify accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, and, by extension, the decision to intervene in a
particular way (Douglas 2000; Steel 2016). They purport to justify a preference for (or
more accurately, a tolerance of) black boxes when the costs of agnosticism or inaction
outweigh the possible negative consequences of ignorance about the intermediate steps
between some putative C and E, or when the costs of providing evidence for a plausible set
of intermediate steps are too high, given the projected benefit of additional detail.
While I am sympathetic to these accounts, I am concerned to show that, by the same
token of inductive risk, there are circumstances in which we ought to prefer black boxed
explanations not despite, but because of their lack of information about causal
intermediates. This is because black boxes can prevent wishful intelligibility, especially
where stability is concerned. Imagine a case in which misjudging the stability of a cause
can be expected to have serious consequences for the success of some possible intervention.
Since filling in a black box can actively mislead us with respect to the stability of a cause,
we may prefer a black box for purposes of designing such an intervention. Wishful
intelligibility often has a price.
The above discussion of stability can help to predict the contexts in which we might be
11
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particularly susceptible to these mistakes. In cases where we have reason to expect a
complex or nonspecific, multi-causal structure, we might be misled by estimating stability
from a single causal chain. Further, I have argued that piecemeal causal inference (and
especially multilevel piecemeal causal inference) may lead us to overestimate the stability
of a causal chain, especially when links in the chain are poorly integrated. In both cases,
black boxed explanations capture and convey an appropriate sense of uncertainty about
the stability of some cause. In such cases, agnosticism about the stability of a cause may
be more conducive to the design of effective interventions than wishful intelligibility would
be. In this sense, my argument is concordant with Trout’s (2002, 212) condemnation of the
risks of “counterfeit understanding.” Admittedly, the value of black boxes in these cases is
indexed to the costs of being wrong about stability. However, given that stability is lauded
as a critical determinant of which epidemiological causes make for good interventions, I
take it that these concerns are relevant to a non-trivial number of cases.
Black boxes may thus preserve a certain humility, akin to what Pickersgill (2016) calls
“epistemic modesty” about the stability of a cause that is conducive to the design of good
interventions and the avoidance of bad ones. This means that black boxes are not merely
to be preferred despite the risk of unknown intermediates. Rather, a black box is preferable
to evidence of a causal chain in cases where the consequences of error about stability are
sufficiently undesirable. When we have thorough and well-integrated knowledge of a causal
structure, my concerns about under- and overestimating stability are less troubling. Given
that the appropriateness of black boxes (and of filling in) is contextual and specific, these
considerations put black boxes on par with evidence of intermediate linking causes as
features of explanations that may contribute to their pragmatic intelligibility in a
contextual and contingent manner.
Of course, this does not mean that black boxes are to be preferred to information about
intermediate causes in all or even most epidemiological explanations. The problem lies not
12
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with information about intermediate causes, but with the inferences we are tempted to
make about stability on the basis of this information. Furthermore, I have by no means
exhausted the arguments for filling in black boxes in epidemiological explanation, and I
expect we may have good reasons to prefer filling-in that outweigh these concerns about
stability in some contexts. Rather, my argument shows that black boxes deserve the same
status of contextual relevance to pragmatic intelligibility as do other features of
epidemiological explanations, not despite, but because of, the absence of information about
intermediate causes. This means that their inclusion (or filling-in) should be a matter of
transparent negotiation and justification, rather than a default preference one way or the
other.
6 Conclusions
Wishful intelligibility is a helpful diagnosis for the mistaken expectation that filling in black
boxes is a good guide to causal stability. Filling in black boxes is by no means the only
possible source of wishful intelligibility in epidemiology or elsewhere, nor does it always
have this effect. Rather, I have been concerned to argue about specific epidemiological
cases precisely because the features of an explanation that make it conducive to some
particular goal are contextual and specific. Similarly, I have shown that there is a positive
role for black boxes in preventing wishful intelligibility and in preserving epistemic humility
about the stability of complex causes in some cases of interest to epidemiologists.
These cases seem to have something in common; namely, incomplete, limited, or poorly
integrated knowledge of a complex causal structure. We might worry that my account
could mistakenly preclude a positive and epistemically responsible role(s) for various
departures from the whole truth (à la Elgin 2007) or that a preference for black boxes in
such contexts perpetuates a harmful role for “ideal science” which may cripple important
13
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regulation and delay helpful interventions (Cranor 2017). But such a preference does not
depend on a false dichotomy between ideal science and wishful intelligibility; after all, black
boxes are themselves departures from the whole truth. Incomplete or poorly integrated
information about a complex causal structure need not paralyze the design of public health
interventions; it merely makes our assessments of stability a matter of second-order
inductive risk. My account invites transparency and justification for such decisions on a
case-by-case basis, and recommends specific ways in which the state of current
epidemiological knowledge should inform these considerations. To the extent that these
measures avoid wishful intelligibility, they make for more trustworthy reasons to intervene
in a particular way, not less.
14
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Abstract 
 An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological 
data. Different aspects of causal cognitionspecifically, causal perception and causal 
inferenceare thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they 
thereby distinctively support transference and dependency theories of causation, respectively. 
We argue that this dualistic picture of causal concepts arises from methodological differences, 
rather than from an actual plurality of concepts. Hence, philosophical causal pluralism is not 
particularly supported by the empirical data. Serious engagement with cognitive science reveals 
that the connection between psychological concepts of causation and philosophical notions is 
substantially more complicated than is traditionally presumed.   




Imagine a billiard ball rolling into a stationary ball, immediately followed by movement of 
the latter ball. Now imagine a healthy person who brushes against a plant and develops a rash an 
hour later. While both seemingly causal, these two sequences differ along many dimensions 
(e.g., timeframe, domain, reliability). In response, cognitive science research arguably points 
towards at least two distinct concepts of causation, one driven chiefly by perceptual features, the 
other statistical (e.g., Lombrozo 2010). At the same time, many philosophers of causation have 
argued—explicitly or otherwise—that the metaphysics of causation should depend partly on its 
psychological plausibility (e.g., Woodward 2011a, 2011b; Hitchcock 2012). These arguments are 
not simplistic inferences from psychological to metaphysical reality, but rather an observation 
that, for example, our causal concepts should be defeasibly anchored in actual relations in the 
world. The result of these two lines of work is a pluralistic metaphysical picture in which 
causation not only appears differently, but also comes in “basic and fundamentally different 
varieties” (Hall 2004, 1; see also Hitchcock 2003).  
At a high level, the general argument-schema that unifies many different proposals of causal 
pluralism can be understood as:  
(1) Our lay concept(s) of causation are defeasibly correlated or connected with the 
metaphysical or scientific relation(s) of causation in the world 
(2) Cognitive science tells us that we have multiple distinct lay concepts of causation, 
realized through distinct cognitive processes and representations ⇒ (Conclusion) Metaphysical or scientific causal pluralism is defeasibly correct 
One way to resist this argument is to challenge premise (1) by arguing that our lay concepts 
need not have any connection with metaphysical or scientific relations. In this paper, we instead 
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challenge premise (2): we argue that the appearance of multiple causal concepts in human 
cognition can be explained by methodological variations between communities of cognitive 
scientists. Moreover, we show that there are empirical data in support of complex interactions 
between the perceptually- and statistically-driven concepts of causation, thereby suggesting a 
single (perhaps complex) lay concept of causation. We conclude by showing how different 
empirically possible theories of causal cognition have different metaphysical implications, and so 
the need for philosophically-motivated cognitive science to resolve these issues. 
 
2. Causal Pluralism in Cognitive Science 
One cannot help but see a flying baseball break the window (not just be correlated with the 
breakage), or a person running at top speed because of (and not just in conjunction with) a 
barking dog. The standard cognitive science account of these phenomena (Michotte 1963) is that 
such impressions of causation result from a perceptually driven concept characterized by 
signature spatiotemporal features (e.g., spatiotemporal contiguity between purported cause and 
effect). The resulting causal perception exhibits a set of distinctive features: automatic, 
phenomenologically instantaneous, unamenable to top-down influences, and highly sensitive to 
spatiotemporal features. Causal perception has largely been studied through variations on the 
direct launching paradigm (Michotte 1963; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000): a stationary object A is 
on screen; a moving object B enters the screen and moves until it contacts object A; at that point, 
object B stops while object A moves until it disappears from screen. In ordinary circumstances, 
participants invariably claim that the moving object kicked, pushed, or launched the stationary 
object. Notably, a delay between contact and motion, or a gap between the two object at 
movement onset, destroys any impression of causality. Different spatiotemporal features can 
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signal different causal processes, though in all cases, causal perception emerges automatically 
without explicit reasoning.  
In contrast, so-called causal inference1 involves learning about causal relations from 
information about covariation, contingency, and other statistical information. This information 
might come from observed correlations (Rottman and Keil 2012) or interventions (Steyvers et al. 
2003). For example, one often needs some data or trial-and-error to infer that an infant is crying 
because of a rash rather than hunger. Direct spatiotemporal connection is not a useful guide for 
this type of causal cognition (though see below). Strength judgments of a causal relation are 
sensitive to the degree of covariation between a purported cause and its effect (Shanks and 
Dickinson 1987; Buehner, Cheng, and Clifford 2003). Statistics also support causal structure 
learning or the ability to determine how different causal variables relate to one another (Griffiths 
and Tenenbaum 2005; Lu et al. 2008). In contrast with causal perception, causal inference is: 
cognitively effortful, has non-salient phenomenology, is largely independent of spatiotemporal 
features, and strongly amenable to top-down cognitive influences (Buehner and May 2002).  
The different behavioral manifestations of the perceptual and statistical concepts of 
causation—causal perception and causal inference, respectively—are often taken to suggest that 
these concepts rely on distinct cognitive processes or systems. This suggestion is further 
supported by a behavioral study (Schlottmann and Shanks 1992), in which participants 
anecdotally reported that they “knew the collision was not necessary for Object B to move, but 
                                                          
1 The name is somewhat unfortunate, as causal perception arguably also involves some 
inferences. Nonetheless, ‘causal inference’ is the term used in cognitive science to refer to this 
kind of statistics-driving causal learning. 
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that it just looked as if it should be” (338). Further evidence for causal pluralism comes from 
neuroscientific research, which demonstrates a clear differentiation in the brain networks 
activated during causal perception and causal inference. The perception of causal launching 
events, compared to that of non-causal launching events, was accompanied by a higher activation 
level in bilateral V5/MT/MST, the superior temporal sulcus and the left intraparietal sulcus 
(Blakemore et al. 2001). These areas are involved in complex visual processing, which suggests 
that causal perception might involve the recovery of causal structures in an event from motion 
cues (Fugelsang and Dunbar 2009). In contrast, inferential or statistical tasks with causation 
involved the activation of prefrontal and occipital cortices, precentral gyrus, and 
parahippocampal gyrus when the data conformed to participants’ expectations. A slightly 
different networkthe anterior cingulate, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the 
precuneuswas activated when the data were incongruent with expectations (Fugelsang and 
Dunbar, 2005). Notably, all of these brain areas are typically associated with ‘higher’ cognition, 
such as decision-making, conflict resolution, and information integration. Additionally, patients 
who had a corpus callosotomy (severing the connection between brain hemispheres, usually to 
treat epilepsy) exhibited a double dissociation between causal perception (seemingly) localizing 
in the right hemisphere and causal inference (seemingly) in the left hemisphere (Roser et al. 
2005). Insofar as one commits to the thesis that different brain network activations imply 
different brain mechanisms, these neuroscientific results all seem to imply that causal perception 
and causal inference recruit two different learning mechanisms. 
On top of all of these results, causal perception and causal inference also seem to develop at 
different points during childhood. Humans develop sensitivity for rudimentary cues to causality 
such as spatial contiguity between 4 and 5½ months of age (Cohen and Amsel 1998), and 
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perceive direct launching as a causal event based on the appropriate causal roles between 6½ and 
10 months of age (Leslie and Keeble 1987; Oakes and Cohen 1990). By 15 months, infants can 
perceive a three-object causal chain (in which the first object launches the second, which in turn 
activates the third) as involving a causal relationship between the first and third object (Cohen et 
al. 1999). In contrast, humans do not successfully solve the blicket detector task—a classic 
paradigm in causal inference research—until roughly two years of age (Gopnik et al. 2004; Sobel 
and Kirkham 2006). Children develop more complex causal reasoning abilities, such as the 
ability to infer unobserved causes (Schulz and Sommerville 2006) and integrate base rates 
(Griffiths et al. 2011), by four years of age, significantly later than all of the causal perception 
capacities. The different developmental timelines lend further empirical support to the initial 
claim that causal perception and causal inference result from two different cognitive processes 
and representations, which in turn depend on distinct psychological concepts of causation. 
 
3. Causal Pluralism in Philosophy 
Many metaphysical accounts of causation can be organized into two clusters of theories: 
transference and dependency. Transference theorists typically define causation by a transfer of 
energy or a conservation of quantities through transformation (e.g., Salmon 1984; Dowe 1992, 
2000), all of which have signature spatiotemporal properties. For example, in a collision event 
between two billiard balls, spatiotemporal contiguity during contact enables a transfer of 
momentum from each ball to the other. In contrast, dependency accounts of causation 
characterize (though not necessarily define) a causal relation between two factors by their 
statistical relationship: generative causes make their effect more likely; preventative causes make 
their effect less likely. This statistical dependency is then grounded in different ways by different 
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authors, such as counterfactuals, hypothetical interventions, or statistical differences in 
appropriate reference classes (e.g., Lewis 1973; Woodward 2009).  
Rather than arguing for one type of metaphysical account to the exclusion of the other, causal 
pluralists argue for the co-existence of transference and dependency as distinct kinds of 
causation that govern different phenomena (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Although arguments for these 
accounts can be purely metaphysical, a significant subset derive force from the empirical 
plausibility of these accounts (e.g., Hitchcock 2003; Woodward 2006, 2011a, 2011b; Hall 2004; 
Lombrozo 2010). The empirical observation that humans exhibit different behaviors and shift 
their criteria for causation in different scenarios, as presented above, is ostensibly a natural 
consequence of distinct philosophical causal concepts. For example, there is a straightforward 
mapping between the signature criteria for causation in many transference accounts and the 
specific spatiotemporal conditions encoded in the perceptually realized concept of causation. In 
particular, the immediacy and experiential richness of causal perception is inexplicable by many 
existing dependency theories of causation, but is more readily explained if causation involves 
transference (Wolff 2008; Beebee 2009). In the other direction, causal inference can often take 
place even in the absence of any obvious transfer of force or quantity between agent and 
recipient, such as cases of prevention in which there is no direct physical connection at all. This 
kind of causal cognition is often taken to support a dependency notion of causation (Woodward 
2009). Causal pluralism seems to explain a wide variety of human causal intuitions—those of 
both laypeople and philosophers—at the cost of only a slightly more crowded ontology.  
 
4. Causal Pluralism in Cognitive Science: A Methodological Analysis 
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The previous sections presented the “standard view” in cognitive science of causal learning 
as consisting of two distinct cognitive processes and representations, and noted the important 
role that it plays in philosophical arguments about the nature of causation. In this section, we 
challenge the premise that the standard (cognitive science) view is well-supported. In particular, 
we contend that there are three key methodological differences between causal perception and 
causal inference experiments, and those differences can explain the differences in observed 
phenomena without appeal to multiple cognitive processes. 
First, the presentation formats and response measures drastically differ between causal 
perception and causal inference experiments. In the former, participants usually watch a single 
event and answer questions about that particular event (Scholl and Nakayama 2002). 
Additionally, participants typically answer a forced-choice question of whether a causal relation 
exists, or give a quantitative rating of the extent to which a purported causal relation exists in this 
particular event. In contrast, causal inference experiments involve trial-by-trial presentations of 
cases (Fernbach and Sloman 2009) or a contingency table summarizing those cases (Hagmayer 
and Waldmann 2002). Moreover, the typical causal inference measures include (but are not 
limited to): ratings of proportions in sets of counterfactuals; numeric ratings of the strength of the 
cause; a categorical choices between causal models; construction or drawing of causal graphs; 
measures of intervention choices or post-intervention predictions; and more. Neuroscientific and 
developmental research on causal perception and causal inference typically use the same kinds of 
stimuli and measures as the corresponding cognitive/behavioral studies. Hence, the stimuli and 
measures lead directly to phenomenological and behavioral differences without any strong 
empirical justification, and—as we show next—vastly divergent theories.  
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Second, our theories of causal perception and causal inference aim to explain judgments 
about different things, but without directly considering whether they are distinct processes. 
Causal inference theories aim to explain participant judgments that are based on multiple cases, 
and that generalize to future instances. In contrast, causal perception theories aim to explain 
judgments about single cases with no expectation of generalization. That is, causal perception 
judgments are about token events whereas causal inference judgments are about types. The very 
construction of the theories thus precludes direct comparison, since they do not attempt to 
explain the same phenomena. Moreover, the focus of each theory closely correlates with its 
experimental methods: experientially rich, automatic causal perception can only be captured by 
judgments of singular events; explicit statistical causal inference can only occur in judgments of 
multiple instances. The appearance of empirical difference between causal perception and causal 
inference can be explained by these methodological and focus divergences without any need to 
appeal to underlying differences in concepts or representations. 
A third set of issues arises for the neuroscientific studies, which one might have thought to be 
immune from the other two worries. Those studies all relied on subtraction methods in which the 
brain activation map of a null condition is subtracted from that of the experimental conditions. 
This calculation reveals areas that are uniquely activated in the experimental conditions, yet 
omits areas that are commonly activated across conditions. Additionally, that an area activates 
more strongly during causal inference does not mean it is unactivated during causal perception, 
and vice versa. Cognitive scientists need a thorough investigation of the common areas of 
activation and the interactions between different brain regions during causal perception and 
causal inference. Liberal interpretations of early neuroimaging data without sensitivity to these 
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nuances could produce an overstated conclusion about distinct underlying brain networks for 
causal perception and causal inference.  
 
5. Cognitive Science in Support of Causal Monism 
A careful look at the cognitive science not only undermines the putative inference for 
pluralism in causal cognition, but actually provides some positive evidence for monism in causal 
cognition. In particular, consider causal inference and reasoning studies that use both mechanical 
and statistical information. For example, Kushnir and Gopnik (2007) tested 4-year-old children 
with a modified blicket detector task in which (i) statistical information matched standard blicket 
studies in which children infer causality; but (ii) objects were held over the machine rather than 
placed on it. Children in that task were more inclined to say that such objects were not related to 
the machine’s activation; they smoothly integrated spatiotemporal information and constraints 
into a (seeming) causal inference task. Similarly, Schlottmann (1999) introduced 5-, 7-, 9-, and 
10-year-old children to two systems whose inner mechanisms were hidden from view, but 
described as different. The experimenter dropped one ball (A) into one end of the system, 
followed by another ball (B) after 3 seconds; the bell rang roughly 1 second after that (i.e., the 
observed sequence was A-pause-B-bell). The experimenter then showed children the system 
mechanisms: the fast system had a two-arm seesaw system that rings the bell almost 
immediately; the slow system had a downward ramp along which the ball had to roll. Intuitively, 
the children should make different inferences about which ball caused the bell ring: ball A in the 
slow system and ball B in the fast system. Most children could diagnose the likely mechanism 
when only one ball was dropped, but 5- and 7-year-old children had difficulty predicting a delay 
in ringing even when they saw that the slow mechanism was at work. That is, children’s causal 
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learning and inference up to 7 years of age depended on both statistical data accumulated over 
trials and the spatiotemporal contiguity cues of the events. 
Spatiotemporal contiguity shapes causal judgments even among adults. In a series of 
experiments, Buehner and May (2002) tested the effect of prior knowledge about the time course 
of a causal relation on their causal judgments of observed contingencies. Participants were given 
two scenarios: either a light switch immediately causes a light bulb to turn on, or a grenade 
launch leads to detonation only after a delay. Experiment 1 used a within-subjects design, 
meaning that participants completed all experimental conditions. Prior experimentation 
suggested that these two scenarios produced different explicit assumptions about the causal time 
course, but results showed almost no difference between participants’ causal ratings of the light 
switch and of the grenade launcher: as the delay period between purported cause and effect 
increased, participants’ causal ratings of the cause decreased regardless of the domain or cover 
story. Buehner and May’s preferred explanation is that the ‘pull’ of the temporal contiguity in the 
light switch scenario was so strong that it skewed participants’ ratings and overshadowed their 
assumptions about delayed timeframes in the grenade condition. Even if their explanation is 
incorrect, spatiotemporal cues clearly play a significant role in adult causal inference. 
If the previous section provides methodological reasons for doubting the empirical 
distinction between the perceptual and statistic concepts of causation, this section offers evidence 
that these concepts are more interconnected than previously thought. We suggest that a pluralism 
of psychological causal concepts is currently unwarranted by the data, and cautiously propose 
that monism should again be a feasible theoretical candidate. This monism clearly must allow 
different types of input, ranging from spatiotemporal cues to frequency and contingency 
information, but those could lead to distinct behaviors in light of variation in information and 
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task demands. Admittedly, many details remain to be provided about this kind of monism, but 
premise (2) in the original argument-schema clearly does not hold as straightforwardly as has 
been assumed in the philosophical literature. We now turn to the philosophical import of 
different possible ways of developing a monist account of causal cognition and learning.  
 
6. Philosophical Implications of Alternative Cognitive Accounts 
If we do not accept the standard view of pluralism in causal cognition, then we should 
consider some plausible alternatives. First, we could prioritize the developmental data, which 
suggest that the perceptual notion of causation develops first, and then the statistical or 
dependency notion emerges from it. As young learners gain perceptual exposure to simple causal 
events such as collision or pulling, their mental representations of these events include relevant 
perceptual features. Further exposure to new instances can result in automaticity of processing, 
which thereby manifests behaviorally as causal perception. For more complex causal events, 
some of the causal representations might not bear the same perceptual characteristics as those 
previously learned. Patterns of characteristics over multiple token perceptions can provide input 
to the later-developing statistical notion of causation, which are originally grounded in 
abstraction over spatiotemporal features. The resulting two concepts might develop to be distinct 
in adults; the developmental story underdetermines the final number of causal concepts in adults. 
On this theory, a transference notion of causation provides the historical basis for all causal 
judgments, and perhaps the actual conceptual basis if the concepts are not independent in adults. 
That is, a true causal relation must involve either a transference of energy or a preservation of 
some quantity from state to state during transformation, where those spatiotemporal features 
might be imputed on a system from statistical data. 
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Second, the order of development of causal cognition could be reversed: humans might 
develop the statistical notion of causation before the perceptual one. In particular, if causal 
inference occurs implicitly, then repeated exposures to a causal relation could enable learners to 
construct a representation of this causal relation that encodes statistical information, such as the 
frequency of occurrence of the purported effect (base rate), the strength of covariation between 
cause and effect, and so on. In practice, many of these relations are highly reliable or completely 
deterministic, and all exhibit reliable spatiotemporal characteristics (e.g., contiguity). Thus, the 
perceptual features of spatiotemporal contiguity might be encoded alongside—and perhaps even 
stand in for—statistical information: seeing that a rolling ball makes contact with a stationary 
ball is sufficient for the prediction that the stationary ball is likely to start moving. A 
philosophical monist account inspired by this psychological picture would take the dependency 
notion of causation as fundamental. Notably, causation in the physical, mechanical world 
typically has (statistically) reliable features such the appearance of determinism, or the ubiquity 
of spatiotemporal contiguity. The dependency framework can thus account for cases that are 
typically characterized by spatiotemporal features alone (such as causal perception): those 
features indicate an underlying, deterministic causal relation (see also Woodward 2011a). 
Third, a unitary concept of causation might underpin all of human causal cognition. 
Importantly, this underlying concept is irreducible to either the perceptual or the statistical 
concept alone, but is rather inferred from features of the seemingly distinct types of cognition. In 
this theory, people infer the existence of an unobserved causal relation using essentially anything 
that might be relevant, whether spatiotemporal constraints, information about mechanisms, or 
reliability of control interventions. One can even imagine other types of information being 
relevant in one’s causal judgment, such as color: the color of a mushroom might suggest its 
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toxicity. These different information sources are integrated to infer the causal connection (if 
any), which could potentially require significant tradeoffs by the cognizer. Critically, in the case 
of events where people have had substantial ‘perceptual practice’ such as collision events, the 
spatiotemporal contiguity of the event might be the most important. In the case of events with 
only statistical information (e.g., determining if the peanuts or the shrimps caused an allergic 
reaction), people can use other types of information to both infer the relation and to suggest 
alternative control actions. On this account, causal perception and causal inference are only 
different behavioral manifestations—in response to different task demands and stimuli types—of 
the same process(es) and mechanisms whose goal is to yield usable representations of the causal 
web of the world. To the extent that a unitary concept of causation is psychologically plausible 
and distinct from the previous two alternatives, the third resulting monistic account of causation 
might plausibly depart from transference and dependency accounts in various ways. Instead of 
solely relying on transference or dependency between cause and effect, causation can be 
characterized by both, and which features are more salient depend on how epistemically 
accessible they are. In the case of billiard balls colliding into each other, the epistemically 
accessible features are the contact between the balls and the immediacy with which they move 
differently upon contact. In the case of prevention (e.g., plugging a hole in the sink prevents the 
leakage), the epistemically accessible features include the absence of leakage after plugging, and 
that leakage continues when one fails to plug the hole.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Many variants of causal pluralism in philosophy, most of which lean on the distinction 
between transference-based and dependency-based causation, map onto the parallel development 
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of two research clusters in cognitive science: the perceptually- and statistically-driven concepts 
of causation, respectively. In this paper, we argued that the foundation of the dualistic research 
program in cognitive science is shaky insofar as it traces an artifactual divergence between 
research paradigms and measures, rather than a natural fault line in the empirical landscape of 
causal cognition. We then discussed how cognitive science might point to a version of causal 
monism that includes interactions between the perceptual and statistical concepts of causation. 
Finally, we sketched three alternative accounts of how the statistical and perceptual concepts of 
causation might relate to each other, and briefly discussed the implications each of those account 
would have on the philosophical picture of causation. This sketch is not an endorsement of any 
particular theory, and the three alternatives are non-exhaustive: There are certainly other 
possibilities that we cannot explore here due to space limits. Rather, the sketch is an invitation 
for philosophers and psychologists alike to consider these un- and under-explored alternatives 
before settling for any particular theory. 
  




Beebee, Helen, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, eds. 2009. The Oxford Handbook of 
Causation. Oxford University Press. 
Beebee, Helen. 2009. "Causation and Observation." In Beebee et al. 2009, 471–97. 
Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne, Pierre Fonlupt, Mathilde Pachot-Clouard, Céline Darmon, Pascal 
Boyer, Andrew N. Meltzoff, Christoph Segebarth, and Jean Decety. 2001. "How the 
brain perceives causality: an event-related fMRI study." Neuroreport 12(17):3741–46. 
Buehner, Marc J., Patricia W. Cheng, and Deborah Clifford. 2003. "From covariation to 
causation: a test of the assumption of causal power." Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 29(6):1119–40. 
Buehner, Marc J., and Jon May. 2002. "Knowledge mediates the timeframe of covariation 
assessment in human causal induction." Thinking and Reasoning 8(4):269–95. 
Cohen, Leslie B., and Geoffrey Amsel. 1998. "Precursors to infants' perception of the causality 
of a simple event." Infant Behavior and Development 21(4):713–31. 
Cohen, Leslie B., Leslie J. Rundell, Barbara A. Spellman, and Cara H. Cashon. 1999. "Infants' 
perception of causal chains." Psychological Science 10(5):412–18. 
Dowe, Phil. 1992. “Process causality and asymmetry.” Erkenntnis 37(2):179–96. 
———. 2000. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fernbach, Philip M., and Steven A. Sloman. 2009. "Causal learning with local computations." 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 35(3):678–93. 
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -254-
17 
 
Fugelsang, Jonathan A., and Kevin N. Dunbar. 2005. "Brain-based mechanisms underlying 
complex causal thinking." Neuropsychologia 43(8):1204–13. 
———. 2009. “Brain-based mechanisms underlying causal reasoning.” In Neural correlates of 
thinking. On thinking, vol. 1, ed. Eduard Kraft., Balázs Gulyás, and Ernst Pöppel, 269–
79. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2009. “Causal pluralism.” In Beebee et al. 2009, 326–37.  
Gopnik, Alison, Clark Glymour, David M. Sobel, Laura E. Schulz, Tamar Kushnir, and David 
Danks. 2004. "A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets." 
Psychological Review 111(1):3–32. 
Griffiths, Thomas L., David M. Sobel, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Alison Gopnik. 2011. "Bayes 
and blickets: Effects of knowledge on causal induction in children and adults." Cognitive 
Science 35(8):1407–55. 
Griffiths, Thomas L., and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. 2005. "Structure and strength in causal 
induction." Cognitive Psychology 51(4):334–84. 
Hagmayer, York, and Michael R. Waldmann. 2002. "How temporal assumptions influence 
causal judgments." Memory and Cognition 30(7):1128–37. 
Hall, Ned. 2004. "Two concepts of causation." In Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. John 
David Collins, Edward J. Hall, and Laurie Ann Paul, 225–76. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Of Humean Bondage.” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 54:1–25. 
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -255-
18 
 
———. 2012. "Portable causal dependence: A tale of consilience." Philosophy of Science 
79(5):942–51. 
Kushnir, Tamar, and Alison Gopnik. 2007. “Conditional probability versus spatial contiguity in 
causal learning: Preschoolers use new contingency evidence to overcome prior spatial 
assumptions.” Developmental Psychology 43:186–96. 
Leslie, Alan M. and Stephanie Keeble. 1987. Do six-month-old infants perceive causality?. 
Cognition 25(3):265–88. 
Lewis, David. 1973. “Causation.” Journal of Philosophy 70(17):556–67. 
Lombrozo, Tania. 2010. “Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and 
mechanisms influence causal ascriptions.” Cognitive Psychology 61(4):303–32. 
Lu, Hongjing, Alan L. Yuille, Mimi Liljeholm, Patricia W. Cheng, and Keith J. Holyoak. 2008. 
"Bayesian generic priors for causal learning." Psychological Review 115(4):955–84. 
Michotte, Albert. 1963. The Perception of Causality. Trans. T. R. Miles and E. Miles. Andover, 
Hants: Methuen. Original work published in 1946. 
Oakes, Lisa M., and Leslie B. Cohen. 1990. "Infant perception of a causal event." Cognitive 
Development 5(2):193–207. 
Roser, Matthew E., Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Kevin N. Dunbar, Paul M. Corballis, and Michael S. 
Gazzaniga. 2005. Dissociating processes supporting causal perception and causal 
inference in the brain. Neuropsychology 19(5):591–602. 
Rottman, Benjamin M., and Frank C. Keil. 2012. "Causal structure learning over time: 
Observations and interventions." Cognitive Psychology 64(1-2):93–125. 
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -256-
19 
 
Salmon, Wesley. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Schlottmann, Anne. 1999. "Seeing it happen and knowing how it works: How children 
understand the relation between perceptual causality and underlying mechanism." 
Developmental Psychology 35(1): 303–17. 
Schlottmann, Anne, and David R. Shanks. 1992. "Evidence for a distinction between judged and 
perceived causality." The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 44(2):321–42. 
Scholl, Brian J., and Patrice D. Tremoulet. 2000. "Perceptual causality and animacy." Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 4(8):299–309. 
Scholl, Brian J., and Ken Nakayama. 2002. “Causal capture: Contextual effects on the perception 
of collision events.” Psychological Science 13(6):493–98. 
Schulz, Laura E. and Jessica Sommerville. 2006. God does not play dice: Causal determinism 
and children’s inferences about unobserved causes. Child Development 77(2):427–42. 
Shanks, David R. and Anthony Dickinson. 1987. "Associative accounts of causality judgment." 
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation 21:229–61. 
Sobel, David M., and Natasha Z. Kirkham. 2006. "Blickets and babies: the development of 
causal reasoning in toddlers and infants." Developmental Psychology 42(6):1103–15. 
Steyvers, Mark, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Eric‐Jan Wagenmakers, and Ben Blum. 2003. "Inferring 
causal networks from observations and interventions." Cognitive science 27(3):453–89. 
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -257-
20 
 
Wolff, Phillip. 2008. "Dynamics and the perception of causal events." In Understanding Events: 
From Perception to Action, ed. Thomas F. Shipley and Jeffrey M. Zacks, 555–86. Oxford 
University Press. 
Woodward, James. 2006. "Sensitive and insensitive causation." The Philosophical Review 
115(1):1–50. 
———. 2009. “Agency and Interventionist Theories.” In Beebee et al. 2009, 234–62. 
———. 2011a. "Causal perception and causal cognition." In Perception, Causation, and 
Objectivity, ed. Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan, 229–63. Oxford 
University Press. 
———. 2011b. "Psychological studies of causal and counterfactual reasoning." Understanding 
Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, ed. 






PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -258-
The substantial role of Weyl symmetry in




String theory reduces to general relativity in appropriate regimes.
Huggett and Vistarini have given an account of this reduction that includes
a deflationary thesis about symmetry: though the usual derivation of
general relativity from string theory appeals to a premise about the theory’s
symmetry, Huggett and Vistarini argue that this premise plays no logical
role. In this paper I disagree with their deflationary thesis and argue that
their analysis is based on a popular but flawed conception of the interaction
between symmetry and quantization. On this conception, quantization
can break symmetries of the classical theory, and we must decide whether
these symmetries should be reimposed. I argue that a better conception
recognizes a tripartite distinction between ordinary, broken, and anomalous
symmetries.
1 Introduction
The basic conceptual task for a quantum theory of gravitation is to recover
something like the rough-and-ready picture of space and time that we use to
characterize the target gravitational phenomena. Much recent philosophical
work on this topic addresses general questions about this task: the extent
to which theories must presuppose the rough-and-ready picture, the different
possible success conditions for a recovery, whether and how to make sense of
claims that spacetime emerges from some more fundamental quantum features
of the world, and so on (Huggett and Wüthrich, 2013; Crowther, 2018). But
there are also specific questions that arise within particular research programs.
For example, Huggett and Vistarini (2015) and Vistarini (2019) point out
that symmetry considerations seem to be “a key concept connecting string
theory to phenomenological space-time” (2015, 1170) but that the status of
these considerations is obscure. Despite the apparent importance of symmetry,
Huggett and Vistarini argue that it is merely a formal feature of string theory,
suggesting that it can play no substantial role. Getting to philosophical grips
with string theory as a quantum theory of gravity requires a resolution of this
conceptual tension.
1
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This paper disagrees with Huggett and Vistarini’s account and suggests an
alternative. Their argument focuses on the interaction between symmetry and
quantization. We recover the Einstein field equation (EFE) in string theory
by quantizing a classical theory that exhibits so-called Weyl symmetry. On
Huggett and Vistarini’s telling, quantization breaks this Weyl symmetry, and
we face a choice: if we decide to reimpose the symmetry then we are led to the
EFE, and if we try to leave the symmetry broken then it will reappear in a
different guise and again lead to the EFE. They conclude that Weyl symmetry
is unavoidable and hence “not a logically independent postulate” (2015, 1173)
of string theory. But I think this framing is misleading. When a theory is
quantized, its symmetries have three possible fates: they might be preserved,
they might be broken, or they might be anomalous. As I will argue, Huggett
and Vistarini confine their attention to the first case; that is, their conclusion
that Weyl symmetry is always preserved rests on considering only those cases in
which it is preserved. Further attention to the other cases—and especially to
cases in which the symmetry is anomalous—shows that Weyl symmetry is not a
merely formal feature of string theory. It also illustrates the more general use of
symmetries in the string-theoretic approach to theory construction, which plays
an important role in defenses of the string theory program (Dawid, 2013).
The plan is as follows. In Section 2 I isolate the feature of Huggett and
Vistarini’s framing that I disagree with. Though this debate is motivated by
the string-theoretic derivation of the EFE, my disagreement with Huggett and
Vistarini is really a disagreement about the interpretation of quantum field
theories with spacetime-dependent symmetries. It bears on their analysis only
insofar as the derivation they discuss occurs within such a theory. As I argue, their
presentation supposes that classical symmetries are either broken or preserved in
the process of quantization. Section 3 argues that this is not a natural dichotomy,
for there is a third possibility: the symmetry might be anomalous. Anomalous
symmetries are in some sense preserved and in some sense broken; as such, they
fit uncomfortably in Huggett and Vistarini’s account. Section 4 uses this third
category to argue that Weyl symmetry is not merely a formal feature of string
theory.
2 Weyl symmetry
The argument that string theory reproduces general relativity in the appropriate
domains has various prongs; Weyl symmetry is primarily relevant to the recovery
of the EFE for the spacetime metric. In the appropriate regimes, a morass
of string excitations ought to look like a Lorentzian metric to a test string
moving through it. If the test string is to have a consistent quantization it
must be Weyl invariant, and if it is to be Weyl invariant then the effective
Lorentzian metric must satisfy the EFE. Or at least, this is the standard story.
Huggett and Vistarini ultimately argue that this appeal to Weyl invariance can
be circumvented: whether or not we suppose Weyl invariance, the EFE will
follow. This is the claim I want to take issue with.
2
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On Huggett and Vistarini’s analysis, string theory’s recovery of general
relativity—and, thereby, phenomenological space—is expressed by two results.
First, the spectrum of the string contains gravitons, the force carriers for gravity.
More precisely, upon quantizing the string you will find quantum states containing
massless spin-2 particles, the representation of the Lorentz group in which
gravitons live. Second, an adequate quantization of a string moving in an
approximately classical background made up of these massless spin-2 quanta
requires the background to satisfy the EFE. String theory therefore contains the
right stuff behaving in the right way to reproduce general relativity in the right
regimes.
This paper is concerned with the second of these results, which is set within an
effective theory of a string propagating in a classical background. Effective field
theories model the salient degrees of freedom in systems where the fundamental
degrees of freedom are unknown, or cannot be connected to the salient degrees
of freedom, or are computationally intractable. For example, the Standard
Model of particle physics contains twelve elementary matter particles. While
some of these particles are observable in isolation at low energies, some only
appear in bound states—the up and down quarks only occur as constituents of
protons, neutrons, and pions. The effective degrees of freedom at low energies
are therefore not those appearing in the Standard Model, and the effective field
theory used to model physics at this scale is formulated directly in terms of
protons, neutrons, and pions instead of quarks. Analogously, the EFE is derived
from string theory in an effective theory that replaces gravitonic excitations with
a classical Lorentzian metric. It’s this metric that must satisfy the EFE.
More formally, the effective theory of interest is the following. The classical
background is given by a metric G on a manifold X of dimension D. A possible
history for a string is a map Σ → X with Σ a two-dimensional surface. We
define a quantum field theory on Σ with two fluctuating fields: a Lorentzian
metric g on Σ and a map φ : Σ → X picking out a possible history for the string.







where volg is the volume element on Σ determined by g and the norm is induced








where Roman indices run over the two dimensions of Σ and Greek indices over
the D dimensions of X.
The EFE for G is obtained by requiring the quantum theory to be well-
behaved. As a first pass at articulating this requirement, consider the path
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If we fix a metric g on the worldsheet Σ, the inner integral is the path integral for
a quantum field theory of D scalar fields in two spacetime dimensions. Theories
of this kind are relatively well understood, and the integral over φ is relatively
easy to perform, at least when G is nearly flat. The path integral of our effective
theory is therefore an integral over a family of scalar field theories indexed by
metrics g on Σ. Integrating out the scalar fields, our integral becomes
∫
Dg exp(iSred(g))
where Sred(g) is an action for g that incorporates the quantum fluctuations of
the field φ. The full path integral ought therefore reduce to an integral over g
alone.
We can only integrate out the field φ if G satisfies the EFE. If the reduced
action Sred exists then its exponentiation must have the same symmetries as the
integral over φ. In particular, note that the original action S(g, φ) is invariant
under the Weyl transformation
g 7→ e2ω g
determined by a positive real-valued function ω on Σ, since the induced change
in the norm of dφ cancels out the induced change in the volume element. On
the other hand, to leading order in fluctuations in φ, an infinitesimal Weyl



















with RGµν the Ricci tensor associated with the metric G and R
g the scalar
curvature associated with the metric g. Since Sred must have the same symmetries
as the original theory, this shift must vanish for all ω and g. This implies that
the first term in the integrand vanishes for all g and φ, so that RGµν = 0. And
this is the EFE in vacuum. The argument generalizes: if we add other classical
background fields on X to the effective action then the shift in Sred under a
Weyl transformation will include terms involving these other fields, and the shift
will vanish when RGµν satisfies the EFE determined by the stress-energy tensor
of the added fields.
Huggett and Vistarini argue that Weyl symmetry plays no substantial role
in the derivation I’ve just sketched; this is our point of disagreement. The
derivation relied on the claim that Sred must have Weyl symmetry, and this
“must” requires justification. Huggett and Vistarini argue that it is tautologous:
although the derivation of the EFEs appeals to [Weyl] symmetry,
since that is itself a consequence of string theory, it is not, logically
speaking, a necessary premise of the derivation (2015, 1173).
On their view, the appeal to Weyl symmetry could in principle be eliminated.
We must have RGµν = 0 (and D = 26), and Sred must be Weyl-invariant, but
4
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according to Huggett and Vistarini this is a downstream consequence of other
hypotheses in string theory. We could just as well take a different route, one
that made no explicit detour through Weyl symmetry.
Weyl symmetry certainly appears to play a role in the derivation just sketched,
so Huggett and Vistarini argue for their triviality thesis by arguing that this is
a mere appearance. In light of the generally nontrivial behavior of Sred under
Weyl transformations, Huggett and Vistarini say that the Weyl symmetry of the
original action is “broken by quantization” and that the EFE appears to follow
when the symmetry is “reimposed” on Sred (2015, 1170). If we don’t reimpose
the symmetry then it seems we might have RGµν 6= 0 or D 6= 26. But, they
claim, if we don’t demand Weyl invariance then we must change our classical
background:
In this case, different choices of conformal factor in the Weyl transfor-
mation of the internal metric. . . will be physically different. Hence,
[ω] is a new physical degree of freedom over the worldsheet, a scalar
background field: specifically a dilaton field [Φ] (2015, 1171).
Suppose, then, that we adopt a different effective field theory, one that includes
a scalar field Φ on X. Huggett and Vistarini argue that if we suppose Φ to be
tachyonic, and if we suppose that some mechanism gives it good long-distance
behavior, then we can show that Weyl invariance must hold. They conclude that
Weyl invariance is unavoidable: even if we suppose that it doesn’t hold we can
derive that it does.
In the rest of this paper I argue that Huggett and Vistarini’s reasoning does
not go through and that talk of breaking and reimposing Weyl invariance is mis-
leading. The Weyl symmetry of Sred is a necessary premise in the derivation of
the EFE just sketched and is not a logical consequence of some other hypotheses.
Huggett and Vistarini’s argument only shows that Sred is Weyl-invariant under
the hypothesis that Sred is Weyl-invariant. The triviality of this conclusion is ob-
scured by a common way of talking about the role of symmetries in quantization,
according to which quantization can break symmetries of the classical theory
and it’s left for us to decide whether to reimpose them. A better accounting of
the situation distinguishes between cases in which the symmetry is preserved,
cases in which it cannot be implemented, and cases in which it is anomalous.
3 Anomalies
My disagreement with Huggett and Vistarini’s framing isn’t particular to Weyl
symmetry but applies to symmetries of all kinds. This section illustrates an
alternative framing according to which any symmetry might be preserved, broken,
or realized anomalously. Huggett and Vistarini also take their discussion to
generalize to other kinds of symmetry. They explicitly analogize Weyl and gauge
symmetry, and elsewhere Vistarini suggests that the possibility of a substantial
role for Weyl symmetry “challenges the general idea that gauge symmetries
are simply formal features of the way in which a theory’s physical content is
5
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formally represented” (2019, 40).1 I agree that deflationary views about Weyl
and gauge symmetry stand and fall together, but I think they are untenable in
both cases. They fail to mark an important distinction between anomalous and
broken symmetries.2
3.1 Anomalous global symmetries in field theories
There’s an important difference between a theory’s being invariant under a
symmetry or anomalous, and both of these situations are importantly different
from a theory lacking that symmetry altogether. These differences can be
illustrated by simpler theories with obvious physical application. Anomalous
symmetries are also found in quantum field theory, where they can play an
important role in saving the phenomena. The chiral anomaly in the Standard
Model is a relatively simple example that illustrates why anomalous global
symmetries are acceptable.
A particularly simple instance of the chiral anomaly appears in quantum
electrodynamics with one charged fermion. The setting is four-dimensional
Minkowski space, and the two fields in the theory are the electromagnetic gauge













with Fµν the field strength and D/ the Dirac operator determined by A. As in





As before, we think of the inner integral as defining a quantum field theory
with a single fluctuating fermion field ψ in the presence of a fixed classical
electromagnetic potential A. And again as before, we proceed by integrating out
the fermionic degrees of freedom to obtain an action depending only on A, with
the full theory given by performing this remaining integration.
The integral over the fermion field transforms anomalously under the global
symmetries of the action. Recall that a Dirac fermion ψ naturally decomposes
into two parts: a left-handed Weyl fermion and a right-handed Weyl fermion.
The Dirac operator D/ is chirally symmetric, so the fermion term in S(A,ψ) can
be split into two terms, one involving the left-handed component of ψ and one
involving the right-handed component. The action S(A,ψ) is therefore invariant
under two kinds of phase transformations,
ψ 7→ eiθψ ψ 7→ eiθγ
5
ψ
1See Healey (2007) and Redhead (2003) for more detailed articulations of this general idea
as well as some discussion about how issues of symmetry and quantization are related to more
obviously philosophical issues.
2What follows are two simple examples of anomalies. See Monnier (2019) for more thorough
but still relatively informal discussions of anomalous quantum field theories.
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the first of which rotates the phase on the left- and right-handed components by
the same angle θ, and the second of which rotates the phases of each component
the same magnitude θ but in opposite directions. Call the latter a chiral phase
rotation, since it treats left- and right-handed components differently. While the
integral over the fermion fields invariant under the first type of phase rotation, a







where Q is the charge of the fermion. The effective fermion action transforms
under chiral rotations, so there’s a sense in which it exhibits chiral symmetry.
But it is not invariant; it has an anomaly.
The chiral anomaly doesn’t vanish, but this isn’t a problem. The derivation
in Section 2 required the Weyl anomaly to vanish, but a vanishing chiral anomaly
would lead to empirical inadequacy (Dougherty, 2020). For example, neutral
pions decay to photons at a rate proportional to the chiral anomaly. If the
chiral anomaly vanished then pions would hardly ever decay to two photons, but
this is their most common decay channel. Indeed, the chiral anomaly was first
discovered when trying to account for the neutral pion’s decay rate. As another
example, the mass of the η′ meson is approximately proportional to the chiral
anomaly. A theory without the chiral anomaly gets the η′ meson’s mass wrong
by almost an order of magnitude.
The effective action varies under chiral rotations, but it exhibits chiral rotation
symmetry in a weaker sense. Because the chiral anomaly is a reflection of this
weaker invariance, it reflects the structure of the symmetry group by satisfying
the so-called Wess–Zumino consistency conditions. This is importantly different
from a theory that is not invariant under chiral rotations at all, like a theory
with massive fermions. These two cases should be distinguished.
3.2 Anomalous gauge symmetries in field theories
Anomalous global symmetries like the chiral symmetry of Section 3.1 or Galilei
symmetry in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics are unobjectionable. Indeed,
they are desirable, because neutral pions often decay and the mass of a non-
relativistic particle isn’t state-dependent. Anomalous spacetime-dependent
symmetries are less anodyne. These include Weyl symmetry when RGµν 6= 0 or
D 6= 26, but they are also found in minor modifications of the Standard Model.
The demand for a vanishing Weyl anomaly is analogous to the demand for a
vanishing gauge anomaly, and the latter is perhaps more easily interpreted in
physical terms by comparison with the Standard Model.
To illustrate gauge anomalies, consider a slightly different theory of charged
matter. Replace the Dirac fermion in the action of Section 3.1 with a charged
left-handed Weyl fermion χ to give the action S(A,χ). This action exhibits
a spacetime-dependent symmetry: for any real-valued function α on M4 the
transformation
Aµ 7→ Aµ − ∂µα χ 7→ e
iQαχ
7
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leaves the action S(A,χ) unchanged. But when we integrate out the fermion χ







This resembles the chiral anomaly but is distinct. The action S(A,χ) doesn’t have
chiral symmetry at all—neither ordinary nor anomalous—because it contains
only a left-handed Weyl fermion. And integrating out the Dirac fermion ψ from
the action S(A,ψ) of Section 3.1 produces a gauge-invariant reduced action, not
one that transforms anomalously under gauge transformations.
The Standard Model has no gauge anomalies, and this expresses a nontrivial
fact about the charges of its various particles. If we replaced the Weyl fermion
in S(A,χ) with a right-handed fermion of the same charge then we would obtain
another anomalous theory, and the anomaly would have the same form but with
a sign flip. So we can build a theory with no anomaly if we include two Weyl
fermions with the same charge, one of each handedness, for then the two anomaly
terms would cancel. This is just the theory of Section 3.1, since a Dirac fermion
is a pair of opposite-handed Weyl fermions. By similar reasoning, the anomaly
associated with the U(1) hypercharge gauge symmetry in the Standard Model is
proportional to (Schwartz, 2014, Eq. 30.73)











where the Y s are the hypercharges of left-handed leptons and quarks and right-
handed electron, neutrino, and up- and down-type quarks. In the classical action
these charges are freely specifiable independently, but their observed values are
such that this expression vanishes. Similar anomaly cancellation conditions hold
for other gauge symmetries in the Standard Model. And, of course, these are all
cousins of the Weyl anomaly cancellation conditions RGµν = 0 and D = 26.
The examples in this section show that the preserved–broken dichotomy
Huggett and Vistarini employ is too coarse a classification. Putting anomalous
symmetries in the “broken” bucket neglects the fact that they satisfy nontrivial
constraints, like the Wess–Zumino consistency condition. But putting them in the
“preserved” bucket erases the difference between cases where anomalies cancel and
cases where they don’t. In particular, it elides theories where the Weyl anomaly
vanishes and theories where it doesn’t. Once we recognize that symmetries
may be anomalously realized, we can further distinguish between anomalous
global symmetries, like chiral symmetry, and anomalous gauge symmetries, like
that of an electromagnetically charged Weyl fermion or the Weyl symmetry of
Section 2’s string theory. While the former obtain in perfectly good theories—
both in principle and of particle phenomena—the latter are ruled out in the
string-theoretic derivation of the EFE.
8
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4 Theory space
The distinctions introduced in Section 3 clarify the task of justifying the string-
theoretic derivation of the EFEs, and they lead to a problem for Huggett and
Vistarini’s analysis. The desired conclusion of RGµν = 0 follows from the demand
that the Weyl anomaly vanish, and this follows from the demand that the total
gauge anomaly always vanish. So we need a justification for this more general
demand. I won’t try to provide one here. But, supposing this demand is justified,
it’s a nontrivial one. There are theories that exhibit a nonvanishing gauge
anomaly, like electrodynamics with a single Weyl fermion, and there are theories
in which the gauge anomaly vanishes. Anomaly cancellation isn’t tautologous.
Indeed, the stringency of anomaly cancellation is sometimes claimed to uniquely
determine a possible model of string theory.
Weyl symmetry plays a substantial role in Section 2’s derivation of the EFE.
This derivation required the reduced action to be exactly Weyl symmetric, not
anomalously so. This is a substantial requirement because it forces us to have
R
G
µν = 0 and D = 26. And this requirement is nontrivial because there are
metrics that aren’t Ricci flat and there are manifolds with dimension other than
26. In just the same way, demanding gauge anomaly cancellation in the theories
of Section 3 or in the Standard Model puts nontrivial constraints on the field
content and charges. It rules out a theory containing a single charged Weyl
fermion, and it requires the electron’s charge to be precisely the opposite of the
proton’s. Far from being a tautology, the vanishing of the Weyl anomaly is a
powerful constraint on the construction of a quantum field theory.
The power of the vanishing anomaly condition requires an equally powerful
justification, and I think this deserves further philosophical attention. Certainly
we can’t count every anomaly as pathological, since the chiral anomaly in
Section 3.1 is instrumental in reproducing low-energy collider phenomena. But
we can demand that every gauge anomaly vanish, and this demand is often made.
It is sometimes said that theories with gauge anomalies aren’t “coherent” (Dawid,
2013, 12) or “consistent” (Schwartz, 2014, 627), but this isn’t obviously right, at
least not in the strict sense. The traditional argument for this conclusion claims
that gauge anomalies “destroy the renormalizability, and thus the consistency,
of the gauge theory” (Bertlmann, 1996, 245). This seems too quick. Plenty
of perfectly respectable theories aren’t renormalizable, including the effective
field theories used to model low-energy collider physics (Weinberg, 1995, §12.3).
On the other hand, these effective field theories have unitary truncations at
each order in the momenta, while any finite truncation of a gauge theory spoils
unitarity. This is not the place to sort out the exact relationship between gauge
anomalies and renormalization, but this relationship should be clarified if we
would like to better understand the derivation of the EFE in string theory.
Because the vanishing Weyl anomaly is a nontrivial constraint, Huggett and
Vistarini’s deflationary argument must misfire. The problem with it is clear if
we adapt it to a simpler theory with anomalous gauge symmetry, like the theory
of the single charged fermion. Their argument, recall, begins by supposing that
the reduced action isn’t exactly invariant under the gauge symmetry. It’s a
9
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matter of mathematical fact that the reduced action transforms under the gauge
symmetry; the only question is whether it’s invariant or anomalous. If we suppose
it’s anomalous then the fermion’s charge must be nonzero. The theory then has
a gauge anomaly and is not invariant under the gauge symmetry. At this point
Huggett and Vistarini introduce new degrees of freedom and show that these
cancel the anomaly. The analogous move in our charged fermion theory would
be the introduction of further Weyl fermions: one fermion with the opposite
handedness and the same charge, or two fermions with the opposite handedness
and charge Q/2, or one Weyl fermion with the same charge and handedness
and two with the same charge and opposite handedness, or something like this.
The total gauge anomaly in any of these modified theories vanishes, so they are
exactly gauge-invariant. But they’re also just different theories. Introducing
another fermion doesn’t make the theory with one fermion consistent, it gives
a theory with two fermions. In the same way, Weyl invariance in a theory
containing a background scalar field Φ doesn’t lead to Weyl invariance in a
theory without a background scalar field.
Huggett and Vistarini’s reasoning doesn’t show that Weyl invariance is a
purely formal requirement, but it can be useful in a different way. Anomaly
cancellation can be a guide to theory development, because it can suggest
modifications for the sake of anomaly cancellation. If you observe a charged Weyl
fermion then there must be at least one more out there, because a theory with only
one charged Weyl fermion has a gauge anomaly. Anomaly cancellation therefore
constrains our exploration of the possible space of theories. Dawid’s (2013)
account of non-empirical theory assessment promotes this type of constraint to a
general method for evaluating scientific theories. If we have reason to believe that
the vast majority of theories have gauge anomalies then the fact that we’ve found
some that lack them—the Standard Model, or the string theory with RGµν = 0
and D = 26—is a good sign that we’re on the right track. The antecedent is a
big “if”, but it does seem difficult to construct theories in which all anomalies
cancel.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that Weyl symmetry plays a substantial role in the derivation of
the EFE in string theory. More precisely, the EFE follows from the hypothesis
that the Weyl anomaly vanishes, and this hypothesis isn’t empty. An adequate
account of the Weyl anomaly requires a conception of symmetry that goes beyond
the preserved–broken dichotomy found in Huggett and Vistarini’s analysis and
more broadly. I have indicated a replacement. On the alternative framing I
have provided, the derivation of the EFE rests on the prohibition of gauge
anomalies, and the justification of this prohibition should be further investigated.
Leaving these details aside, I think Huggett and Vistarini’s deflationary argument
doesn’t work. It finds Weyl invariance in every theory because it responds to
failures of Weyl invariance by changing the theory under consideration. Some
theories—indeed, most—are not Weyl invariant.
10
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Towards Mechanism 2.1: A Dynamic Causal Approach 
 
Abstract: I propose a dynamic causal approach to characterizing the notion of a 
mechanism. Levy and Bechtel, among others, have pointed out several critical 
limitations of the new mechanical philosophy, and pointed in a new direction to 
extend this philosophy. Nevertheless, they have not fully fleshed out what that 
extended philosophy would look like. Based on a closer look at neuroscientific 
practice, I propose that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system that involves various 
components interacting, typically nonlinearly, with one another to produce a 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last three decades have witnessed the rise of the so-called new mechanical 
philosophy (NMP) in philosophy of science. The emergence of this NMP was largely 
motivated by philosophers’ realization that, in contrast with the physical sciences 
where natural laws play a central role in offering explanation, prediction and 
understanding, the life sciences are best characterized as a hodgepodge of 
subdisciplines that focus on discovering and investigating mechanisms. Another 
motive for the NMP’s arising is related to the shift from the focus on scientific 
theories to on scientific practice.  
Advocates of the NMP provide philosophers with a new framework for 
re-examining many pivotal problems in philosophy of science, e.g., scientific 
explanation, causation, the autonomy of the special sciences, to name just a few. 
However, even though the NMP has significantly reshaped the landscape of 
philosophy of science, there is still a long way to go. Recently, many authors have 
realized that the framework has serious limitations (Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 
2013; Levy and Bechtel 2016). At the heart of these limitations is the fact that 
previous work tends to center on qualitative aspects of mechanisms and draws on 
examples primarily from textbooks in cell and molecular biology, while neglects 
quantitative/dynamic aspects of mechanisms that are reflected in real scientific 
practice.  
Given these limitations, Levy and Bechtel (2016) call for an extended conception 
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of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation, the so-called ‘mechanism 2.0’.1 
Although Levy and Bechtel, among others,2 point in the right direction (or so I 
suppose) and highlight several crucial points regarding what the extended philosophy 
would look like, they have not yet fully developed their proposal. So, I here, 
following in their footsteps, take up the mission of developing one version of such an 
extended philosophy and call it ‘mechanism 2.1’. My approach, largely inspired by 
neuroscientific practice, is capable of capturing both the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of mechanisms, and dovetails well with real scientific practice.  
The essay unfolds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the NMP, followed by 
Section 3 where Levy and Bechtel’s proposal for ‘mechanism 2.0’ is introduced. 
Section 4 proposes a dynamic causal approach to characterizing mechanisms, and 
Section 5 discusses what philosophical implications it can deliver.  
 
2. The New Mechanical Philosophy 
 
The NMP represents a bundle of closely connected but slightly different ideas 
 
1 Notice that Levey and Bechtel (2016)’s interest is in expanding the mechanistic 
explanation framework rather than the conception of mechanisms. However, I think 
an extended conception of mechanistic explanation must be built upon an extended 
conception of mechanisms, since the latter is more fundamental. Yet, their project 
does inform me of how to develop an extended account of mechanisms.  
2 E.g., Kaplan and Bechtel (2011), and Brigandt (2013). 
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proposed by a number of philosophers concentrating primarily on practice in the life 
sciences (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002, 2005; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel 2006, 2008; Darden 2006; Craver 2007). 
These philosophers all agree that we place mechanisms on center stage when 
examining those traditional philosophical questions (e.g., explanation, causation), 
even though they have not yet reached a consensus on how to philosophically specify 
the notion of mechanisms. According to one most commonly cited characterization: 
 
“Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive 
of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.” 
(Machamer et al. 2000, 3) 
 
In characterizing mechanisms, different authors employ different terminologies which 
reflect their distinct ontological commitments.3 Setting aside these ontological 
disputes, nevertheless, they all seem to agree that a mechanism involves four elements: 
a phenomenon/behavior, components/parts/entities, interactions/activities/operations, 
 
3 Machamer et al. (2000) take a dualistic stance towards mechanisms, holding that a 
mechanism is composed of two ontologically different kinds: entities and activities. 
Bechtel (2006, 2008) also thinks that a mechanism is composed of two different kinds: 
component parts and component operations. Glennan (2002), by contrast, takes a 
monist position, holding that a mechanism is composed of parts that interact to 
produce a phenomenon of interest. 
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and spatiotemporal organization/structure. Another element, not clearly shown, is also 
worth mentioning: multilevel hierarchy.  
The multilevel hierarchy is manifested by the fact that the component of a 
mechanism may constitute a sub-mechanism by itself, and that the mechanism may 
constitute a component of an even bigger mechanism. This also implies that a 
mechanism’s identification hinges on what target phenomenon/behavior is under 
question. In other words, there is no mechanism simpliciter, but only a mechanism for 
a particular phenomenon/behavior. With respect to components and interactions—in 
terms of Craver (2007)’s constitutively relevant criterion—only those that contribute 
to producing a particular phenomenon/behavior of the mechanism count as the 
components and interactions of the mechanism. 
This NMP has significant implications for a number of philosophical issues, e.g., 
explanation. This philosophy advocates a new account of explanation, i.e., 
mechanistic explanation. According to this account, explaining a 
phenomenon/behavior (at least in the life sciences) lies in uncovering a mechanism, 
i.e., uncovering how the various components interact with one another in a 
spatiotemporally orchestrated manner to produce the phenomenon of interest. 
Obviously, there is no role for laws to play, and explanation does not proceed in a 
manner suggested by the covering-law model of scientific explanation.  
No doubt, this philosophy’s attractiveness essentially comes down to the fact that 
it goes in concert with the practice in the life sciences. Yet, as many philosophers have 
pointed out, although this framework has come very close to practice, it does not 
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come close enough. 
 
3. Mechanism 2.0: Call for An Extension 
 
Recently, many philosophers have cast doubt on the adequacy of the NMP (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 2016). 
According to these philosophers, the NMP has the following limitations. First, the 
NMP treats a mechanism as if it is composed of a linear causal sequence. However, 
scientists have recognized that a mechanism can be a very complex network of 
interacting components that possesses feedback/feedforward loops, whose interactions 
are typically non-linear and non-sequential. Second, the NMP routinely concentrates 
on the structural, organizational, and spatial aspects of a mechanism, ignoring that a 
mechanism is essentially a dynamic system within which the parts are changing over 
time. Third, these two features, linear and non-dynamic thinking, are always 
associated with a third feature of that philosophy: qualitative thinking. This feature is 
clearly illustrated by the way the new mechanists qualitatively describe how a 
mechanism is brought about, and by the simple paradigmatic examples drawn from 
textbooks (e.g., the lac operon of E. coli). These qualitative characterizations of 
mechanisms may help unravel some qualitative aspects of the mechanism, but fall 
short of making sense of those quantitative, often more important and more complex, 
aspects.  
Due to these limitations, an extended philosophy of mechanisms, accompanied 
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by an updated account of mechanistic explanation, is called for (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2016). However, although Levy 
and Bechtel (2016), among others, have pointed out the limitations of the NMP and 
signposted the direction for an extension, they have not fully fleshed out what that 
extended philosophy would be. For the moment, let me list those key features, as 
singled out and agreed upon by these philosophers, that an extended conception of a 
mechanism must be able to capture. First, the extended framework must treat a 
mechanism as a non-linear, dynamic complex system that may involve 
feedback/feedforward loops. Second, in addition to the qualitative thinking, the 
extended framework must also facilitate quantitative thinking. Third, as a result, the 
extended philosophy must come even closer to real scientific practice. Given these 
ingredients, it is time to portray the full image.  
 
4. Mechanism 2.1: A Dynamic Causal Approach  
 
I propose that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system that involves various 
components interacting, typically non-linearly (though sometimes linearly), with one 
another to produce a phenomenon of interest. In agreement with the NMP, my 
approach also holds that a mechanism involves four elements: a 
phenomenon/behavior to be explained, components/parts/entities, 
interactions/activities/operations, and spatiotemporal organization/structure. Besides, 
it also considers the multilevel character of mechanisms. However, my approach 
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differs from the NMP in two important aspects. First, it treats a mechanism as a 
dynamic system that may involve non-linear interactions and feedback/feedforward 
loops, and second, it explicitly views a mechanism as a causal structure composed of 
components and their causal connections (Here I am not denying that many advocates 
of the NMP also treat a mechanism as a causal structure. The point is that they only do 
so implicitly or qualitatively. So, by ‘explicitly’ I mean a mechanism is formally 
represented as a causal structure using certain quantitative tools, e.g., causal graphs 
(Spirtes et al. 2000; Pearl 2009).  
This approach does not come out of the blue. Rather, it reflects how 
scientists—especially those neuroscientists—in practice conceptualize a mechanism 
(Friston et al. 2003, 2009, 2017; Stephan et al. 2007; Rubenstein et al. 2016). To see 
how this approach can make sense of scientific practice and therefore offer us an 
extended conception of mechanisms, consider an example drawn from neuroscience. 
Neuroscientists wonder how human brains respond to stimuli, e.g., visual words. The 
question they are asking is what mechanism underlies the observed pattern regarding 
humans’ response to visual stimuli. To answer this question, they hypothesize a 
mechanism involving five components (i.e., areas) in the brain: visual areas V1 and 
V4, the inferior temporal gyrus (BA37), the angular gyrus (BA39), and the superior 
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Figure 1. A schematic representation of a neuronal mechanism responsible for 
bringing about the observed stimuli-response pattern in humans. The figure is 
adapted from Friston et al. (2003, 1275). 
 
Obviously, this mechanism involves feedback loops. Also, the mechanism can be 
interpreted as a causal structure, for all the arrows, both the one-way and two-way 
arrows, denote causal connections.4 These causal connections are termed effective 
connectivity, denoting “the influence that one neuronal system exerts over another in 
terms of inducing a response” (Ibid., 1277). As can be seen from the figure, there are 
two kinds of stimuli/inputs that influence the system: a stimulus can induce a response 
by either exerting direct influences over a specific region, e.g., 𝑢1, or exerting 
indirect effects by modulating the coupling (i.e., the causal connection) among 
regions, e.g., 𝑢2. Attention to a particular feature is a case of the second kind of 
stimulus/input, for differing degrees of attention usually can result in different 
strengths of the coupling between the same set of regions. In total, there are three 
 
4 Notice that this approach differs from the causal graphical theory (Spirtes et al. 
2000; Pearl 2009), since it allows cyclic causal structures while the latter does not.  
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types of interactions: (1) the direct influence of inputs on brain areas, (2) the intrinsic 
coupling among brain areas, and (3) the modulation of the intrinsic coupling induced 
by inputs. 
We have not yet seen how the mechanism can be dynamic. Given Figure 1, 
mental simulation may help us roughly understand how the mechanism works, but it 
offers no help in understanding the mechanism dynamically. To do so, we must be 
equipped with some mathematical tools. The deterministic differential equations are 
often the sought-after tools by neuroscientists.5 Now, we assign a state variable 𝑥𝑖 to 
each region of the mechanism, describing some neurophysiological properties of that 
region, e.g., postsynaptic potentials. These state variables can interact with one 
another, namely, one state variable’s change relies at least upon (the change of) one 
other state variable. The set of interactions between the state variables then can be 
expressed by a set of ordinary differential equations: 
 
𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑡 = [  
  𝑓1(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)...𝑓𝑛(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)]  
  = 𝐹(𝑥)                             (1) 
 
Yet, this set of equations is insufficient to specify the mechanism. To begin with, the 
set of equations does not give us any information about the specific form, or the 
nature, of the causal relationships, 𝑓𝑖. Hence, a set of parameters, denoted by 𝜃, that 
 
5 The other options are state space models, iterative maps, etc.  
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encodes the information about the form and strength of the causal relationships is 
required. The set of dependence/causal relationships, however, does define the 
structure/organization of the mechanism (Stephan et al. 2007, 130). Second, since the 
mechanism is an open system that exchanges matter, energy and/or information with 
its environment, the inputs into the system, denoted by the vector function 𝑢(𝑡), 
should also be considered. By expanding equation (1) along these two lines, we obtain 
a general nonlinear state equation for the system: 
 
𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑢, 𝜃)                                      (2) 
 
This equation describes how a state variable’s change is a function of some 
neurophysiological influences exerted by some state variables (including itself at an 
earlier time) and some inputs, and establishes a mapping between the system 
dynamics and the system structure. It offers  
 
“A causal description of how system dynamics results from system structure, 
because it describes (i) when and where external inputs enter the system; and (ii) 
how the state changes induced by these inputs evolve in time depending on the 
system’s structure. Given a particular temporal sequence of inputs 𝑢(𝑡) and an 
initial state 𝑥(0), one obtains a complete description of how the dynamics of 
the system […] results from its structure […]” (Ibid., 130).  
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The equation is general because it provides an overarching framework for 
representing neural systems that can be implemented in different ways. One such an 
implementation, a bilinear approximation,6 represents the system dynamics using a 
bilinear differential equation:  
 𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑢, 𝜃) = 𝐴𝑥 + ∑𝑢𝑗𝐵𝑗𝑥 + 𝐶𝑢  = (𝐴 + ∑𝑢𝑗𝐵𝑗)𝑥 + 𝐶𝑢                               (3) 
 
where 𝐴 is the connectivity matrix denoting the intrinsic coupling among brain areas 
when no input is present, 𝐵𝑗 are the induced connectivity matrices denoting the 
change of the intrinsic coupling induced by the 𝑗th input, and 𝐶 is the matrix 
standing for the direct influences of inputs on brain areas. Together, they constitute 
the parameter set 𝜃 = {𝐴, 𝐵𝑗, 𝐶} to be estimated. With the parameter set at hand, the 










6 A bilinear approximation is achieved in the following way: the differential 
equations for each state variable and for each input are linear individually, but 
nonlinear jointly. For details of this method, see Svoronos et al. (1980). 





[?̇?1⋮?̇?5] = {  
  
[  
  𝑎11                  …                     0𝑎21     𝑎22     𝑎23                     ⋮                      𝑎33               𝑎35             𝑎42               𝑎44    𝑎450         ⋯       𝑎53     𝑎54    𝑎55]  
  + 𝑢2 [  
  0      ⋯       0  𝑏232⋮        ⋱        ⋮   𝑏422            0      ⋯       0]  
  
}  
  [𝑥1⋮𝑥5] + [ 𝑐11   0⋮          ⋮0      0 ] [𝑢1𝑢2] 
 
?̇? = (𝐴 +∑𝑢𝑗𝐵𝑗𝑗 )𝑥 + 𝐶𝑢 
 
Figure 2. A schema that re-depicts the mechanism in Figure 1 using the 
differential equations. The lower panel presents the differential equations 
shown in the upper panel in a matrix form, which can be further simplified 
using the parameter matrices 𝐴, 𝐵𝑗 and 𝐶. The figure is adapted from Friston 
et al. (2003, 1279). 
 
In this scenario, each state variable’s change, ?̇?𝑖, is a function of its own state at an 
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earlier time, at least one other state variable, and some external inputs.  
So far, we have shown in detail how a mechanism can be dynamic, and how a 
mechanism’s dynamic character can be properly captured with the help of certain 
quantitative tools. However, that is not the end of the story. To fully understand a 
mechanism, it is standard practice that neuroscientists look deeply into each area of 
the mechanism and treat each as a dynamic system, i.e., a sub-mechanism.7 More 
specifically, the sub-mechanism in our example is this: changes in neuronal activity 
induce a vasodilatory signal which results in changes in blood flow, which in turn 
cause changes in blood volume and deoxyhemoglobin content. Then, blood volume 
and deoxyhemoglobin content nonlinearly generate measurable responses of that area. 
The sub-mechanism of each area is depicted below: 
 
 
7 Doing so is partly because each state variable, as representing some neuronal 
activities, can induce measurable hemodynamic responses, but the causal architecture 
of the mechanism itself is not observable. So, this is a way to get access to the causal 
architecture of the mechanism. 
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Figure 3. A schema that depicts the sub-mechanism of each area of the 
mechanism. The figure is adapted from Stephan et al. (2007, 133). 
 
This sub-mechanism involves four hemodynamic state variables (𝑠, 𝑓, 𝑣 and 𝑞), 
and a parameter set 𝜗. To understand this sub-mechanism dynamically, we, again, 
need appeal to a set of differential equations that captures the (causal) relationships 
between these state variables employing the parameter set 𝜗.8 Finally, we obtain a 
full picture of the mechanism involving two levels (the mechanism-level and the 
component-level): 
 
Figure 4. A schema that represents a mechanism and its sub-mechanisms. 
 
8 This parameter set and the parameter set 𝜃 for the system dynamics constitute the 
whole parameter set {𝜃, 𝜗}, which can be estimated from the measured signal data 
using a Bayesian estimation approach. The estimation procedure can be found in 
Friston et al. (2003). 
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This schematic graph, as depicting a causal structure, together with the quantitative 
tools necessary to capture the nonlinear, dynamic aspects embodied in the causal 
structure, constitute the basis for proposing that a mechanism is a dynamic causal 
system that involves various components interacting, typically non-linearly, with one 
another to produce a phenomenon of interest.9 The next section will discuss the key 




5.1. What is a mechanism, again?  
 
The dynamic causal approach shares with the NMP all those important insights 
regarding the conception of mechanisms. For example, it agrees that a mechanism 
consists of four basic elements: a phenomenon to be explained, various components, 
interactions among these components, and a spatiotemporal organization/structure. 
Moreover, it treats a mechanism as a multilevel system. Figure 4 in the last section 
 
9 For the limitations of space, this essay does not fully show how the dynamic, 
quantitative aspects of the mechanism under consideration are unpacked. For those 
interested in these details, please see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010), where they 
demonstrate via a similar case, i.e., circadian rhythms, that the dynamic, quantitative 
aspects can be understood only when certain quantitative tools are employed. 
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unambiguously reflects this multilevel feature of a mechanism. Furthermore, this 
approach subscribes to the view that there is no mechanism simpliciter, but only a 
mechanism for a particular phenomenon/behavior. In our neuroscientific example 
discussed above, neuroscientists only singled out five regions of the brain plus their 
interactions and dismissed all the rest as irrelevant with respect to the 
stimulus-response pattern in question. Last but not the least, I concur that scientific 
practice is our best guide to understanding what a mechanism is—that is, we better 
look at how scientists conceptualize, hypothesize, represent, discover, and entertain 
mechanisms.  
However, a closer look at neuroscientific practice can lead us to some key points 
overlooked by many new mechanists. First, as some authors have pointed out (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 2016), a 
mechanism is essentially a dynamic system. Following these authors, I further 
proposed that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system such that dynamic and causal 
aspects are a mechanism’s defining features. This understanding implies that a 
qualitative mindset is no longer sufficient to fully understand mechanisms, so that a 
philosophical conception of mechanisms should be better equipped with a quantitative 
thinking. Second, many new mechanists emphasize the distinction between 
entities/parts and activities/interactions. However, an updated philosophy must be able 
to accommodate the fact that, being a dynamic system, the boundary between 
entities/parts and activities/interactions may become blurred in some cases. This is the 
case in our neuroscientific example, where the boundary is clear in the mechanism 
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involving five regions, but unclear in the sub-mechanisms since their components 
stand for some quantities that are not clearly entities, e.g., changes in blood flow, 
changes in blood volume, etc. Though many would think that these quantities are 
better classified as activities/interactions, the practitioners do not find this 
classificatory problem worrisome as long as they believe that the state variables 
denoting them are meaningful and well-defined. 
Third, although some philosophers implicitly regard a mechanism as a causal 
structure, they fail to fully cash out this idea. In my approach, the organization of a 
mechanism now is explicitly treated as a causal structure that can be quantitatively 
described using some mathematical tools, e.g., differential equations. The quantitative 
tools facilitate understanding the nonlinear, dynamic aspects of the causal structure 
that a qualitative thinking usually stops short of making sense.10 Also, this dynamic 
causal approach largely extends the causal graphical theory in characterizing a causal 
structure, because it allows a causal structure to be cyclic.11 The causal structure 
involves both spatial and temporal dimensions, as the spatial dimension is clearly 
represented by Figure 4 and the temporal dimension is captured by the set of 
differential equations (in which each region’s change is a function of its own earlier 
 
10 So, the quantitative tools also facilitate understanding the linear aspects if there are 
such aspects. 
11 Because the variables in the differential equations are somehow time-indexed, e.g., 
each variable’s change is a function of its own state at an earlier time, the problem of 
circularity does not arise here. 
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state, at least one other state variable, and perhaps some external inputs).  
Unsurprisingly, the dynamic causal approach ramifies into other issues 
associated with mechanisms, e.g., mechanistic explanation, the way of representing 
mechanisms, etc. 
 
5.2. An updated account of mechanistic explanation 
 
I follow those new mechanists in holding that a mechanistic explanation is one that 
uncovers the underlying mechanism of a phenomenon/behavior of interest. But I 
further add that a mechanistic explanation is a very complicated practice that 
often—if not at all times—involves the employment of many different epistemic 
means, e.g., qualitative tools such schematic drawings and verbal descriptions, and 
quantitative tools such as causal graphs and differential equations, to unpack the 
dynamic, causal aspects of a mechanism. This view does not deny the value of 
qualitative tools in offering mechanistic explanation, but it does insist that those 
qualitative tools can provide explanation only when the explanatory task does not 
require us to unravel the dynamic aspects of the mechanism.  
So, in accordance with Levy and Bechtel (2016), this view regards mechanistic 
explanation as dynamic in two related senses: on the one hand, the mechanism itself is 
a complex, dynamic system, and on the other, the process of constructing, articulating 
and evaluating a mechanistic explanation based on the mechanism in question is also 
a dynamic matter. This dynamic nature can be reflected by, but not restricted to, the 
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following scenarios: some parts of a larger system regarded as irrelevant to explaining 
a phenomenon of interest at an earlier time may be incorporated into a new 
explanation that treats them as relevant, an explanation may take a different form 
when a new mathematical tool is invented or when a new component/interaction is 
identified, a mechanism may at some later stage be embedded into a larger 
mechanism to explain a phenomenon of interest, etc.  
This view also suspects the dichotomy made between mechanistic and 
mathematical explanation.12 Some authors maintain that there is a clear-cut boundary 
between mechanistic and mathematical explanation and that they are competitors 
rather than comrades (e.g., Craver 2006; Winter 2006). However, our updated account 
of mechanistic explanation, based on the dynamic causal approach, is able to show 
that mathematical elements play an indispensable role in building a mechanistic 
explanation. This is the case in our neuroscientific example, where the set of 
differential equations is the key to revealing the dynamic aspects of the mechanism. 
This position goes in tune with many philosophers who either show that mathematical 
elements are indispensable for a mechanistic explanation (e.g., Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Brigandt 2013), or demonstrate that constructing 
mechanistic explanation in the life sciences usually takes an integrative strategy 
where both mechanistic and mathematical elements figure prominently and work 
 
12 Mathematical explanation here narrowly means those using mathematics to explain 
physical phenomena, rather than those purely mathematical explanations. See 
Colyvan (2012) for the distinction. 
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collaboratively (e.g., Fagan 2012; Boogerd et al. 2013; Green et al. 2015).13  
 
5.3. A new way of representing mechanisms 
 
A new conception of mechanisms is usually coupled with a new way of representing 
mechanisms, and, on the other hand, a new way of representing mechanisms typically 
reflects a new conception of mechanisms. This two-way dependence relationship has 
been instantiated in our neuroscientific example, where neuroscientists’ 
conceptualizing mechanisms as dynamic causal systems urges them to appeal to 
relevant mathematical tools to capture this dynamic causal nature, and the way they 
represent mechanisms employing these tools also reveals that they think of the 
mechanisms as dynamic causal systems. Most prominently, they employ differential 
equations and causal graphs to capture those dynamic causal aspects of a mechanism.  
We must note that there might be different ways of representing mechanisms, 
which may reflect distinct ways of conceptualizing mechanisms. In fact, Casini et al. 
(2011) and Gebharter and Kaiser (2014) have proposed two alternatives. Casini et al. 
(2011) attempt to represent a mechanism as a recursive Bayesian network, where each 
variable at a higher-level can be described as a sub-mechanism at a lower-level. 
However, though this approach captures the hierarchical and causal nature of 
 
13 Some also argue that the mathematical elements are part of a broader practice of 
building mechanistic explanations (Kaplan and Craver 2011; Matthiessen 2017). 
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mechanisms, it seems unclear how it can treat mechanisms as dynamic systems.14 
Gebharter and Kaiser (2014)’s approach comes closer to my approach, for it respects 
both the dynamic and causal aspects of mechanisms. But it differs from my approach 
since it brings the dynamics to the scene via adding time index to each variable, e.g., 𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑡2 denote 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑥 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑡1 and 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑥 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑡2. This usually 
results in a very complicated causal structure and therefore seems unpractical.  
Notice that this short section is not intended to assess the 
plausibility/implausibility of different representational strategies, but rather to point 





Based on neuroscientific practice, I have proposed a dynamic causal approach to 
characterizing the notion of mechanisms. This approach shares with the NMP all 
those insights about mechanisms, but also offers an extended, updated conception that 






14 For a more comprehensive criticism, see Gebharter (2014). 
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“It takes two to make a thing go right”: The coevolution of technological and 
mathematical tools in neuroscience 
 
Abstract 
Some philosophers of neuroscience have recently argued that the history of 
neuroscience is principally a history of technological tool development. Across 
these claims, there is little to no mention of data analysis methods nor their 
underlying assumptions. Here, I argue that mathematical tools have played crucial 
roles in the history of neuroscience. First, I present the Hodgkin-Huxley model as 
an example of research constrained by technological limitations and mathematical 
assumptions. Second, I highlight scale-free neuronal dynamics and explain how 
that discovery required both technological and mathematical advancements. I 
conclude by discussing consequences for explanations in neuroscience. 
 
Keywords: Hodgkin-Huxley model, mechanism, neuronal dynamics, 
scale-free, tool development 
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It takes two to make a thing go right. 
—Rob Base (Ginyard) and DJ E-Z Rock (Bryce), It takes two 
 
1. Introduction 
There should be no doubt that technological developments have played 
significant roles throughout the history of scientific discoveries and progress. This 
is as true in the physical sciences (e.g., particle accelerators in physics) as in the 
life sciences (e.g., microscopes in biology). What is less apparent is the role 
mathematical developments have played in facilitating and supporting many of 
those discoveries. Mathematical tools for analyzing data may not be at the 
forefront of discoveries centering on the physical structure of investigative targets 
of interest (e.g., cells); but they certainly are crucial in research focused on the 
dynamics of phenomena (e.g., planetary motion). In short, for science to progress, 
research on the movement and temporal aspects of phenomena often require the 
coevolution of technological and mathematical tools. 
Recently, it has been increasingly argued by some philosophers of 
neuroscience that experimental tools are not just important but are fundamental to 
neuroscience research (e.g., Bickle, 2016). Put in its most extreme terms, the line 
of thought goes like this: From Golgi’s staining technique to functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, and from deep brain stimulation to optogenetics, the history 
of neuroscience is principally a history of tool development. Moreover, it has 
been argued that this history is best characterized as one that exhibits reductionist 
(Bickle, 2006, 2016) and mechanistic explanations (Craver, 2002, 2005). Across 
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these claims, little to no mention of data analysis methods are mentioned nor the 
underlying assumptions of those methods. Here, I argue that the mathematical 
assumptions of applied data analyses have played crucial roles in the history of 
neuroscience. First, I present the Hodgkin and Huxley model of action potentials 
as an example of research constrained by technological and mathematical 
limitations of the time. Second, I draw attention to a feature of neurons that is 
overlooked by the Hodgkin-Huxley model: scale-free dynamics. After describing 
scale-free dynamics, I then point out a consequence scale-free neuronal dynamics 
has for mechanistic explanations of neuronal activity. I conclude by discussing the 
necessity of mathematical developments in providing appropriate accounts of 
scale-free neuronal activity. 
 
2. Hodgkin-Huxley model and scale-free neuronal dynamics 
The canonical Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) model of action potentials in 
the squid giant axon is considered “the single most successful quantitative model 
in neuroscience” (Koch, 1999, p. 171). The majority of the details of the model 
are not essential for my current aims. For detailed explanations of this model see 
Gerstner, Kistler, Naud, and Paninski (2014), as well as Koch (1999) for 
discussion and further references. For now, it is important to understand that this 
model treats the action potential as an event that is “all-or-none” in that it occurs 
within distinctly defined timescales (e.g., ; Bear et al., 2016; Figure 1). Moreover, 
those timescales have a lower boundary, specifically, 10 milliseconds (ms) in the 
canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952, p. 528; Koch, 1999, 
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p. 334; Marom, 2010, p. 23). What that means is that the action potential of a 
neuron (i.e., its “spike” of activity) is treated within the Hodgkin-Huxley model as 
occurring at least 10 ms from initiation to termination of all involved processes 
(Marom, 2010, p. 22). 
 
Figure 1. Hodgkin-Huxley model. (a) The canonical Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) 
model of action potentials in the squid giant axon. (b) Definitions of key model 
variables. (c) The basic shape of an action potential as produced by Hodgkin-
Huxley model. (Modified and reprinted with permission from Wikipedia. CC BY-
SA 4.0.) The x-axis captures the entire range of time in which an action potential 
occurs. According to the model, the lower temporal boundary of an action 
potential is 10 ms. This means that the entire event, from start to finish, occurs 
within that time frame. 
 
As is well-known (e.g., Marom, 2010), although there were empirically 
justifiable reasons at the time (e.g., Adrian & Zotterman, 1926), defining the 
“action potential” as a 10 ms event was due to investigator observational 
preferences in combination with technological limitations. Observational 
preferences were constrained by the limits of the recording technology, namely, 
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the voltage clamp. Although the voltage clamp was instrumental in providing the 
data that lead to the development of the Hodgkin-Huxley model, it was limited in 
its ability to record the full range of ion channels, charged particles, and other 
physiologically relevant features of neuronal activity (Schwiening, 2012). This 
resulted in the need to sum across molecular activity (Gerstner et al., 2014)—
certainly a necessity when calculating at the molecular scale—and collapse other 
physiological features into imprecise “leak” terms, a sort of “catch all” variable 
used in models that have causally relevant features that have not been precisely 
measured. Other limitations involved the manner in which the data was 
calculated. Hodgkin and Huxley calculated data from the voltage clamp via hand 
calculators (Koch, 1999, p. 160). Specifically, Hodgkin and Huxley utilized a 
mechanical calculator, the Brunsviga 20 (Figure 2), which required them to spend 
a few weeks and many thousands of rotations of the mechanical calculator’s crank 
(Schwiening, 2012). 
 
Figure 2. The Brunsviga 20, “one of the most popular mechanical calculators. It 
was produced up to the early 1970s and marketed with the slogan ‘Brains of 
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Steel’” (Schwiening, 2012). (Reprinted with permission from Wikipedia. CC BY-
SA 2.0 DE). 
 
Although the canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model is described by some as 
being linear in nature (e.g., Gerstner et al., 2014; Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952, pp. 
538-540), there is debate about whether or not it is able to capture the relevant 
types of nonlinearities exhibited by feedback that are now established as 
occurring during action potentials (e.g., Marom, 2010; Schwiening, 2012). 
Regardless whether or not the canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model is linear or 
nonlinear, or can capture particular forms of feedback, it is clear now that even 
single neurons are appropriately understood as nonlinear systems (e.g., 
Izhikevich, 2007). 
Advancements in recording technologies have facilitated the ability of 
neuroscientists to obtain more detailed data on neuronal activity (e.g., 
multielectrode arrays; Gross, 2011), making it possible to record more detailed 
and accurate data from longer timescales of neuron activity. As a result, it is 
becoming increasingly evident that the relevant timescales for explaining even 
“basic” single-neuron activity requires looking below and above that 10 ms 
window. Action potentials do not appear to have strictly defined windows of 
activity, specifically, nonlinearities in the forms of feedback and hysteresis 
significantly contribute to the event. Instead of viewing action potentials as 
having clear startup and finish conditions (Figure 1), it is more accurate to view 
action potentials as continuous, nonlinear cycles. This is clearly depicted in early 
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models, such as the FitzHugh-Nagumo model (FitzHugh, 1961; Nagumo et al., 
1962; Figure 3a) and more recent models, such as the Izhikevich model 
(Izhikevich, 2007; Figure 3b). 
 
Figure 3. Models of single-neuron activity. (a) FitzHugh-Nagumo model and 
phase space portrait. (Modified and reprinted with permission from Scholarpedia. 
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.) (b) Izhikevich model and phase space portrait. (Modified 
with permission from J. Terwilliger, 2018.) 
 
As mentioned above, there is debate as to the degree or not that the 
canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model accounts for a wide range of nonlinear features 
of action potentials, such as hysteresis. I am not entering that debate here. Instead, 
I focus on a particularly notable recent finding that has resulted from improved 
recording technologies. That finding is the apparently scale-free nature of 
neuronal activity. At its most general, a phenomenon is “scale-free” (or “scale 
invariant”) when its structure (i.e., behavioral, spatial, and/or temporal) is 
statistically self-similar from various points of observation (Bak, 1996; Gisiger, 
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2001). Many illustrative examples of spatial scale-free structures are found in 
fractal geometry (Mandelbrot, 1983; Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Koch triangle is an example of a spatial fractal. Here, three 
iterations of self-similarity are depicted (a,b,c). (Modified and reprinted with 
permission from Wikipedia. CC BY-SA 3.0.) 
 
Scale-free properties have become particularly popular in recent years in 
regard to network structure, where few nodes have many connections and many 
nodes have few connections. Consequently, such networks have no specific or 
average number of connections that characterize the entire system. 
Mathematically speaking, scale free structures can be characterized by their 
power-law distribution (He, 2014). It has become commonly accepted that many 
phenomena and systems of diverse composition are scale free in this way, for 
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example, cellular metabolism, Hollywood actors that have worked together, 
sexual relationships, and the World Wide Web (Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003). 
There is increasing evidence that neural systems exhibit many scale-free 
properties (e.g., Boonstra et al., 2013; He, 2014). These properties are exhibited 
from neuronal network connections to neuron branching patterns. For current 
purposes, I focus on the scale-free dynamics exhibited by neuronal dynamics (for 
a wide range of examples see Boonstra et al., 2013). In short, neuronal dynamics 
are considered “scale free” when there is no single time scale that properly 
characterizes its activity, which includes attempting to define an event as 
occurring within specific windows of time. There are a number of consequences 
that result from the fact that many neural systems exhibit scale-free spatial or 
temporal structure. In the next section I explore one such consequence, 
specifically, the inability of mechanistic explanations to account for scale-free 
neuronal dynamics.  
 
3. Consequences of scale-free dynamics for explanations in neuroscience 
In a recent paper, Bechtel (2015) argues against the claim that scale-free 
biological phenomena cannot be explained mechanistically. He rejects the 
following argument, which I summarize as follows: 
1. Mechanistic explanations require that the phenomena being explained 
have well-defined boundaries, such as a temporal boundary. 
2. Many biological phenomena exhibit scale-free features. 
3. Scale-free phenomena have no well-defined temporal boundaries. 
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4. Therefore, scale-free biological phenomena cannot be explained 
mechanistically. 
Marom (2010) presents such an argument and serves as one of Bechtel’s targets. 
Marom argues that there is empirical evidence suggesting that neuronal activity is 
scale-free and, thus, is just the type of biological phenomenon that cannot be 
explained mechanistically. Marom’s argument includes discussion of the 
Hodgkin-Huxley model, which leads him to conclude: 
Indeed, the lesson from our journey across levels of organization, 
from behavior through neural assemblies to single neurons and 
proteins, suggests that dreams on all-encompassing microscopic 
timescale-based descriptions, aimed at explaining the temporal 
richness of macroscopic levels, should be abandoned. Other 
approaches are called for. (2010, p. 23) 
In short, Marom claims that there are no uniquely defined timescales that could 
justify defining action potentials as events that have a lower boundary of 10 ms. 
Consequently, macroscale neuronal activity that appear scale-free are not merely 
the result of additive or linear combinations of microscale contributions. Instead, 
they are truly scale-free: the micro timescales contribute to and constrain the 
macro timescales, but so too does the macro contribute to and constrain the micro, 
such that no single scale serves a more fundamental explanatory role than the 
others. 
Bechtel’s reply to Marom is that scale-free phenomena can still be 
explained mechanistically. But to do so requires that we appreciate the role of 
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mechanisms in scientific practice. According to Bechtel, scientists often posit 
“bounded mechanisms” for the purposes of testing hypotheses (2015, pp. 84-85). 
A scientist can understand that a phenomenon is interconnected (e.g., networks) 
and still pursue a mechanistic account of that phenomenon by drawing boundaries 
around that organism. Those bounded mechanisms are not abstractions, however. 
“Abstractions,” according to Bechtel, leave information out. Instead, those 
bounded mechanisms are idealizations. Idealizations, according to Bechtel, are 
models with simplifying falsehoods (2015, p. 85). For example, if phenomenon X 
is understood to be highly interconnected, an explanation of X that assumes that it 
is not affected by all of those connections would be an abstraction. But to localize 
X to, for example, its nearest neighbors, is to provide a “first approximation” 
(2015, p. 85; italics in original) that appreciates the practical challenges of 
accounting for all the actual connections. Such an explanation would be both an 
idealization and a mechanism. 
Although he accepts that neuronal dynamics can be scale-free, Bechtel 
remains committed to providing mechanistic explanations of those dynamics. 
Accordingly, Bechtel remains committed to mechanisms being bounded, on the 
further stipulation that such bounded mechanisms are idealizations and not 
abstractions. For example, the action potential is a “bounded mechanism” that 
occurs within 10 ms windows. Such an idealization is acceptable because it makes 
the timescales of that phenomenon tractable to investigators’ cognitive limitations 
(2015, p. 92). Thus, the Hodgkin-Huxley model can be understood as an 
idealization of action potentials, with the 10 ms feature being a simplifying 
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falsehood—though not an abstraction that leaves out relevant features. This is a 
very streamlined presentation of Bechtel’s argument, for example, he makes a 
further claim that such idealized mechanisms can point out areas for further 
investigation in a mechanistic explanation. What matters for my current purposes, 
is Bechtel’s attempt to make room within mechanistic accounts to explain scale-
free activity. 
There is a lot in Bechtel’s reply to Marom to agree with, for example, the 
fact that scientists are epistemically-limited creatures who need to simplify some 
phenomena in order to get an intellectual grip on them. However, I think 
Bechtel’s reply overlooks a central issue raised by Marom. If mechanisms are, by 
definition, bounded, then scale-free phenomena (e.g., scale-invariant, fractal, 
flicker noise, power laws, etc.; Gisiger, 2001) are, by definition, not mechanisms. 
In the case of action potentials, the canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model sets a lower 
boundary on the phenomenon at 10 ms. In other words, it treats action potentials 
as starting and finishing within windows of time of at least 10 ms (Figure 1c). As 
discussed above, such a claim was justified as being consistent with the best 
science of the time (e.g., Adrian & Zotterman, 1926). With that said, it was 
constrained by technological (voltage clamp) and mathematical (the type of 
calculations that could be conducted on a Brunsviga 20 calculator; Figure 2) 
limitations. Technological advancements have certainly played a role in revealing 
scale-free dynamics (e.g., multielectrode arrays; Gross, 2011). However, data 
from advanced equipment alone has not justified the existence of scale-free 
dynamics in neuronal systems. The other part needed for the right account—
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remember, “it takes two to make a thing go right”—is the pairing of data from 
suitable technology with the appropriate mathematical tools. 
In the case of single-neuron activity, the right mathematical tools are those 
from nonlinear dynamical systems theory (NDST; e.g., Izhikevich, 2007; 
Liebovitch & Toth, 1990). NDST methods are crucial to assessing scale-free 
structure, and can contribute to establishing whether a phenomenon is truly scale-
free or not and, if so, what kind of scale-free characteristics it has. What’s more, 
applying NDST methods to complex and nonlinear phenomena typically requires 
powerful computers. For example, generating phase portraits of relatively simple 
two-dimensional dynamical systems was often not practical before computers. 
Hodgkin and Huxley’s “Brains of Steel” mechanical calculator was certainly not 
up to the task. Thus, the Izhikevich model of single-neuron activity required both 
the appropriate processing power (i.e., modern computers) and data analysis 
methods (i.e., NDST) in order to provide qualitative and quantitative accounts of 
that phenomenon’s nonlinear dynamics. 
As mentioned above, nonlinear dynamics are not central to my current 
aims; but scale-free dynamics are. Scale-free properties are a particularly unique 
set of phenomena in regard to the need for coevolved technological and 
mathematical tools. Many aspects of mammalian biological phenomena alone 
exhibit scale-free structures, such as, bronchial tube branching, eye saccades, 
heart beats, neuronal networks, and postural sway. Accordingly, different 
mathematical tools are needed to properly determine the ways they are scale-free. 
For example, detrended fluctuation analysis (Peng et al., 1994) can assess 
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structural self-similarity in a signal, but will not necessarily make clear if the 
structure results from linear or nonlinear processes (Bryce & Sprague, 2012). In 
the case of appropriate mathematical methods for assessing the scale-free 
dynamics of action potentials, if such activity is, for example, fractal, then it 
would not have been possible to accurately analyze such data, regardless of 
technological advancements, until the 1980s. The reason is because the concept 
“fractals” was not introduced to the broader scientific community until then 
(Mandelbrot, 1983). 
In order to identify fractal scale-free structures, whether resulting from 
linear or nonlinear processes, the concept “fractals” and their measurement must 
be part of an investigators toolbox. Fractals, such as the Koch triangle (Figure 4) 
are paradigm examples of scale invariance: the overall structure of the system is 
maintained at each level of observation. Such phenomena are thus not 
appropriately explained in terms that, for example, treat them as having an 
average value. Instead, as Mandelbrot pointed out, such phenomena are 
appropriately characterized via a fractal dimension. The fractal dimension 
provides a quantitative means of characterizing a scale-free phenomenon that 
accounts for all of its scales. The equation for calculating the fractal dimension is: 
𝑛 = 1 𝑆!%  
Let’s go back to the Koch triangle. For demonstration purposes, we will 
look at a four-lined Koch triangle (Figure 4). Here n is the number of line 
segments at a particular scale of observation; in this case, it is 4. Next, S is the 
scale factor, or the size reduction at each iteration; here it is 1/3. Our equation is 
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now: 4 = 1/(1/3)d, or 4 = 3d. We want to figure out d, or the fractal dimension. To 
do so, we take the log of both sides: d = log 4/log 3, which gives us a fractal 
dimension d = 1.26. In English, this means that the fractal dimension of the Koch 
triangle is 1.26, which means it is not a straight line (1) or a square (2), but closer 
to being a straight line than a square (1.26). There are various other methods for 
mathematically assessing fractals and multifractals (Lopes & Betrouni, 2009). 
The point of this example is to demonstrate that before Mandelbrot’s 
invention (discover?) of fractal geometry, it was not possible to accurately 
account for such phenomena, for example, collapsing scale-invariant structures 
into single values (e.g., arithmetic mean). The consequence for neuronal activity 
is that it was not until the 1990s (e.g., Liebovitch & Toth, 1990) that scale-free 
dynamics could be properly identified. Before then, such properties were 
misidentified via other statistical methods. Since scale-free structures have no 
primary scale or average scale, they have no specific window to identify as the 
start and finish boundary. Such a view of neuronal activity is further evidenced by 
other NDST-based work, such as the Izhikevich model (2007; Figure 3b), which 
treats action potentials as continuous cycles and not “all-or-none” (cf. Figure 1c). 
If true, that is, if action potentials are not bounded within discrete windows of 
time, then action potentials cannot be accounted for mechanistically. 
In concluding this section, an important clarification needs to be made in 
order to address a significant critique of the current line of thought. The critique 
centers on the notion of “bounded” in regard to natural phenomena. As discussed 
above, the currently-relevant aspect of the Bechtel/Marom debate centers on the 
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idea that mechanistic explanations treat targets of investigation as bounded, 
namely, as having delineated borders, which can be spatial or temporal. The 
Hodgkin-Huxley model of action potentials and its 10 ms event window were 
presented as an example of such a bounded mechanism. Scale-free neuronal 
dynamics was presented as an unbounded phenomenon, which means it is not a 
phenomenon accessible to mechanistic explanation (i.e., if “mechanistic 
explanations” include the stipulation of boundedness; see Bechtel, 2015 and 
Marom, 2010). The critique of this line of thought centers on the point that even 
scale-free neuronal dynamics are “bounded” in a number of ways, for example, 
there is a window of time in which they occur (e.g., they do not last for months, 
years, or centuries) and they are spatially confined (e.g., they occur in an area of 
the brain, and not across the whole brain, let alone body). This is a compelling 
critique. However, it does not address the way in which scale-free dynamics are 
“unbounded.” The way in which scale-free dynamics are unbounded concerns the 
inability of single, bounded values to characterize the phenomenon. A time series 
(Figure 5) need not be infinite nor recorded from an event that has no spatial 
location in order to be scale free. A scale-free time series exhibits the same 
pattern among windows of various lengths of time. For example, if a heartbeat 
shows a pattern of activity over 60 minutes, then, to be considered scale-free, that 
same pattern should be shown in each of two 30 minute windows of time, at each 
of four 15 minute windows, and so on. In that way, the time series is not properly 
understood as “bounded” in that there is no single length of time that 
characterizes the entire signal. That is to say, it is not correct to treat the event as a 
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bounded 60 minute event, or a 30 minute event, and so on; but in terms of the 
structure of the patterns across various scales. It is in that sense that Marom 
argues that neuronal dynamics do not have timescales, and it is in that sense that 
they are unbounded, and, thus, not properly explained mechanistically. 
 
Figure 5. Fractal time series exhibiting scale-free structure at various windows of 
time. (Reproduced with permission from Armentano et al., 2017. CC BY 3.0.) 
 
4. Conclusion 
It is highly unlikely to find disagreement among the scientific research 
community at large that technological advancements have paved the way for 
some of the greatest advances and discoveries. What is less often 
acknowledged—especially in neuroscience—is the necessity of coevolving our 
mathematical tools with technological advances, and vice versa. Consequently, 
technological advancements that produce more detailed and accurate data 
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -312-
 18 
recording will not alone necessarily provide proper explanations of biological 
phenomena. Mathematical tools like those provided by NDST are needed as well 
in order to properly characterize data. The Hodgkin-Huxley model was informed 
and constrained by the available technological (i.e., voltage clamp) and 
mathematical (i.e., Brunsviga 20 calculator) tools of the time. Since then, more 
advanced technology (e.g., multielectrode arrays) and mathematics (e.g., fractal 
analysis) have highlighted some of the shortcoming of the Hodgkin-Huxley model 
as a comprehensive model of action potentials across temporal scales. Scale-free 
neuronal activity provides a rich example of this. In order to identify scale-free 
activity, researchers needed more accurate measurements, data analyses, and—in 
this case—new concepts altogether. In order to properly account for scale-free 
activity, a new concept—namely, fractals and the fractal dimension—was needed, 
as was accompanying innovative mathematical analyses. One consequence of the 
existence of scale-free neuronal activity discussed here involves the limitations of 
mechanistic explanations to account for phenomena that are without discrete 
temporal boundaries. In sum, an attempt has been made here to demonstrate that it 
takes two to make progress in neuroscience, namely, both technological and 
mathematical advancements. 
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This paper presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between
default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is
based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement
over causes and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier
arguments for defaults.
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A number of authors have argued for incorporating a distinction between default
and deviant states into the formalism of causal models.1 A central motivation for this
has been the Problem of Isomorphism (Hall (2007); Halpern and Hitchcock (2015)). This
problem arises from pairs of target systems that supposedly have isomorphic causal
models but give rise to different judgements of actual causation. The idea is that the
different judgements are explained by assumptions about particular values that variables
typically or normally take on. These assumptions are taken to be captured by the
default/deviant distinction.
However, more recently Blanchard and Schaffer (2017) have argued that key instances
of the problem can be solved by revising one of the involved models such that it gives a
more appropriate representation of the corresponding target system. They also suggest
a generalization of this strategy, which I shall call the adjust-the-model argument. They
argue that, when confronted with an instance of the Problem of Isomorphism, we should
suspect that at least one of the involved models is not an appropriate representation of
its target system. They also argue that defaults "come close to a free parameter in an
otherwise so precise and objectively constrained formalism, which basically gives the
theorist leeway to hand-write the result she wants" (192). Thus, according to them, the
default/deviant distinction does more damage than good to the formalism of causal
models.
In this paper I shall provide a more nuanced account of the benefits of the de-
fault/deviant distinction. I shall grant that Blanchard and Schaffer’s criticism of defaults
as a solution to the Problem of Isomorphism is right. However, there is another problem
that is far less prominent: the Problem of Disagreement. I will show that this problem
gives rise to a genuinely new argument for incorporating the default/deviant distinction.
The Problem of Disagreement has been introduced by Halpern and Hitchcock (2015).
It arises from cases where agents disagree in their causal judgement even though
they make the same assumptions about the underlying causal model. The Problem
of Isomorphism is related to well-known examples of disagreement over what is ’the
1In the following the term ’causal model’ will refer to standard causal models (models without defaults),
as introduced by Pearl (2000). Models with defaults will be called ’extended causal models’ as introduced by
Halpern and Hitchcock (2015).
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cause’ of a given effect as discussed, for example, by van Fraassen (1980). The main
difference is that the Problem of Disagreement involves the explicit assumption that
the disagreeing agents base their causal claims on the same underlying causal model.
Halpern and Hitchcock take this to indicate that the agents’ causal judgements depend
not only on assumptions about causal structure but also on a distinction between default
and deviant behaviour.
I will show that this argument allows two readings. First, it can be read as involving
descriptive claims about how agents do reason about causal models in contexts where
they disagree. This reading seems to be vulnerable to a version of Blanchard and
Schaffer’s adjust-the-model argument. If two agents disagree about judgements of
actual causation, we should expect that these agents also disagree about the underlying
causal model. Second, the argument can be read as involving prescriptive claims about
how agents should reason about causes when they disagree. Here the adjust-the-model
argument does not apply. I will argue that it would be wrong to require that the
agents support their conflicting causal judgements with different models. Instead, I
will argue, causal models should be understood as a representative tool that helps
express causal claims that go beyond causal judgements that are based on potentially
idiosyncratic normative presumptions. If understood in this way, they can help resolve
disagreement over causes by giving a framework for disentangling normative and
epistemic dimensions of disagreement. And this function can only be fulfilled if models
incorporate the default/deviant distinction. I will illustrate this claim with an example
that concerns the causal role of Search and Rescue missions in the Central Mediterranen
with regard to increasing numbers of deaths through shipwreck in 2015 and 2016.
In section 1 I introduce Blanchard and Schaffer’s arguments against defaults. In
section 2 I introduce the Problem of Disagreement and I point out that Halpern and
Hitchcock’s way of employing it as an argument for defaults is vulnerable to a version of
Blanchard and Schaffer’s criticism. In section 3 I raise the question what the function of
extended causal models should be in instances of disagreement. Based on the example of
Search and Rescue Missions (section 4) I argue that defaults help us clarify disagreement
over causes (section 5).
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1 The Adjust-the-Model Argument
Blanchard and Schaffer put forward three main lines of criticism against incorporating
the default/deviant distinction. First, the default/deviant distinction is unnecessary.
Instances of the Problem of Isomorphism arise only because one of the involved models
does not provide an appropriate representation of the underlying target system. Instead
of incorporating the default/deviant distinction, we should adjust the models, adhering
to generally accepted aptness constraints. These aptness constraints are rules for selecting
a set of variables V that constitutes the causal model and in the following we shall focus
on the rule that "variables should not be allotted values that we are not willing to take
seriously" (182). Blanchard and Schaffer take this aptness constraint to help us deal with
cases like the gardener/queen example: some flowers would not have died if either the
gardener or the Queen of England had watered them and it needs to be explained why
we tend to identify only the gardener as an actual cause.2
"It is because we are willing to indulge in the fantasy of the gardener watering
the flowers [...], but just can’t imagine the queen stooping to the job, that
we feel an asymmetry. If so then [the constraint to represent only serious
possibilities]—which does independent work—was all we needed to explain
the gardener/queen asymmetry. There is no apt causal model in which
wiggling whether the queen waters the flowers wiggles the fate of the flowers,
because there is no apt causal model that considers so ridiculous a scenario
as the queen of England popping by, watering can in hand, to engage in
random acts of gardening" (197).
Figure 1A gives a representation of the gardener/queen case that Blanchard and
Schaffer consider to be problematic. They argue that this is not an apt model because
Q = 1 represents a scenario that we are not willing to take seriously. Thus, they suggest
eliminating variable Q, which leads to the simpler model in figure 1B, which reproduces
the plausible verdict that only the gardener is an actual cause of the flowers’ death.
2In the gardener/queen case the problem arises from a symmetry that is internal to the model, not from
two causal models that have isomorphic structure.
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Figure 1: The flowers survive if they are watered by the gardener or by the queen.
Second, Blanchard and Schaffer argue that the default/deviant distinction involves
unclarities. Most proponents of defaults relate them to an underlying theory of typicality
or normality that involves a range of possibly conflicting standards. Blanchard and
Schaffer worry that the unclarity associated with these notions spoils the otherwise
precise theoretical framework of causal models.
Third, Blanchard and Schaffer criticise that incorporating the default/deviant distinc-
tion is psychologically implausible. Proponents of defaults assume that the judgements
evoked by thought experiments like the gardener/queen case reflect judgements that
arise from the competent use of a norm-laden notion of actual causation. Instead, accord-
ing to Blanchard and Schaffer, the fact that causal reasoners ascribe a higher relevance to
norm-violating factors or agents is to be explained by norm-related biases that interfere
with the correct use of a norm-free notion of actual cause.
There is an important tension between the first line of criticism and the other two.
Suppose I am a proponent of the idiosyncratic (and potentially biased) view that the
queen is in charge of watering the flowers and that the gardener is not supposed to
water them. According to the adjust-the-model strategy, I am supposed to represent
only those scenarios that I take to be serious possibilities. Thus, I will provide a model
in which variable Q is the only cause of variable F. But this is a problem. Because now
my idiosyncratic view does not only spoil my judgements of actual causation, but also
the corresponding causal model!
The underlying point is this. Blanchard and Schaffer argue that the default/deviant
distinction is unclear and reflects biases. But they also suggest to solve cases like the
gardener/queen example by adjusting the models on the basis of considerations about
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what scenarios are to be taken seriously. But what is a scenario that is to be taken
seriously? Presumably this depends on ideas regarding normality that are similar to
those affecting the defaults—otherwise it would be easy to generate counterexamples
to the strategy. But this means that the constraint on models is no less unclear. In fact,
exploiting constraints on V makes the problem even worse. For now the unclarities are
not confined to the defaults but they infect the whole model. My argument in this paper
is that there are situations where normality considerations should not affect the choice
of variables in V . If there are unclarities, then defaults are a better place for them.
2 The Problem of Disagreement
Consider a version of the gardener/queen case provided by Halpern and Hitchcock
(2015):
"while a homeowner is on a vacation, the weather is hot and dry, her next-
door neighbour does not water her flowers, and the flowers die. Had the
weather been different, or had her next-door neighbour watered the flowers,
they would not have died" (414f).
Halpern and Hitchcock argue that since the flowers’ death depends on both the weather
and the neighbour’s omission it seems like a counterfactual theory of causation cannot
distinguish between these factors. Yet, according to some authors (e.g. Moore (2009)) the
weather is a cause of the flowers’ death but not the neighbour’s omission to water them
because omissions generally cannot be considered to be causes. Halpern and Hitchcock
flag this as the "problem of isomorphism." But, according to them, there is "an even
deeper problem. There is actually a range of different opinions in the literature about
whether to count the neighbour’s negligence as an actual cause of the flowers’ death
[...]. Prima facie, it does not seem that any theory of actual causation can respect all
of these judgments without lapsing into inconsistency" (415). This is the Problem of
Disagreement.
The Problem of Disagreement arises where the following two conditions hold. First,
there are two (or more) agents that have conflicting judgements of actual causation with
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regard to the same target system. For example, theorists like Moore argue that only the
weather is an actual cause because they think that omissions cannot be actual causes.
They disagree with theorists like Lewis (2000) who think that the neighbour’s negligence
is also an actual cause, because they think that omissions are genuine causes. Second, it
has to be the case that the opposing agents agree on the underlying causal model. In the
flower case Halpern and Hitchcock take this to be a model with a graph like the one in
figure 1A, and a structural equation such that the flowers die if the weather is hot and
the neighbour fails to water them: D = H ∧ ¬W.
What exactly do the agents disagree about in such cases? According to Halpern and
Hitchcock, the disagreement concerns the actual cause of the outcome. But wouldn’t
this imply an implausible metaphysical view according to which actual causation is
subjective? Halpern and Hitchcock admit that actual causation is a subjective and context-
dependent notion that is to be distinguished from an underlying and objective notion of
causal structure. Yet such a notion has an important function because it indicates targets
of intervention that are particularly suited from the pragmatic perspective of the agent
(Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009).
Let us see how Halpern and Hitchcock account for this case of disagreement. The
idea is that the default/deviant distinction gives rise to a normality ordering over the
worlds that can be represented by the model. Actual causes are those factors that fulfil
the Halpern-Pearl (2005) definition of actual causation plus a normality criterion. The
normality criterion requires that the possible world that is needed to show that the effect
depends on the cause be at least as normal as the actual world. Halpern and Hitchcock
argue that "[t]hose who maintain that omissions are never causes can be understood as
having a normality ranking where absences or omissions are more typical than positive
events" and Halpern and Hitchcock take this to reflect "a certain metaphysical view:
there is a fundamental distinction between positive events and mere absences, and in
the context of causal attribution, absences are always considered typical for candidate
causes" (437f). This assumption of typicality gives rise to the judgement that the only
actual cause of the flowers’ death is the weather.
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An advocate of the view that omissions are always causes can be understood as
subscribing to an alternative normality ordering. Here the worlds in which the flowers
do not die are equally normal and they are taken to be at least as normal as the world
where the flowers die. Consequently, both the weather and the neighbour’s negligence
fulfil the normality criterion and qualify as actual causes of the flowers’ death.
There are two problems with this reconstruction of the disagreement. First, it seems
implausible that Moore would agree that absences are generally more normal than
positive events. In fact, according to each of the many dimensions of normality, there
seem to be clear counterexamples. Living humans more frequently breathe than not,
functional smoke detectors remain silent (unless there is smoke), we are legally and
morally required to help those whose lives are in danger. The kind of metaphysical
point that Beebee and Moore make with regard to the causal status of omissions is
independent of claims regarding the normality of omissions. Thus, it seems Halpern
and Hitchcock have chosen an example where defaults do not do the explanatory work
that they expect them to do.
Second, suppose for the sake of the argument that there is an agent who believes
that absences are always considered typical and, thus, never can be causes. Moreover,
suppose that the agent complies to the constraint that causal models should only
represent scenarios that are to be taken seriously. According to the agent’s beliefs, it is a
very far-fetched possibility that omissions like the one of the neighbour are causes. Thus,
the rules of appropriate modelling command that she leave out the variable representing
the neighbour’s negligence. But if this is the case, then this agent disagrees with the
proponent of absences as causes already at the level of the standard causal models.
So, if we take the Problem of Disagreement to give rise to an argument for defaults,
it seems like this argument faces the same difficulties as the argument from the Problem
of Isomorphism. In particular, there is not really a problem in the first place if we choose
what seem to be the most plausible representations of the agents’ beliefs. The claim that
there are agents who disagree about actual causes but agree on the underlying causal
model seems to involve implausible empirical assumptions about the involved agents’
sets of believes.
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3 What is the Function of Extended Causal Models?
In the remainder of the paper I will argue that there is an alternative reading of the
Problem of Disagreement that involves prescriptive claims about how disagreeing agents
should use extended causal models. I will argue that the alternative reading shows that
in some cases the default/deviant distinction is a useful extension.
What is the function of extended causal models? Halpern and Hitchcock "envision
a kind of conceptual division of labour where the causal model [...] represents the
objective patterns of dependence that could in principle be tested by intervening on the
system, and [the normality ordering] represents the various normative and contextual
factors that also influence judgments of actual causation" (2015, 435). So, it looks like
causal reasoning involves considerations that are located at two distinct levels. First,
there is the level of standard causal models. These represent the objective patterns of
counterfactual dependence. Second, there is the level of judgements of actual causation.
These judgements are influenced by the normality ordering which reflects normative
and contextual considerations.
However, the conceptual division of labour does not seem to work as straightfor-
wardly. First, objectivity on the level of standard causal models means that "once a
suitable set of variables has been chosen, there is an objectively correct set of structural
equations among those variables" (431f). Thus, the causal model itself is not objective.
For the choice of the set of variables (and their possible values) is likely to be governed
by criteria that are sensitive to normative and contextual factors as well (such as in
Blanchard and Schaffer’s treatment of the gardener/queen case). Second, even the
judgements of actual causation need to have some objective core. Otherwise they could
hardly help us "identify appropriate targets of corrective intervention" (432).
If causal models (plus information about the variables’ actual values) and claims
of actual causation are so similar, couldn’t we just make do with one of them? No.
Claims of actual causation are highly selective. And this has the advantage that they
can guide agency very straightforwardly by indicating the best targets of intervention.
Presumably, causal models are somewhat closer to the objective structure because
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they allow representing larger chunks of it. They express complex counterfactual
dependencies that are not captured by a simple claim of the form ’X = x is an actual
cause of Y = y.’ These larger chunks still depend upon norms, but do so to a lesser
degree, for selection does not have to be constrained so narrowly.
In the following we shall see that the Problem of Disagreement helps to indicate one
distinctive advantage of causal models, understood along these lines: they can help us
provide a representation of disagreement of causes that is more conducive to resolving
the disagreement than the bare claims of actual causation. Moreover, I shall argue that
this function is sometimes (but not always) crucially facilitated by incorporating the
default/deviant distinction.
4 An Example: Search and Rescue Missions
According to Frontex,3 the European Border Control Agency, Non-governmental Search
and Rescue missions (NGO SARs) are an actual cause of the increase of the number of
deaths in the Central Mediterranean in the period from 2015 to 2016. On the other hand,
it has been argued that NGO SARs are only one factor acting within a complex causal
structure, and that it is erroneous to describe NGO SARs as the cause of the increase.
I will look at a study performed by Forensic Oceanography4 and show that the most
natural way to understand their criticism of Frontex’s claim is to see it as an attack on
Frontex’s assumptions about the causal model.
Let us begin with a closer look at the claims put forward in the Frontex report. The
report describes an increase of the number of deaths of refugees and states that
"it transpired that both border surveillance and SAR missions close to, or
within, the 12-mile territorial waters of Libya have unintended consequences.
Namely, they influence smugglers’ planning and act as a pull factor that
compounds the difficulties inherent in border control and saving lives at sea.
Dangerous crossings on unseaworthy and overloaded vessels were organised
3The following is based on the risk analysis report for 2017 (FRONTEX (2017)).
4Forensic Oceanography is part of the Forensic Architecture agency located at Goldsmiths, University of
London.
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with the main purpose of being detected by EUNAVFOR Med/Frontex and
NGO vessels. Apparently, all parties involved in SAR operations in the
Central Mediterranean unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives
at minimum cost, strengthen their business model by increasing the chances
of success. Migrants and refugees – encouraged by the stories of those who
had successfully made it in the past – attempt the dangerous crossing since
they are aware of and rely on humanitarian assistance to reach the EU"
(FRONTEX, 2017, 32).
Thus, the presence of SARs (both NGO and state-led operations) near the Libyan
coastline is said to give a sense of security that encourages migrants and refugees to risk
their lives. This has two effects. First, smugglers can offer crossings that are more risky.
Second, there is an overall increase in attempted crossings.
The report also states that "[c]losely related issues are the safety of migrants and
refugees and, most significantly, the increasing number of fatalities" (32). After reporting
estimates of the fatalities in 2016 the report states that "[t]he increasing number of migrant
deaths, despite the enhanced EUNAVFOR Med/Frontex surveillance and NGO rescue
efforts, seems paradoxical at first glance" (33). But then the report relates the increase of
fatalities to a change in the smugglers’ tactics: "[t]he rising death toll mainly results from
criminal activities aimed at making profit through the provision of smuggling services
at any cost" (33).
It seems fair to assume that the above quoted passages can be summarized by the
causal model displayed in figure 2A. In the model S represents the presence of SARs,
C is a factor that represents the risk level of the individual crossing and the number
of attempted crossings, and D represents the number of deaths. It is claimed that an
increase in S leads to an increase in C, that an increase in C leads to an increase in D,
and that an increase in S also leads to a direct decrease in D. The narrative does not
allow a more detailed quantification of these functional relations. But there is a possible
reading of the narrative according to which the increase of deaths via the route 〈S, C, D〉
is larger than the decrease via the route 〈S, D〉.
The Forensic Oceanography report (Heller and Pezzani, 2017) identifies the pull-
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Figure 2: A simple model of the "pull-factor" narrative. A: Frontex. B: Forensic Oceanography.
factor claim as part of a toxic narrative within a "de-legitimisation and criminalisation
campaign" directed at non-governmental search and rescue missions. The aim of the
report is an empirical assessment of the claims put forward by Frontex. The report
can be understood as challenging the structural relation between S and C as stated
by Frontex and adding a variable X that feeds into C and that explains the increase
in risk level and number of attempted crossings from 2015 to 2016. Relevant factors,
among others, are the availability of seaworthy vessels, involvement of Libyan militia
and Libyan Coast Guard.
The Forensic Oceanography report also describes non-governmental search and
rescue missions as a continuation or replacement of preceding state-led search and
rescue missions. In particular, the report claims that "[a]iming to deter migrants from
crossing the Mediterranean, the EU and its member states pulled back from rescue
at sea at the end of 2014, leading to record numbers of deaths. Non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) were forced to deploy their own rescue missions in a desperate
attempt to fill this gap and reduce casualties." That is, whereas the Frontex report
suggests that there is a new kind of search and rescue missions that explains the increase,
the Forensic Oceonography report describes the presence of search and rescue activity
in the Mediterranean as a default condition.
5 The Role of Defaults
The disagreement between the Frontex report and the Forensic Oceanography report
concerns the question whether the presence of SARs led to an increase in the number of
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deaths. The underlying question is: why are refugees willing to risk their lives? The
presence of SARs (and stories about how they guarantee safety on sea) is considered to
be one factor. However, there are at least three further kinds of factors: (i) the situation in
the home country, (ii) the hope for a better life in the EU, (iii) the absence of alternative
pathways into the EU (legal pathways, or simply pathways that are not as risky).
Suppose each of these factors corresponds to a variable in a causal model such that a
variable describing the willingness of refugees to risk their lives depends upon these
variables. The disagreement about the causal role of SARs involves agents that have
opposing views about which of these variables represent possible scenarios that are
to be taken seriously—for functional, legal, and moral reasons. For example, there is
disagreement about the moral and legal feasibility of cutting back life-saving missions
on sea.
How should this disagreement be represented? One way would be to require that
the involved agents agree on a set of variables V by including all variables that are at
stake in the debate and represent their disagreement on the level of the default/deviant
distinction. From a humanitarian perspective, for example, life-saving missions would
be the moral and legal default state. By contrast, certain opposing agents might want to
describe the absence of SARs as the default state. But both kinds of agents would be
required to include a variable representing SARs.
Alternatively, one could require the views to be expressed by different standard
causal models that reflect the individual views about what scenarios are to be taken
seriously. This is what is suggested by the adjust-the-model strategy. The advantage is
that such models do not incorporate the default/deviant distinction, which is considered
unclear. The disadvantage, however, is that now the unclarity occurs in a disagreement
about which scenarios are to be represented by the model in the first place.
The problem with this strategy is that it leaves unclear whether agents disagree for
normative or for epistemic reasons. Suppose agent A1 does not include a particular
variable X in her standard causal model even though agent A2 thinks that X is a cause
of Y. Does agent A1 mean to say that a change in X would merely amount to a scenario
that is not to be taken seriously? Or does agent A1 mean to imply that a change in
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X would not make a difference to Y? Extended causal models fare better in this kind
of context. They provide the formal resources that help the involved agents to point
out where disagreement arises for normative reasons and where it arises for epistemic
reasons. Agent A1 would be required to include X into the model and clarify whether
she takes Y to be independent of X or merely considers X to represent scenarios that
from her particular point of view are highly abnormal.
This is particularly important in cases where it is likely that disagreement arises not
only about norms but also about the underlying counterfactual dependencies. The core
of Frontex’s pull factor claim is the counterfactual dependency of C on S. This claim
is difficult to assess directly. It involves non-trivial assumptions about the refugee’s
dispositions to risk their lives. It is also difficult to assess in an interventionist fashion.
For performing testing interventions on the target system is unfeasible in practice.
Instead Frontex supports the pull-factor claim by a comparison of the risk levels in 2015
and 2016 and relates this to an increase of the NGO SAR activity over this period. But
this argument is valid only if all other potential causes for an increased risk level remain
constant over this period. In Frontex’s selective causal model it looks like this is the case.
A more encompassing model such as the one provided by the Forensic Oceanography
report, however, suggests that Frontex’s claims are unwarranted. In order to warrant the
pull-factor claim in the context of such a more encompassing model the Frontex report
would have to show that the influence of these other factors is irrelevant.
6 Conclusion
The adjust-the-model strategy gives rise to a powerful objection to existing arguments for
defaults that are based on the Problem of Isomorphism and the Problem of Disagreement.
In this paper I have suggested a prescriptive reading of the Problem of Disagreement that
provides a new argument for defaults that is not undermined by the adjust-the-model
strategy. In cases of disagreement extended causal models should represent assumptions
about the underlying causal structure that are shared by the involved agents, while the
defaults should account for the normative disagreement. This helps keeping normative
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disagreement apart from disagreement about the underlying counterfactual structure.
References
Blanchard, Thomas and Schaffer, Jonathan. Cause without default. In Helen Beebee,
Huw Price, Christopher Hitchcock, editor, Making a Difference, pages 175–214. Oxford
University Press, 2017.
FRONTEX. Risk analysis for 2017, 02 2017. URL ❤tt♣✿✴✴❢r♦♥t❡①✳❡✉r♦♣❛✳❡✉✴❛ss❡ts✴
P✉❜❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s✴❘✐s❦❴❆♥❛❧②s✐s✴❆♥♥✉❛❧❴❘✐s❦❴❆♥❛❧②s✐s❴✷✵✶✼✳♣❞❢.
Hall, Ned. Structural equations and causation. Philosophical Studies, 132:109–136, 2007.
Halpern, Joseph Y. and Hitchcock, Christopher. Graded causation and defaults. The
British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 66:413–457, 2015.
Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea. Causes and explanations: A structural-model
approach. Part I: Causes. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(4):843–887,
2005.
Heller, Charles and Pezzani, Lorenzo. Blaming the rescuers, 06 2017. URL ❤tt♣s✿
✴✴❜❧❛♠✐♥❣t❤❡r❡s❝✉❡rs✳♦r❣✴.
Hitchcock, Christopher and Knobe, Joshua. Cause and norm. The Journal of Philosophy,
106(11):587–612, 2009.
Lewis, David. Causation as influence. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(4):182–197, 2000.
Moore, Michael. Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics.
Oxford University Press, 2009.
Pearl, Judea. Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press,
2000.
van Fraassen, Bas C. The Scientic Image. Oxford University Press, 1980.
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -332-
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2020 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
	
Title: Edmond Goblot’s (1858-1935) Selected Effects Theory of Function: A Reappraisal 
 
Author: Justin Garson 
 
Abstract: At the beginning of the twentieth century, the French philosopher of science 
Edmond Goblot wrote three prescient papers on function and teleology. He advanced the 
remarkable thesis that functions are, as a matter of conceptual analysis, selected effects. 
He also argued that “selection” must be understood broadly to include both evolutionary 
natural selection and intelligent design. Here, I do three things. First, I give an overview 
of Goblot’s thought. Second, I identify his core thesis about function. Third, I argue that, 
despite its ingenuity, Goblot’s expansive construal of “function” cannot be right. Still, 
Goblot deserves (long-overdue) credit for his work.  
 
Keywords: Philosophy of biology; Edmond Goblot; biological function; selected effects 
 
Address: Department of Philosophy, Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City 




Acknowledgements: I wish to thank the participants of the workshop, “The Concept of 
Function in Biology: New Philosophical Perspectives,” held at UQAM on October 4, 
2019, including Brandon Conley, Antoine Dussault, Christophe Malaterre, and Parisa 
Moosavi. I particularly wish to thank the organizers, Antoine Dussault and Christophe 
Malaterre, for their extremely valuable feedback. I’m also grateful to Sarah Arnaud and 
Dan Dennett for their comments on an earlier draft.   
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -333-
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2020 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 




According to the selected effects theory of function, a biological trait’s function is, very 
roughly, whatever it was selected for by natural selection (or some comparable selection 
process). The function of the butterfly’s eyespots is to deflect attack away from vital 
organs because that’s what they were selected for. A chief virtue of the selected effects 
theory is that it makes sense of how function statements can work as teleological 
explanations – which is implicit in at least some strands of biological usage. If functions 
are selected effects, then when we attribute a function to a trait (say, deflection of attack 
to eyespots) we are quite literally offering an explanation for why that trait exists. No 
other account of function – perhaps with the exception of the “organizational theory” – 
even purports to make sense of this feature of biological usage.  
 
A consensus among philosophers of biology is that the selected effects theory was first 
formulated independently by Neander (1983) and Millikan (1984), though perhaps earlier 
work such as Wright (1973), Wimsatt (1972) and Ruse (1971), gestured in that direction. 
One goal of this paper is to challenge that consensus. The forgotten French philosopher 
of science, Edmond Goblot (1858-1935), should be credited with formulating the theory, 
or at least an early incarnation of it. In a series of papers, Goblot (1899; 1900; 1903) 
argued, quite rigorously and explicitly, first, that function statements are teleological 
explanations, and second, that function statements can be teleological explanations only 
if functions are selected effects. My goal is not in any way to undermine the originality 
and insight of Neander, Millikan and their followers. It is rather to ensure that Goblot 
receives long-overdue credit for his prescient discovery.  
 
But this paper does not simply have the goal of insisting that Goblot receive some 
intellectual credit. That fact alone would be worthy of an extended footnote in a 
philosophy of biology textbook, and not a whole paper. Goblot, however, did much more 
than that. He articulated a very distinctive (even by today’s standards) version of the 
selected effects theory. For Goblot, “selection” was much more inclusive than 
evolutionary natural selection. It was even more inclusive than the abstract notion of 
“differential reproduction,” or “differential retention,” as some would have it. For Goblot, 
“selection” refers to a very general process wherein one possibility is realized, to the 
exclusion of another, by virtue of an apparent advantage. For Goblot, evolutionary 
natural selection, and intelligent design, are two subtypes of this abstractly-specified 
process.  
 
Moreover, Goblot seemed to think that this claim – that functions are selected effects 
(when “selection” is broadly construed) – is a conceptual analysis of both lay and 
scientific use of “function.” If Goblot were right, that would be game-changing even by 
today’s standards. For it would imply that the selected effects theory, properly grasped, 
embraces both biological and artifact functions, scientific and lay usage, modern and 
ancient usage. This expansive construal of the selected effects theory deserves serious 
consideration.  
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To be fair, some philosophers of biology have flirted with expanding the selected effects 
theory to be more inclusive, that is, to allow processes other than evolutionary natural 
selection to produce new functions. These thinkers include Millikan (1984) herself, 
Papineau (1984), Godfrey-Smith (1992), Griffiths (1993), Kitcher (1993), and Garson 
(2011). Dennett (1969), Wimsatt (1972), and Wright (1973) also gestured toward the 
possibility of such an all-encompassing theory. Goblot, however, is unique in that he 
joined two ideas that nobody else joined: First, he attempted to specify, rigorously and 
precisely, the nature of this general process of which natural selection and intelligent 
design are subtypes. Second, he posited that this fact, that functions are selected effects – 
when selection is understood in this expansive way – is part of a correct conceptual 
analysis of “function.” This is a new thing.  
 
Unfortunately, it seems to me that, while there’s something right about Goblot’s 
expansive way of thinking about functions, his particular construal of function cannot be 
right. That’s because there’s no single kind of process in the world of which natural 
selection and intelligent design are subtypes. The illusion that there is a single kind of 
process in nature arises from a hidden equivocation in the very idea of “selection for an 
advantage.” As I’ll show, one sense of the phrase points to human choice; the other to 
evolutionary natural selection; these – as Darwin himself recognized – cannot be fused in 
any non-metaphorical way. Though Goblot’s attempt fails, it’s a quite noble sort of 
failure, one that still demands a serious philosophical reckoning.  
 
 
2. Goblot’s Basic Account of Function and Teleology 
 
Goblot wrote two major papers on the topic of function and teleology, “Fonction et 
Finalité” of 1899 and “La Finalité Sans Intelligence” of 1900.1 Crucially, Goblot intended 
the two papers to be read as a continuous whole. This can be seen from the fact that the 
purpose of the first paper is to raise a general problem about biological functions, and the 
purpose of the second paper is to solve that problem. In fact, the first paper actually ends 
with the parenthetical remark “A suivre” – “to be continued.” This is important for us, 
because it helps us to see that the two papers are intended to be read as one long 
meditation on functions.  
 
Though the two papers are meant to be read as one, each pursues a distinct question and 
offers a distinct thesis. The first paper, “Fonction et Finalité,” argues that function 
statements are teleological explanations. When we say, for example, “the function of the 
eyespots on butterfly wings is to deter attacks away from vital organs,” we are, in 
ordinary biological discourse, trying to explain why butterfly wings have eyespots. The 
second paper, “La Finalité Sans Intelligence,” argues that teleological explanations are 
grounded (in a way to be determined) by evolutionary natural selection. Hence, on the 
surface, his position seems nearly identical to that which Larry Wright developed in 
	
1 A third paper, his “La Finalité en Biologie” of 1903, is a commentary on other works 
and will not be discussed here. 
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1973: function statements are teleological explanations (a trait has a function if the trait 
“is there because” it serves the function), and one way that a trait can have a function is if 
it was shaped by natural selection for the effect in question.  
 
As we will see, however, Goblot goes much further by arguing that functions are just 
selected effects, where selection must be construed broadly enough to include both 
evolutionary natural selection and intelligent design.2 Before diving deeply into Goblot’s 
analysis, I’ll turn to the text to draw out Goblot’s own presentation of these two theses. 
Any further analysis we conduct must be based squarely on Goblot’s own words.  
 
His first paper argues that the function of a trait is not just any useful effect it happens to 
have. Rather, a trait’s function is the effect that the trait (in some sense) was made for. 
It’s an effect that plays into an explanation of the trait itself. He begins his analysis by 
pointing out that functions, in the ordinary biological sense of the term, are peculiar and 
worthy of serious philosophical reflection: 
 
Of the properties of cells, tissues, and organs, some are, and others are not, 
functions. Sometimes scientists intentionally use this word function; sometimes on 
the contrary they take care to avoid it; the definition is difficult, but the use is not 
at all arbitrary (1899, 495).3 
 
He then argues that, in ordinary biology, we only call something a “function” when we 
think that the effect in question is somehow part of an explanation for the trait’s 
existence: 
 
The blood cell fixes atmospheric oxygen; it also fixes carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen dioxide…Of these three chemical properties, only the first one is a 
function; and the only reason that one calls it that, is that the cell is made to draw, 
in its passage in the lungs, atmospheric oxygen…If the cell also fixes other gases, 
these properties are not functions, for it is not made for that (1899, 497-8; 
emphasis in original).  
 
The problem, of course, is that it is very difficult to see how an effect of a trait can be part 
of the explanation for that very trait, unless we are invoking some sort of supernatural 
principle, such as divine intervention or a mysterious vital force: 
 
	
2 One might think that this is precisely what Wright (1973) was saying, particularly 
because of his suggestive comments on pages 162-4 about the similarity of the concept of 
selection in natural selection and in intelligent design. One would be mistaken, for 
reasons to be discussed in Section 4. Wright did not think that functions were selected 
effects, regardless of whether “selection” is construed narrowly or broadly. This was, of 
course, a major point of Neander’s (1983) and Millikan’s (1984) critiques. See Garson 
(2016, Chp. 3) for more on the relevant historical background.  
3 All translations from the French are my own.  
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Certain physiologists seem to have a sort of distrust for this idea of finality, 
which, despite them, can be found in all parts of their science. They dare not look 
at it directly; finality seems unknowable; for them, it is an anti-scientific, and 
almost mystical, idea (1899, 499).  
 
Nonetheless, teleology is such a critical part of physiology itself that if we eliminate 
teleology, we eliminate physiology, too:  
 
Does there exist, in the facts, a teleological order? Put differently, is physiology 
possible?...The existence of a teleological order is the postulate of the science of 
life…The physiologist must therefore assume the reality of a teleological order, as 
the physicist assumes the reality of a constant and necessary order (1899, 504-5).  
 
That is the puzzle that his paper ends with: teleology seems both impossible and 
necessary.  
 
The purpose of his next paper, “La Finalité Sans Intelligence,” is, as the title indicates, to 
point the way to a solution. If, in the past, a trait was shaped by evolutionary natural 
selection for a certain effect, then that trait exists now precisely because of that effect. If 
the flower’s nectar glands were selected for attracting insects, then we can rightfully say, 
now, that the nectar glands exist (that is, one reason flowers have nectar glands) because 
they attract insects. When selection is present, a trait’s effect can be cited as part of an 
explanation for its existence, without appealing to theism or vitalism.  
 
But if it happens that an individual character is an advantage, natural selection 
will make of it a species character, and that because it is an advantage. Hence 
again there is finality, but finality without intelligence…It is easy to see that these 
examples [e.g., “the function of nectar glands in flowers is to attract insects”] 
answer to the definition of finality, for the consequent is the raison d’être of the 
antecedents. Cross-fertilization exists because it causes greater fecundity; nectar 
glands, large or brilliant corollas, perfumes exist because they have the effect of 
attracting insects...It would not be exact to say that the effect is here the cause of 
its cause, but it is true to say that it is the reason for it; the existence of the cause 
is explained by the effects that it produces (1900, 402-3).  
 
And later:  
 
[After selection,] the final term [that is, the trait with the function which is now a 
“fixed” species character] no longer has an accidental character, since it is this 
very advantage, which has become a species character. Utility is the origin of 
finality; utility characterizes the initial term, it serves a certain end, but it is not 
made for this end; finality characterizes the final term; it is well made for this 
usage, since it is because of its utility that it became fixed as a species character. 
(1900, 404).  
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In sum, Goblot holds that function statements are teleological explanations, and that 
natural selection can vindicate such explanations, since natural selection shows how a 
trait’s effect can play a role in an explanation of that trait’s existence. As we will see, 
however, Goblot thinks that the relation between function and selection is, in fact, even 
more intimate than this.  
 
 
3. Rethinking Teleology as Selection 
 
What is really innovative about Goblot’s thought, even by today’s standards, is what I 
take to be his core thesis about biological functions, one that is never stated explicitly but 
implied throughout the text.4 I will try to articulate the view as follows: As a matter of 
conceptual analysis, an object has a function when it is the result of an abstract kind of 
selection process. In this selection process, one possibility is realized to the exclusion of 
another on account of something like “the appearance of an advantage [l’apparition d’un 
avantage].” The function of the object is just this advantage. Evolutionary natural 
selection, and intelligent design, are two different subtypes of this abstract process.   
 
My main textual evidence that this was, in fact, Goblot’s view of function, stems from the 
extraordinary closing section of “La Finalité Sans Intelligence.” There, he states that all 
teleology, intelligent or not, somehow involves a selection between possibilities and the 
preferential realization of one over another:  
 
All finality, intelligent or not, is a choice between possibilities…Natural selection 
is the effective trial of all of the possibilities. The one which is the best wins only 
by proof of its superiority. Intelligent finality is more rapid and economical, since 
the possibilities are judged before being tried; or rather, the trials are made ideally 
instead of being carried out. It is also therefore a sort of selection, which operates 
between ideas. The God of Leibniz conceives in thought all of the possible 
worlds; he compares them, judges them, and realizes the best...There is therefore, 
in the divine understanding, competition between the possible worlds and 
selection of the best. Things are no different in our own deliberations. There is a 
competition between the diverse choices we can make, and selection of that which 
is or which seems to us the best. The initial term is always the appearance of an 
advantage; the final term the realization of this advantage. The analogy is 
therefore complete between intelligent and unintelligent finality; only intelligence 
abridges the path and diminishes the effort. Finality, therefore, is not at all the 
characteristic mark and like a seal of intelligence imprinted on its works. 
Intelligent finality is a specific mode of finality in general. (405-6) 
	
4 Bonsack (1976) is the only paper that I’ve encountered that critically engages with 
Goblot’s teleology. His main complaint is that Goblot defines finalité differently in 
different places, and that he introduces inappropriate value notions. I agree with thrust of 
his critique, but I find a unified notion of biological function underlying Goblot’s 
presentation. (I thank Antoine Dussault for drawing Bonsack’s paper to my attention.)  
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In this passage, Goblot leads us through three major areas where teleological statements 
loom large, and shows us that, in each of the three domains, teleology exhibits the same 
fundamental pattern. First, he asks us to consider intelligent design in the creationist 
worldview. Suppose we are willing to agree that some feature of the world is designed by 
God for certain end. We can then ask ourselves: what exactly is God doing when God 
“designs” something? It consists in none other than this: God somehow surveys a vast 
array of possibilities, and chooses to realize one possibility over another because of an 
apparent advantage.  
 
In the lengthy passage cited above, Goblot is quick to point out that the same pattern is 
exemplified in human decision-making. When a person designs something, something 
takes place in her mind that is like a competition between imagined possibilities, and one 
possibility is ultimately realized, over another, because of an apparent advantage.5 
 
Finally, and most importantly, Goblot sees evolutionary natural selection as conforming 
to this basic pattern. Natural selection, he thinks, involves a competition between 
possibilities, wherein one possibility is realized, over another, because of the appearance 
of an advantage. At this juncture, one might suspect that Goblot is playing a semantic 
game with us, or that he is abusing the natural contours of ordinary language. Surely, 
natural selection isn’t a competition between possibilities! To the extent that natural 
selection is a “competition,” it’s a competition between actual organisms (cells, groups) 
and not merely possible ones.  
 
Though natural selection must be seen as a competition between actual, rather than 
possible, beings, for Goblot, natural selection is also, and at the same time, a competition 
between possible species characters. When a new variant arises in a population through a 
genetic mutation – say, the first butterfly with eyespots on its wings – that variant 
represents a possible species character. It is not yet an actual species character; it must 
compete with other variants to earn that title. One thing that natural selection does is that 
it takes a possible species character and transforms it into an actual species character 
because of an advantage it possesses:  
 
But if it happens that an individual character is an advantage, natural selection 
will make of it a species character, and that because it is an advantage. Hence 
again there is finality, but finality without intelligence…(1900, 402) 
 
	
5 Christophe Malaterre has pointed out to me that the French text admits of a different 
interpretation, where “our own deliberations [nos propres délibérations]” refers to an 
interpersonal, rather than intrapersonal, decision-making process. For example, we can 
speak of a committee “deliberating over” various social policies. This interpretation 
would still imply that the kind of function a social policy has is the same kind of thing as 
the kind of function that a biological organ has.  
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -339-
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2020 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
	
It is because of this somewhat unconventional perspective on natural selection that 
Goblot can see it as conforming to the basic pattern of teleology in other domains. 
 
4. Convergence and Divergence 
 
As I noted earlier, Goblot is not the only person to suggest a deep similarity between 
natural selection and intelligent design. Many philosophers have hinted at a deep 
connection, even identity, between the two sorts of things. It is impossible to do justice 
here, in a rather short paper, to the rich similarities and differences between these 
theorists. Here it will have to suffice to say this: nobody, with the exception of Goblot, 
has ever held this convergence of ideas:  
 
(1) Functions are selected effects. 
(2) “Selection” in (1) must be understood very generally to encompass natural 
selection and intelligent design. 
(3) (1), understood in terms of (2), is a conceptual analysis of both ordinary and 
scientific language.  
 
An all-too-brief perusal of the literature will show exactly how and where Goblot departs 
from others. To begin with, Wright (1973) didn’t accept (1), at least not as a conceptual 
analysis. He thought that, as a matter of conceptual analysis, a function of a trait is just an 
effect that explains the trait’s existence. He does discuss the similarity between natural 
selection and intelligent design, and even the idea that they both exemplify, in a very 
abstract way, a kind of “selection process” (see pp. 163-4), but he never identifies 
function, as a matter of conceptual analysis, with this abstract “selection process.” He 
identifies it with what he calls a “consequence-etiology.”  
 
Wimsatt (1972, 13) seemed to accept that, empirically speaking, functions probably 
always involve selection, where “selection” is understood broadly to encompass both 
natural selection and intelligent design: “the operation of selection processes is not only 
not special to biology, but appears to be at the core of teleology and purposeful activity 
wherever they occur.” But he adamantly rejected that this should be understood as a 
conceptual analysis.  
 
Dennett (1969), too, describes a deep analogy between natural selection and learning, and 
even suggests that selection is at the root of teleology itself (64), though he does not 
develop this insight into a theory of “function” per se. In fact, Dennett has pursued this 
analogy throughout much of his work, particularly in his classification of “Darwinian,” 
“Skinnerian,” and “Popperian” creatures (1995), each of which involves the operation of 
different sorts of selection processes.    
 
Millikan (1984) defined functions in terms of a general process involving the differential 
reproduction of one type of entity over another. Her view of “reproduction” is expansive 
enough to include trial-and-error learning and learning by imitation (p. 28). But in her 
view, differential reproduction does not include the process wherein a person creates an 
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artifact for the first time. (The first hammer did not have a history of differential 
reproduction on account of its past success.) Goblot’s view is, therefore, more inclusive 
than hers. Similarly, Papineau (1984,  557-8) states that mental states can undergo natural 
selection within the lifetime of an individual, and thereby acquire (selected effects) 
functions – but not, presumably, the artifacts that are produced by said mental states.  
 
Kitcher (1993), to whom I’ll return in the next section, says that function is “design,” as a 
matter of conceptual analysis, and that natural selection and intelligent design are two 
subtypes of this “design.” Unlike Goblot, however, he does not articulate what “design” 
is supposed to be such that it encompasses both. That is, he never articulates what this 
non-metaphorical form of “design” is supposed to amount to, other than alluding to 
Darwin’s view that natural selection can be seen as a kind of “design without a designer.” 
 
Neander (1991) holds that functions are selected effects, but only in the sense of 
Darwinian natural selection. Hence, her theory of function is only supposed to apply to 
the biological sort of function, and it is only intended as a conceptual analysis of modern 
biological usage. She notes, in passing, the possibility of a theory like Goblot’s, but 
chooses not to develop it in any detail (p. 175).  
 
Griffiths (1993) sketches a theory of artifact function that rests on the idea that artifacts 
come from a kind of “competition” of ideas. But he says explicitly that natural selection 
and artifact design are quite different things and that there is no single concept of 
function that applies to both (p. 421).   
 
5. A Critique 
 
If Goblot were right, that would be a game-changer for contemporary philosophical 
discussion of function and teleology. That is because it would give us a version of the 
selected effects theory that effortlessly captures teleology in every domain in which it 
arises, both natural and conscious, human and divine. It would also, as a conceptual 
analysis, unify both modern and ancient usage, as well as scientific and lay usage. For 
Goblot, by “function,” everybody has always meant selected effect.  
 
Unfortunately, Goblot’s expansive analysis of function simply does not work. The reason 
is that there is no single kind of process in the world, loosely called “selection for an 
advantage,” of which both natural selection and intelligent design are two subtypes. 
There is only a strained analogy. Goblot’s view relies, ultimately, on an unacceptable 
anthropomorphism. 
 
The crux of the matter is this: in the standard selected effects theory, an object’s effect 
becomes that object’s function by virtue of the fact that that sort of object has an actual, 
historical, track record of producing that effect. Having an actual, historical track record 
of producing a given effect is necessary for having a function, in the ordinary selected 
effects sense. Artifacts, however, are not subject to this constraint. As far as artifacts go, 
it is possible for the effect of some artifact to be its function even if that artifact has no 
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actual, historical track record of producing that effect. Neander (1991, 174-5) makes 
precisely this point in enumerating the differences between natural and artifact functions. 
The very first twist corkscrew that was ever invented, back in 1795 by the Reverend 
Samuel Henshall, no doubt had the function of opening wine bottles, even though it had 
no actual historical track record of doing so. True, there may have been a kind of “virtual 
selection process” involved in the production of the first spiral corkscrew, a selection 
process that took place in the Reverend’s mind. But the physical corkscrew, that is, that 
physical type of thing, was not selected because it actually ever opened a wine bottle, 
since it had never done so. It was selected because someone (namely, Henshall), thought, 
or surmised, or believed, or reckoned, or figured, that it would have that advantage. But 
anticipated advantages are not real advantages, any more than imaginary ponies are real 
ponies. To say that all function involves something like “selection for an advantage” 
obliterates that distinction.  
 
Let me put the point somewhat differently: Goblot’s argument involves a fallacy of 
equivocation. In the fallacy of equivocation, two or more premises only seem to support a 
conclusion because of a critical ambiguity in a word or phrase that appears in the 
premises. Goblot, I maintain, is guilty of such an equivocation. We can reconstruct his 
argument as follows: natural functions involve selection for an advantage; artifact 
functions involve selection for an advantage; so, natural and artifact functions both 
involve selection for an advantage. The ambiguity is this: in the first premise, the 
“advantages” in question are real, actual advantages; in the second, the “advantages” in 
question are merely imagined or hoped for. But imagined advantages are not real 
advantages – any more than imagined ponies are real ponies. 
 
The problem is analogous to the problem in Kitcher’s (1993) theory of function. Kitcher 
attempts to define “function” simply and solely in terms of “design.” He then says that 
human invention, and Darwinian natural selection, are two subtypes of this “design.” The 
problem is that the apparent unity of the concept of function is purchased at the cost of an 
equivocation: there is no single kind of thing called “design,” of which human choice and 
natural selection are subtypes. The latter is “design” in name only; it is a clever 
anthropomorphism to speak of natural selection as a form of design, but this analogy 




If Goblot is wrong, then what is the right way to think about function and selection? First, 
if we are to maintain that functions are selected effects, we should continue to understand 
“selection” in a relatively narrow sense which requires (not as a sufficient condition, but 
as a necessary one) something like an actual history of differential reproduction, or 
differential retention, on account of the effect in question. It is not enough that some 
agent hopes or anticipates or surmises that the object will have the relevant effect. In 
	
6 That said, there is much to appreciate in Kitcher’s view, in particular the distinction 
between selection having a “direct” versus an “indirect” role in a trait’s function. 
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contrast, functions in the realm of artifacts come about because the artifact bears the right 
kind of relationship to an agent’s mental states – though the precise nature of that 
relationship remains highly contentious. But I think we should give up the search for a 
unified theory of biological functions and artifact functions. Too many smart people have 
tried and failed for that to be a fruitful endeavor.  
 
Now, it may very well be true that, as a rule, when someone produces an artifact, that 
event of production is preceded by something like a virtual selection process in the 
agent’s mind. Dennett (1995) calls us “Popperian creatures” for our ability to carry out a 
hypothetical trial-and-error in our minds before implementing our schemes in the real 
world. But this, in my view, is incidental to an artifact’s having a function. It is not by 
virtue of the fact that a selection process takes place “in the designer’s mind” that the 
artifact acquires a function. As Wimsatt (1972, 15-16) argued some time ago, if God is 
real, and if God had a creative hand in designing the universe or some of the things in it, 
he wouldn’t have had to go through anything like a virtual form of trial-and-error in order 
for his creations to have functions. He would have just known what to do.  
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Deep neural networks (DNNs), a particularly effective type of artificial
intelligence, currently lack a scientific explanation. The philosophy of science is
uniquely equipped to handle this problem. Computer science has attempted,
unsuccessfully, to explain DNNs. I review these contributions, then identify
shortcomings in their approaches. The complexity of DNNs prohibits the
articulation of relevant causal relationships between their parts, and as a result
causal explanations fail. I show that many non-causal accounts, though more
promising, also fail to explain AI. This highlights a problem with existing accounts
of scientific explanation rather than with AI or DNNs.
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1 The Need for Explainable Artificial Intelligence
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded considerably in the past decade. AI is
increasingly being used to make high-stakes decisions, often under questionable
circumstances that indicate the presence of racial or gender bias, including granting or
denying loan applications (Fuster et al. 2018), deciding which prisoners are eligible for
parole (Khademi and Honavar 2019), and diagnosing mental health disorders (Bennett et
al. 2019). If AI is used to make these decisions — especially if these decisions appear to
have reinforced biases present elsewhere in society — understanding how the algorithm
made the decision is essential. Absent explanation, arbitrary or biased decisions may go
unchecked. Computer scientists have recognized this problem and have begun developing
explainable AI (XAI), but many of their strategies haphazardly employ a mix of causal,
psychological, and counterfactual strategies that fail to generate adequate explanations.
It is impossible to explain AI without first explaining explanation. The philosophy of
science is uniquely positioned to take on this problem and offer solutions by examining
the meaning of scientific explanation and developing an account of explanation which
adequately explains AI.
An explainable algorithm is one for which a true, satisfactory explanation exists. An
interpretable algorithm is one for which a complete account of the relationships between
the steps in the algorithm exists. In many cases, AI decision and classification
algorithms are neither explainable nor interpretable. Many of the AI algorithms used in
these cases are deep neural networks (DNNs), a type of algorithm whose complexity
defies explanation in a particularly striking manner. Because explanation through
merely technological means is lagging behind the complexity of the networks that are in
2
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need of an explanation, it is reasonable to conclude that the solution to this problem
cannot be technological. If this is the case, a potential solution can be found in the ways
in which explanation is conceptualized within the context of AI. In order to solve the
explainability problem, it is first necessary to articulate an appropriate model of
explanation which can be effectively applied in this context.
I argue that recent attempts by computer scientists to develop XAI fail because they
do not employ a theoretically-grounded concept of explanation. Further, I show that it is
necessary to employ non-causal accounts of explanation in order to solve the problem of
explainability in AI. I begin with a brief overview of the aspects of AI that are relevant
to my argument. Then I discuss two existing methods for developing XAI: one causal,
and one non-causal. I demonstrate why each approach fails to generate a satisfactory
explanation, then I propose alternative non-causal possibilities and explore the viability
of each. I conclude that existing approaches to both causal and non-causal explanation
fail to fit the needs of XAI, though of the two approaches, non-causal accounts hold
greater promise.
1.1 Deep Neural Networks
‘Machine learning,’1 an increasingly common form of AI, is a broad term that describes
programs that can work with unexpected input data without being explicitly
programmed to do so. One of the more common contemporary approaches to machine
learning is the neural network. Neural networks attempt to replicate the behavior of
biological brains by linking input and output together via various intermediary nodes in
1for a more comprehensive overview, see Buckner (2019).
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a network. Each node is called a ‘neuron’, hence ‘neural network’. Neural networks
contain multiple layers including an input layer, an output layer, and one or more
‘hidden layers’ between the input and output. Each layer is made up of a group of
neurons. Neural networks with more than three hidden layers are called deep neural
networks (DNNs). DNNs produce a complex, often non-interpretable model that is used
in decision or classification tasks. In what is called ‘supervised learning,’ a ‘trained
model’ is created by providing labeled datasets to the DNN, which iterates over the
labeled data and builds a model capable of making the correct decision or classification
given novel data. In other words, the deep neural model is built with the deep neural
network. DNNs and the models they produce are both in need of explanation.
2 The Current Landscape: Two Case Studies
Computer scientists have made use of two contrasting strategies in order to develop XAI.
Most researchers attempting to build explainable DNNs appear to prefer causal forms of
explanation,2 however some have attempted to develop non-causally explainable DNNs.
I present instances of each approach and discuss their relationships to the explanation
literature in the philosophy of science.
2.1 Case Study One: “Rationalizations”
One approach to XAI is to develop algorithms that produce patterns of explananda that
imitate human reasoning. This is analogous to chatbots that imitate human texting
2See for example Yang et al. (2016), Jain and Wallace (2019), Khademi and
Honavarand (2019), and Sharma, Henderson, and Ghosh (2020)
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patterns. For instance, Harrison et al. (2017) uses two AIs. The first plays the classic
video game Frogger, and the second explains the actions of the first by translating
internal game state data to natural-language approximations of human-supplied
explanations. In order to accomplish this, the research team recorded human subjects
playing Frogger, then periodically paused the game and asked the subjects to verbally
explain an action that they recently took. The human responses were used as training
data for the “explainer” DNN.
Importantly, the explainer DNN was not generating veridical statements about the
internal state of the game-playing DNN, but was generating a unique natural-language
statement based on data gathered from human players when in similar in-game
situations. This approach generates psychologically satisfying explanations of AI
behavior. Because the generated explanations are only meant to approximate
human-supplied explanations of similar situations, a tradeoff is made between accurately
reporting internal DNN states and psychologically satisfying explanations. The authors
accept this tradeoff in order to obtain quickly-generated and human-like explanations.
The authors write that “rationalization is fast, sacrificing absolute accuracy for real-time
response” (Harrison et al. 2017, 1).
The explainer DNN does not supply a veridical explanation of the decision making
process used by the game-player DNN. Instead it produces statements that approximate
human-generated explanations when faced with similar in-game circumstances. Another
much deeper problem with this model is that, since the explanation of one DNN is itself
generated by a different, independent DNN, there is now a need for an explanation of the
explanation. If one black-box system is explained by appealing to a second black-box
system, nothing has actually been explained. The number of phenomena in need of
5
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explanation has actually increased.
If humans depend on the use of AI for a critical task, it is important that a sense of
trust in that AI is maintained. One goal of the research of Harrison et al. (2017) is to
provide explanations that reassure human operators of AI that the AI had a good reason
for doing an action that may appear to a human to be questionable. In some cases this
may mean that the AI only needs to be able to communicate that a good reason for a
particular action exists, i.e. to articulate a how-possibly explanation, rather than
communicating the right reason for the action, i.e. a how-actually explanation.
Rationalizations are an attempt to deal with the problems associated with the lack of
XAI without actually solving them. The authors endorse the view that, when it comes
to AI, we must choose between fast, intuitive, human-understandable explanations, and
technically correct explanations. Rationalizations do not attempt to provide
explanations, but instead provide fictional statements that sound like plausible
explanations.
2.2 Why Rationalizations are not Explanations
Rationalizations represent only one attempt to build non-causal XAI, but this attempt
leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of scientific explanation. Rationalizations
are explicitly non-veridical. Fictionalizations often serve a role in scientific explanation.
Many, including Potochnik (2017) and Rice (2018), have argued that fictionalizations
can play a key role in understanding. Rationalizations differ from fictionalizations in
other models. If the understanding that an explanation helps to foster is not in any sense
an understanding of a true state of affairs, then the purported explanation has not
6
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contributed to epistemic success, and is not actually explanatory. Rationalizations do
not make use of strategic inaccuracies in order to help individuals to come to recognize a
greater truth about the explanandum, rather rationalizations serve to further conceal the
truth behind natural language statements meant to have the appearance of an adequate
explanation with none of its substance. While there may be practical reasons why AI
developers would find it appropriate to make use of rationalizations rather than genuine
explanations, this does not imply that rationalizations have any value as scientific
explanations. Rationalizations are an attempt to articulate “how possibly” explanations
rather than “how actually” explanations. In the case of explanations of high-stakes
automated decisions, “how actually” should be the standard. Rationalizations are not
explanations.
2.3 Case Study Two: Attention Layers in Neural Networks
Attention mechanisms, introduced by Bahdanau et al. (2015), allow the training of a
DNN in such a way as to focus the network’s attention on specific input elements.
Attention mechanisms can be incorporated into neural networks as another layer of the
network as shown in figure 1. The weights of the attention layer are thought to correlate
to measures of feature importance in the input: the input has some features that are
more important than others, and if the attention layer is able to identify which features
of the input are most important, this is thought to generate explanantia by
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant inputs. Allowing the DNN to focus on the
more important parts of the input could increase the accuracy of the output. In the case
of attention as explanation, the explanandum is the output of the DNN, and the
7
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explanans involves an appeal to the attention layer, which points to specific input
elements. In many cases, it appeared as if the attention layer was explanatory because it
indicated which parts of the input were most important in the creation of the output.
For those evaluating these systems for explanatory value, this appears to be a plausible







Figure 1: Researchers often use attention weights (shown in orange) to generate explanations.
Jain & Wallace scramble attention weights and show that output remains stable; a similar result
is obtained by Serrano & Smith omitting highly-weighted attention nodes entirely.
2.3.1 Critical Responses from Computer Science
Jain and Wallace (2019) argue that the output of the attention layer cannot serve as an
explanation of the underlying DNN because it is possible to intentionally interefere with
the way the weights of the attention layer are set (called “adversarial weighting”) in such
a way that the underlying DNN produces the same output as it did under
non-adversarial weighting while the adversarial attention layer indicates the importance
8
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of entirely different - and obviously unimportant - elements of the input data. An
example discussed by Jain and Wallace is the use of a DNN to gauge whether a movie
review is positive or negative. The DNN outputs a number between 0 and 1 with 0 being
very negative and 1 being very positive. The attention layer indicates which words in the
movie review (the input) are supposedly more important in determining this output.
Under the non-adversarial case, a word like “waste” would be indicated as important,
whereas under the adversarial weighting, a word like “was” would be indicated as
important. In both the adversarial and non-adversarial cases, the network produced an
identical score for the review.
While the attention weights were set adversarially, they still represent a configuration
that could have occurred during the non-adversarial training of the network. In
developing a neural model under normal conditions, the production of either of the
models (adversarial or non-adversarial) are equally possible. If one expects that the
attention layer can serve as an explantion of the overall model, it must be the result of
the ability of the attention layer to identify the most important features of the input
data, but if selectively randomized attention weightings can produce the same model
output as the actual attention weights, it is difficult to see in what sense the attention
layer could possibly generate an explanation. Jain and Wallace (2019) conclude that it
cannot. Their paper is appropriately titled “Attention is not Explanation.”
Serrano and Smith (2019) make a similar argument, agreeing that attention is not
explanation. Instead of assigning randomized weights to the attention nodes, Serrano
and Smith selectively deleted many of the highest weighted - that is the supposedly most
important - attention nodes. Under these conditions the model still produced the same
output. The experiment demonstrates that if adversarial attention weightings using data
9
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that should adversely affect the neural model’s accuracy has no such effect, the ability of
the attention layer to discriminate between important and unimportant inputs is called
into question, and so must be any explanations that are derived from attention.
Both of these papers relied on counterfactual analyses of the attention layer in order
to come to thier conclusions: if the attention weights had been different in such and such
a way, the attention layer would have identified a different set of input features, while
the model’s output would have remained unchanged. Implicitly, both are appealing to an
interventionist account of explanation. They are attempting to determine the pattern of
counterfactual dependence among the variables in the DNN. As I show below, due to the
complexity and lack of interpretability of the systems this analysis is being applied to,
the use of the interventionist account here is inappropriate, and is not likely to lead to
the development of XAI.
2.4 Why Attention is not Explanation
Alisa Bokulich (2018) defines ‘causal imperialism’ as the view that “all scientific
explanations are causal explanations” (141). There appears to be a large amount of
causal imperialism in XAI - most attempts at XAI make use of causal explanations
exclusively, assuming that anything other than a causal explanation is a fictionalization
akin to the rationalizations described in section 2.1. Indeed, the bar for explanation
under these conditions is so high that some authors have advocated for abandoning the
project of developing explainable models entirely, opting instead only for models that are
interpretable (Rudin 2019). There are simpler models that exist that are interpretable,
such as decision trees, but they are generally less effective than more complex black box
10
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models. The tradeoff with these models is that a causal explanation can be more readily
derived when a model is interpretable, because a pattern of counterfactual dependence
within the model is easier to discover.
Given their complexity, a causal account of explanation that successfully explains
DNNs is likely to be impossible because a pattern of counterfactual dependence cannot
be located. The extremely high number of nodes in a DNN, each with an associated
weight, is not human parsable. A complete account of causal relationships among nodes
will also be non-parsable by humans. AI that is non-interpretable will necessarily also be
non-explainable under causal accounts, because to say that a system is non-interpretable
is to say that a pattern of counterfactual dependence cannot be established for that
system. This follows directly from the definition of non-interpretability. A
non-interpretable system is a black box system; when the inner workings of a system are
unknown, the causal relationships between that system’s components cannot be
established. Given the failure of causal accounts in the development of XAI, non-causal
accounts of explanation should be explored instead.
The criticisms of attention as explanation from Jain & Wallace and Serrano & Smith
implicitly make use of an interventionst account of causal explanation similar to that
proposed by Woodward (2003). Because the criticisms of attention as explanation
attempt to establish the existence of empirically verifiable causal patterns that hold
between the explanandum and those factors without which it would not have occurred, it
fits within Woodward’s framework. Woodward explains that “an intervention can be
thought of as an idealized experimental manipulation which changes C ‘surgically’ in
such a way that any change in E, should it occur, will occur only ‘through’ the change in
C and not via some other route” (Woodward 2018, 119).
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In order to determine the existence of causal relationships between variables in a
system of variables, the relevant variables are subject to manipulation. Successful
explanations, on this account, require that targeted manipulations of relevant system
components cause changes in the output of that system when the system output is the
explanandum. If manipulations of these parts cause changes to the system’s output, the
core elements of an explanation are already present. Because the critics of attention as
explanation were able to modify seemingly relevant variables without changing the
system output, they concluded that deriving an explanation from attention is
inappropriate.
The criticisms of attention as explanation implicitly appealed to a view similar to the
interventionist account of explanation, but one without a requirement that some
variables in the system be held invariant such that the interventions on the system are
surgical. Following this requirement ensures that the explanation which is eventually
generated can’t be superseded by another more plausible explanation related to variables
which were not controlled for. In the social sciences, for example, a study of the effects
of diet on longevity that does not control for income is likely to be tainted by many
spurrious connections between variables that are better explained by the relationship
between income and longevity than between diet and longevity. Without holding the
extraneous variables invariant, the appropriate pattern of counterfactual dependence
cannot be established. The absence of this requirement in the criticisms of attention as
explanation may account for the results of these experiments: the discovery of
nonsensical alternative explanations derived through the same means, which allowed the
researchers to cast doubt on both sets of explanations. The situation does not improve
significantly when surgical intervention is used; the problem with applying this approach
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to a DNN is that the number of interconnected nodes is so great that engaging in a
surgical intervention on any one particular node is likely to be impossible as its value
cannot be disentangled from the values of each other node. When making this explicit
and taking this requirement into consideration, the outcome is the same - attention is
not explanation - but for a different reason. In this case attention is not explanation
because under the interventionist framework, it is impossible to engage in surgical
intervention on a DNN, and it is thus impossible to find a pattern of counterfactual
dependence among the relevant variables within the DNN.
Under the manipulability account of causal explanation, surgical intervention is a
method of testing counterfactual conditionals of the form, “if I were to change X in such
and such a way, the result would be Y.” Actually manipulating the value of X tests the
truth of this conditional. Attention is only one part of a larger system of variables. The
relevant system in this case is not attention alone, but attention in addition to the DNN
itself. While both Jain and Wallace and Serrano and Smith demonstrate the possibility
of engaging in surgical intervention on the attention configuration, similar interventions
of the remainder of the system are not possible. When surgical intervention is
impossible, all counterfactuals are rendered unintelligible since surgical intervention is in
one sense merely the testing of a counterfactual conditional. To say that surgical
intervention on a given system is impossible is to say that we cannot know the truth of
certain counterfactual conditionals about that system.
Of the two case studies explored in section 2.1 and section 2.3, what initially
appeared to be the more plausible approach (the use of causal explanations through
attention mechanisms in DNNs) now appears as if it may be a dead end. While the use
of rationalizations explored in section 2.1 has clear flaws, a factor motivating the
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approach, the desire to avoid the messy business of attempting to build causal
explanations of DNNs, may have been correct. In the following section I will explore the
possibility of applying non-causal explanations to DNNs.
3 Applying Non-Causal Accounts of Explanation to
XAI
Both the causal and rationalization approaches to XAI have so far failed to yield good
explanations of the decision process happening inside DNNs. The use of rationalizations
was an attempt to build psychologically satisfying rather than veridical explanations.
The attention example did appear to come closer to an acceptable conclusion. Even if
the conclusion was that attention is not explanatory, the discovery of this fact advances
the discussion and sets up the possibility for the discovery of other causal explanations in
the future. For reasons I discuss below, the use of non-causal explanations is more
appropriate for XAI.
The counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) has causal and non-causal variants.
Computer scientists have previously used causal CTE in attempts to build XAI. See, for
instance, Wachter et al. (2017) and Sharma et al. (2020) These approaches suffer from
many of the same problems identified by computer scientists as discussed in section 2.3.1
and by philosophers as discussed in section 2.4. Alexander Reutlinger (2018) proposes a
pluralist extension of the CTE which would allow for both causal and non-causal
explanations under the CTE. If it is possible to use a non-causal variant of the CTE to
explain DNNs, it might be possible to overcome the objections described in sections 2.3.1
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and 2.4.
Mathematical explanation, another candidate category of non-causal explanation of
AI, comes, according to Colyvan et al. (2018), in two varieties: intra-mathematical and
extra-mathematical. Intra-mathematical explanation is “the explanation of one
mathematical fact in terms of other mathematical facts,” while extra-mathematical
explanation is “the explanation of some physical phenomenon via appeal to
mathematical facts” (Colyvan et al. 2018, 232). Extra-mathematical explanation holds
great promise for XAI because all DNNs are mathematical. One possible problem is that
the relationship between the math used to build AI models and the world is more
complicated than, e.g. the relationship between the mathematics used for graph theory
when representing the bridges in the city of Königsburg as a graph and the actual city of
Königsburg. If an AI classifier is putting images in categories, it can be described and
explained in mathematical terms, but the relevant question we seem to want answered
isn’t about the math, but about the connection between the math and the world. The
question of how an AI knows the difference between strawberries and bananas isn’t a
question limited to its internal mathematical operations because it is also appealing -
even if implicitly - to the actual difference between strawberries and bananas. The Seven
Bridges of Königsburg problem can be solved with graph theory, but the explanation is
still recognizable as representing the actual city of Königsburg. The connection between
mathematics and the world in this case is clear, but it is not clear in the case of
extra-mathematical explanations of AI.
The potential for the use of models as explanations has been disccused by Bokulich
(2011), Batterman & Rice (2014), Morrison (2015), and Potochnik (2017) among others.
Model explanations are an exciting possibility for DNNs because DNNs produce models
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which are used in decision and classification tasks. If models can serve as explanations,
the explanation for deep DNNs could be found in the models they produce (referred to
as deep neural models). One major problem with this approach is that with the types of
explanatory models discussed in the philosophy of science literature, the model and the
phenomena being modeled are different, but in the case of DNNs, the model is the
phenomenon that needs to be explained. It is clear from the literature how a model
could be explanatory of some external phenomenon, but it is not clear how a model
could explain itself. It may be the case that the deep neural model explains the DNN
rather than explaining itself, but then the problem of how to explain the model still
remains. An explanation of the network that does not also explain the model (which is
ultimately responsible for decision and classification tasks) is not enough. It isn’t just
the DNN which requires an explanation, but the DNN and the model it produces.
4 Conclusion
Because of the high stakes of AI-based decision and classification tasks, explanations of
DNNs, deep neural models, and the decisions and classifications they produce are
necessary. Computer scientists have attempted to develop explanations of these systems,
but their efforts are inadequately grounded in theories of explanation. The study of
scientific explanation by the philosophy of science is well suited to this task. non-causal
accounts appear to have greater potential to explain DNNs than causal accounts.
Non-causal variants of the CTE, extra-mathematical explanations, and model
explanations all have potential to provide explanations of DNNs in the future, though
more work needs to be done before this is possible. The persistent problems surrounding
16
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explanations of DNNs point to problems with existing accounts of scientific explanation
and indicate the necessity for the extension of existing accounts of scientific explanation
or the development of new accounts.
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Understanding & Equivalent Reformulations
Josh Hunt, October 2020
Abstract
Reformulating a scientific theory often leads to a significantly different way of understand-
ing the world. Nevertheless, accounts of both theoretical equivalence and scientific under-
standing have neglected this important aspect of scientific theorizing. This essay provides a
positive account of how reformulating theories changes our understanding. My account si-
multaneously addresses a serious challenge facing existing accounts of scientific understand-
ing. These accounts have failed to characterize understanding in a way that goes beyond
the epistemology of scientific explanation. By focusing on cases where we have differences
in understanding without differences in explanation, I show that understanding cannot be
reduced to explanation.
1 Introduction
Accounts of theoretical equivalence have neglected an important epistemological question
about reformulations: how does reformulating a theory change our understanding of the
world? Prima facie, improving our understanding is one of the chief intellectual benefits
of reformulations. Nevertheless, accounts of theoretical equivalence have focused almost
entirely on developing formal and interpretational criteria for when two formulations count
as equivalent (Weatherall 2019a). Although no doubt an important question, focusing on it
alone misses many other philosophically rich aspects of reformulation.
The burgeoning literature on scientific understandingwould seem to be a natural home for
characterizing how reformulations improve understanding. However, existing accounts of
scientific understanding do not provide a clear answer. These accounts tend to focus on com-
peting rather than compatible explanations, investigating how the best explanation provides
understanding. This strategy neglects how equivalent formulations of the same explanation
can provide different understandings. To address these gaps, I will show how theoretically
equivalent formulations can change our understanding of the world.
Harkening back to Hempel, Kitcher, and Salmon, the received view of understanding holds
that understanding why a phenomenon occurs simply amounts to grasping a correct expla-
nation of that phenomenon (Strevens 2013; Khalifa 2017, 16ff). Many recent accounts of
understanding have decried this picture as overly simplistic, arguing that genuine under-
standing goes well beyond grasping an explanation (Grimm 2010; Hills 2016; Newman 2017;
de Regt 2017). Nevertheless, these critics of the received view still maintain a close con-
nection between explanation and understanding, which Khalifa (2012, 2013, 2015) has ex-
ploited to systematically undermine their more expansive accounts. Defending what I’ll call
explanationism, Khalifa (2017) has argued that all philosophical accounts of understanding-
why straightforwardly reduce to the epistemology of scientific explanation. Explanationism
thereby poses a serious challenge to accounts of scientific understanding that seek to go be-
yond the traditional received view.
Here, I argue that we can refute explanationism by considering theoretically equivalent
formulations. By definition, theoretically equivalent formulations agree completely on the
way the world is, thereby describing the exact same state of affairs. Moreover, philosophers
1
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typically adopt an ontic conception of explanation, wherein explanations themselves corre-
spond to states of affairs or propositions, e.g. the reasons why an event occurs.¹ By agreeing
on the way the world is, equivalent formulations ipso facto provide the same explanations.
Nonetheless, they can differ radically in the understandings that they provide. Thus, concern-
ing many phenomena, theoretically equivalent formulations do not differ qua explanation,
even as they differ qua understanding. These differences in understanding—without con-
comitant explanatory differences—make a separate account of understanding necessary.
Section 2 develops Khalifa’s challenge for existing accounts of scientific understanding,
showing how they reduce to accounts of explanation. I focus in particular on how Khalifa
problematizes both skills-based accounts of understanding and a different strategy developed
by Lipton (2009) that foreshadows my own. Section 3 demonstrates that theoretically equiv-
alent formulations provide a large class of cases that meet Khalifa’s challenge. In these cases,
we have differences in understanding-why without differences in explanation. In Section 4,
I introduce and defend conceptualism as a positive account of these differences in under-
standing. Conceptualism characterizes how these differences arise from differences in the
presentation and organization of explanatory information. Although not a complete account
of understanding, conceptualism can be adjoined with existing accounts to both meet Khal-
ifa’s challenge and accommodate reformulations. Section 5 considers and rebuts an objection
to my use of theoretically equivalent formulations.
2 The challenge from explanationism
Traditional accounts of explanation defend a deflationary stance toward understanding. Ac-
cording to Khalifa, “on the old view, if understanding was not merely psychological afterglow,
it was nevertheless redundant, being replaceable by explanatory concepts without loss” (2012,
17). Explanationism encapsulates this deflationary position:
Explanationism: all philosophically significant aspects of understanding-why are
encompassed by an appropriately detailed account of the epistemology of scien-
tific explanation.²
Importantly, even non-deflationary accounts of scientific understanding must adopt some
account of scientific explanation. Then, given whatever account of explanation is adopted,
explanationism demands an argument that understanding-why does not reduce to claims
about (this kind of) explanation. For this reason, explanationism is dialectically most ef-
fective when married with explanatory pluralism (Khalifa 2017, 8).³ Then, no matter which
account(s) of explanation is ultimately correct, explanationism challenges non-deflationary
accounts of understanding on their own terms.
Khalifa defends explanationism by developing a detailed account of the epistemology of
scientific explanation, which he calls the explanation-knowledge-science (EKS) model. Ac-
cording to this framework, an agent improves their understanding why p provided that they
¹For the ontic conception, see Salmon (1998 [1984], 325), Strevens (2008, 6), Craver (2014), and Skow (2016).
²In earlier work, Khalifa refers to this position as the explanatory model of understanding (2012, 17). Khalifa
(2017, 85) uses “explanationism” in a narrower sense aimed at showing how objectual understanding can be reduced
to explanatory understanding, ultimately defendingwhat he calls “quasi-explanationism.” For convenience, I simplify
this more cumbersome terminology.
³Khalifa (2012, 19) claims that explanationism is compatible with explanatory monism, but only if the requisite
unified theory of explanation accommodates all typical cases of explanation. It is not clear that such a theory exists.
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either (i) gain amore complete grasp of p’s explanatory nexus or (ii) their grasp of this explana-
tory nexus more closely resembles scientific knowledge (Khalifa 2017, 14). Khalifa defines the
explanatory nexus as the “totality of explanatory information about p,” which includes all cor-
rect explanations of p and the relations between these explanations (2017, 6). I will return to
the explanatory nexus in Section 3, arguing that knowledge of this nexus does not exhaust
differences in understanding-why. Turning to scientific knowledge, Khalifa argues that this
requires learning a correct explanation through a process of scientific explanatory evaluation
(SEEing).⁴ Scientific explanatory evaluation involves a three-step process of 1) considering
plausible potential explanations, 2) comparing these potential explanations, and 3) deciding
how to rank these potential explanations with respect to approximate truth (or at least saving
the phenomena) (Khalifa 2017, 12-13). Khalifa uses this ordinary process of SEEing to deflate
many anti-explanationist accounts of understanding.
To date, the main anti-explanationist strategy has been to argue that understanding-why
involves special skills or abilities. Provided that these skills go beyond what’s required for
explaining or possessing knowledge-why, explanationism would be refuted.⁵ Versions of
this skills-based strategy include skills for grasping counterfactual information (Grimm 2010,
2014), “cognitive control” over providing and manipulating explanations (Hills 2016), and in-
ferential skills used in making certain kinds of models (Newman 2013, 2017). de Regt has
provided one of the most sustained defenses of the skills-based strategy, arguing that under-
standing involves the ability to make qualitative predictions using an intelligible theory that
explains the phenomenon (de Regt and Dieks 2005; de Regt 2009a, 2017).
Khalifa’s criticism of Grimm provides the most succinct illustration of explanationism in
action. Khalifa argues that Grimm’s (2010) account of understanding makes no advance over
Woodward’s (2003) account of explanation. According to Grimm, understanding is an ability
to predict how changing one variable changes another variable, ceteris paribus (2010, 340-
41). Yet, as Khalifa notes—and Grimm acknowledges (2010, 341; 2014, 339)—this kind of un-
derstanding is closely related to Woodward’s analysis of “what-if-things-had-been-different
questions.” Hence, this kind of counterfactual reasoning ability is clearly part of scientific
explanatory evaluation (SEEing). We already deploy counterfactual reasoning in considering
and comparing alternative explanations, and explaining already involves the ability to answer
these what-if questions (Khalifa 2017, 71, 74). Khalifa’s response is easily generalized: if all
that a theory of understanding adds is referencing a cognitive ability to use an explanation,
then a theory of explanation can make the same move without modification.⁶
Another obvious anti-explanationist strategy would involve identifying cases of scientific
understanding in the absence of an explanation. Such cases would, at first glance, show that
accounts of explanation miss something about understanding. Undertaking precisely this
strategy, Lipton (2009) considers a number of cases where we seemingly acquire the cognitive
benefits of explanations without actually providing explanations. These cognitive benefits
include knowledge of causes, necessity, possibility, and unification (2009, 44). Against the
received view, Lipton identifies understanding not as “having an explanation,” but rather
with “the cognitive benefits that an explanation provides” (2009, 43). Notice that this still
⁴Khalifa also requires that this belief-forming process be safe, i.e. sufficiently unlikely to lead to false beliefs.
⁵Some epistemologists have pursued other strategies, arguing that objectual understanding either does not re-
duce to understanding-why or else that some forms of objectual understanding do not even require explanatory
understanding. Khalifa responds at length to these approaches (2017, 80ff).
⁶Khalifa (2012) applies this strategy to criticize de Regt and Dieks (2005) and de Regt (2009a, 2009b) in detail.
Against Hills, Khalifa argues that her necessary conditions for understanding are either irrelevant for enhancing
understanding or else they are captured by the EKS model (2017, 70-72). He responds to Newman in his (2015).
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maintains a close connection between understanding and explanation.
Khalifa (2013) exploits this connection to argue that Lipton’s strategy makes no funda-
mental advance over the explanation literature. Systematically examining each of Lipton’s
examples, Khalifa shows that whenever there is understanding through a non-explanation,
there is an explanation that provides that understanding and more. This leads to what Khalifa
calls “explanatory idealism” about understanding, which holds that “other modes of under-
standing ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by
knowledge of a good and correct explanation” (2013, 162). Thus, a suitably detailed account
of scientific explanation would provide the same insights about understanding that Lipton
defends. In this way, explanation functions as the “ideal of understanding” (Khalifa 2013,
162). More recently, Khalifa (2017) has recast part of his criticism as what he calls the “right
track objection.” According to this objection, Lipton’s examples involve agents who merely
have a kind of “proto-understanding,” wherein they are on the right track to acquiring an
explanation and thereby understanding-why.
In the remainder of this essay, I defend a strategy that avoids Khalifa’s objections against
existing accounts of scientific understanding. My strategy succeeds where others fail for two
reasons. First, I do not rely on positing any special abilities unique to understanding, so
Khalifa’s challenge from SEEing does not apply. Secondly, the examples I consider provide
understanding through the same explanatory information, so explanatory idealism does not
apply either.
3 Intellectual differenceswithout explanatory differences
To refute explanationism, it suffices to identify differences in understanding-why between
two presentations of the same explanation, since these appeal—ipso facto—to the same ex-
planatory information. In such cases, understanding-why still arises from an explanation,
but non-explanatory differences account for the corresponding differences in understanding.
The features we ascribe to “understanding-why” and to “explanation” then truly come apart.
For convenience, I will refer to differences in understanding as intellectual differences. This
section aims to show that, pace explanationism, we can have intellectual differences without
concomitant explanatory differences.
To forestall any hopes of a piecemeal explanationist rebuttal, my argument requires a
sufficiently large class of examples stemming from scientific practice. As we will see, the re-
cent literature on theoretical equivalence provides a rich set of cases, spanning many parts of
physics. Nevertheless, somemight worry that these mathematical reformulations are too iso-
lated or special to be indicative of scientific understanding in general. Hence, it is worthwhile
to also consider a more common aspect of scientific practice: diagrammatic reformulations. I
will consider both cases in turn, illustrating each with a paradigmatic example.⁷ Importantly,
my argument does not apply to cases of different but complementary explanations, such as
Salmon’s example of causal-mechanical vs. unificationist explanations of a balloon moving
forward upon takeoff in an airplane (Salmon 1998, 73; de Regt 2017, 77). Such complementary
explanations appeal to different explanatory information and are hence genuinely different
explanations. Khalifa’s EKS model of understanding accommodates such cases since they
reference different parts of the explanatory nexus (2017, 25).
By definition, theoretically equivalent formulations express the same scientific theory,
⁷Reformulations of symmetry arguments provide another class of examples. See Hunt (forthcoming) for details.
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agreeing exactly on the way the world is (or could be). Philosophers have defended a few dif-
ferent characterizations of theoretical equivalence, including definitional equivalence (Gly-
mour 1971), model isomorphism (North 2009), and categorical equivalence (Halvorson 2016;
Weatherall 2016; Barrett 2019). These accounts all seek to formalize the intuition that two
formulations are theoretically equivalent if and only if they are mutually inter-translatable
and empirically equivalent. Mutual inter-translatability requires that any thing expressed in
one formulation can be expressed in the other without loss of physically significant informa-
tion. Empirical equivalence requires that the formulations agree on all physically possible
measurable consequences.
Recent defenses of categorical equivalence have shown it to be the most fruitful crite-
rion for theoretical equivalence. It successfully formalizes a number of philosophically and
scientifically plausible cases of theoretically equivalent formulations.⁸ Five prominent exam-
ples include Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations of classical mechanics (Barrett 2019),
standard and geometrized formulations of Newtonian gravity theories (Weatherall 2016),
Lorentzian manifold and Einstein algebra formulations of general relativity (Rosenstock et
al. 2015), Faraday tensor and 4-vector potential formulations of classical electromagnetism
(Weatherall 2016), and principal bundle and holonomy formulations of Yang–Mills gauge the-
ories (Rosenstock and Weatherall 2016). Here, then, is a varied class of cases that collectively
pose a substantive problem for explanationism.
In each of these cases, I contend, we have intellectual differences without corresponding
explanatory differences. Each formulation provides a different understanding than its equiv-
alent counterpart for at least the following simple reason: understanding one does not entail
understanding the other (and indeed, showing that they are equivalent requires nontrivial in-
sights). For instance, understanding a phenomenon via Lagrangian mechanics does not entail
an understanding of that same phenomenon using Hamiltonianmechanics. Thus, Lagrangian
understanding-why differs from Hamiltonian understanding-why, even though both involve
grasping the same explanation. The lack of explanatory differences follows from categorical
equivalence, which entails that we can inter-translate models of one formulation into mod-
els of the other without losing any information.⁹ In other words, equivalent formulations
possess “the same capacities to represent physical situations” (Rosenstock et al. 2015, 315).
On the common ontic conception of explanation assumed here, explanatory information it-
self is a subset of this physical information, so equivalent formulations a fortiori represent
the same explanatory information. Thus, whenever one formulation provides an explana-
tion, any equivalent formulation provides the same explanation, preserving everything of
explanatory significance—but not necessarily of intellectual significance.
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics provide a simple but detailed illustration of the
foregoing points.¹⁰ These equivalent formulations display two main sources of intellectual
differences. First, they differ in how they encode the system’s dynamics. The Lagrangian
formalism uses a Lagrangian function L(qi, q̇i, t), encoding the dynamics as a function of time
t , generalized coordinates qi, and generalized velocities q̇i.¹¹ In the Hamiltonian formalism,
we perform a variable change from generalized velocities to generalizedmomenta pi, yielding
the HamiltonianH(qi, pi, t). Despite encoding the same physical information, the Lagrangian
⁸For an introduction see Halvorson (2016, 601) and for technical details Weatherall (2016, 2019b).
⁹For defenses of this claim, see Weatherall (2016, 1083, 1087) and Rosenstock et al. (2015, 314).
¹⁰Technically—within a subclass of models known as the hyper-regular domain—Barrett (2019) shows that the
Lagrangian tangent bundle and Hamiltonian cotangent bundle formulations are equivalent. For ease of exposition,
I present their more elementary coordinate-based formalisms. For details see Goldstein et al. (2002).
¹¹Here, the index i runs over {1, 2, …, n}. The “v̇” notation indicates a first derivative with respect to time.
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and Hamiltonian organize this information differently, as illustrated below. Secondly, the
two formulations represent the dynamical laws of evolution (the equations of motion) in
dramatically different ways. Whereas the Lagrangian formulation represents these as a set
of n-many 2nd-order differential equations (the Euler–Lagrange equations), the Hamiltonian
formulation represents these same equations of motion as a set of 2n-many 1st-order differ-
ential equations (Hamilton’s equations).¹² By reorganizing the equations of motion in this
way, the Hamiltonian formulation treats the generalized coordinates qi and the generalized
momenta pi more symmetrically. This leads to further intellectual differences in some cases,
such as the symmetry argument considered next.
A typical explanandum in mechanics concerns the evolution of a classical system such
as a pendulum or spinning top. In systems with symmetry, one generalized coordinate—e.g.
qn—is typically ignorable, meaning that it does not occur in the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian.¹³
The equations of motion then entail that the corresponding conjugate momentum, pn, is a
conserved quantity, i.e. a constant α . It is here that a dramatic intellectual difference oc-
curs between the formulations. Despite pn being constant, the corresponding generalized
velocity q̇n need not be. Hence, q̇n still appears in the Lagrangian as a nontrivial variable.
A Lagrangian understanding of the system’s evolution thereby still requires considering n-
many degrees of freedom, despite having an ignorable coordinate. In contrast, the Hamilto-
nian formalism enables a genuine reduction in the number of degrees of freedom that need
to be considered, resulting in a different understanding. Thanks to changing variables from
generalized velocities to generalized momenta, the Hamiltonian depends on the latter but
not the former. Hence, we can replace pn in the Hamiltonian with a constant α , and—with
the ignorable coordinate qn also absent—this eliminates an entire degree of freedom from
consideration.¹⁴ As Butterfield remarks, this example “illustrates one of mechanics’ grand
themes: exploiting a symmetry so as to reduce the number of variables needed to treat a
problem” (2006, 43). Although not an explanatory difference, this variable reduction demon-
strates a difference in how the same explanatory content is organized. This organizational
difference results in a different understanding of the system’s evolution. Indeed, these kinds
of organizational differences ultimately lead to differences in understanding Noether’s first
theorem—a foundational result connecting continuous symmetries and conserved quantities
(Butterfield 2006).
Thanks to their rigorous mutual inter-translatability, categorically equivalent formula-
tions provide the most precise illustration of my argument. However, at a less rigorous level,
theoretically equivalent formulations arise whenever we reformulate a theory while keeping
its physical content the same. This motivates including at least some instances of diagram-
matic reasoningwithin the class of theoretically equivalent formulations. Although neglected
by the literature on theoretical equivalence, diagrammatic reformulations satisfy the same in-
tuitive criteria: mutual inter-translatability and empirical equivalence. They thereby provide
another large class of examples where we can have differences in understanding-why with-
out concomitant explanatory differences. Examples of diagrammatic reformulations include
Feynman diagrams in particle and condensed matter physics, graphical approaches to the
quantum theory of angular momentum (Brink and Satchler 1968), Penrose–Carter diagrams
in space-time theories, graph-theoretic approaches to chemistry (Balaban 1985; Trinajstić
¹²In both cases, we require 2n initial values to solve these equations.
¹³It is easy to show that a generalized coordinate does not appear in the Lagrangian if and only if it does not
appear in the Hamiltonian.
¹⁴Technically, we replace one of Hamilton’s equations with a trivial integral for calculating q̇n.
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1992), and diagrams for mechanistic reasoning in biology (Abrahamsen and Bechtel 2015).
To illustrate how diagrammatic reasoning can provide intellectual differences, consider
Feynman diagrams in particle physics. Here, the explanandum is typically a scattering am-
plitude for a particular interaction, explained by calculating terms in a perturbation expan-
sion. Without using Feynman diagrams, we can calculate each term up to a desired order in
perturbation theory. This provides one way of understanding the scattering amplitude. Al-
ternatively, we can reorganize this same explanatory information using Feynman diagrams,
allowing us to express connectivity properties of terms in the perturbation expansion. To
calculate the scattering amplitude, it suffices to know the connected terms; the disconnected
terms do not contribute.¹⁵ Focusing on connectivity therebymakes it unnecessary to consider
a vast number of terms in the perturbation expansion—terms that a brute force calculation
would show vanish. In this way, Feynman diagrams lead to a different understanding of
scattering amplitudes but without introducing any additional explanatory information.¹⁶
4 A conceptualist account of understanding
I have argued that a variety of mathematical and diagrammatic reformulations provide intel-
lectual differences without associated explanatory differences. Yet, if not from explanatory
differences, whence do these intellectual differences arise? To answer this question, I will
introduce and defend conceptualism, which claims that intellectual differences result from
differences in how explanatory information is organized and presented. These organizational
differences lead to differences in what we need to know to present explanations, leading to
differences in understanding-why. I will consider an objection that conceptualismmerely de-
scribes how reformulations modify explanatory concepts, with no effect on understanding-
why. To rebut this objection, I will argue that nontrivial changes in explanatory concepts
necessarily lead to differences in understanding-why.
Conceptualism posits a sufficient condition for differences in understanding-why: refor-
mulating an explanation generates an intellectual difference whenever it changes what we
need to know or what suffices to know to present that explanation. For instance, in shifting
from Lagrangian mechanics to Hamiltonian mechanics, we learn that we don’t need to know
how to represent the system and its dynamics using the Lagrangian and the Euler–Lagrange
equations. Knowledge of the Hamiltonian and Hamilton’s equations suffices. Mutatis mutan-
dis, the same can be said for shifting from Hamiltonian mechanics to Lagrangian mechanics,
leading again to a difference in understanding. Similarly, reformulating scattering amplitude
explanations using Feynman diagrams teaches us that we don’t need to know the discon-
nected terms in the perturbation expansion: knowledge of the connected terms suffices. For
convenience, I will refer to these differences in what-we-need-to-know or what-suffices-to-
know as epistemic dependence relations (EDRs). Conceptualism claims that when equivalent
formulations provide different epistemic dependence relations, they manifest intellectual dif-
ferences.
To rebuff explanationism, these intellectual differences must be genuine differences in
understanding why empirical phenomena occur. If instead these intellectual differences con-
¹⁵A term is connected if there is a path of propagators connecting every pair of source factors and/or vertex factors
in the term. For technical background and formal results, see for instance Srednicki (2007, §§8–10) and Lancaster
and Blundell (2014, §§16–20, 22, and 24).
¹⁶de Regt (2017, 251ff) also considers Feynman diagrams to defend his account of understanding. Whereas he
focuses on visualization, I focus only on formal features that are independent of human psychology.
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cern some other kind of understanding, explanationism is left unscathed. Accordingly, an
explanationist might argue that differences in EDRs do not genuinely affect understanding-
why. Rather, these differences might merely affect our understanding of the concepts used
to represent explanations, concepts such as Lagrangians, Hamiltonians, connected diagrams,
Lorentzian manifolds, etc.¹⁷ If so, conceptualism would have failed to identify a genuine
source of intellectual differences.
Conceptualism agrees with part of this objection: in the first instance, reformulating an
explanation changes our understanding of that explanation. However, nontrivial changes
in understanding an explanation entail differences in understanding-why. Conceptualism
reframes this claim as a simple bridge principle:¹⁸
Intellectual bridge principle (IBP): A nontrivial difference in understanding an ex-
planation of p leads to a different understanding why p.
According to this bridge principle, organizing the same explanatory information differently
can lead to a different understanding-why, as we have seen in the case of Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian mechanics. Different ways of understanding an explanation are nontrivial pro-
vided that they are not merely conventional differences in presenting an explanation. Hence,
the intellectual bridge principle excludes a large class of trivial notational variants from count-
ing as intellectually significant.¹⁹ For instance, uniformly replacing “5” everywhere with “V”
in an Arabic numeral system would result in different presentations of many explanations,
but these differences would be trivial, rather than intellectually significant. Similarly, re-
casting an explanation using a left-handed coordinate system rather than a right-handed one
would not result in any differences in understanding-why. Although it is difficult to precisely
delimit trivial from nontrivial notational variants, my defense of conceptualism requires only
the existence of clear cases of nontrivial reformulations, such as those developed in Section 3.
In general, conceptualism posits that a difference in epistemic dependence relations is both
necessary and sufficient for an intellectually significant difference.²⁰ Trivial notational vari-
ants do not provide different EDRs and hence do not generate intellectual differences.
In response, an explanationist might attempt to reject this bridge principle. However,
the IBP follows straightforwardly from the received view of understanding, which explana-
tionism seeks to uphold. Recall that according to the received view, understanding why a
phenomenon occurs amounts to grasping an explanation of that phenomenon. Grasping ex-
planations requires that we can represent them, and any way of representing explanations
involves concepts. Hence, understanding the relevant explanatory concepts is necessary for
understanding-why. Understanding-why is thereby derivative on the way that we have un-
derstood this explanation, such as the epistemic dependence relationswe have used to present
it. Thus, at least some changes in explanatory concepts must lead to concomitant changes in
understanding-why. In other words, any account of understanding requires a bridge principle
to connect our explanatory concepts with achieving understanding.
With these distinctions in hand, conceptualism straightforwardly identifies the origins of
intellectual differences between the equivalent formulations mentioned in Section 3. To take
¹⁷I adapt this objection from Khalifa (2017, 138), who develops it as a further argument against Lipton (2009).
¹⁸de Regt similarly argues that understanding a phenomenon necessarily requires being able to understand a
theory (2017, 44). However, I disagree with de Regt that understanding a theory is always pragmatic and contextual.
¹⁹Grammatically, “intellectually significant” is analogous to “explanatorily significant.” It characterizes differences
that matter for understanding.
²⁰Reasons of space prevent a detailed defense of this claim, which I defend elsewhere.
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one example, the Einstein algebra formalism is markedly different from the standard formu-
lation of general relativity. It teaches us that we don’t need to know the standard Lorentzian
manifold and metric concepts to provide explanations in general relativity. Instead, we can
reorganize all of the relevant explanatory information using algebraic notions, as Geroch
(1972) has argued. Since this reformulation changes what we need to know to present expla-
nations, it is not a trivial notational variant of the standard formulation. It thereby satisfies
the intellectual bridge principle, leading to a different understanding-why for phenomena
explained by general relativity.
By itself, conceptualism does not provide a full-fledged account of scientific understand-
ing. Instead, it illuminates an important facet of understanding that has been neglected in
the literature. Due to its minimal commitments, conceptualism can be adjoined with exist-
ing accounts of understanding, particularly those allied against explanationism. Although
compatible with skills-based accounts of understanding, conceptualism does not assume any
special role for skills or abilities. The key insight behind my position is that how a theory-
formulation organizes explanatory information matters for understanding. Scientific agents
perform no more special a role than grasping this organizational structure. For these reasons,
my position is not susceptible to the explanationist strategy against skills-based accounts con-
sidered in Section 2. Likewise, since conceptualism focuses on how recasting explanations
changes understanding, it does not succumb to Khalifa’s objections to Lipton’s (2009) under-
standing without explanation proposal.
5 An objection against theoretical equivalence
Prima facie, one strategy remains available to an explanationist: they can reject my argument
in Section 3 that theoretically equivalent formulations provide the same explanation. Instead,
they might argue that in such cases, one formulation takes explanatory priority. There are
at least two candidate sources of explanatory priority. First, one formulation might be phys-
ically privileged. For instance, Curiel (2014) privileges Lagrangian mechanics for allegedly
encoding the kinematic constraints of classical systems. Secondly, one formulation might be
more fundamental or joint-carving than another. This metaphysical difference would pre-
sumably entail a corresponding explanatory difference, wherein the more fundamental for-
mulation provides a better explanation (Sider 2011, 61). Differences in joint-carving or per-
fectly natural properties would then be part of the explanatory nexus. For instance, North
(2009) argues that Hamiltonian mechanics is more fundamental than Lagrangian mechanics.
However, this objection sits uneasily within the broader dialectical strategy of explana-
tionism. Recall from Section 2 that to problematize multifarious accounts of understanding,
explanationism adopts a form of explanatory pluralism. Otherwise, it is all too easy to desig-
nate some aspects of explanation (e.g. the causal-mechanical ones) as genuinely explanatory
while other aspects (such as unification) are seen as mattering for understanding but not
explanation. Furthermore, adopting explanatory pluralism seems to require a modicum of
ontological pluralism as well (Khalifa 2017, 7). This is because different models of explana-
tion take different ontological features as necessary for providing explanations, as shown in
recent debates over causal vs. noncausal explanations (Lange 2017).
Hence, insofar as explanationism requires both explanatory and ontological pluralism, it
cannot preclude the interpretation of theoretically equivalent formulations adopted in Sec-
tion 3. It must allow philosophers to interpret cases of theoretically equivalent formulations
9
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as being just that: genuinely equivalent both physically and metaphysically.²¹ If explanation-
ists instead adopt a single account of explanation, they will be unable to systematically recast
all purported differences in understanding as explanatory differences. The explanationist is
thus caught on the horns of a dilemma. Either they renounce explanatory pluralism and
thereby fail to systematically deflate skills-based accounts of understanding, or they main-
tain pluralism and thereby allow that theoretically equivalent formulations provide the same
explanation but different understandings.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that theoretically equivalent formulations provide a clear counterexample to
explanationism. Whereas explanationism holds that all intellectual differences arise from ex-
planatory differences, equivalent formulations show that some differences in understanding-
why do not reduce to explanatory differences. To accommodate these intellectual differences,
I have proposed conceptualism. Conceptualism argues that understanding-why involves not
only the explanatory content that we have understood, but also the way that we have under-
stood it. In particular, it claims that equivalent formulations manifest intellectual differences
whenever they provide different epistemic dependence relations. These are differences in what
we need to know or what suffices to know to provide an explanation. By characterizing how
reformulations change understanding, conceptualism addresses complementary lacunae in
current accounts of both scientific understanding and theoretical equivalence. In this way,
conceptualism supplements existing anti-explanationist accounts of scientific understanding.
By adopting conceptualism, these accounts can forestall the challenge from explanationism
and genuinely go beyond the epistemology of scientific explanation.
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The paper analyzes Brouwer’s intuitionistic attempt to reform mathematics through the prism 
of Leo Corry’s philosophical model of “body” and “image” of knowledge. Such an analysis 
sheds new light on the question of whether Brouwer’s intuitionism could at all be attractive to 
broader groups of mathematicians. It focuses on three characteristics that are unique to 
Bouwer’s reformation attempt and suggests that when considered together, they combine to 
provide a more complex understanding of the reasons behind the lack of reception to 
Brouwer’s intuitionism than any of the three can offer alone. 
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1. Introduction  
Brouwer’s intuitionistic program was an intriguing attempt to reform the foundations of 
mathematics and was probably the most controversial one within the contours of the 
foundational debate during the 1920s (van Stigt 1990; Hesseling 2003). Historians and 
philosophers of mathematics have tried to account for the reasons why Brouwer’s intuitionism 
did not prevail. Some associate the demise of Brouwer’s intuitionism with his dismissal from 
the editorial board of the Mathematische Annalen in 1928 (van Atten 2004). Others suggest 
that the lack of reception derived from technical difficulties within Brouwer’s mathematical 
arguments (Epple 2000) or due to his awkward and too-technical style of writing (van Dalen 
2013).  
In the following pages, I wish to discuss a specific aspect of the question of whether 
Brouwer’s far-reaching intuitionistic program could at all be attractive to broader groups of 
mathematicians. In order to do that, I would like to consider the story of Brouwer’s 
intuitionism in light of Leo Corry’s model of image and body of knowledge, and alongside 
Corry’s compelling analysis of Van der Waerden’s Moderne Algebra, which created new 
knowledge from mathematical notions that already existed. I intend to focus on three 
significant differences between the stories of Brouwer and Van der Waerden: on their different 
motivations for change, on the scope of the change, and on the implications of using familiar 
mathematical concepts (as opposed to introducing completely new notions). The variations 
between the two stories, I shall argue, offer a new perspective on the lack of reception to 
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Brouwer’s intuitionism, that is owed not only to technical difficulties within the theory but to a 
combination of a deep philosophical motivation (with which mathematicians were less 
sympathetic), a too comprehensive reformation, and contradicting new mathematical concepts.     
The terminology of ‘image of knowledge’ and ‘body of knowledge’ is borrowed from Yehuda 
Elkana’s work. According to Elkana, the ‘body of knowledge’ is where the research is being 
done; thus, it consists of different theories, concepts, and mechanisms (Elkana 1978, 315). The 
‘images of knowledge’ governs particular aspects of scientific activity that the ‘body of 
knowledge’ does not address, like: sources of knowledge, the legitimization of knowledge, the 
audience of knowledge, and relatedness to prevailing norms and ideologies. Building on 
Elkana’s theory, the process of scientific progress can be described as engaging with two 
different types of questions: the first addresses the methods used in the process of making a 
discovery or forming a new theory, and the second addresses the guiding principles and 
normative boundaries of the discipline itself. 
Unlike other disciplines, mathematics is uniquely endowed with a special interconnection 
between its body and image of knowledge. The reflexive aspect of mathematics enables it to 
examine the nature of the discipline itself by applying the same framework that is used in 
everyday methodological practice1 (Corry 1989). Some mathematical theories can be easily 
 
1 Consider, for example, proof theory. No other discipline has a dedicated practical doctrine 
about how its methods should be properly done. 
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classified into one of the two realms, while other arguments may encompass an aspect of both. 
Upon considering past attempts to transform a constituting mathematical framework, a series 
of questions arise regarding the place of such revolutionizing theories: do they evolve from the 
body of knowledge, the image of knowledge, or both? Is there a specific path or order for 
changes to occur? Does a shift in one layer must proceed the other? 
The historian Leo Corry suggests that there is not only one direction in which mathematical 
transitions can occur (Corry 2001). As a case study, Corry examines the structural image of a 
specific mathematical discipline, namely, algebra, by analyzing van der Waerden’s Moderne 
Algebra, which presents the body of algebraic knowledge as deriving from a single unified 
perspective, and all the relevant results in the field are achieved using similar concepts and 
methods (Corry 2001, 172). The systematic study of different varieties of algebra through a 
common approach is what Corry calls a structural image of algebra, and whereas the transition 
to a new structural image in the case of van der Waerden’s Moderne Algebra was enabled due 
to changes in the body of knowledge, it does not imply that this is mandatory. Thus, 
transitions between images of knowledge are unique and distinct processes from transitions in 
the body of knowledge. Corry perceives the body and image of knowledge as organically 
interconnected domains in the history of a discipline, but he does not regard their relation as a 
cause and effect.  
In the case of van der Waerden’s Moderne Algebra, the newly proposed image had firm roots 
in the then-current body of knowledge. Though the textbook presents an original perspective 
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regarding the algebraic structure, it uses as cornerstones several mathematical notions such as 
groups, fields, and ideals that have already been introduced to the mathematical community, 
and it builds upon already developed theories of renown algebraists (such as Emmy Noether 
and Ernst Steinitz). Van der Waerden took mathematical concepts (such as Isomorphism) that 
were previously defined separately for different mathematical notions (such as groups, rings, 
or fields) and showed that they could be a-priori defined for each algebraic system (Schlote 
2005; Corry 2001). The mathematical entities van der Waerden discussed were familiar and 
acceptable within the mathematical discourse; the novelty he introduced lied in the relations 
between them. 
The notions van der Waerden applied in Moderne Algebra did not appear there for the first 
time: the concept of 'group' was already found in algebra textbooks from 1866, and the notions 
of ideals and fields were introduced by Dedekind in 1871. Brouwer, on the other hand, 
introduced new, original concepts and theories that were meant to replace the old, classical, 
non-constructive ones.  
To suggest an alternative to the set-theoretical notions of a class of numbers, Brouwer 
employed two intuitionistic analogs: ‘species’ and ‘spread.’ A species is a property that 
mathematical objects can have, and objects with this property are called the elements of the 
species. A spread is a collection of sequences called the nodes of the spread and is defined by 
a ‘spread function’ which performs a decidable procedure on finite sequences (Troelstra 1969; 
Dummett 1977). Another new concept that Brouwer introduced was ‘choice sequences,’ also 
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called ‘infinitely proceeding sequences’ (Troelstra 1977; van der Hoeven & Moerdijk 1984). 
Such sequences need be neither law-like (that is, governed by computable recipes for 
generating terms) nor even fully determinate in advance. Nothing about the future course of 
the sequence may be known, other than the fact that its terms are freely and independently 
chosen2. 
The problematic aspect of spread, species, and choice sequences (that are only taken here as 
representatives among several other new intuitionistic concepts Brouwer had introduced3), 
does not lie solely in their novelty. It is entwined with Brouwer’s motive to develop these new 
intuitionistic concepts, namely, his philosophical views that put philosophy before 
mathematics (and not the other way around). Brouwer was willing to forego significant parts 
of mathematics in order to refrain from the paradoxes of set theory, but for mathematicians, 
the scope of the change was far too comprehensive. Practicing mathematicians wish to solve 
problems at the core of the discipline, not to contemplate philosophical conundrums. Here lies 
another significant difference between Brouwer’s and van der Waerden’s stories: due to 
Brouwer’s philosophical views, the whole foundational basis of mathematics had to change. 
 
2 Brouwer permitted restrictions imposed by a spread law, but nothing beyond that.  
3 From these notions, together with the new definition of the natural numbers as mental 
constructs, Brouwer goes on to formulate additional intuitionistic concepts and theories such 
as bar theorem, fan, and fan theorem (Dummett 1977, van der Hoeven & Moerdijk 1984). 
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Brouwer’s intention was primarily to reform the foundations of mathematics, but van der 
Waerden’s agenda was utterly different. Even tough Moderne Algebra turned out to be an 
influential book that had a significant impact on algebra as a discipline, ‘reformation’ was not 
what van der Waerden had in mind. To take seriously the question of whether intuitionism 
could at all appeal to a broader mathematical audience, we must consider the combination of 
several differences between the two stories. It is not only the use of familiar or non-familiar 
mathematical notions, but also the philosophical motives for change (or lack thereof), and the 
scope of the change that shape the way mathematicians read and respond to new ideas. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the differences between Brouwer’s and van der 
Waerden’s motives and scope of change, let us explore the contours of Brouwer’s 
intuitionism.  
 
2. The scope of change as suggested by Brouwer’s intuitionistic program 
Brouwer’s intuitionism holds that the existence of an object is equivalent to the possibility of 
its construction in one’s mind. There is an important philosophical distinction between objects 
like finite numbers and constructively given denumerable sets, which are objects that we finite 
beings can intuitively grasp, and the Cantorian collection of all real numbers, which is an 
infinite entity that exceeds our limited grasp. Brouwer regarded the former entities as 
‘finished’ or ‘finish-able’ while the latter are ‘unfinished.’ A ‘finished’ set is produced by a 
recognizable process (that is, a process that one can construct), yielding some legitimate grasp 
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of the object with all its parts (that is, that the parts are ‘determined’ by the initial grasp). An 
‘unfinished’ collection is one that we cannot grasp in a way that suffices to determine all its 
parts (Brouwer 1952; Posy 2008).  
Throughout his dissertation, Brouwer uses this differentiation to confront Cantor’s perception 
of infinity. Brouwer accepts ω-sequences as legitimate mathematical objects since it is a 
sequence of discrete elements that are generated by a countably ordered process (Brouwer 
1912, 85-86), but it is the only infinite object he accepted (Brouwer 1907, 142–143). 
Brouwer addressed the set of real numbers as ‘denumerably unfinished’ from a negative 
perspective, pointing out that given a denumerable subset, we can straightaway find an 
element of the continuum that is not in the given subset, but there is no positive existence 
claim to support it. Hence, he proclaimed Cantor’s second number class and any ranked order 
of increasing cardinalities as illegitimate mathematical objects, a mere “expression for a 
known intention” (Brouwer 1907, 148).   
As for the intuition of the continuum itself, Brouwer firmly believed that we have an intuitive 
grasp of the continuum as a whole (Brouwer 1907, 8-9, 62). Thus, a continuum that is 
constructed out of a set of independently given points (like the Cantorian continuum) cannot 
be considered a legitimate mathematical entity. No set of points can exhaust the continuum 
since, in Brouwer’s view, it is a unity in its own right (Posy 2005). Building on from this 
concept of the continuum and his notion of infinity, Brouwer postulated a separate form of 
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intuition that delivers the continuum as a whole and generates the ‘mathematics of the 
continuum,’ thereby creating a new body of mathematical knowledge.  
By virtue of Brouwer’s new concept of a potential infinity, core notions like the principle of 
excluded middle and the concept of negation are deemed unacceptable in Brouwer’s 
intuitionism. The principle of excluded middle can only be used as a reliable tool in finite 
systems where each object of the set can be examined (in principle) by means of a finite 
process. Within a finite system, one can eventually determine whether there is a member of 
the set with the property A or that every member of the set lacks the property A. However, in 
infinite systems it is no longer possible to examine every object of the set (not even in 
principle); thus, even if one never finds a member of the set with the property A, it does not 
prove that every member of the set lacks the property A (Brouwer 1908, 1918). 
Together with the restricting concept of infinity and his demand that mathematical objects 
must be constructed, Brouwer introduced a new image of mathematical knowledge, which he 
considered as the only proper way to do mathematics. As a result of such changes, the idea of 
mathematical truth and its relation to the provability and refutability of a mathematical 
statement was redefined: in the newly proposed intuitionistic theory knowing that a statement 
P is true means having proof of it. Otherwise stated, to assert that a statement P is true is to 
claim that P can be proved; to negate P is to claim that P is refutable (i.e., that a 
counterexample exists), but it does not imply that “not P” is provable (Brouwer 1912; Heyting 
1966; Sundholm and van Atten 2008). One of the many implications from such an utter 
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reformation was that proofs of mathematical existence by contradiction ceased to be a 
legitimate technique within the discipline, inducing a change both to the image and to the body 
of knowledge.      
Moreover, Brouwer’s newly proposed image excluded several central mathematical theories, 
and extensively altered other widespread mathematical concepts. Among some of the classical 
theories Brouwer was willing to eschew, was Zermelo’s axiom of choice, that was referred to 
by Hilbert as constituting “a general logical principle which, even for the first elements of 
mathematical inference, is indispensable” (Moore 1982, 253), emphasizing the considerable 
differences between the new and the existing bodies of knowledge.  
 
3. Differences in the process of creating new knowledge  
According to Corry, the innovative aspect of van der Waerden’s book was that it created new 
and significant mathematical knowledge without introducing any new mathematical entities, 
theories, or concepts. Van der Waerden took mathematical concepts and elements that were 
developed within specific, different mathematical contexts and realized that within the 
framework of algebra, a variation of the same elements could be axiomatically defined, 
studied, and brought together into a new conceptual organization of the discipline. Such 
mathematical concepts were “different varieties of a same species (“varieties” and “species” 
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understood here in a “biological,” not mathematical term), namely, different kinds of algebraic 
structures” (Corry 2001, 176).  
The type of knowledge created in van der Waerden’s Moderne Algebra can be regarded, to 
some extent, as a continuation of the already existing mathematical body of knowledge. 
Brouwer’s story was rather different; the extensive scope of reformation Brouwer imposed on 
the prevailing body of mathematical knowledge, including the restricting concept of infinity 
and the intuitionistic notion of the continuum as a whole, made intuitionism altogether 
incomparable with classical mathematics. The intuitionistic approach is not merely a 
restriction of classical reasoning; it contradicts classical mathematics in a fundamental way 
(Iemhoff 2019).  
More than it was a new mathematical approach to the foundational problem of mathematics, 
Brouwer’s Intuitionism was, first and foremost, a philosophy of mathematics. Tracing back to 
his 1907 Ph.D. dissertation, Brouwer intended to work out his ideas in the philosophy of 
mathematics, rather than to describe various views on the foundations of mathematics (van 
Dalen 1981). In a letter from Brouwer to his supervisor, Diederick Korteweg, Brouwer wrote 
that he is glad he is finally able to use mathematics in order to support his criticism of the 
value and usefulness of language and logic4.  
 
4 As documented in a letter from Brouwer to Korteweg from September 1906 (taken from Van 
Dalen 1981, 5). 
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Brouwer's dissertation consisted of three chapters: 'The construction of mathematics,' 
'Mathematics and experience,' and 'Mathematics and logic.' In the first chapter, Brouwer 
constructs mathematics from the natural numbers to the negative, the rational, and the 
irrational numbers and introduces the continuum as an ever unfinished (Brouwer 1907, 44-52; 
Van Dalen 1999). The goal of Brouwer's second chapter is to improve Kant's view of the a 
priori, as in Brouwer's opinion the only a priori element in science is the intuition of time since 
the creation of the image of space is a free act of the intellect and as such cannot be part of the 
a priori. In the third and last chapter Brouwer touches the two themes that will become the 
most central issues in the foundational debate: the principle of excluded middle and 
mathematical existence, and directs his criticism towards Hilbert's idea of securing the 
foundations of mathematics by consistency proof (Brouwer 1907, 176).  
Korteweg's main criticism of Brouwer's dissertation was directed towards the second chapter, 
as he firmly objected to the idea of philosophical mathematics as a scientific topic for a 
dissertation. Korteweg read parts of Brouwer's book Life, Art, and Mysticism, but he expected 
Brouwer to separate between his philosophical and mathematical work5. However, in 
 
5 It should be noted that despite his criticism of Brouwer's philosophical views, Korteweg was 
one of Brouwer's most prominent advocates. He was a firm believer in Brouwer's 
mathematical abilities and did everything in his power to secure him an academic position. 
Throughout his attempt to get Brouwer elected to the Academy of Sciences in 1910, Korteweg 
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Brouwer's case, philosophy was "the basic ingredient that made the mathematics work" (van 
Dalen 2013, 86), and he had no intention in restricting his philosophical activity to leisure 
hours. Korteweg was concerned with the reception of Brouwer's work in the faculty, 
specifically with the philosophical and moral views Brouwer presented as part of his second 
chapter. He expressed his misgivings in a letter to Brouwer, where he stated: 
After receiving your letter I have again considered whether I could accept it as it is 
now. But really Brouwer, this won’t do. A kind of pessimistic and mystic philosophy 
of life has been woven into it that is no longer mathematics, and has also nothing to do 
with the foundations of mathematics. It may here and there have coalesced in your 
mind with mathematics, but that is wholly subjective. One can in that respect totally 
differ with you, and yet completely share your views on the foundations of 
mathematics. I am convinced that every supervisor, young or old, sharing or not 
sharing your philosophy of life, would object to its incorporation in a mathematical 
dissertation. In my opinion your dissertation can only gain by removing it. It now gives 
it a character of bizarreness which can only harm it. (van Dalen 2013, 92-93) 
 
even approached leading international mathematicians such as Hilbert and Poincaré in order to 
get their recommendations for a membership to a "gifted and exceptional scholar" such as 
Brouwer (van Dalen 2013). 
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Korteweg's remarks on Brouwer's dissertation stress out the extent to which Brouwer's work 
deviated from the acceptable norm of a standard mathematical dissertation. Korteweg 
suspected that Brouwer's philosophical incentive to reform mathematics might not appeal to a 
wide mathematical audience, mainly as it contradicted familiar notions and stood against the 
theories developed by momentous mathematicians like David Hilbert. Some changes are too 
far-reaching for mathematicians to endure, and even the glamorous promise of consistency 
and non-paradoxical foundations is not enough to make them give up the methods and theories 
they use doing everyday mathematics.  
Eventually, Brouwer revised the second chapter, leaving some of the problematic 
philosophical parts out of it. However, Brouwer maintained his philosophical views and 
continued to develop intuitionism primarily as a philosophy of mathematics that entailed a 
massive reformation to the foundations of the discipline rather than an extension or a 
continuation of classical mathematics. The role of intuition in Brouwer’s mathematics is a 
means of introducing new mathematical structures, not ‘different kind of the same species’ 
structures as in van der Waerden’s work. As David Hesseling puts it, Brouwer “started from 
his own ideas and looked for mathematics that fitted in, instead of working the other way 
around” (Hesseling 2003, 35). 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
The current paper suggests that three factors played a significant role in the lack of reception 
to Brouwer’s intuitionism: the first is Brouwer’s philosophical agenda to reform mathematics, 
which was foreign and unrelatable in the eyes of most mathematicians, including Brouwer’s 
Ph.D. supervisor, Korteweg. The second is the extensive scope of change Brouwer had 
imposed on all aspects of mathematics, thereby excluding major theories and acceptable 
proofs from the legitimate body of mathematical knowledge. The third element is the 
introduction of new concepts and theories that were meant to replace the non-constructive 
ones, a move that only further characterized intuitionism as an isolated theory, deprived of any 
foothold in current mathematical practices. Each factor is entwined with and explains the other 
two factors: Brouwer’s philosophical motivation is the reason behind the massive scope of 
reformation he suggested, and every new concept he introduced is rooted in his philosophical 
views of what mathematics actually is and how it should be practiced. Taken alone, each 
factor is necessary but not sufficient in the attempt to explain why the intuitionistic program 
was not able to attract broader groups of mathematicians. However, all three factors together 
offer a more comprehensive picture of the lack of reception to Brouwer’s intuitionism.  
Among the mathematicians who did embrace Brouwer’s intuitionism for a short period was 
Hermann Weyl, who was deeply influenced by philosophers such as Fichte and Husserl 
(Scholz 2000, Feferman 1998) and tried to develop his philosophical view of mathematics in 
his monograph Das Kontinuum (Weyl 1918). However, Weyl was quite a unique scholar 
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among mathematicians and physicists that not only contributed to his own fields of research 
but also engaged with philosophical questions about the foundations of mathematics and the 
nature of mathematical entities (Weyl 1949). Most mathematicians restricted their areas of 
expertise to the discipline of mathematics and did not find a necessary connection between 
practicing mathematics and doing philosophy. Even Brouwer’s prominent student, Arend 
Heyting, was ambivalent in regards to the inseparable connection between mathematics and 
philosophy that Brouwer had imposed.  
Heyting’s intuitionism and Brouwer’s intuitionism were quite different: while Brouwer 
insisted on detaching intuitionism from any axiomatic method, Heyting took Brouwer’s 
intuitionistic ideas and expressed them using a formalistic approach. Heyting’s formalization 
comprised intuitionistic propositional and predicate logic, arithmetic, and analysis, all together 
in one big system (Heyting 1930; 1980). While his formalization of analysis did not derive 
from its classical counterpart (thus it was somewhat overlooked within the foundational 
debate), the parts concerned with logic and arithmetic were subsystems of their classical 
counterparts (expect from the principle of excluded middle, which was excluded from 
Heyting’s theory), and were extensively discussed (van Atten 2017).  
Heyting’s intuitionism reached a wide mathematical audience and continued to develop over 
the following decades (see: Gentzen 1935; Heyting 1966; Kleene 1952; Myhill 1966; Vesley 
1980). Was the reaction to Heyting’s intuitionism a result of the differences between 
Heyting’s intuitionism and Brouwer’s intuitionism? Was it only the formalization of 
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intuitionism that made Heyting’s ideas more approachable to working mathematicians, or was 
it also the sense of detachment from Brouwer’s philosophical stances that is evident in 
Heyting’s approach to intuitionistic mathematics? There is a conflicting view regarding the 
way Heyting addressed Brouwer’s philosophical considerations. Albeit Heyting quoted 
Brouwer’s remarks on the relation between mathematics and logic, Heyting also claimed that 
philosophy is not necessary in order to understand intuitionistic mathematics, and some of 
Brouwer’s most significant concepts (such as consciousness and mind) play no role in 
Heyting’s approach (Heyting 1974; Placek 1999). Unlike Brouwer, Heyting did not attempt to 
justify the intuitionistic revision philosophically, nor to suggest that philosophical assumptions 
are inherent in intuitionistic mathematics. As opposed to Brouwer’s viewpoint, Heyting 
argued that intuitionism is much simpler than any philosophy and that it would be better for 
the sake of intuitionism to eliminate any philosophical (metaphysical as well as 
epistemological) premises. As Heyting put it: 
The only philosophical thesis of mathematical intuitionism is that no philosophy is 
needed to understand mathematics. (Heyting 1974, 79). 
The superiority of intuitionistic mathematics over classical mathematics, according to Heyting, 
derives from the former being free from any metaphysical or philosophical assumption. 
Therefore, it appears that even Brouwer’s most devoted student deviated from Brouwer’s 
philosophical positions and regarded them as alien and even irrelevant to Brouwer’s 
intuitionistic program. What caused Heyting to abandon Brouwer’s philosophical approach 
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but to continue his intuitionistic pursue? Is it possible that Brouwer’s philosophical views 
combined with the massive reformation he suggested and the introduction of new concepts 
demanded too much mathematical compromises, even from a faithful disciple like Heyting? 
Can the examination of Heyting’s reception of Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics while 
discarding Brouwer’s philosophy shed yet another light on the question of why other 
mathematicians, less devoted to Brouwer, were unwilling to accept Brouwer’s intuitionistic 
program? The current paper sets the stage for exploring these questions and provides a prolific 
ground to start from, in its attempt to present a more inclusive perspective on how certain 
developments in mathematics prevailed whereas others did not.   
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REFLEXIVITY, FUNCTIONAL REFERENCE, AND
MODULARITY: ALTERNATIVE TARGETS FOR LANGUAGE
ORIGINS
TRAVIS LACROIX
Abstract. Researchers in language origins typically try to explain how com-
positional communication might evolve to bridge the gap between animal com-
munication and natural language. However, as an explanatory target, compo-
sitionality has been shown to be problematic for a gradualist approach to the
evolution of language. In this paper, I suggest that reflexivity provides an apt
and plausible alternative target which does not succumb to the problems that
compositionality faces. I further explain how proto-reflexivity, which depends
upon functional reference, gives rise to complex communication systems via
modular composition.
Keywords — reflexivity, language origins, explanatory targets, functional ref-
erence, modular composition, compositionality, animal communication
1. Introduction
Communication is ubiquitous in nature: every taxon that has been investigated
displays some form of communication system (Kight et al., 2013). However, lin-
guistic communication—i.e., natural language—is (or at least is often taken to be)
unique to humans. This raises the question; how did language evolve? That is, how
did rich linguistic communication systems like the ones we see in humans evolve
out of simpler non-linguistic systems of communication? This is an inherently diffi-
cult question due to a lack of direct evidence—language does not fossilise, and we
cannot observe the actual precursors of human language in, e.g., extinct hominin
ancestors.
Nonetheless, work on language origins has blossomed in recent decades. New
data, increasingly sophisticated techniques and technologies, and productive inter-
disciplinary research have helped foster the development of subtle models of lan-
guage evolution. This is achieved using a multi-component approach to understand
the mechanisms underlying language and how they might have evolved (Fitch,
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2017). For example, comparative methods in evolutionary biology start by breaking
down a complex trait into multiple subcomponent mechanisms or features (Fitch,
2017; Martinez, 2018). We can then examine the presence or absence of traits, in
phylogenetic terms, to infer facts about whether some particular trait common to
several species is a homologue or an analogue. Computer simulations further provide
a concrete and explicit way to test hypotheses (Cangelosi and Parisi, 2002), furnish-
ing a how-possibly explanation of the sort that is common in evolutionary biology
(Resnik, 1991). However, the plausibility of these results requires figuring empirical
evidence from relevant fields—in the case of language origins, this includes evidence
from biology, linguistics, animal communication, neuroscience, and more.
The most common feature of natural language that is appealed to as a gap-
bridging explanatory target is compositionality (and related features like hierarchy
and recursion). The idea is that if we could explain how compositional communi-
cation can evolve out of non-compositional communication, we would have taken
great strides in explaining how language evolved. However, this is problematic inso-
far as (1) compositionality, in an evolutionary context, proffers asymmetric benefits
for senders and receivers of signals, and researchers have not maintained adequate
sensitivity to this role-asymmetry (LaCroix, 2020a); (2) there is no empirical ev-
idence for proto-compositional communication as a precursor to natural language
insofar as the oft-cited evidence is more likely homologous to human-level linguistic
compositionality than analogous (LaCroix, 2019a); and (3) there is no gradualist
explanation of compositionality, insofar as this is a binary property of language
(Berwick and Chomsky, 2011; LaCroix, 2020b).
In this paper, I propose that reflexivity—the ability to use language to talk
about language—provides an apt and plausible alternative explanatory target for
language-origins research. I further explain how proto-reflexivity, which depends
upon functional reference, gives rise to complex communication systems via mod-
ular composition. I argue that reflexivity does not succumb to the problems that
compositionality faces since (1) role asymmetries are accounted for by the underly-
ing mechanism of functional reference, (2) there exists empirical evidence of plau-
sible precursors to reflexivity in nature, (3) the precursors of reflexivity are graded.
Finally, reflexivity allows for rich compositional structures that have been shown
to give rise to genuinely compositional syntax.
2. Proto-reflexivity, functional reference, and their evolutionary
precursors
Communication is a unique evolutionary system in the following sense. Once a
group of individuals has learned some simple communication convention, those
learned behaviours may be used to influence future communicative behaviour,
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thereby affecting future communication conventions. This may give rise to a feed-
back loop, wherein more complex communication, in turn, is used to influence future
communicative behaviours which are even more sophisticated.
When faced with a novel context, individuals can always learn a brand-new dis-
position from scratch. However, in some cases, it may be more advantageous or
more efficient to utilise a pre-evolved disposition. When individuals take advantage
of pre-evolved communicative dispositions to thereby influence future communica-
tion, this is a form of proto-reflexivity. Such an ability is an evolutionary precursor
to the reflexivity of natural languages, wherein one can use language to talk about
language.
Proto-reflexivity depends primarily upon functional reference, which has been
the subject of much empirical and theoretical work in animal communication (Siev-
ers and Gruber, 2016). Functional reference is so-called because it is meant to evoke
the idea of reference in language without being equivalent to reference in the way
that words refer. So, the ability to refer functionally is an evolutionary precursor
to the ability to refer linguistically. Signals are functionally referential if they are
‘elicited by a special class of stimuli and capable of causing behaviours adaptive to
such stimuli in the absence of contextual cues’ (Scarantino, 2013, 1006).1 They are
therefore context-specific for the signaller to produce, and stimulus-independent for
the receiver to understand. This can be defined formally, as in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1: (Strong) Functional Reference
A token of type X functionally refers to a token of type Y just in case the
following two criteria are jointly satisfied:
(1) Production Criterion: Xs are reliably caused (only/mostly) by Y s;
(2) Perception Criterion:Xs presentations reliably cause responses adap-
tive to Y s in the absence of Y s and any other contextual cues.
For example, vervet monkey (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) alarm calls are suggested
(Seyfarth et al., 1980) to be functionally referential since the presence of an eagle
(Y ) reliably causes an eagle alarm call (X), satisfying the production criterion.
Furthermore, the presentation of an eagle alarm call (X) reliably causes recipients
to hide in the bush (an adaptive response to the presence of an eagle, Y ), satisfying
the perception criterion. Playback experiments suggest that these responses occur
in the absence of other contextual cues.
Female Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana) elicit alarm calls upon viewing a
predator first-hand and respond to alarm calls of male Diana monkeys by repeating
the call. Zuberbühler et al. (1999) perform playback experiments of various pairs
1See also Macedonia and Evans (1993).
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of stimuli—a matching pair consists of an alarm call followed by the sound of the
predator to which the call functionally refers; a mismatched pair consists of an
alarm call followed by the sound of a predator to which the call does not function-
ally refer. In each case, pairs of stimuli are separated by five minutes of silence. In
the experiment, the female monkeys displayed less concern upon hearing, e.g., the
characteristic shriek of an eagle five minutes after the eagle alarm call—the for-
mer conveys no new information. However, they showed significant concern upon
hearing a characteristic leopard growl five minutes after hearing the eagle alarm
call. The conclusion is that alarm calls do not just serve to trigger (behaviourally
or deterministically) an evasive response: individuals have an ‘idea’—what Hurford
(2007) terms a ‘proto-concept’—of the relevant predator in mind for at least five
minutes following the initial alarm call.
We might worry about the strength of Definition 2.1 since, for example, aggres-
sion signals may functionally refer to future aggressive behaviour, though it perhaps
seems strange to say they are caused by it. We can weaken this by indexing to a
context and replacing causation with correlation, as in Definition 2.2 (Scarantino,
2013):
Definition 2.2: (Weak) Functional Reference
A token of type X in context C functionally refers to a token of type Y
just in case the following two criteria are jointly satisfied:
(1) Contextual Information Criterion: Xs in context C are corre-
lated with Y s (weakly or strongly);
(2) Contextual Perception Criterion: Xs presentations in context C
reliably cause responses adaptive to Y s in the absence of Y s.
This is information-theoretic because X carries information about Y just in case
Xs and Y s are correlated.2 The intuition is that the signal and the functional
referent must correlate enough to make responding to the signal in ways that are
adaptive to the referent evolutionarily advantageous.
Functional reference, and therefore proto-reflexivity, minimally requires several
communicative precursors, including arbitrariness, specialisation, semanticity, dis-
creteness, and displacement (Hockett, 1960). Arbitrariness requires that there is
no ‘natural’ connection between a linguistic form and its meaning; this contrasts
with iconic signals where there is a similarity between the form of a sign and
its meaning—e.g., onomatopoeia in natural language. Specialisation requires that
the signal produced is intended for communication, and not because of another
2This dovetails nicely with the role that information transfer plays in studies of animal communi-
cation (see Stegmann (2013), though cf. Dawkins and Krebs (1978)), as well as theoretical work
in philosophy on meaning as informational content; see Skyrms (2010a,b).
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behaviour; this contrasts with cues, which are a byproduct of some other (non-
communicative) process—e.g., the presence of CO2 transfers information about the
location of a mammal, though exhalation of CO2 did not evolve for this purpose.
Semanticity requires that there is a relationship between a signal and its meaning.
However, these three features of communication are early-evolving abilities that are
common to mammals generally. Discreteness means that signals are perceived cat-
egorically, as opposed to continuously; this feature is present in primates generally.
Finally, displacement is the ability to talk about things that are not present in the
immediate environment.
Consider a situation where individuals coordinate upon a communication con-
vention, like in a simple signalling game (Lewis, 1969; Skyrms, 2010a). In this case,
the messages may functionally refer to the states of the world—as in the vervet
monkey alarm call system. Now, suppose that this signalling situation occurs in a
pre-evolved context. Suppose further that there is a novel context in which indi-
viduals must learn a new communication system. In some cases, the output of the
novel signalling context may be an appropriate input for the pre-evolved signalling


















However, signals functionally refer to states in the pre-evolved context, and the
states are just the output of the communication system in the novel context; so,
messages come to functionally refer to the communication system itself, in a way
that is proto-reflexive: they functionally refer to a communication context as a
whole, rather than linguistic symbols themselves. In such a situation, discrete, ar-
bitrary, and meaningful signals, which are specialised for communicative purposes,
come to (functionally) refer to something abstract, in a sense, and so displaced from
the immediate environment.
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How might such a property or ability evolve? This happens by way of modu-
lar composition and related processes. Various processes of this sort may include
appropriation or template transfer, analogical reasoning, or genuine modular com-
position.
3. Modular composition and related processes
3.1. Transfer (of) Learning. The simplest way of evolving new strategies from
old strategies is appropriation. This process, minimally, requires the following. First,
the agents must have evolved a disposition for a particular context. The agents then
face a novel context, where the prior disposition just happens to be appropriate—
though this may not be known at the outset. This novel context may be relevantly
similar, but non-trivially distinct, from the original context. Appropriation then
consists in applying the prior strategy to the novel context. It may be that the
agent happens, by chance, to try something pre-evolved when faced with a novel
context. The appropriateness of the pre-evolved strategy may determine a suffi-
ciently beneficial reward such that, when faced with this same context again, the
agent learns quickly (even by simple reinforcement) to perform the old action. This
simple form of appropriation is sometimes called transfer (of) learning.3
This allows for flexibility of behaviour in problem-solving, via the ability to gen-
eralise learned rules to novel contexts. There is good evidence that many species of
new- and old-world monkeys, as well as great apes, are capable of transfer; however,
prosimians are not (Rumbaugh, 1970, 1971, 1995; Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984a,b;
Bonte et al., 2014). One example of transfer learning in nonhuman animals is an
extension of classification tasks, involving ‘reversal learning’. Here, an animal is
trained to associate a particular stimulus with a reward. Once the agent exhibits
some degree of success, the relation between the stimulus and the reward reverses,
so the agent must replace the prior association with the opposite association. If
the animal can quickly reverse its associations, it is assumed that successful per-
formance is based on a concept of oppositeness. On the other hand, if the new
association takes as long or longer to be learned, no such application of conceptual
understanding may be attributed to the agent.4
Minimally, transfer learning requires only that an agent try prior strategies.
Successful strategies may be learned via simple reinforcement, or they may be dis-
covered via a more sophisticated trial-and-error. When salience is present—e.g., the
physical properties of a new predator being saliently similar to an old predator—the
3See, e.g., Ellis (1965); Schunk (2004); Pugh and Bergin (2006); Hung (2013).
4Hurford (2007) argues that reversal learning experiments do not merely highlight an ability to
apply the relation of oppositeness between a source and a target context; instead, the agent ‘seems
to be keeping its old mental representation (concept) of the general class of stimuli acquired in
the first training regime and relating the new set to that acquired concept’ (25).
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new strategy may be implemented immediately; however, this is a more sophisti-
cated version of transfer learning, which requires a concept of analogical similarity.
3.2. Analogical Reasoning. The most common way of testing analogical reason-
ing ability is with a set of analogy problems known as relational matching-to-sample
(RMTS) tasks.5 This experimental task involves showing the agent a sample set,
which consists of two or more objects that are either identical or non-identical. The
agent is then shown two comparison sets, which contain novel objects—one of which
involves identity, and the other of which involves non-identity. To be successful, the
agent must choose the comparison set which matches the sample set.
In this case, the analogy between various stimuli requires a concept of Same
versus Different. As with transfer learning, there is some evidence that nonhu-
man animals can utilise analogical reasoning. Despite prior belief to the contrary
(Thompson and Oden, 2000), it has been shown experimentally that some apes (im-
portantly, chimpanzees) can perform these tasks easily. Other apes and very few
old-world monkeys can perform these tasks, but only after extensive training. In
each case, symbolic training results in better performance, implying a relationship
between cognition and linguistic ability.6
Noting and taking advantage of analogy is more cognitively complex than sim-
ple transfer. Increasing complexity again, we arrive at a full concept of modular
composition.
3.3. Modular Composition. Finally, modular composition itself varies in com-
plexity, but the most complex forms are supposed to be unique to humans and
to depend upon language. Spelke (2003) suggests that humans and other animals
are endowed with early-developing, core systems of knowledge, called ‘modules’.
However, these core systems are limited in several ways. First, they are domain-
specific, since these modules represent only a subset of entities in the surroundings
of the agent. Second, they are task-specific, since they inform only a subset of the
repertoire of the agent’s actions and cognitive processes. Third, they are (at least
relatively) encapsulated, since there is a restriction on the flow of information into
and out of a module. Finally, modules are (at least relatively) isolated from one
another, since they do not readily combine (Spelke, 2003, 291).7
5See Skinner (1950); Blough (1959); Ferster (1960).
6See, e.g., Skinner (1950); Blough (1959); Ferster (1960); Fagot et al. (2001); Wasserman et al.
(2001); Katz et al. (2002); Flemming et al. (2011).
7See also Fodor (1983, 1984, 2000); Sherry and Schacter (1987); Sperber (1994); Coltheart (1999);
Sperber (2002); Carruthers (2002); Barrett and Kurzban (2006); Shettleworth (2012); Robbins
(2017).
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Many core cognitive capacities that are available to (and were once thought to be
unique to) humans are also available to nonhuman animals (Spelke, 2003).8 There-
fore, humans, but also nonhuman animals, have early-developing core knowledge
systems, which allow for a broad range of intelligent behaviour and cognitive ca-
pacities; and, in many cases, these same core systems enable nonhuman animals
to outperform human infants in similar tasks. Thus, core systems alone do not ac-
count for uniquely human cognitive capacities. Spelke (2003) suggests that human
cognitive capacities depend on core knowledge systems, which are shared by other
animals, and on a uniquely human combinatorial ability for conjoining these repre-
sentations to create new systems of knowledge. Furthermore, she suggests that the
latter capacity is made possible by natural language, which provides the medium for
combining the representations delivered by core knowledge systems (305). Specifi-
cally, it is the compositional nature of natural language, which gives rise to uniquely
flexible human cognition, on her account.
The basic communicative abilities that give rise to human linguistic capacities
are shared with many other species; however, the ability to produce and interpret
recursive structures is uniquely human (Hauser et al., 2002). If we assume that the
human capacity for language can be decomposed into a set of well-defined mecha-
nisms that interact via interfaces, then we can begin to examine how such interfaces
between individual components may ‘hook up’ in the first place. In essence, this is
the concept of modular composition as it is described in Barrett and Skyrms (2017).
Modular composition ties together explanations of complexity in communicative,
cognitive, and social structures.
4. Reflexivity as an explanatory target
Researchers typically propose evolutionary theories that explain how composi-
tionality arose, moving from a one-word stage (simple signalling), to a two-word
stage (combinatorial signalling), and eventually to (compositional) language.9 How-
ever, as was mentioned in the introduction, prioritising linguistic compositionality
as an explanatory target gives rise to significant theoretical and practical problems.
The novel approach to the evolution of language suggested here prioritises reflex-
ivity as an explanatory target. On this account, simple communicative capacities
evolve alongside cognitive capacities. Signals may become functionally referential,
referring to concrete objects in the world. Once individuals are able to make use
of proto-concepts, they can refer to abstracta. Therefore, they can refer to commu-
nicative contexts, giving rise to proto-reflexivity. This ability means that they can
8See empirical work in Wynn (1992); Simon et al. (1995); Koechlin et al. (1998); de Walle et al.
(2001); Feigenson et al. (2002). See Wynn (1998); Spelke (1998) for reviews of this literature.
9See, e.g., Bickerton (1990); Jackendoff (1999); Progovac (2015).
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influence future communicative behaviour via communication. Such capacities may
evolve by modular composition and related processes. Furthermore, it has been
demonstrated that reflexivity gives rise to functional composition (compositional
syntax) as a byproduct of these processes (LaCroix, 2019b).
Several recent works in the signalling game literature have demonstrated that
modular compositional processes, like the ones described here, are more efficient and
more effective for evolving or learning communication conventions than learning
novel dispositions from scratch, often by orders of magnitude (Barrett, 2016, 2017,
2020; Barrett and Skyrms, 2017; LaCroix, 2019b, 2020c; Barrett et al., 2020).
Furthermore, reflexivity does not succumb to the same problems that composi-
tionality does, as an explanatory target. It was mentioned in the introduction that
compositionality, as it is discussed in the literature, fails to maintain sensitivity to
role-asymmetries between producers and interpreters of signals (LaCroix, 2020a);
however, for reflexivity, this role-asymmetry is built-in via functional reference (Def-
initions 2.1; 2.2), which accounts for these differences by definition. Furthermore,
there are no empirical precursors to compositionality (LaCroix, 2019a), whereas
the processes by which reflexivity evolves are supported by significant empirical
evidence. Finally, compositionality is a binary property of language (Berwick and
Chomsky, 2011), meaning that there is no gradualist explanation of the evolution of
compositionality; in contrast, both reflexivity and the processes by which it might
arise are graded notions. In non-reflexive functionally-referential systems, signals
refer to states; in proto-reflexive functionally-referential systems, signals refer to
communicative contexts; and in reflexive language, words refer to linguistic enti-
ties. So, reflexivity is graded, but the processes by which it arises are also graded—
appropriation is simpler than analogical reasoning, which is simpler than modular
composition.
Finally, compositionality is focused too internally on language and syntax itself,
so explanations do not (or at least need not) take account of related cognitive
and social mechanisms that are important factors in the evolution of language.
On the other hand, reflexivity does. Therefore, there are significant practical and
theoretical reasons to replace compositionality with reflexivity as an explanatory
target for language origins research.
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Previous discussions of observation selection effects (OSEs) have ignored the
distinction between observation and evidence. Evidence for a hypothesis, I argue, is
distinct from the observation of that evidence. This shows that the fact that
evidence is unobservable does not entail that the evidence does not obtain. What is
required for an OSE is that evidence is guaranteed, not that counter-evidence is
unobservable. With the evidence-observation distinction in hand, apparent
counterexamples fail. I then show that observer perspective can change whether or
not an agent is subject to an OSE, even when knowledge is shared between
perspectives.
1 Introduction
In this paper I defend the entailment model of observation selection effects (OSEs). This
simple model states that when background conditions, in conjunction with the
hypotheses under consideration, entail evidence E, then E does not favor either of the
1
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hypotheses.1 However, this model for understanding how OSEs work has been subject to
several apparent counterexamples, including Firing Squad and a modified version of
Eddington’s Fish example.
What these, and other discussants, have presupposed, however, is that evidence and
observation of evidence are equivalent. I argue that evidence and observation of evidence
are importantly distinct. Evidence is a fact or state of affairs, about the world, that
obtains. But the fact that a state of affairs obtains does not guarantee that it is
observed. In many cases evidence obtains, but we do not, or cannot, observe it. With
this distinction clarified, the entailment model is shown to handle the apparent
counterexamples deployed against it.
I then present an example from Francis Bacon which shows the surprising result that
observer perspective can change whether or not an agent is subject to an OSE, even
when both perspectives share all the same knowledge.
2 Eddington’s Fish and the Entailment Model
Discussions of observation selection effects (OSEs) rightly begin with an example
adapted from Eddington’s 1939 Philosophy of Physical Science. (Eddington 1939)2 In
this example, Fishing, we imagine a biologist attempting to distinguish between two
1It is not necessary that selection biases, more generally, require that the background
and hypotheses entail the evidence. For a more general discussion of the phenomena of
selection bias see Berkson’s Paradox.
2This version due to Sober 2003, 41f.
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hypotheses:
L: All fish in this pond are longer than 10 inches.
S: Half of the fish in this pond are longer than 10 inches, the other half are
shorter than 10 inches.
The biologist then observes this evidence:
E: All fish caught in this pond were longer than 10 inches.
How should we evaluate the hypotheses in light of E? One way would be to express the
relationship between the evidence and hypotheses would be through the Law of
Likelihood:
Law of Likelihood: E is evidence for Hi over Hj iff pr(E|Hi) > pr(E|Hj)
In this case, since all the fish caught were larger than 10”, and this is more likely if L is
true rather than S, we get the following inequality:
pr(E|L) > pr(E|S)
Thus, by the law of likelihood, E is evidence for L over S.
But now a further fact about how the observations were made is revealed:
N : The net used to catch fish in this pond always catches fish, if it can, but
it can’t catch fish smaller than 10 inches because of the size of the holes in
the net.3
3Most authors have given N as, “The net used can’t catch fish smaller than 10 inches
3
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Now E no longer appears to be evidence for L over S because:
pr(E|L ∧N) = pr(E|S ∧N) = 1
The simplest explanation for what has happened is that,
N ∧ L  E and N ∧ S  E
Since N , in conjunction with either L or S, ensures that any fish caught will be larger
than 10”, it entails E. The alternative, ¬E, that some fish caught in this pond were
shorter than 10”, is ruled out.
In general:
If, for background conditions B and hypotheses H1 and H2, B ∧H1  E and
B ∧H2  E, then E is not evidence for H1 over H2.
Since it is necessary to consider background conditions, we must supplement the Law of
Likelihood with a total evidence requirement which makes it explicit that we must take
these conditions into account:
Law of Likelihood*: E is evidence for H1 over H2 with respect to background
conditions B iff pr(E|H1 ∧B) > pr(E|H2 ∧B)
This model of observation selection effects is the one I clarify and defend in the rest of
the paper. In the next section, I explain the Firing Squad counterexample to the
because of the size of the holes in the net,” but then need to build in a “catch” condition
so that N  E.
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entailment model. I then show that, once we distinguish evidence from observation, the
entailment model gives the right result for Firing Squad after all.
3 Evidence, Observation, and Firing Squads
3.1 Firing Squad
The first objection to the simple model above is Firing Squad (Sober 2003, 44f.). In
this example, imagine a prisoner faced with a firing squad. Two hypotheses are being
considered:
Aim: The firing squad is aiming at the prisoner.
Avoid: The firing squad is aiming to avoid hitting the prisoner.
After the shots are fired and the smoke has cleared, the prisoner makes her observation:
Alive: The prisoner is alive.
Since it is unlikely that the prisoner would still be alive, were the executioners aiming,
but quite likely that she would be alive, if they were avoiding her, it seems that:
pr(Alive|Avoid) > pr(Alive|Aim)
Thus her survival seems to be evidence that the executioners were aiming to miss.
But, if the entailment model formulated above is correct, there appears to be an OSE
at work in Firing Squad. The way the evidence was gathered guarantees that, if the
prisoner observes anything, she is guaranteed to observe that she is alive. The
background necessary for the prisoner to observe that she is alive is:
5
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Survive: The prisoner survives.
Survive clearly entails Alive, so:
pr(Alive|Aim ∧ Survive) = pr(Alive|Avoid ∧ Survive) = 1
But this will not do. It seems clear that the prisoner would be correct in taking her
survival to be evidence that the guards aimed to miss. What has gone wrong?
3.2 Evidence and Observation
In order to understand what has gone wrong, we must give an account of the difference
between observation and evidence. These two concepts have frequently been conflated.
From an internalist perspective it is often assumed that observations are the only things
which could possibly be used as evidence. Evidence, after all, must be accessible to the
agent and therefore must be a mental state (or similar). The only candidate for evidence
about the world, then, is our phenomenal experience of it—namely observations.
But there is more to the story. If we take observations to be evidence then we can,
classically, only have two evidential states with respect to E: either we have the evidence
E or we do not. But once we move outside of the agent and into an external world, rich
in evidence, that is not how observations of evidence work. No doubt we do need to
observe in order to incorporate evidence, but that is not what evidence is.
Evidence is, on my account, a state-of affairs or fact about the world. It can be, and
often is, independent of our knowledge, awareness, or observation of it. As a
state-of-affairs it either is, or is not, the case. Thus for any state-of-affairs E, either E or
¬E.
6
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Observation of that E, on the other hand, is distinct from E. While E or ¬E is
necessary, our observation of E or ¬E is not. We might observe E, observe ¬E, or we
might fail to observe anything, with respect to E.
The test of whether some claim is an observation claim or an evidence claim will,
then, as a first pass, be whether it obeys excluded middle. If the claim about ϕ does
obey excluded middle, then it is an evidence claim. If it does not and there is a third
option—failure to observe ϕ—then it cannot be a claim about evidence and must be a
claim about observation.
Here’s an example to help understand this distinction: An astrobiologist seeks
evidence of life on other planets, such as O2 concentrations in the atmosphere. There is a
fact-of-the-matter about the O2 concentration. It is there whether anyone ever knows
about it. This evidence, however is difficult to observe. It may never be observed. But
this does not mean that a high O2 concentration is not evidence for life. It merely means
that our observation of this evidence is contingent.
As a first pass at giving a logic of observation, let me propose the observation
operator ‘©’.4 ©αϕ should be read as the tenseless claim that α observes ϕ. One might
plausibly know ©αϕ without being the agent α and without observing ϕ oneself.
Crucially, © will have the following properties:
1. ©αϕ  ϕ
2. ¬©α ϕ 6 ¬ϕ
4© may be understood as similar to the epistemic modal operator K and will have
similar properties, though developing the connections will require further work.
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Thus observation is factive; observation of some evidence E, by an agent, α, entails E
(or alternatively, entails that E is the case). But failure to observe E does not entail
that there is no evidence E (or alternatively, that E fails to obtain). This distinction is,
I think, easily understood, but easily overlooked.
The same distinction between observation and evidence may be elucidated in terms
of conditionalization upon learning new evidence:
Conditionalization: for any time ti and later time tj, if proposition E
represents everything the agent learns between ti and tj and pri(E) > 0, then
for any H, prj(H) = pri(H|E) (Titelbaum 2015, 92).
5
Note that conditionalization is put in terms of learning E, not in terms of whether E or
¬E. Just as with observation, failing to learn E between ti and tj does not entail ¬E.
One does not update upon failing to learn anything.6 Thus failing to observe E is
equivalent to learning nothing between ti and tj.
Conditionalization tells us that Bayes’ rule is about what one would do if one had
the evidence, not simply what one believes already. It sets a norm that, if one had some
evidence, one ought do such-and-such with that evidence. It does not guarantee that one
has that evidence. This diachronic norm forces us to consider the act of
learning—observing—new evidence. Rather than just considering evidence as a static
phenomenon, the observation of evidence causes a change in our epistemic state. Thus
5Other updating norms are, of course, possible, such as Jeffrey conditionalization.
6Note, however, that one might learn, between ti and tj, that one has (or has not)
made an observation. ϕ may be a complex statement which contains ©.
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we should be considering two states: the state prior to receiving the evidence, which is
when the law of likelihood tells us how we should react to the evidence, and the state
after receiving the evidence, which is when we do incorporate that evidence.
Since Bayesians posit this tight link between synchronic conditional credences and
posterior diachronic credences, how one ought to update on evidence is built in from the
beginning. One can, therefore, evaluate how one ought to react upon learning E without
having to observe E. Similarly, one retains this judgment about how one should evaluate
E whether or not one does, or even can, observe E. Thus the evidence and observation
distinction is built into the Bayesian approach.
This parallel between evidence-observation and conditionalization will be a useful
heuristic going forward.
3.3 Resolving Firing Squad
Let’s take a closer look at Firing Squad to see how the observation-evidence
distinction is relevant.
First, let us use conditionalization to review the situation. Recall that each of Aim
and Avoid, in conjunction with Survive entail Alive, thus Alive seemed to provide no
evidence for Avoid over Aim. But as we are considering how evidence is used to update
beliefs, we should consider the prisoner’s epistemic situation before and after the shots
are fired.
It may be easiest to consider the perspective of a bystander to Firing Squad. This
bystander will not be subject to an OSE. Her life and future observations are not
threatened by the executioners’ guns. Thus he can legitimately have this likelihood
9
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argument in mind at t0:
pr(Alive|Avoid) > pr(Alive|Aim)
Thus, upon learning, between t0 and t1, whether or not the prisoner is alive, he can
update on that evidence. Both Alive and ¬Alive are possible states of affairs that come
into being between t0 and t1. He learns something new when the smoke clears and the
prisoner has survived.
The prisoner is in exactly the same evidential position at t0, prior to the volley.
7 Just
as the bystander is in suspense as to whether Alive or ¬Alive, the prisoner too is in
suspense. She does not know what will happen. She knows that she will not observe that
she is not alive, but this does not rule out the possibility that she does not survive.
Thus, when the smoke clears, she learns something new and surprising—she is alive! She
then updates on the information learned between t0 and t1, increases her credence in
Avoid, and lowers her credence in Aim.
Let us put this in terms of observation and evidence. What will the prisoner’s
background conditions include? Survive (the prisoner survives) will not be in the
prisoner’s background conditions. Survive would presuppose that the only evidence
possible is Alive. But this is not the case. Alive and ¬Alive are both possible states of
affairs. What will be among her background conditions is Survive*:
7Contra Sober who argues that, because the prisoner cannot make the observation that
she is not alive, the prisoner and bystander are in different evidential positions (Sober 2003,
p. 46, 50n20f.).
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Survive*: I will not observe that I am not alive.8
In symbols, for prisoner p:
¬©p ¬Alive
This states that the prisoner, p, will not observe that she is not alive. Thus the correct
likelihood argument will be:
pr(Alive|Avoid ∧ ¬©p ¬Alive) > pr(Alive|Aim ∧ ¬©p ¬Alive)
Recall that ¬© Alive 6 ¬Alive. Survive* does not entail Alive. Survive* thus makes no
difference to the likelihood argument. The fact that the prisoner will not observe that she
is alive does not entail that she will not be alive. Thus, since it is not guaranteed that she
survives, her survival can count as evidence that the soldiers were not aiming to hit her.
Once we recognize the role that the evidence-observation distinction is making, the
entailment model gives the correct result for Firing Squad after all.
3.4 The No-Observation Objection
But this response leads to another objection to the entailment model. If we are correct
about how the entailment model ought to respond to Firing Squad, then it seems as
though our intrepid ichthyologist is also not guaranteed to observe that there are large
fish in the net.
8Survive* is equivalent to Weisberg’s S ′: If I observe whether I survive, I will observe
that I survive (Weisberg 2005, 816).
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The objection is this: it is possible that the biologist dies, or simply fails to return to
the pond to look in her net, thus the evidence is no more guaranteed for her than for the
hapless prisoner above. The biologist knows that she will not observe anything other
than large fish, but this does not entail that she will observe large fish. In the same way,
the prisoner knows she will not observe that she is not alive, but this does not entail that
she will be alive. If this is right then the biologist’s background conditions do not seem
to entail E (Weisberg 2005, 817). Since the evidence is not entailed, there will be no
OSE and the fish in the net are evidence for L over S.
In order to answer this we must be careful to specify what the evidence is in Fishing
and what is in the biologist’s background conditions. Recall what N says:
N : The net used to catch fish in this pond always catches fish, if it can, but
it can’t catch fish smaller than 10 inches because of the size of the holes in
the net.9
And this, in conjunction with either L or S, does entail E, which states:
E: All fish caught in this pond were longer than 10 inches.
Thus the biologist knows, given N , without needing to observe the evidence, what the
evidence is: there are large fish in the net. N therefore entails, not that she observes
large fish (©E), but the evidence (E) itself: All fish caught in the pond are larger than
10”. The biologist will, of course, also know that she will not observe anything other




Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -427-
Conditionalization can similarly explain the problem. If the biologist dies, or
otherwise fails to return to the net, she learns neither E nor ¬E. Thus she cannot
change her credences pr(L) or pr(S) on the basis of E or ¬E. One cannot update
without observing evidence!
The No-Observation objection seems to depend on one of two confusions. First, we
might think that, in order to generate an OSE, ©E must have been in the biologist’s
background conditions. Second, we might have thought that ¬©¬E  E. But both of
these assumptions are incorrect and both depend on a conflation of evidence and
observation.
Sober seems to make this first mistake, stating: “If you fish with Eddington’s net, you
are guaranteed to observe that the net contains fish that all are over 10 inches long”
(Sober 2009, 77). If we mistake observation for evidence then it is easy to assume that N
is equivalent to ©E. That is, the fact that the net will contain large fish is the same as
the claim that we will observe that the net contains large fish. But of course, as the
no-observation objection shows, the biologist is not guaranteed to observe anything! The
net, however, is guaranteed to contain fish over 10”.
Second, we might have thought that ¬©¬E  E, and since ¬©¬E is in the
biologist’s background, that is the reason E is entailed. But this is, once again, to think
that failure to observe small fish is an observation of large fish.
The lesson here is that, if we were already inclined to think that evidence must be
observed in order to make any difference to our arguments, we will think that there is no
harm in using ‘evidence’ and ‘observation’ interchangeably. Not observing E will sound a
lot like observing ¬E. Similarly, we might argue that observation entails evidence, thus
there is no harm in using them interchangeably. But observation statements are not
13
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equivalent to evidence statements and thus there is harm in conflating evidence and
observation. We will think that necessitated evidence necessitates observation or that
failure to observe is itself an observation. This is a mistake. What is the case in Fishing
is that the observation that there are large fish in the net is not guaranteed, but the
evidence—the fact that there will be fish in the net—is guaranteed. The fact that
evidence can be guaranteed—and we can know that it is guaranteed—makes it such that
evidence can make a difference to OSEs, even without being observed.
To sum up, in Fishing the evidence is guaranteed, but the observation of it is not.
In Firing Squad neither the evidence nor the observation is guaranteed. The objection
was that observation is not guaranteed, and this is true. But I’ve argued that it is the
evidence that must be guaranteed by background conditions, not the observation of it.
Thus the biologist in Fishing is subject to an OSE, while the prisoner in Firing
Squad is not.
4 Survivor Bias and the Power of Prayer
The evidence-observation distinction allows us to see a further consequence of observation
selection-effects: parties can differ in what their evidence supports, even if both parties
know all the same facts. To illustrate this, let’s start with a case of shipwreck survivors
and the power of prayer given by Sir Francis Bacon in Novum Organum:
It was well answered by him who was shown in a temple the votive tablets
suspended by such as had escaped the peril of shipwreck, and was pressed as
to whether he would then recognize the power of the gods, by an inquiry, But
where are the portraits of those who have perished in spite of their vows?
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(Bacon 1620/2000, XLVI)
There is an OSE at work here. Clearly, only survivors give testimony (in the form of
votive tablets). Those whose prayers were not answered did not survive to give
testimony. Thus it is guaranteed that the evidence of the votives will always be from
sailors who prayed and survived. Bacon’s story is well explained by the entailment model
of OSEs. A background condition for the testimony is the survival of the testifier. Thus
the background condition entails that a sailor who leaves a votive must have survived, no
matter the efficacy of prayer.
Now, to see the surprising result, let’s consider a hypothetical conversation between a
single sailor and the skeptical temple visitor, call it Shipwreck:
Sailor: As the ship was sinking I wasn’t sure I was going to make it. So I
prayed and, lo and behold, I was saved! Surely, as I might not have been
saved, my survival provides evidence that my prayer was effective.
Visitor: I’m very happy you survived, but I’m sorry to say that your survival
is no evidence that your prayer was effective. After all, if you hadn’t
survived, you wouldn’t be standing here telling me your story. You couldn’t
have told me that you prayed and weren’t saved, thus, because the fact that I
met you entails that you survived, it does not tell me anything about
whether prayer is effective.
Sailor: But you must admit that I might not have been saved, and that’s all
that the argument requires. It’s not the fact that we met that matters, but
that I survived when I might not have.
Visitor: True, the fact that we met doesn’t matter to your argument. But
15
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that fact matters very much to my argument. You must admit that I
wouldn’t know anything about your prayer or your shipwreck without your
being able to tell me. I am not surprised that, given I met someone who was
in a shipwreck, I met one of the survivors. I could not possibly have met
someone who did not survive.
Sailor: Then it seems we’re at an impasse. I can tell you everything about
my situation and it doesn’t change the fact that you could only have learned
these things by meeting a shipwreck survivor. You can tell me all about the
fact that no other evidence was possible for you and it changes nothing for
me. How strange that we agree on all the facts, but differ in what our
evidence supports.
What has happened here? Unlike the prisoner and bystander in Firing Squad, in
which neither of the parties was subject to an OSE, in Shipwreck the sailor is not
subject to an OSE, while the visitor is. Let’s take a closer look at the sailor and visitor’s
likelihood arguments:
Let our two hypotheses be:
Effective: Prayer is efficacious.
¬Effective: Prayer is inefficacious.
And the sailor’s evidence:
Alive: Sailor s is alive.
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Formally, we may now give the sailor’s argument as:
pr(Alive|Effective ∧ ¬©s ¬Alive) > pr(Alive|¬Effective ∧ ¬©s ¬Alive)
The sailor could not have observed that she did not survive, but as this does not entail
that she does survive, it is no challenge to the argument, according to the entailment
model. She is in an analogous position to the prisoner in Firing Squad.
The visitor’s situation is crucially different in two ways. First, there is an additional
relevant fact in her background conditions:
Meet: The visitor, v, meets a sailor, σ, who has been shipwrecked, but v
cannot meet sailors who did not survive shipwreck.
This is parallel to the fact N in Fishing. Just as N guarantees that there will be fish in
the net, the visitor does meet a sailor who has been shipwrecked. And just as N
guarantees that the fish caught will be larger than 10”, the visitor can only meet sailors
who have survived shipwreck.
But note that, while Meet does guarantee that the visitor meets a sailor, it does not
guarantee that he meets this particular sailor, s. The claims in N and Meet describe the
evidence, but do not mention the particular fish that was caught or the particular sailor
who was met. This leads us to the second difference between the sailor and the visitor’s
situations: the visitor does not care which particular sailor he meets. In the visitor’s
case, then, the evidence is:
Alive*: The sailor, σ, that v meets, is alive.
The evidence, for the visitor, is not that some particular sailor, s, survived, but that a
17
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sailor, σ, survived and is met. Similarly, in Fishing, no particular fish was guaranteed
to be caught, but the fish that was caught was guaranteed to be large. We now have all
the necessary ingredients to give the visitor v’s argument:
pr(Alive*|Effective ∧ Meet) = pr(Alive*|¬Effective ∧ Meet) = 1
The two sides of the argument are equal because Meet  Alive*. Thus there is an OSE
for the visitor.
Note that this is different from the bystander’s position in Firing Squad. In that
case the evidence was the same for both prisoner and bystander. Prisoner P’s survival
was what mattered to both the prisoner and bystander in that case. Thus the evidence
that the prisoner survived was not guaranteed.
The fact that the visitor is subject to an OSE, while the sailor is not, remains true
when the two meet and share information. It is not relevant to the sailor that Meet be
known, because Meet only entails that v meet some sailor σ, not that she meet sailor s.
Similarly, the fact that sailor s survived is crucial to the sailor’s argument—if she had
not survived, Effective would not be supported. But the fact that sailor s survived is
irrelevant to the visitor’s argument—if sailor s had not survived, the visitor would have
met some other sailor who had survived. Thus while the two share all the same facts,
they do not take those facts to provide equal support for the efficacy of prayer.
This surprising result follows because the arguments that the sailor and visitor make
are different and use different statements of the evidence to come to their respective
conclusions. The sailor’s argument uses the de re claim that she survives, while the
vistor’s argument uses the de dicto claim that someone survives. More needs to be said
18
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about whether this can result from a difference in the facts known by the agents. It is at
least plausible that the difference rests in a difference in known facts such as, “I am
subject to an OSE,” said by v, which differs in content from “v is subject to an OSE.”
Such facts will be unsharable by the agents.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I have distinguished observation from evidence and shown how this can
help clarify when there is, or is not, an OSE. I have given three kinds of scenarios:
1. Firing Squad Bystander: Can observe E and can observe ¬E. No OSE.
2. Firing Squad Prisoner and Shipwreck Sailor: Cannot observe ¬E, but E is not
guaranteed. No OSE.
3. Shipwreck Visitor and Fishing: E is guaranteed. OSE.
These three possibilities make it clear that the unobservability of evidence is necessary,
but not sufficient for an OSE.
Although I suggest the development of a modal treatment of observation, there is a
quick heuristic for distinguishing an evidence claim from observation claim. If the claim
about ϕ does obey excluded middle, then it is an evidence claim. If it does not and there
is a third option—failure to observe ϕ—then it cannot be a claim about evidence and
must be a claim about observation.
Finally, observer perspective seems to matter in cases such as the two Shipwreck
scenarios. Whether this results from an unshared—or unsharable—fact or results from
the accessibility of arguments to agents is an avenue for further exploration.
19
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -434-
References
Bacon, Francis. 1620/2000. The New Organon. Edited by Lisa Jardine and
Michael Silverthorne.
Eddington, Arthur Stanley. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science. CUP Archive.
Sober, Elliott. 2003. God and Design: The teleological argument and modern science. In
God and design: the teleological argument and modern science, edited by
Neil A Manson. Routledge.
. 2009. Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential transitivity in
connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads. Philosophical Studies
143 (1): 63–90.
Titelbaum, Michael. 2015. Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology. Unpublished
manuscript.
Weisberg, Jonathan. 2005. Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the design
argument. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4): 809–821.
20
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -435-
Infrared Cancellation and Measurement
Michael E. Miller†
Quantum field theories containing massless particles such as photons and glu-
ons are divergent not just in the ultraviolet, but also in the infrared. Infrared
divergences are typically regarded as less conceptually problematic than ultra-
violet divergences because there is a reasonably straightforward cancellation
mechanism that renders measurable physical observables such as decay rates
and cross-sections infrared finite. In this paper, I scrutinize the restriction
to measurable physical observables that is required to make the cancella-
tion mechanism applicable. I argue that this restriction does not necessitate
a retreat to operationalism about the meaning of the theory as one might
reasonably have worried, but it does call attention to a collection of under-
appreciated conceptual issues lurking in the infrared regime of quantum field
theories with massless particles.
1. Introduction. The structural core of non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics is reasonably well agreed upon. It includes states defined on a Hilbert
space, operators on that space to represent observables, the Schrödinger dy-
namics, and the Born rule for determining probabilities for the outcomes of
experiments.1 This structural core provides an algorithm for extracting em-
pirical predictions from the theory. Interpretive debates are concerned with
whether we should adopt an operationalist view of this algorithm, or if the
structural core should be furnished with a realistic interpretation. And of
course, providing such a realistic interpretation requires that one provide a
resolution to the quantum measurement problem.
Giving a realistic interpretation of quantum field theory similarly requires
a solution to the quantum measurement problem, but the measurement prob-
lem is often conspicuously absent in foundational discussions of the theory.
One reason for this is that relativistic constraints raise difficulties for gener-
alizing some solutions to the measurement problem from quantum mechanics
to quantum field theory. Another reason is that quantum field theory is of-
ten characterized as a theory of scattering.2 This can be seen from the fact
that the basic phenomenological object in the theory is often taken to be the
S-matrix which encodes transition amplitudes between prepared incoming
states and measured outgoing states, both with determinate particle content.
Draft of 3 July 2020
†Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
1Helpful critical discussion of what belongs to the structural core, and what does not, can
be found in (Wallace 2019).
2The historical reasons for this are discussed in (Blum 2017).
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So one might worry that before we even get to the issue of the measure-
ment problem, the formalism for the theory is tinged with operationalism.
The structure of the theory is designed to capture the scattering experiments
used to test the theory from the outset.
Suppose we are interested in pressing on and attempting to give a realist
interpretation of the scattering phenomena that quantum field theory is able
to describe. We can use the scattering form of Born’s rule,
Pr(ψout|ψin) := |〈ψout|S|ψin〉|
2, (1)
to determine the probability of a transition from the state |ψin〉 to the state
|ψout〉. On first inspection, this seems to involve essentially the same struc-
tural core as non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and to provide an algorithm
for predicting the outcomes of experiments which we can go about interpret-
ing. However, the quantum field theoretic algorithm is beset with interpretive
challenges of its own that arise before we confront the measurement problem.
As a result, much of the interpretive work dedicated to quantum field theory
has been concerned with the processes that are required to get the algorithm
up and running, and not the interpretation of the algorithm itself.
The interpretive difficulties facing the quantum field theoretic algorithm
are diverse. For one, |ψin〉 and |ψout〉 are not states in the physical statespace
of the interacting quantum fields involved in the scattering. Rather, they
are states in the statespace of free fields. Information about the interacting
fields must be gleaned from the perturbative evaluation of the S-matrix ele-
ment for a particular |ψin〉 and |ψout〉. To do this we sum all of the Feynman
diagrams with the appropriate particle content and incoming and outgoing
momenta. This perturbative evaluation gives rise to additional obstacles to
interpretation. The most widely discussed of these are the ultraviolet diver-
gences that arise from the short-distance and large-momentum regime of the
theory. The integrals corresponding to individual diagrams contributing to
the probabilities in Eq. (1) are infinite. These ultraviolet divergences neces-
sitate the renormalization of the theory in order to render predictions for the
outcomes of experiments finite.3 Some presentations of the theory give the
impression that a properly implemented renormalization procedure is suffi-
cient to get an algorithm up and running that gives probabilities that match
the experimental results.
3With the development of the renormalization group, the physical need for this process is
now well-understood. Quantum field theories are understood as effective theories with an
explicitly specified domain of applicability. Recent philosophical literature has begun to
address how this approach to understanding the ultraviolet divergences might affect the
prospects for realist interpretations of the the theory. For my purposes, the important
conclusion that can be drawn from these discussions is that the ultraviolet divergences do
not provide an obstacle to realist interpretations of field theory.
-2-
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In fact, an additional step is required. There is an independent source of
infinities that need to be addressed before the algorithm yields finite proba-
bilities. These infrared divergences come from the long-distance and small-
momentum regime of the theory, and have received comparatively little at-
tention in the literature. The infrared divergences result from the emission
of very low momentum massless particles, and are typically regarded as less
conceptually problematic than ultraviolet divergences because there is a rea-
sonably straightforward cancellation mechanism that renders physical observ-
ables such as decay rates and cross-sections infrared finite. More precisely,
the infrared divergences cancel when we restrict to measurable physical quan-
tities. My aim in this paper is to scrutinize the restriction to measurable
physical observables that is required to make the cancellation mechanism ap-
plicable. It is prima facie plausible that there are physical quantities that
are not measurable, but about which there are still facts. For this reason, a
restriction to what is measurable is potentially problematic. If one adopts an
operationalist interpretation which only countenances those quantities which
are measurable as meaningful, such a restriction is unproblematic. However,
if one ultimately aspires to provide a realist interpretation, one needs the
quantum field theoretic algorithm to be well-defined for all of the physically
meaningful quantities, which may not just be the measurable ones. So to
ensure that the restriction in question does not amount to a thumb on the
operationalist’s side of the scale, we need to make sure that we are not re-
stricting beyond the physical matters of fact.
In order to determine whether or not the restriction to measurable physical
quantities is an acceptable one, we must analyze the origin of the infrared
divergences and the infrared cancellation mechanism in detail. I turn to that
task in Section Two. In Section Three I discuss the restriction to measurable
physical quantities and I argue that it need not mark a problematic retreat
to operationalism. In the fourth section I argue that the infrared divergences
from massless particles are a conceptually distinct infrared problem from the
one raised by Haag’s theorem. The infrared divergences discussed here are
more directly relevant for the prospects of providing a realist interpretation
of the theory because they bear on the nature of the physical statespace of
the theory. Section Five concludes by emphasizing that the infrared regime
of quantum field theory contains foundationally significant issues which are
important for the project of interpreting the theory.
2. Infrared Cancellation. Early in the development of quantum electro-
dynamics it was recognized that the infrared problems of classical electro-
dynamics carried over to quantum field theory. In this latter context, the
problems stem from the presence of massless particles. If a massless particle
is “soft” in the sense that it has very low momentum, then the emission of
such a particle requires very little energy. In the case of quantum electrody-
-3-
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namics, for example, in processes with outgoing electrons in the final state,
the electron is never actually free as we are accustomed to thinking of it.
In reality, outgoing electrons emit many soft photons which lead to infrared
divergences in the S-matrix element for the process.4 Closely analogous prob-
lems arise in quantum chromodynamics due to the massless gluons, and in
quantum theories of gravity involving massless gravitons.
An approach to addressing the infrared divergences was discovered by
Bloch and Nordsieck even before the development of covariant perturbation
theory for quantum electrodynamics (Bloch and Nordsieck 1937). What they
realized was that the infrared divergences from the emission of soft photons
are perfectly cancelled by infrared divergences from virtual soft photons. This
cancellation mechanism was elaborated in full detail for quantum electrody-
namics by Yennie, Frautschi and Suura who showed conclusively that QED
can be rendered infrared finite to all orders of perturbation theory (Yennie,
Frautschi, and Suura 1961). Weinberg produced a significant simplification of
the argument, which also applies to theories with massless gravitons, shortly
after (Weinberg 1965). Similar arguments, though more limited in their gen-
erality, have also been provided for quantum chromodynamics.5 The central
observation required to induce the cancellation in each case is that any re-
alistic particle detector has some minimum energy threshold. Particles with
energy below this threshold will pass through the detector undetected. When
S-matrix elements, transition rates, and cross-sections are expressed in a way
that accounts for the presence of such a threshold, the infrared divergences
can be shown to cancel to all orders.
Suppose we are interested in a QED process with initial state α and final
state β containing a total of n incoming and outgoing electrons.6 The S-
matrix element for this process Sβα requires corrections from the emission of
soft photons. Consider the simplest case where a single soft photon is emitted
from one of the outgoing electron lines as shown in Fig. 1(a). This yields a
correction given by the product of an electron-photon vertex, and an electron














p · q − iǫ
. (2)
4Additional infrared divergences can occur when massless particles move collinearly with
the particle from which they were emitted. This class of divergences can be addressed
with methods similar to those discussed in this section, though they will not be my focus
in this paper.
5One important example is provided by the KLN theorem (Kinoshita 1962; Lee and Nauen-
berg 1964). For helpful discussion see (Muta 1987, Ch. 6).
6The argument I present here is a simplified version of the one initially given in (Weinberg
1965) and further elaborated in (Weinberg 1995, Ch. 13).
7In taking the limit I have used the freedom to rescale ǫ without changing the sign of the
term.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 1: Emission of real soft photons, and exchange of virtual soft photons.
If the photon is emitted from an incoming line rather than an outgoing line,
as shown in Fig. 1(b), then the momentum in the additional propagator is














−p · q − iǫ
. (3)
To obtain the correction for the emission of a single soft photon from any
of the incoming or outgoing electron lines we must sum over each way the
process can happen. If we adopt the convention that ηn = +1 if the emission
is from an outgoing line and ηn = −1 if it is from an incoming line, this sum






pn · q − iηnǫ
. (4)
If two soft photons are emitted, the correction is given by a product of
factors like those we found in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). For example, if one is
emitted from an incoming line and one is emitted from an outgoing line, as












−p1 · q1 − iǫ
]
. (5)
If both electrons are emitted from the same outgoing line, as in Fig. 1(d),












p1 · (q1 + q2)− iǫ
]
. (6)
A simple induction8 shows that the correction for the emission of N soft
8See (Weinberg 1995, pp. 538-539).
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pn · qi − iηnǫ
)
. (7)
From this basic relation we can determine the effects of both virtual and real
soft photons on Sβα.
To determine the correction from the contribution of soft virtual photons
depicted in Fig. 1(e), we must introduce a scale Λ which determines which
virtual photons we want to count as soft. Different choices of Λ simply cor-
respond to different choices of what count as radiative corrections, and what
count as part of the uncorrected matrix element. We will also be manipulat-
ing infrared divergent expressions and so we will introduce an infrared cutoff
λ. This cutoff will eventually be removed by taking the λ → 0 limit at the
end of the calculation.
The correction from a single soft virtual photon can be determined by
taking the product of two emitted photon corrections, multiplied by a photon
propagator (−igµν)/[(2π)
4
· (q2 − iǫ)], summing over the polarization indices,













(pmn · q − iηnǫ)(−pm · q − iηmǫ)]
. (9)
To obtain the correction from N virtual soft photons, we take the product of
N such factors, and divide by factors of N ! to account for possible permuta-
tions of where the lines attach, and (2N) to account for interchanges of the





























SΛβα is the S-matrix element with no virtual photon exchange with momentum
less than Λ included. Sλβα is the S-matrix element corrected to include virtual
soft photon exchange with momentum greater than λ but less than Λ. The
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Inserting Eq. (13) into Eq. (12), and using familiar properties of exponentials


























This provides a complete statement of the correction to the rate from virtual
soft photons. In the limit where λ → 0 we see that the rate Γλβα vanishes.
This is the result of exponentiating ln(Λ/λ) which is divergent in the λ → 0
limit.
The virtual soft photon divergences leading to this unphysical vanishing
of the rate are cancelled by divergences from real photon emission. More
precisely, this cancellation can be seen to apply to all orders of perturbation
theory when the total rate, including all radiative corrections, is expressed in
terms of the resolution of the detector used to measure the real soft photons.
Weinberg explains the restriction as follows:
The resolution of the infrared divergence problem . . . is found in
the observation that it is not really possible to measure the rate
Γβα for a reaction α → β involving definite numbers of pho-
tons and charged particles, because photons of very low energy
can always escape undetected. What can be measured is the rate
Γβα(E,ET ) for such a reaction to take place with no unobserved
photon having an energy greater than some small quantity E,
and with not more than some small total energy ET going into
any number of unobserved photons. (Weinberg 1995, pp. 544-545,
my emphasis)
This restriction to the measurable quantity Γβα(E,ET ) in order to render the
rate infrared finite requires careful analysis. I will turn to that task in Section
-7-
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Three. The remainder of this section completes the demonstration that if one
makes this restriction, then the infrared divergences cancel.
In order to calculate the correction from the emission of N real soft pho-
tons, with momenta q1, . . . , qN , each term in Eq. (7) must be multiplied by




This yields the following expression for the matrix element Sλβα(q1, q2, . . . , qN),
which includes the contributions of both the virtual soft photons and the N
real emitted soft photons:














where Sλβα is as given in Eq. (11). The differential rate for the emission
of N soft photons into the volume of momentum space
∏
i d
3 qi, is given by

















(pn · qi)(pm · qi)
(18)
Integrating over the direction of photon propagation yields the differential
rate for the emission of N soft photons with energies ω1, . . . , ωN :











where the factor A is as defined in Eq. (14). Note that if we were to inte-
grate Eq. (19) over the emitted energies of the photons, we would produce
logarithmic divergences from the ω → 0 end of the integrations. However,
the imposition of the infrared cutoff λ ensures that the expressions are regu-
lated. If we were to remove the regulator at this stage of the calculation, the
cancellation mechanism would not do its job, and we would not arrive at a
sensible physical rate at the end of the calculation.
In order to arrive at a final expression for the rate, the integration over
photon energies must be done respecting the constraints described in the
quotation of Weinberg above. In particular, the unobserved photons must
each have energy below the detector threshold and above the infrared cutoff,
E ≥ ωi ≥ λ, and the total energy of all of the unobserved photons must not
9In this expression, ǫ is a polarization vector and h is the helicity.
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be greater than ET ,
∑
i ωi ≤ ET :


























The cancellation of the infrared divergences is achieved by inserting the ex-
pression in Eq. (15) for Γλβα into Eq. (21). This combines all corrections from




























Thus, when we account for both soft virtual photon exchange and real soft
photon emission, the rate becomes independent of λ and is infrared finite. The
procedure used to achieve this result does, however, introduce a dependence
on the detector resolution, E.
The subsequent literature adopts a distinction between exclusive and in-
clusive quantities.11 Exclusive quantities stipulate the exact contents of the
incoming and outgoing states. For example, in an exclusive cross-section one
might demand that there are exactly three electrons and no other particles,
even if the other particles are not detected. Inclusive quantities stipulate part
of the contents of the final state, but they also account for the possibility that
there are other particles in the final state. The rate in Eq. (23) provides an
example of an inclusive quantity. We have stipulated that there are a total
of n incoming and outgoing electron lines, but we have also accounted for
the emission of an arbitrary number of undetected soft photons each with
energy less than E and with total energy less than ET . At particle acceler-
ators, attention is often restricted to such inclusive quantities, and the it is
the justification for this to which we now turn our attention.
10I have omitted an overall factor resulting from the integration which is close to 1 in the
circumstances we are interested in analyzing.
11As far as I have been able to determine, this distinction originates from (Feynman 1969).
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3. Measurement. The apparent need to restrict to measurable physical
quantities has arisen in other contexts during the development of quantum
field theory. Early in the development of the theory, Bohr and Rosenfeld
argued that the value of the field at a point was not a measurable quantity,
but that the average value of the field over a small spacetime region was
measurable (Bohr and Rosenfeld 1933; Bohr and Rosenfeld 1950). It was
later realized that field operators could not be mathematically defined at
points of spacetime, and that instead they had to be represented as operator-
valued distributions which are well-defined only as integrations against test
functions of compact support on small regions of spacetime.12 When it was
realized that the mathematical definition of the theory became ill-defined
for associations of operators with points, a number of figures suggested that
this should be intepreted as resulting from the fact that such quantities were
unmeasurable.13 If one adopts the additional assumption that unmeasurable
quantities are not meaningful, then the ill-definedness of field operators at
points becomes unproblematic: there is no physically meaningful quantity
for the ill-defined field operators to correspond to.
Similar reasoning has been employed to address other ill-defined quantities
from the ultraviolet regime. Empirically interesting field theories are ultravi-
olet divergent and require renormalization. This process involves recognizing
that some parameters in the lagrangian such as the bare mass and the bare
charge are infinite and introducing counterterms to cancel the infinities and
re-express the theory in terms of measurable parameters such as the dressed
mass and charge. In response to this situation one frequently encounters the
claim that bare parameters in the Lagrangian are unmeasurable. To take just
one example, Srednicki explains that “It may be disturbing to have a param-
eter in the Lagrangian that is formally infinite. However, such parameters are
not directly measurable, and so need not obey our preconceptions about their
magnitudes” (Srednicki 2007, p. 67).14 Once again, we encounter the view
that only those quantities that are measurable are required to be meaningful.
Compare this to the reasoning Weinberg offered in the previous section.
The rate Γλβα is infrared divergent in the limit where λ → 0, but it is un-
measurable. The measurable rate Γλβα(E,ET ) is infrared finite to all orders
of perturbation theory in the λ → 0 limit. The justification for the need
to make this restriction in order to arrive at infrared finite quantities, when
one is explicitly articulated, is that any real physical detector has some finite
energy resolution and particles with energy below that threshold will not be
12This came to be understood in stages, with the conclusive theorem provided in (Wight-
man 1964).
13(Friedrichs 1951; Cook 1953)
14Similar claims can be found in (Peskin and Schroeder 1995, p. 315) and (Itzykson and
Zuber 2012, p. 319), and in many other accounts of the rationale underlying renormal-
ization.
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registered in the detector. Thus, Weinberg’s demonstration establishes that
quantum field theory provides well-defined values for all of those observables
that are physically measurable and most discussions of this issue leave off
here.15
Absent additional argumentation, I think that this amounts to a prob-
lematic retreat to operationalism. To be clear, my concern is not with oper-
ationalism as an account of meaning in general. I am open to the possibility
that operationalism provides a compelling account of meaning in at least
some cases. What is problematic in this case is that the justification for the
restriction to measurable quantities relies on the stronger claim that only
those quantities that are measurable are physically meaningful. Suppose
this stronger claim were true. Then the demonstration that the field the-
oretic expressions for the measurable observables are well-defined amounts
to a demonstration that the field theoretic expressions for every physically
meaningful quantity is well-defined. If the stronger claim is not true, and
there are physically meaningful quantities that are not measurable, then the
demonstration that the measurable quantities are well-defined does not go
far enough to establish that the theory adequately accounts for all of the
meaningful quantities.
To determine whether or not the restriction to measurable quantities in
the infrared case is problematic, we need to know whether or not failures of
measurability stand in direct correspondence with failures of meaningfulness.
For this reason, each proposed restriction to measurable quantities requires
its own analysis, as each involves distinct physical limitations on what is
measurable. While I believe that both of the ultraviolet cases introduced
above merit further attention of their own, here I will restrict attention to
the infrared case as that is my central concern in this paper.
Suppose we simply grant that every physical detector will have some
threshold E such that particles with energy less than E will not be detected.16
Note that quantities like cross-sections and rates are defined with respect to
a particular collection of incoming particles, and a particular collection of
detected outgoing particles. However, for a given incoming state, α, the dy-
namics of the theory will yield an outgoing state which is a superposition
with indeterminate particle content, including an indeterminate number of
electrons, hard photons, and soft photons with energy below the detection
threshold. It is only upon measurement that the outgoing state becomes
15Essentially the same justification can be found throughout the physics literature. See, for
example, (Brown 1992, pp. 490-491), (Duncan 2012, p. 719, p. 723, p. 728), (Itzykson
and Zuber 2012, p. 173, p. 354), (Peskin and Schroeder 1995, pp. 200-202), (Schweber
2011, p. 549), and (Srednicki 2007, pp. 157-158).
16This claim is often asserted without argument. Establishing its validity would require a
detailed analysis of the physical nature of the detector and its coupling to the measured
particle. I am grateful to Jeff Barrett for discussion of this point.
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one with the determinate particle content as we assumed β to have. And,
of course, how one conceives of this process of becoming a state with deter-
minate particle content depends on how one prefers to resolve the quantum
measurement problem.
In computing the rate Γβα(E,ET ) we assumed that this measurement
process yields a specific number of electrons and no hard photons in the final
state. If there were hard photons, or a different number of electrons, we
would need to compute the rate for a different process. Given that there
are outgoing electrons in the final state, there are also soft photons which
were not detected. So the justification relied on here is not that there is no
photon detector that can detect arbitrarily soft photons and hence quantities
involving them are meaningless. Rather, every measurement that is done has
some energy resolution, and we need to account for the fact that given the
particular measurement that has been executed, there can be soft photons
below that resolution.
This shows why it necessary to express the physical quantities in terms
of the detector resolution, E. For a given incoming state, there are distinct
possible outgoing states. By selecting a specific β, we have not done quite
enough to specify which part of the statespace the measurement is a projection
onto. By specifying E, we condition on which kinds of soft radiation can
be undetected in the final state. For a different detector energy resolution
E ′, different kinds of unobserved soft radiation states are possible, as are
different alternatives to β. The need to restrict to what is measurable is not
a retreat to operationalism. Rather, the presence of the energy resolution is
an articulation of the precise nature of the question we are asking about the
outgoing state by executing the particular measuring process that we chose
to execute.
4. The Connection to Haag’s Theorem. In their appraisal of the philo-
sophical significance of Haag’s theorem, Earman and Fraser make several ref-
erences to infrared divergences (Earman and Fraser 2006). They claim, for
example, that “In the physicists’ lingo, the move from one inequivalent repre-
sentation to another is marked by divergences. Haag’s theorem is concerned
with infrared divergences that are associated with Euclidean invariance and
the infinite volume of space (Earman and Fraser 2006, p. 319)”. They also
note the infrared divergences can be tamed by imposing some form of infrared
regulator.17 The imposition of an infrared regulator can cure more than one
kind of infrared pathology, and caution is required here in order not to run
together two conceptually distinct issues.
The interaction picture is a formal intermediary between the the Schrödinger
picture and the Heisenberg picture which is often employed as a calculational
17The regulators they consider are the compactification of space, and the restriction of the
theory to bounded regions of spacetime (Earman and Fraser 2006, p. 319, 323, 330).
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tool to facilitate the perturbative evaluation of observables. It postulates the
existence of a global unitary transformation connecting the free and inter-
acting Hilbert spaces. Haag’s theorem shows that this transformation does
not exist and that these spaces are unitarily inequivalent. Thus, the interac-
tion picture is predicated on an inconsistent set of assumptions. Miller has
provided an account of how perturbative calculations that employ the interac-
tion picture can be empirically successful despite this apparent inconsistency
(Miller 2016). The imposition of an infrared regulator renders some of the
assumptions of the theorem false. This undercuts the threat to the empirical
success of the theory from Haag’s theorem, but it leaves questions about the
well-definedness of the interaction picture in the limit where the regulator is
removed.
Infrared divergences from soft massless particles raise a more serious worry
about the infrared regime of quantum field theory than the one implicated
in Haag’s theorem. The infrared cancellation results are sufficient to assuage
worries about how it can be that theories with infrared divergences are still
empirically successful. However, because of the presence of the soft massless
particles, free electron states with distinct momenta are unitarily inequivalent
to one another.18 As such, this class of infrared divergences call into question
the well-definedness of the physical state spaces of theories like quantum elec-
trodynamics. For this reason, I think they are rightly regarded as a symptom
of more serious conceptual problem than Haag’s theorem, which only under-
mines a method for extracting predictions from the theory. The challenge
from the soft massless particles is a serious one for interpreters of quantum
field theory and it is one which in my view requires significant further atten-
tion.19
5. Conclusion. I have argued that the need to express physical quantities
in terms of the energy resolution of a detector does not mark a problem-
atic retreat to operationalism. As in the case of the ultraviolet divergences,
the infrared divergences can be understood physically. With a properly im-
plemented renormalization scheme and infrared cancellation mechanism in
place, the algorithm of quantum field theory provides finite expressions for
physical observables. Thus, the infrared divergences, like the ultraviolet diver-
gences, are not ultimately an obstacle to realist interpretations of the theory.
The infrared regime of the theory is fraught with conceptual issues which
bear directly on the issue of how one might go about producing such an in-
terpretation, and very much warrants further attention from a foundational
perspective.
18For discussion see (Duncan 2012, pp. 722-723) or (Buchholz 1982).
19Perhaps the first philosopher to approach this problem is Ruetsche, who has suggested
that coherent state representations may play an important role in understanding these
issues (Ruetsche 2012, pp. 245-246).
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Engineering roles and identities in the scientific 
community: toward participatory justice1 
 
V. Pronskikh2 





This paper seeks to examine the roles and identities of engineers constituting one of the 
fundamental, but a completely indescribable community in modern big science with particle 
accelerators. Large communities of accelerator and detector specialists, which replaced 
experimenters and instrumentalists of the middle of the last century, themselves exhibit a complex 
structure and are divided. However, this division is in turn grounded on the division of those whose 
activities focus on the phenomena of nature considered independent of human beings and those 
who design processes and phenomena of an artificial, technical nature. Nevertheless, in terms of 
their modus operandi and identity, the kinship between engineers and experimental scientists is 
considerable. I argue that such exclusion of the engineering community from epistemic practices 
can serve as an example of participatory injustice. As one of the ways to transcend participatory 
injustice, I suggest that the communities should be encouraged to work together in epistemically 
tantamount roles while structural hindrances to the mobility between communities need to be 
alleviated. 
 






Contemporary fundamental science has a number of significant contrasts with the science of the 
early 20th century. Having become a complex social institution in its very structure, it demanded 
the eliciting and scrutinizing of the communities that make up research teams and the features of 
their interaction. Several outstanding studies have been undertaken by a number of historians, 
philosophers, and sociologists of science (Galison 1987; Pickering 1988; Collins 2002, Hoddeson 
et al. 2008, Knorr-Cetina 1999, Traweek 1988, Latour and Woolgar 1979). The objective of this 
work is to examine the phenomenon of the big science community in its development and the 
influence of the rise of an elementary particle accelerator and a complex elementary particle 
detector in it on the amplification of the social structure, the deepening of the epistemic division 
                                                             
1 Talk accepted for presentation at PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 
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of labor and the need for lengthy engineering activity at the stage of preparation of experiments. 
To accomplish that task, it becomes necessary to clarify the roles of members of scientific 
communities and the dynamics of changes in their structure, to discuss the difficulties of 
classification and identities of community members, as well as issues that arise at the present stage 
in the relationship of scientific and engineering activities and possible ways to resolve them. 
 
Notably, the rise of the accelerator in the 1930s–1940s was the first milestone in the development 
of a modern complex physics experiment and the complication of the structure of communities 
associated with large-scale experiments in high-energy physics. First, the emergence of such a 
large and complex device as an accelerator led to the appearance of accelerator physicists (and 
engineers) as scientific and technical specializations. Their task comprised the design of the 
accelerator, the calculation and optimization of its parameters, as well as ensuring its operation 
(providing particle beams accelerated to the required energies and intensities, to the community of 
experimentalists). The creation of the accelerator not only led to the spatial separation of the 
theoretician working silently in their Ivory Tower from the experimentalist, who now had to spend 
most of their time in the experimental halls near the accelerator, where their installation was 
established. In addition to the communities of experimentalists and theorists, with the beginning 
of experiments on accelerators, a community of accelerator specialists emerged, engaged in the 
creation and maintenance of the accelerator machine. Galison (1987) also introduced a community 
of instrumentalists involved in the creation of scientific instruments and installations, and formally 
accelerator scientists could be classified as such a community because the accelerator is a 
technically sophisticated device whose operating principles are essentially based on classical 
electrodynamics. However, in such a case, it would turn out to be very heterogeneous because the 
expertise of the accelerator researcher and the instrumentalist, who builds, for example, a particle 
detector, will differ. 
 
Beginning from the 1970s and finally by the beginning of the 1990s, a detector—a device in which 
particles born in collisions of a beam are detected, and their characteristics are identified by 
measurement, ended up to be so tangled and universalized that it morphed into the central object 
of the experiment that in many respects began to designate the long-term directions of research in 
accelerator laboratories (Hoddeson 2008). The structure of the corresponding communities began 
to change accordingly. Now, experimenters became engaged in detector calculations and design 
for a long time, taking on some of the tasks that were previously assigned to instrumentalists (in 
particular, engineers), then undertaking measurements with it and analyzing the data for an equally 
long time. After a series of measurements, they often continued to improve the design of the 
detectors and their components, returning to the engineering kind of work, again measuring and 
analyzing until the range of tasks that can be solved with this type of detector and accelerator 
capabilities was exhausted. All together, it took dozens of years, sometimes the whole conscious 
life of the experimentalist of this particular type of detector or the same detector. However, the 
communities of accelerator and detector researchers themselves are also heterogeneous. We shall 
consider their structure in more detail. 
 
Accelerator and detector researchers 
 
Starting from the 1990s, one can assume that instead of communities of theorists, experimenters, 
and instrumentalists, in high-energy physics, one should talk about communities of theorists, 
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accelerator, and detector researchers. The structure of the theoretician community has not changed 
much, while other communities have undergone the greatest changes since the first third of the 
20th century. The community of accelerator specialists now builds and maintains the accelerator, 
and the community of detector specialists—the detector. Instrumentalists can now be considered 
a subset of detector and accelerator specialists, and the dividing line between them and detector 
experimental experts is rather blurred. At the stage of creating the setup, the distinction between 
experimental scientists and nonscientists is such that, although they both study processes in the 
detector on computational models, the former focus more on aspects related to future searches for 
a useful signal, its reconstruction (reconstruction of events occurring in the detector by triggering 
numerous sensors), while the second—on aspects related to ensuring the overall operability of the 
installation. The second difference between them becomes evident after the beginning of 
measurements at the setup, when the scientists participate in the data acquisition, and then enter 
on processing and analysis of the data, while the instrumentalists set about the creation of other 
installations and instruments. 
 
Until about the 30s of the 20th century, the role of an instrumentalist did not exist because their 
functions were divided between the experimentalist and engineer as follows: the experimentalist 
formulated the technical requirements for the device (installation) to the engineer (industry) in the 
form of a set of requirements and those independently manufactured the device, most of which 
was standard and serial. Then, the experimentalist performed measurements on the setup, 
performing its adjustment as necessary, as well as data analysis, which was quite simple and not 
requiring separate education and specialization. With the birth of Big Science and the resulting 
complexity and uniqueness of the installations, the technical design specifications are becoming a 
joint product of experimentalists and toolmakers, resulting from a compromise and trade-off 
between a multitude of installation requirements. In this sense, the instrumentalist (and nowadays, 
the detector and accelerator researchers) is a transitional type between the engineer and the 
experimenter, and their own instrumentalists appear in both the accelerator and detector 
communities. 
 
Roles and specializations in megascience 
 
Each of these communities now become heterogeneous (see Table 1). Accelerator specialists also 
began to be divided into theorists (calculators) performing computational modeling of the particle 
acceleration, experimentalists who conducted experimental measurements of the developed 
accelerator assemblies to help create its technical theories, as well as engineers manufacturing the 
accelerator assemblies and performing their tuning and adjustment. Detector scientists are divided 
by the type of detector unit, which they simulate and build, and then support during the 
measurements and data which they own for analysis after the experiments. With the advent of the 
era of complex hybrid detectors, the detector began to consist of several complex, but 
heterogeneous system units, for example, such as a time-of-flight system, calorimeter, tracker, or 
shielding against the cosmic background. Each of these units, from its design period until the 
completion of the experiment, was under the responsibility of a certain group of experimentalists, 
which assumed both a number of technical issues and a physical interpretation of the data harvested 
from it. These groups together form a community of detector scientists. Engineers are entrusted 
with the development of installations, accelerators, and their units according to the technical 
specifications, maintenance of installations, accelerators, and software. 
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Area Role Specialization 
Accelerator Accelerator Physicist Accelerator Theorist 
Accelerator experimentalist 
Engineer Accelerator Engineer 
Detector Detector physicist Unit scientist 
 Data measurer 
 Data analyst 
Engineer Unit engineer 
Phenomena theory Theorist Model developer 
Developer of calculation tools 
and methods 
Computing Programmer 
System Tools Developer 
Engineer Software Maintenance 
 
Table 1. The structure and functions of communities in high-energy physics. 
 
 
Experimentalists' identity and engineering 
 
To grasp the social processes in the high-energy physics laboratory, the nature of community 
interactions, their similarities, and dissimilarities, it is necessary to elucidate the identities of their 
members. As one of the signs of the experimenter’s “identity shift,” characteristic of the period of 
the 1970s, the awkwardness felt by the experimental physicist toward others (including the 
engineer) in the laboratory began to be noted (Galison 1997, 5). This “identity shift,” was ascribed 
to the fact that the very nature of experimentation has changed: if earlier the experimenter’s work 
was unambiguously associated with the design of the installation, the development of experimental 
procedures, the application of these procedures, the recording of results, and their theoretical 
analysis, then later the experimenter was considered to be the one who only analyzes the data 
harvest hiding behind the monitor a long distance away from the installation threshing mill. Hence, 
it became impossible to have a single view of what can be considered experimentation (which is 
reflected in Table 1). Another distinctive feature of this stage of the development of science can 
be considered the complex contradiction between the experimentalist and engineer on the one 
hand, and the productive tension between the experimentalist and theorist on the other (Galison 
1997, 5). 
For the sake of our analysis, in the above claims, we highlight the following central narratives: 1) 
the contradictions between the experimenter and other specialists of the scientific laboratory 
(theorist and engineer) that have been growing since the 1970s and 2) the emergence of 
experimentalists who were not engaged in the activities previously considered traditional, such as 
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creating a facility and experimental procedures for it. These observations appear to be based on 
the following premises. 
First, the community of experimenters implicitly related to detector specialists (as reflected in 
Table 1) is not uniform but covers a wide range of activities. As was noted, experimentation begins 
to shift toward data analysis. In practice, it is often believed that, because data analysis constitutes 
an interpretation of the processes occurring in the detector, in terms of high-level theories, bearing 
upon the language of instrumental theories in which the principles of the functioning of detectors 
are rooted, the outcome of this procedure is what directly becomes the experimental result. Because 
obtaining the measurement result is the experiment’s main aim, therefore, the experimentalist, first 
of all, can be deemed the one whose activity immediately delivers the result, that is, an analysis of 
detector data. 
Notably, most of the participants in the analysis of data (experimentalists) in the period preceding 
the acquisition and analysis of data are also engaged in the creation of detectors and procedures 
for them. Thus, the scope of their activity also partially covers that which belongs to the expertise 
of instrumentalists (who may also be engineers)—the creation of instruments. On the one hand, 
considering the fact that the creation of the device and the corresponding procedures take a long 
time (years and even tens of years), the experimenter had to devote a lot of time to the activities 
that are very close to engineering ones, de facto becoming a highly professional engineer. This 
may raise a legitimate question, why is one of them identified as a detector physicist 
(experimentalist) and the other as an engineer when their work and professional expertise are so 
similar? On the other hand, the epistemic distinctions in the nature of their work also blurred: the 
experimental search, in addition to being carried out, as before, in terms of the dominant theories, 
was increasingly guided and determined by these theories; the discovery of new phenomena was 
increasingly dependent on the development of high-level theories. Thus, experimentation became 
more and more tangibly the construction of theoretical natural objects, which was closer to the 
work of the designer than before. This became especially pronounced during the period of success 
of the Standard Model in elementary particle physics, which predicted many particles that were 
subsequently measured experimentally. This could not but affect the identity of the 
experimentalist, as well as the perception of the experimenter by the engineer as a theoretician. 
The shift of identity, therefore, arose in connection with the need for lengthy engineering work for 
the experimentalist (because the creation of the installations took a long time and was not serial 
due to their uniqueness), on the one hand, and the increased constructiveness of the 
experimentation itself, on the other. This entailed the actual blurring of the lines between the nature 
of the work of the experimentalist and engineer, which was initially opposed much due to distinct 
educational trajectories, which are also linked by the mass consciousness with the level of possible 
scientific horizons and achievable professional competencies. 
 
Why is a scientist more prestigious than an engineer? 
 
Joseph Martin (Martin 2017) has recently argued that prestige of different social and epistemic 
groups in science, for example, particle physics and applied science (or engineering), is 
asymmetric (the latter being the least prestigious). The question of what constitutes an engineer’s 
identity requires, first and foremost, an answer to two interrelated questions: Who is an engineer 
and what features make a person an engineer? Modern literature on identity theory distinguishes 
cognitive (internal) and social (external) identity (Anderson 2010; Wenger 1998). In the case of 
an engineer, the former part is predicated upon what they know about the profession, how they 
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understands their role, what they want (may want) or do not want (may not want) to know 
professionally. This part is set not only by the engineer’s personal cognitive peculiarities but also 
by the interrelation of their professional role as an engineer with the whole variety of other roles 
their play in life. The latter part, the social one, is not the traits that an engineer acquires in the 
course of professional practice, but those shaped by their membership in a social group. The latter 
part is formed by the community as a result of belonging to it, as well as by other communities 
and society as a whole, with which the engineer interacts and in which the attitude toward 
engineers as a social group is defined. This view raises the question of the stability of such an 
identity and the need for such conditions in the formation of the so-called engineering identity in 
general. Speaking of engineers as a social group, it becomes necessary to distinguish between an 
engineer, as the holder of engineering education, and an engineer as a performer of the role of an 
engineer. 
To establish what constitutes an engineer’s identity in science, one has to answer the initial 
question of what features and functions make one an engineer. In the practice of scientific 
laboratories in basic science (for example, elementary particle physics), the role of an engineer 
implies working with complex technical systems, but first, we will clarify what the disparities 
between engineers and scientists boil down to. Historically, these distinctions are rooted in an 
understanding of the very nature of the activities of these communities and the goals for which 
these activities, namely scientific and technical research, are oriented. Most approaches to 
distinguishing science and technology in one way or another reflect the Aristotelian distinction 
between ἐπιστήµη (episteme) as knowledge, understanding, or cognition and τέχνη (techne) as 
craft or practical art. The first, according to Aristotle, is a theoretical knowledge of eternal and 
universal things that exist by virtue of their necessity; the second is the creation of transient and 
perishable, i.e., practical things. From here originates the ontological distinction between 
“knowledge of what” and “knowledge of how,” knowledge of the true (first) and useful (second). 
In this regard, a “dichotomy of intellectual status” arose in science and society (Boon 2011, p. 63): 
higher status of science and lower of technology. At the same time, several authors point out the 
difficulties of discerning scientific and technical knowledge in modern science, and also advocate 
the possibility of considering them as either including one another (technical includes epistemic), 
or even as independent of each other (Boon 2011). 
Nonanalyzing data detector and accelerator researchers can be classified as technically oriented 
scientists (except when they are studying new phenomena during the development of instruments). 
Engineers (they are not included in the classification (Galison 1987) because they are not classified 
as scientists) are not engaged in the science of independent development of new devices or study 
of new phenomena in technical systems, but operate and establish such systems or develop in 
accordance with the terms of reference, which are formulated by scientists. An engineer who is 
developing a new system or exploring it according to our view should be classified as a scientist. 
Thus, the physics of high energies retains the basis of the Aristotelian dichotomy of epistemic and 
technical which is reflected in the hierarchy of activities and communities in science from pure 
theorizing about natural phenomena (epistemics) down to technology applications (engineers). 
Signs of dichotomy remain, however, because even in mixed, intermediate cases, such as those of 
detector experimental physicists, their activities are clearly divided into two types of roles: the 
design of the device (for example, the tracker) is technical, its operation is also technical, and the 
analysis of data with the formulation of theoretical statements is scientific (epistemic). The same 
applies to the detector scientist, in whose work the epistemic part (the study of new natural 
phenomena suitable for creating new devices) and the technical (construction, design, and 
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operation of devices) can clearly be traced. At the poles are theorists, all of whose roles are 
















        Figure 1. Epistemic hierarchy of 
communities in high-energy physics. 
Detector, as well as accelerator, researchers perform both epistemic and technical roles (which 
clearly differ, preserving the dichotomy), however, if the technical roles of the experimentalist 
(data analysis) are subjected to the measurement of the phenomena under scrutiny as an immediate 
goal, then even the epistemic goals of instrumentalists are resigned to improving the device designs 
(for example, of a particle accelerator), in connection with which the experimenters find 
themselves higher in the epistemic hierarchy. Here we assume the data-analyzing detector 
researchers to be experimentalists while both nondata-analyzing detector scientists and accelerator 
researchers are instrumentalists. 
 
Engineering and epistemic justice in megascience 
 
Thus, we have argued that the dissimilarity between engineering and other types of scientific 
activity do not resolve into the identity or constructive nature of the activity, but, first of all, are 
governed by perceived property relations and the rights claimed to experimental data that arise due 
to involvement in the data acquisition process. It is immixture in epistemically significant practices 
and affiliation in the data-harvesting community that come to the forefront in distinguishing an 
experimentalist from an engineer. Restrictions on the access of certain groups to epistemic 
practices based on their social or professional group membership and external identity raise the 
issue of epistemic justice. 
 
Although epistemic injustice has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature during 
the last decades (Fricker 2007; Anderson 2012; Medina 2012; Pohlhaus 2017), only very recently 
was the attention of scholars attracted to the internal workings of the scientific community 
(Grasswick 2017; Perović 2017; Pronskikh 2018; Pla-Julián 2018). The account by Fricker (2007) 
originally identifies two types of epistemic injustice and considers them in relation to prejudice 
against social identities of certain discourse participants. As was extensively discussed above, 
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community that constitutes it is stratified into subcommunities associated with certain epistemic 
and technical practices, which are unequal in their epistemic weight and value (Galison 1997). 
These communities develop various technical languages for communication, and some of them are 
functionally and linguistically subordinate to others which puts them in epistemically unequal 
positions (Pronskikh 2018).  
 
In her original book, Fricker (2007, 158) suggested two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial 
injustice, which is due to systematic credibility discounting to people of certain disadvantaged or 
stigmatized social identities, and hermeneutical, which implies that members of socially 
marginalized groups lack resources to make meaning of their experience interpretable by the 
society. The remedies to both testimonial and hermeneutic injustices suggested by Fricker (2007) 
are respective virtues that individuals must exercise to counteract their prejudices. In Anderson 
(2012), the individual virtue-based remedies for epistemic injustices are challenged along two lines 
of argument. First, because cognitive biases are rooted deeply in the mind and have an automatic 
character, prejudicial hearers may discount the interlocutor’s testimony because they perceive it 
incompetent or dishonest. Therefore, cognitive biases are difficult to control, although well-
intentioned agents can train themselves to practice cognitive dissonance to discount their 
perceptions. Second, the credibility of the social groups can be discounted or favored not only on 
a transactional basis but also due to their belonging to a group (for example, certain ethnicity or 
using certain grammar). In the case, for example, of group favoritism or bias, there is no 
transactional injustice, on the contrary, in-group trust is vital in cases of division of labor 
(Anderson 2012, 170). Such cases cause, however, structural testimonial injustice and call for 
structural changes for their remedy. In her view, redesigning social institutions is unavoidable to 
mitigate structural epistemic injustice. 
 
In the engineering context, the most relevant is seen as the concept of participatory injustice 
proposed by Hookway (2010) to clarify the forms of testimonial and hermeneutic injustices 
(Fricker 2007). Hookway (2010) pins down that “Participating is not just a matter of exchanging 
information: it involves asking questions, floating ideas, considering alternative possibilities, and 
so on.” He concludes “epistemic injustice that is directed at someone’s functioning as a participant 
in discussion, deliberation, and inquiry does not simply cause the victim to lose epistemic 
confidence more generally. Rather it questions the possession of capacities that are necessary for 
participation in these kinds of epistemic activities.” (p. 6) Excluding engineers who, as we 
explained earlier, have most of the basic skills necessary for a scientist belonging to more 
epistemically significant discourses and practices, such as the collection and processing of 
experimental data, their discussion and presentation of the results of cognition outside, in our 
opinion is an example of epistemic injustice. In this regard, participatory injustice should be 
considered alongside other types of injustice, which is also structural in nature, i.e., requires 
institutional efforts, not just individual ones to transcend them. 
 
Anatomizing the problem of institutional epistemic justice, Anderson (2012) points out that the 
epistemic segregation of the communities is just as unfair as ethnic or racial biases. However, 
collaborative learning and research can help overcome the bias of individuals and more privileged 
groups over less privileged ones. In the context of scientific and engineering communities, we 
believe that, in relation to scientific research and megascience in particular, collaborative learning 
and research can mean that representatives of separate communities (both detector and accelerator 
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communities and, within these communities, research and engineering) should not only complete 
the same training courses, but also jointly discuss and contribute to all stages of research, from 
accelerated particles and facilities to data analysis and phenomenological theoretical calculations. 
Moreover, mobility between communities must be ensured, providing the opportunity and ability 
to move from engineers to scientists. This will help both to transcend the perception of boundary 
objects as delimiters between epistemic and nonepistemic communities and to fulfill the ethical 




This paper examines the community structure in high-energy physics, which for decades has been 
considered as including instrumentalists, experimenters, and theorists. In our view, the first two 
communities are more correctly regarded as accelerator and detector researchers, which can be 
divided into several groups, including engineers and other specializations. I seek to address the 
noted issue of a shift in the identity of the experimentalists and explain it through the convergence 
of the constructive nature of work of the experimentalist with the engineer as well as the advent of 
specialists of a narrower profile in the place of the classical experimentalist with epistemic division 
of labor. Under the conditions of a similar nature of labor against the background of narratively 
fixed perceptions about their purported scientific expertise and horizons, this could entail a certain 
crisis of the experimentalist’s identity. We note that identities of the experimentalist and engineer 
began to blur and overlap, and their activity formulas nowadays almost coincide. The basis of the 
external distinction between engineers and nonengineers, as before, is the orientation of their 
constructive activities either toward the artificial, technical nature (among the former) or by natural 
phenomena (among the latter). At the same time, the engineering, constructing nature of labor 
turns out to be characteristic of both scientists and engineers, and the formal orientation of the 
activity toward artificial nature as a functional role, as a rule, serves as the basis for the refusal of 
engineering specialists to participate in experiments and analyze data. I argue that the exclusion of 
engineers and other nonscientist specializations in megascience from epistemically most valuable 
discourses and practices was considered by us in the framework of the concept of participatory 
epistemic injustice. I suggest an avenue of approach to overcome participatory injustice, such as 
joint projects for engineering and nonengineering specializations, in which they cast themselves 
in epistemically equipollent roles. 
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Abstract
According to the diversity-beats-ability theorem, groups of diverse problem solvers can
outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. We argue that the model introduced by
Lu Hong and Scott Page (2004; see also Grim et al. 2019) is inadequate for exploring the
trade-off between diversity and ability. This is because the model employs an impoverished
implementation of the problem-solving task. We present a new version of the model which
captures the role of ‘ability’ in a meaningful way, and use it to explore the trade-offs between
diversity and ability in scientific problem solving.
Keywords— social epistemology of science; group problem solving; cognitive diversity;
agent-based modeling; distributed cognition
1. Introduction
Modern science is a deeply collaborative enterprise. Most genuinely important intellectual
challenges cannot be tackled by a single scientific discipline, let alone by individual researchers.
1
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Science needs diversity – solving scientific research problems requires attaining specialized
expertise and resources from a variety of perspectives.
Problem-solving groups in general are taken to benefit from diversity (Reagans and
Zuckerman 2001; Mannix and Neale 2005; Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010; Steel et al. 2019).
Among other important benefits, it is assumed that differences in how members of a group see a
problem, in the cognitive resources they have at their disposal, and in the kind of heuristics they
use, make it more likely that the the group as a whole has the resources to solve the problem. An
important question, therefore, is whether the diversity of a group is in itself epistemically
valuable, over and above the epistemic abilities of the group members.
Besides the empirical evidence cited above, a particularly influential argument in favor of
diversity has been presented in the form of a mathematical theorem and an agent-based
simulation. According to the diversity-beats-ability (DAB) theorem, groups of diverse problem
solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. This means that in assembling
problem-solving teams, functional group diversity should sometimes be prioritized over selecting
the most able individual members. Although they originate in computational social science, in
management and organization studies, the DAB results have recently been also discussed in the
philosophy of science (Grim et al. 2019; Singer 2019; Holman et al. 2018).
We argue that the "can" in the DAB theorem is ambiguous between several different
modalities: in some of its uses, it is only a claim about conceptual possibility, whereas in its
much advertised practical applications, it is clearly regarded as a more substantial possibility.
This raises the question of when and under which exact conditions diversity really beats ability.
We examine whether the original model by Hong and Page, and its further developments by Grim
and associates, actually support the existence of the diversity-beats-ability phenomenon.
We show that due to their impoverished task implementation, these models cannot capture
2
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interesting trade-offs between functional diversity and individual ability: the problem-solving
tasks portrayed in the models are too difficult (i.e., random noise) for ability to make any
difference to the outcomes. We develop a new version of the model with an improved
problem-solving task. The new task representation allows our model to capture the role of
individual ability in problem solving. Only when both diversity and ability really affect the
outcome can the trade-off between them be studied.
We start by briefly presenting the DAB theorem and the associated simulation models,
focusing on the latter. In Section 2, we highlight the "bait-and-switch" argumentative strategy
used by Page to argue for DAB, showing that many of the modeling results supposed to support
the theorem are problematic and do not replicate well. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our main
argument: the model template used by Hong and Page as well as Grim and colleagues is ill-suited
for exploring the trade-off between diversity and ability, because the problem-solving task is
computationally implemented in a way that does not afford any advantage to individual ability or
expertise. We introduce our version of the model, the stairway landscape, and demonstrate how it
captures a substantial trade-off between diversity and ability. We draw two potentially interesting
conclusions concerning the trade-off.
In this article, we are only concerned with the purely instrumental value of cognitive
diversity; we are not arguing against the DAB phenomenon as such. We only ask whether the
particular models we discuss are an informative and reliable way of exploring the possible
trade-off, and provide what we regard as a better alternative way for doing so.
3
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2. The diversity–ability trade-off in group problem solving
Consider design tasks such as designing an automobile, a space shuttle, or a piece of software, or
scientific tasks such as measuring the mass of an elementary particle or discovering the structure
of a macromolecule. Heterogeneous cognitive and material resources need to be applied to solve
all these problems, and as the set of solution candidates is not known beforehand, a search for
solutions is needed. Simon (1989) suggested viewing the scientific research process through the
lens of heuristic search. For instance, scientists search for formulations of problems,
experimental designs, patterns in data, mechanisms behind data, and implications of their
theories. On some occasions, these multi-dimensional search trajectories result in beneficial
epistemic design; in other cases, they yield research approaches of little cognitive value.
Importantly, most scientific problems worth solving lie beyond the capacities of a single knower,
and scientific progress relies on a successful division of labor and collaboration between
researchers, research groups, and sometimes even between scientific disciplines. Hence,
scientific research should be understood as a socially distributed problem-solving process.
Such a picture of collective search immediately suggests a possible trade-off. On the one
hand, as Newell and Simon (1972) suggested, expert performance often relies on highly specific
search heuristics. On the other hand, more diversity in the group’s cognitive resources is
beneficial, all other things being equal, as more varied resources provide access to larger portions
of the solution space. Diversity may, however, conflict with individual ability. Experts are often
more alike (in the relevant respects) than non-experts. Herein lies the trade-off: individual ability
and group diversity both contribute to group performance, but, at least in some circumstances,
the two factors may be in conflict.
Explicit modeling of the epistemic benefits of diversity in collective problem solving is
4
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needed, because the phenomenon involves multiple group-level mechanisms as well as possible
interactions between different epistemic, processual, and social factors. Therefore, purely verbal
and conceptual theorizing is not a reliable tool for drawing out the implications of theoretical
assumptions, and empirical (experimental or case-based) evidence does not usually
unambiguously discriminate between alternative mechanistic explanations for why, in any
particular case, diversity may or may not facilitate successful problem solving. Group problem
solving has proved challenging to model, however. The computational implementation of the
problem (task), cognitive resources (and differences therein), problem-solving behavior and
cognition, and interaction between the group members all present difficult methodological and
theoretical choices for the modeler, easily resulting in complex and intractable models with too
many methodological degrees of freedom. Such models yield results which are hard to interpret.
We believe that the heuristic-search paradigm proposed by Newell and Simon (1972) still
provides the most promising approach for addressing these modeling challenges (see also
Kauffman and Levin 1987; March 1991; Darden 1997). The models discussed and developed in
this article join this tradition.
In a series of articles and books, Lu Hong and Scott Page have provided model-based
evidence for the existence of the diversity-ability trade-off (Hong and Page 2001, 2004; Page
2008). They, in fact, use two distinct models to investigate diversity. The first model, introduced
in Hong and Page (2001) and described in length by Page (2008) in the context of the diversity
theorem, represents the problem to be solved as a binary string of finite length, where each bit
could be seen as portraying a yes–no decision regarding a solution to a particular sub-problem
(Kauffman and Levin 1987). A group of problem solvers of limited ability attempts to maximize
a value function defined over the possible states of this string (potential solutions to the problem).
Diversity is represented in the model by each agent having a different set of possible ways of
5
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Figure 1: High-ability vs. random groups in the bit string model. The vertical axis represents the
score differential between high-ability groups and random groups.
flipping the bits ("flipset heuristics") of the candidate solution string shared between the group
members. Measures of problem difficulty can be assigned to alternative value functions (see Page
1996), and so the model can be used to represent a range of problems of different difficulty and
complexity. This model template therefore corresponds well to pre-theoretic intuitions about how
cognitive diversity can facilitate collective problem solving.
It is therefore rather surprising that the influential diversity-beats-ability results are not
derived from this model. Our replication of the model in Hong and Page (2001) did not provide
evidence to support the diversity-beats-ability phenomenon (see figure 1).1 As the figure
illustrates, no systematic difference emerges between groups of high-ability problem-solvers and
groups of randomly selected problem-solvers. A more careful look at Page’s 2008 argument
reveals that it is based on evidence for the diversity theorem from an altogether different model
introduced in Hong and Page (2004). We refer to this simplified model as the ringworld model.
In sum, the substantial intuitions about diversity and ability in collective problem solving are first
1. For details about the bit string model, see Hong and Page 2001. All program code for the simulations and the gen-
erated data sets are available for download at https://osf.io/a6f5e/?view_only=fcee3f72db8643b9999ad19447f89886
6
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formalized in one model, but the results are derived from a different model based on assumptions
which do not correspond as neatly to the original intuitions. We find such a "bait-and-switch"
argumentative strategy confusing, and not appropriate for transparent and epistemically
sustainable use of theoretical models.
The argument in Hong and Page (2004) has a two-pronged structure: The basic assumptions
of the ringworld model are used to derive an analytical proof intended to provide support for the
theorem. However, as argued by Thompson (2014), the implications of the proof are unclear:
even after technical corrections, the theorem only provides a highly abstract proof of possibility,
and its implications for a non-technical interpretation of diversity are difficult to judge. Although
we agree with Singer (2019) that the proof does rely on diversity and not merely on randomness
(see Thompson 2014), it still remains the case that as such, the proof tells us little about the
conditions under which the trade-off between diversity and ability can be expected to be
significant. Mere logical possibility is not enough for the far-reaching practical implications
suggested by Hong and Page. Their more persuasive evidence for DAB and its relevance for
real-world group problem solving are derived from their agent-based simulation of the ringworld
model. It is to this simulation that we now turn.
3. Problems in the Ringworld
The “computational experiment” used by Hong and Page to demonstrate DAB portrays a group of
agents collectively searching for optimal solutions in a one-dimensional landscape. The discrete
landscape consists of positions 1 . . . = on the number line, wrapped as a circle.2 Value function +
defined over the set of positions assigns to each position a payoff value drawn from the uniform
2. It turns out that the circular topology of the landscape does not make a difference to the results, as the distance
explored by the individual agents (and groups) typically does not exceed 20 steps along the 2000-step circle.
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distribution [0,100]. The agents’ goal is to find the largest possible values on this landscape. To
do so, each agent employs a heuristic q. A heuristic is defined as consisting of : different jumps
of length 1 . . . ; (e.g., [1,5,11] and [3,4,12] are two examples of heuristics with parameters
: = 3, ; = 12). Starting from its current position, an agent sequentially applies these jumps along
the landscape, and moves to a new position along the circle if the payoff associated with that
position is strictly larger than the current one. When no further improvement is possible, the
agent stops. The performance of an agent is defined as the expected payoff of the stopping points
over the different starting positions of the landscape, and over a set of landscapes.
Hong and Page implement group problem solving behavior as sequential, iterative search.
First, one agent initiates the search. As its local maximum is found, the second agent in the group
takes the baton, and applies the jumps included in its heuristic as long as they lead to
improvements. After all group members have taken their turn, a new round begins. The
collective search stops when no agent can make further progress. Group performance is defined
as the expected value of the position at which the group search stops.
In order to compare groups of high-ability problem solvers to more diverse ones, an
exhaustive set of agents (with respect to possible heuristics) is first ranked according to their
individual performance on a set of landscapes. A high-ability group of size 6 is constructed from
the 6 highest performers in such a tournament, whereas the diverse group consists of 6 agents
sampled randomly from the population.
In their model analysis, Hong and Page (2004) report results for various sets of parameter
values. For example, for ; = 12, : = 3, = = 2000 they find that that the best individual agents
scored 87.3 whereas the worst agent’s score was 84.3. For groups of 10, the high-ability group
scored 92.56 and the random group 94.53. This difference in favor of the random group is the
diversity effect discovered in the simulation. Similar results were found by Grim and associates
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(2019), and we were also able to replicate the findings.
Hong and Page suggest that there are reasons to believe that the random group scored higher
due to its diversity. An alternative way to express this finding is in terms of effective group size.
In our replication, we noticed that the difference in performance (’performance differential’)
between the random and the high-ability group was strongly correlated (.65) with the difference
in effective group size between the two groups, where effective group size was defined as the size
of the group heuristic from which overlapping elements had been removed. In other words, the
similarity between the members of a high-ability group results in the group being functionally
smaller (from the perspective of the problem-solving task). As the performance of a group
generally increases as its effective group size gets larger, it is not surprising that smaller effective
group size leads to worse performance.
Going back to the original DAB theorem, however, the explanation above seems to capture
only one side of the diversity–ability trade-off. Although the correlation between effective group
size and performance is an indication of the functioning of the "diversity mechanism," it is still
unclear why that effect is stronger than the influence of the "ability mechanism," i.e., the fact that
some heuristics should lead to higher performance than others, and that those high-performing
heuristics should be more common in high-ability groups. A closer inspection of the model
provides a solution to this puzzle.
Unlike Hong and Page, we regard the effect sizes from the simulation as remarkably small,
given that they originate from theoretical modeling where the modeler is free to explore a broad
range of hypothetical scenarios. One would expect a purely theoretical model, purpose-built to
examine and demonstrate a specific mechanism using heavy idealizations, to reveal relatively
unambiguous effects of the modeled mechanisms. As a matter of methodological principle, we
believe that conclusions drawn from agent-based modeling would be strengthened by showing
9
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how the effect size can be manipulated by changing model parameters. In other words, being able
to "turn the dials" and observe how changes in model inputs result in systematic changes in the
modeled effect suggests that we have reached understanding about the dependencies between
model inputs and outputs (see Woodward 2003; Aydinonat, Reĳula, and Ylikoski 2020).
Regarding the ringworld model, we argue there are two reasons to believe that the results reported
by Hong and Page do not provide genuine insight into the diversity-ability trade-off.
First, with the parameter values studied by Hong and Page, in nearly half of the cases, the
random group ends up with a full heuristic, that is, a heuristic consisting of all possible jumps
[1, . . . , 12]. Furthermore, only 13% of the random groups have an effective group size smaller
than 11. Hence, even if the agents in the high-ability group can make the jumps leading to high
performance, it is highly likely that the same jumps will also be included in the heuristic of the
random group – there is simply no way the high-ability group could systematically outperform
the random one.
Secondly, as Grim and his colleagues (2019) also noted, the purely random landscapes
studied by Hong and Page are simply not hospitable to anything that could be meaningfully
interpreted as “ability” or "expertise." For heuristic search to be applicable, the task needs to have
some structure or redundancy that the heuristic can exploit (Kahneman and Klein 2009;
Kauffman and Levin 1987). Hence, aggregated over several random landscapes, no significant
performance differences emerge between the different heuristics. This is seen in the very small
performance differences between the best and worst performing individual agents (see above) in
Hong and Page’s simulations: the "ability mechanism" does not get any traction on the
landscapes they studied. Therefore, we argue that the model does not appropriately capture the
trade-off between diversity and ability.
Grim and his coauthors (2019) propose to remedy this problem by partially smoothing out the
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random landscape (by adding interpolated values between randomly generated values). They
argue that such a task representation can better capture ability, because on smoothed out
landscapes individual performance is more transportable to other landscapes of similar
smoothness. Yet a closer numerical examination of the results of this remedy again reveals only
small differences between diversity and ability. Even on smoothed random landscapes, the
expected performance difference between best performing and random individuals is minute.
This suggests that these landscapes simply do not represent a problem that is suitably complex for
exploring trade-offs between ability and diversity.
4. Modeling the diversity–ability trade-off on stairway land-
scapes
In order to better understand the tension between diversity and ability, we need to portray
scenarios where also ability plays a role. In our own simulations, we introduce a type of problem
where high ability – either at individual or group level – leads to noticeably increased
performance. In science, having the right methodology for the problem at hand often sharply
increases the epistemic payoff. Our stairway model differs from the Hong and Page ringworld
model only in problem structure. The specifications of agent and group behavior remain the same
as in the ringworld model. In generating problem landscapes, we start from the uniform noise
distribution employed by Hong and Page. On top of those landscapes, however, we superimpose
an increasing sequence of values, where the positions of the values are separated by intervals
drawn from a finite set of integers in 1 . . . ; (see figure 2). We call this set the step set.
For an agent to climb the increasing subsequence, the stairway sequence, it must possess the
11
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Figure 2: A stairway landscape with step set {5, 12}, and, therefore, step set size 2.
heuristic jumps corresponding to the steps used to generate the sequence (e.g., [5, 12] in figure 2).
This strongly favors some heuristics over others: whereas an agent who does not possess the full
step set is bound to remain in the noise region of the landscape, a "high-ability" agent that has the
necessary heuristic can climb through the whole sequence (and even reach the maximum payoff
on the landscape, normalized to 1.0).
Figure 3 illustrates outcomes from our model with parameters values corresponding to those
studied by Hong and Page (2004) and by Grim an his colleagues (2019). The left panel presents
the difference between the performance of high-ability and random groups (positive values
standing for high-ability group advantage, and negative values, for random group advantage). The
results indicate that with these parameter values, stairway landscapes always favor high-ability
groups. Especially when the group size is small, because it is made up of high-performing
individuals (who typically possess valuable elements of the step set) the high-ability group
performs significantly better than the random group. The right panel presents the difference
between the redundancy of heuristics between the high-ability and random group (value 0 means
that the overlap of heuristics in both groups is the same). As suggested by findings by Hong and
12
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Figure 3: High-ability vs. random groups on a stairway landscape, step size 3. (: = 3, ; = 12, = =
2000; 100 repetitions over 100 landscapes)
Page (2004), random groups tend to have comparatively lower levels of overlap in their heuristics.
As group size increases, the redundancy in the high-ability group increases more than in the
random group. This suggests that when the group size is larger, random groups again begin to
approach the full heuristic, which obviously is sufficient for climbing the stairway sequence. For
this reason, at group sizes larger than 10, random groups catch up, and no significant
performance difference is observed between high-ability and random groups (left panel).
We argue that this tension between the "ability mechanism" and the "diversity mechanism"
captures the trade-off addressed by the DAB theorem. What happens, however, when the level of
ability or expertise required by the task changes? Different levels of task difficulty can be
represented by stairway landscapes with different step set sizes. For example, landscapes with
step set sizes up to three lie within the abilities of the individual agents studied in the simulation
(: = 3). Climbing the stairway for step sizes larger than 3 requires pooling heuristics from several
agents.
Figure 4 summarizes tentative findings from our studies with landscapes of varying difficulty.
In the figure, group size is represented on the horizontal axis, and step set size (complexity of the
13
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -474-
The diversity-ability trade-off in scientific problem solving
Figure 4: High-ability-vs-random group performance differential on stairway landscapes (50
repetitions, each over 50 landscapes).
problem) on the vertical axis. The color represents the performance differential between the
high-ability group and the random group; lighter shades standing for high-ability group
advantage. A genuine trade-off between diversity and ability can be seen. Observe the contrast
between the upper-left quadrant, where ability dominates, and the lower-right, where random
groups have a slight advantage over the high-ability groups; ability dominates when group size
and step set size are small, whereas diversity leads to better performance when the group size and
step set size are larger.
Finally, our results suggest a conceptual distinction between the complexity and difficulty of a
problem: perhaps not surprisingly, ability dominates when the problem is simple in the specific
sense that multiple cognitive resources do not need to be combined to solve it. Note that if the
problem is simple in this sense, this does not necessarily mean that it is easy to solve. When the
problem becomes complex, requiring efficient division of cognitive labor, the diversity effect
begins to dominate over individual abilities. The results demonstrate how diversity and group
size begin to outdo individual ability only when the problem complexity exceeds the cognitive
resources of any single individual.
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One could object to our stairway model on seemingly similar grounds to the ones on which
we based our criticism of the original ringworld model. We questioned the DAB results on the
basis that the model was built to favor diversity over ability. Why would our model fare any
better, as it was clearly built to favor ability over diversity? This objection misses our point,
however. Our argument is that the original model cannot be used to model the trade-off between
diversity and ability, because it cannot be used to represent the gains from ability. Of course, we
fully admit that the stairway landscape is built to favor ability, but the model nevertheless also
retains the gains from diversity. Stairway landscapes give both ability and diversity their due, and,
therefore, can illuminate the trade-off between them. This, we argue, was the original and
interesting interpretation of the DAB results to begin with.
5. Conclusions
The original results by Hong and Page do not provide reliable evidence for the
diversity-beats-ability theorem because the ringworld model, especially its task implementation,
does not allow for ability to adequately influence individual or group performance. This
one-sidedness implies that their model cannot be used to explore the possible trade-offs between
diversity and ability in problem-solving groups. Our exploration of stairway landscapes illustrates
how the results by Hong and Page (2004) rely on a problematic task structure to get their results.
Stairway landscapes provide a better model for "medium-hard" problems which require
specialized abilities and true division of cognitive labor. Such landscapes can be used to model
the interplay between diversity and ability relevant, and its effects on the division of cognitive
labor in science.
Our tentative modeling results suggest a trade-off between diversity and ability. Ability is
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favored when the problem is moderately difficult, requiring only a few different expert heuristics,
and when groups are small. Diversity is favored when the problem is complex, requiring multiple
component solutions, and when the groups are large. A further qualitative effect can be observed
at the point where problem complexity increases beyond the capacity of a single agent and
necessitates division of cognitive labor: simple problems solvable by individuals favor ability
regardless of group size.
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Learning From the Shape of Data
Abstract
To make sense of large data sets, we often look for patterns in how
data points are “shaped” in the space of possible measurement out-
comes. The emerging field of topological data analysis (TDA) offers a
toolkit for formalizing the process of identifying such shapes. This pa-
per aims to discover why and how the resulting analysis should be un-
derstood as reflecting significant features of the systems that generated
the data. I argue that a particular feature of TDA—its functoriality—
is what enables TDA to translate visual intuitions about structure in
data into precise, computationally tractable descriptions of real-world
systems.
1 Introduction
“Learning from the shape of data” describes an expansive portion of scien-
tific activity. One common example is curve-fitting, in which a data set is
visualized on a two dimensional grid, and we infer that the underlying mech-
anism generating the data can be characterized by a function with a similarly
shaped plot.
As new techniques are developed to gather, store, and analyze large quan-
tities of high-dimensional information, its increasingly difficult to visually
identify and interpret relevant shapes. While we can scale up familiar curve-
fitting tools, such as linear regression, we know there is more structure to be
harnessed from large data sets than these methods can reveal.
One relatively new method of identifying “shapes” in data sets is topolog-
ical data analysis (TDA). Topology is the study of the properties of shapes
that are invariant under continuous deformations, such as stretching, twist-
ing, bending, or re-scaling. TDA aims to identify the essential “structure”
of a data set as it “appears” in an abstract space of measurement outcomes.
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The simplest application of TDA is a type of cluster analysis–a method
of identify “clusters” of data points that are “more similar” to one another
than the wider body of data. While this is relatively conducive to interpre-
tation (as revealed “groupings” in the system being analyzed), TDA can also
identify more complex shapes including “holes”, “voids”, and “tendrils” with
no intuitive interpretation.
This paper is an investigation into why and how the resulting analysis
should be understood as reflecting significant features of the systems that
generated the data. In particular, I will argue that the relevance and utility
of TDA stems from a particular feature: the functoriality of the relationship
between the shapes it picks out and their symbolic representations.
In section 2 I describe TDA in detail. Section 3 explains what functoriality
means and how it justifies the use of TDA despite interpretational challenges.
In section 4, I relate this discussion to philosophical work on the contents
of and relationships among physical theories. Section 5 examines the role of
spatial reasoning in TDA, and how its functoriality enables integrating this
informal activity into a formal data analytic framework.
2 Topological data analysis
The phrase “topological data analysis” is used to refer to a variety of data
science practices that use tools from algebraic topology to make inferences
about the “shape” of data clouds as they appear in the “space” of possible
observations. Here, the term data refers to a set of real vectors corresponding
to a series of observations. This is an adequate definition for capturing
natural language use of the term, but one might object that it does not
necessarily capture what data is. One of the goals of TDA is to circumvent
some of the arbitrariness involved in presenting data as real vectors. A
data cloud can thus be thought of as a visual representation of this set of
vectors as “points” in a (high dimensional generalization of) space. The
abstract “space” where data lives is generally some form of metric space, or
set X of points (including at least the data points) together with a notion of
“distance” d( , ) between the points. For example, I may have data about
the weights of a collection of potatoes. The distance between these data
points would just be the pairwise difference in weight between two potatoes
according to a fixed unit, e.g. pounds.
A characteristic problem of analyzing large data sets is deciding how to
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combine many different types of measurements into a shared metric space. I
can also add information about the length, color, number of eyes, etc. for each
potato, creating an n-dimensional space, where n is the number of potato
attributes. The “distance” between two data points is now some combination
of the distances given by weights, lengths, color, etc. But how should the
notions of distance given by each variable combine into “distance” in the
total space of possible variable values? The standard way of aggregating
one-dimensional metrics into a shared metric space is to imagine each metric
as an axis in an n-dimensional Cartesian grid, with distance given by the
Cartesian distance as follows. Let x = (x1, ..., xn) and y = (y1, ..., yn) be two
sets of potato measurements. Then d(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + ...+ (xn − yn)2.
Setting aside the fact that there are other viable options for constructing
distances from these values, notice that this expression does not include
units. Should weight be presented in pounds or tons? Of course we know
how to translate between these two units, and we consider the choice more of
notational convenience than theoretically meaningful. But if we are looking
to the “shape” of data for information about the system being measured, the
data cloud will look much more “flat” if we use tons rather than pounds. It
is thus desirable to consider properties of the data cloud that do not depend
on the particular choice of metric space or unit, but which are shared by a
variety of plausible modeling choices.
Such considerations motivate the use of topological, as opposed to geomet-
ric methods. Topology is the mathematical field that studies properties of
shapes that remain constant under stretching, twisting, or otherwise deform-
ing. Topologists attend to more general features of metric spaces that would
be present under different modeling assumptions, called topological invari-
ants. Since data sets are finite, although they may suggest some underlying
shape, they likely will not do so uniquely. This is the standard curve-fitting
problem in higher dimensions: for any discrete set of points, there are an in-
finite number of continuous curves (or shapes) that contain (or approximate)
the locations of those points. As with the curve-fitting problem, external
considerations guide the choice of continuous object, rather than just the
bare, uninterpreted set of data points. One may have a priori reasons to
expect that the “right” curve is quadratic, for example.
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2.1 Clusters
The simplest example of TDA, and the one most broadly used by data scien-
tists generally, is a type of cluster analysis. The idea behind cluster analysis is
to ask: do my data points naturally divide into sub-categories of data points
more similar to one another than the overall space? Such a situation indi-
cates that there is some non-trivial structure underlying the data associated
with such groupings, which one may interpret as “natural kinds” in the space.
Cluster analysis is in this way closely related to regression analysis—clusters
point towards a correlation among variables, one of the main “signals” data
scientists hope to read off of large data sets. For example, biological species
are sometimes individuated as ”homeostatic property clusters” of organisms
that are stably more similar to one another than to other organisms (Boyd,
1999).
In scientific contexts, external considerations about the type of data un-
der consideration tends to influence how one chooses to carve a data set
into clusters. For example, only features considered relevant to fitness will
likely factor into the the similarity notion that underlies species clustering.
Moreover, traditional clustering algorithms such as k-means will require a
pre-specification of the number of clusters to be identified, which will likely
come from preconceived notions of the expected number of groupings. For
example, a clustering of voter data might pre-suppose that voters will split
into two clusters along partisan lines.
Even in the absence of such guidance, natural clusters may be easily
“seen” when the data is graphed. With larger and higher dimensional data
sets to analyze, these heuristics are less useful, and data scientists would
prefer a principled algorithmic approach to clustering. This would amount
to a function that takes metric spaces (X, d)—here understood as data sets
X = {x1, ..., xn} with a notion of “distance” d(xi, xj)—as inputs, and outputs
partitions of that data into clusters of data points that are “close together.”
2.2 Constructing Shapes
The most common method to construct a shape from a data cloud is roughly
as follows. Enclose each data point in a “ball” of radius ε centered on that
point. As ε gets larger, the cloud will cease to look like isolated points and
start to gain shape. Once it gets too large, though, we are left with a single
shapeless blob. We use this idea to construct a simplicial complex, beginning
4
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Figure 1: Constructing a C̆ech complex as ε increases, from Bubenik (2015).
with the data points as vertices.1 Where 2 balls intersect, we add an edge
between them. When 3 balls intersect, we add a face enclosed by the three
edges. This process continues, creating higher dimensional n-faces where
n+ 1 balls intersect. The result is called a C̆ech complex.2
This is an intuitively plausible way to construct a discrete shape from a
data cloud. A clustering can be “read off” of a C̆ech complex by grouping
data points according to whether they are connected in a single component
of the complex. This may be complicated by the presence of noise—a single
anomalous data point might connect otherwise robustly distinct clusters.
This can be side-stepped by either looking at only regions that are highly
connected, or avoided altogether by filtering and “cleaning” the data prior
to analysis.
2.3 Holes and voids
Identifying the clusters of a simplicial complex appears is a special case of a
more general phenomenon of homology. Homology is a method of classifying
shapes by looking at how many “holes” the shape has. No matter how much
you stretch and twist it, a circle will always have a “hole” in it, a sphere will
always have a void or cavity, an innertube will always have the “donut hole”
as well as a void in the interior that inflates.
When we look at the connected components of a C̆ech complex, we are
considering the H0-homology of the complex (considered as a topological
space). We can similarly attend to the H1-homology of the complex by
1See Hatcher (2002) section 2.1 for a precise definition of a simplicial complex.
2In practice, TDA employs a more computationally tractable approximation thereof,
called a witness complex. See Carlsson (2009) section 2 for details.
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looking for “holes,” or the H2-homology by looking at “cells,” and so on to
higher dimensions with less intuitive interpretations.
Example 1 (Cosmology). van de Weygaert et al. (2011) study the homol-
ogy of density level sets of an ensemble of randomly generated cosmic mass
distributions. They analyze the evolution of H1, H2, and H3-homology over
time in n-body simulations, revealing characteristic patterns of different dark
energy models. They show how homology can track cosmological structures
of independent interest to physicists, such as matter power spectra and non-
Gaussianity in the primordial density field.
2.4 Persistence
The motivating idea behind the construction of a C̆ech complex is that we can
imagine data as being uniformly sampled (with noise) from some underlying
“shape” in the metric state space, and we can use these data points to infer
the global structure of the “object” we are sampling from. The more samples
we look at, the more accurate our picture of the shape will be. For sufficiently
small ε-balls, the complex will not have any more structure than the bare
data set. Similarly, when the balls get too large, there is nothing more to
look at than a giant blob. The “right” choice of ε is at some intermediate
size, but how should it be chosen? If we chose an ε that is too small, we will
get a shape with a lot more holes, disconnected components, etc., than we
think are meaningful. In other words, we retain some of the noisy features
of the data cloud that we were trying to eliminate. But we risk going to far,
and making ε large enough to obscure both noise and meaningful information
from the data.
A natural way to solve this problem is to look at many different choices of
ε, and use external considerations to decide which gives the best resolution
of the data shape. Two more problems arise when we do this, though. For
one, the whole point of data analysis is to simplify and compress information
about a system, and having a variety of different models we can choose
from does not simplify matters. Second, there may be different features that
arise at different resolutions that are equally significant, and this multi-level
picture can get lost if we have to choose a single model among the many
possibilities. For example, data may be dense in some regions but sparse in
others, where relevant shapes require larger ε-balls to be “seen”.
The key insight that unlocked the power of TDA was the idea of “topolog-
6
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ical persistence,” introduced to data analysis in (Edelsbrunner et al., 2002).
Briefly: instead of picking a particular resolution to look at, we look at them
all, but take advantage of a trick from algebraic topology to connect com-
plexes at different scales in a sophisticated and efficient way The result is the
association of a data cloud with a persistence module that encodes how the
cloud changes structurally as ε increases. Homology is then computed for
these modules, and the result is typically expressed as a homological barcode,
as in figure 2. The “bars” begin when a feature is “born” and end when it
“dies.” Short intervals in barcodes are often attributed to either measurement
noise or inadequate sampling, whereas long, “persistent” bars are thought to
reveal real geometric features of the space being sampled from.
Figure 2: Example of a homological barcode, from Ghrist (2008).
Not only is this decomposition more computationally tractable to analyze
than (sets of) complexes, but the barcode itself provides a visual summary of
behavior as ε increases. When the number of features is large, data analysts
will also sometime use persistence diagrams instead of barcodes.
2.5 Stability
One way to interpret ε is as a modeling parameter, corresponding to the
resolution or scale we use to construct a shape from the data cloud. The per-
sistent features of a C̆ech complex are those that are stable, or robust under
7
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perturbations of the parameter value. Longer bars in barcodes represent fea-
tures that appear for a wider range of ε values, indicating that these features
are robust and unlikely to constitute mere noise. Cohen-Steiner et al. (2007)
made this precise by proving that for a large class of constructions (including
C̆ech complexes), persistence diagrams are stable, meaning that small per-
turbations of the initial data set result in correspondingly small changes in
the resulting persistence diagram.
We can use this same method to consider stability across other indexing
parameters as well at fixed resolution, as in the following example.
Example 2 (Arteries). Bendich et al. (2016) employ topological data anal-
ysis to study the structure of arteries in the human brain. They uniformly
sample a large number of points from a blood vessel diagram (weighted by
thickness of vessel), and construct a C̆ech complex from this data cloud, an-
alyzing the H0 and H1 persistence diagrams over the growing size of ε-balls
in the C̆ech complex. They look at persistent H0 over a stack of “horizontal
slices” of the artery diagram.
Figure 3: Horizontal slices of the artery diagram, from Bendich et al. (2016).
The authors found significant correlation between certain features of these
homological barcodes and the age and sex of the subjects, with the age
correlation a significant improvement over previous attempts at analyzing
similar data. For example, older brains tended to have the longest bars in
the latter barcodes.
In this example, persistence is indexed over the parameter of height. One
can also analyze persistence of homological features over time.
Example 3 (Time-series data). (Perea and Harer, 2015) demonstrate that
persistent H1-homology over time can be used to detect periodicity in time-
series data by embedding it into a higher dimensional space. Note that in the
absence of such an embedding, time series data displays no “loops” (since
8
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prior points in time are never revisited), so as it stands, it is not conducive to
analysis of homology. It is fairly common for data analysts to modify their
data to match their methods in this way, rather than the other way around.
We can thus understand persistence modules as assembling a sequence of
(n− 1)-dimensional models indexed by an nth parameter, such as resolution
or time. Dimensionality reduction is a common feature of data analysis tech-
niques. Data often comes in the form of large vectors, and the goal is often
to compress them—express as much of the original information as possible
with in as few dimensions as possible. This amounts to selecting features or
parameters of interest and suppressing the rest in order to highlight general
patterns. Reducing data models to 2-3 dimensions also makes them more
visualizable, making them more useful to researchers to observe patterns, as
well as easier to communicate to the public. Persistence modules provide
the benefits of low dimensional visualizability without throwing away the
information in the extra dimensions.
3 Functoriality
Most practitioners will admit that the interpretation of homology in data is
unclear. While increasing in popularity of late, TDA (beyond mere cluster
analysis) is still relatively niche. It is often reserved for situations in which
traditional data analysis tools have failed to bear fruit, and TDA is one of
many attempts to gain insight into the data.
Data scientists rarely feel the need to justify their use of TDA beyond the
fact that it seemed to pick up on a relevant pattern in a particular situation.
But when pressed, or in more comprehensive theoretical contexts, the use of
TDA is usually explained by the fact that homology has a particularly nice
property that makes it a reliable data analysis tool: functoriality.
To understand this, we’ll need to look a bit deeper into how TDA func-
tions. TDA summarizes the shape of a C̆ech complex built from a data
cloud in terms of a homology group Hn(X). For each group, Hn(X) essen-
tially characterizes how many “holes” are present in each dimension. This
makes it easy to describe the shape computationally, as groups are more
easily described symbolically than shapes. But in order for this symbolic
representation to to be useful, we need to be able to identify which “holes”
in our complex correspond to which symbolic representation, and we need
to be able to track the holes as we evolve the complexes. We can do this,
9
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because homology is functorial in the sense that more than just translating
complexes to groups, it tells us how to translate maps between complexes into
maps between groups while preserving all relevant topological information.
The functoriality of homology enables us to do three important things,
which are essential to its utility in analyzing data: identify local structures,
connect complexes as parameters vary, and compare complexes constructed
from different samples. We can identify local structures via inclusion maps
that pick out particular clusters, holes, and voids. We can then evolve these
complexes by varying parameters of interest, and see which features persist.
Lastly, we can perform an additional robustness check on our results by
comparing clusters generated with different sub-samples of our data, in a
way analogous to bootstrapping in statistics (Chazal et al., 2015).
Thus data scientists study persistent homology, not because they think
of “counting holes” as the right way to characterize data, but rather because
TDA has a particular feature–functoriality–that make it a reliable tool to
use. Since persistent homology has this nice property, data scientists will
often shoe-horn questions about data into the shape of a homology problem
in order to make it tractable. For example, they might add extra edges to a
C̆ech complex to turn open chains into closed loops. Or they might chose a
particular dimensional reduction in which loops arise, as in Perea and Harer
(2015).
One can also modify TDA to examine how clusters are shaped. For
example, “tendrils” emanating from the core of a cluster can be tracked via
the persistent H0-homology of the resulting data cloud once that core is
removed. Nicolau et al. (2011) use this technique to classify breast cancer
types.
Figure 4: Visualization of data featuring tendrils.
While the recent proliferation of these methods might be dismissed as
mere hammer-nailing, it should rather be said that since we have very few
10
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tools to work with, we had better hope this problem can become nail-shaped.
If I am correct about the significance of TDA’s functoriality, then we
should expect that other fruitful data analytic methods can be understood
functorially. Indeed, Bubenik and Scott (2014) express persistent homology
as a special case of a more general kind of functor, and Carlsson and Mémoli
(2013) demonstrate how a functorial account of clustering algorithms (in-
cluding H0 persistent homology) provides conceptual clarity.
4 Category Theory
The role of functoriality in justifying the use of TDA is suggestive of recent
literature in the philosophy of physics advocating for a functorial account
of intertheoretic relations. This literature is inspired by Halvorson (2013),
who argues that one should understand the content of a scientific theory as
a category of models of that theory. That is, as a collection of theoretical
models, plus relationships (structure preserving functions) between the mod-
els. On this view, the appropriate way to understand relationships between
theories is using a functor—a map that takes models to models and relations
to relations in a consistent way. Once framed in this way, philosophers can
use tools from category theory to enrich their understanding of these theories
and how they relate to one another (Weatherall, 2017; Rosenstock, 2019)
We can conceive of TDA as a special case of this general category theo-
retic framework for characterizing scientific theories, or as a prefer to think
of them, representational frameworks. We begin with a “metric space” repre-
sentational framework for our empirical data. This consists of (finite) metric
spaces, along with relationships between metric spaces (isometries, embed-
dings, etc.), forming category FinMet. We also have a “topological” rep-
resentational framework of “shapes” that our data might have, and struc-
ture preserving maps between them forming a category Comp of simplicial
complexes. And we have an algebraic category, HomAlg, of homological
algebras.
In this language, we articulate a “reading” of shapes from a data set as
a functor F : FinMet → Comp, such as the functor Fδ that takes a metric
space its Cěch complex of radius δ. And we can transform this topological
framing into an algebraic framing via a functor from Comp toHomAlg (the
“homology” functor). And we can construct a category PDiag of persistence
diagrams, associated with our underlying data model again by a functor from
11
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FinMet to PDiag.
There are lessons to be learned from this relationship between TDA and
this philosophy of physics literature in both directions. Philosophers benefit
from a fruitful example outside of physics, and one that incorporates many
“levels” of abstraction from initial data to more abstract representations.
Conversely, formal philosophical work can help elaborate the sense in which
theoretical content is “preserved” in these functorial transformations. In
particular, Rosenstock (2021) illustrates how reflection on the structure of a
data set influences and constrains the ways in which it can be clustered.
5 Spatial inference
The goal of data analysis is to identify patterns in data that provide con-
cise, comprehensible summaries of the system that point towards features of
significance in broad classes of systems. Such recognition of patterns of suf-
ficient generality without overfitting is the holy grail of artificial intelligence
and machine learning research. In the meantime, scientists rely heavily on
visual intuition to guide inquiry, experimenting with parameters and data
filtering until it “looks right”.
TDA removes some of the arbitrariness of this process by enforcing a con-
sistent methodology to the identification of patterns once these discretionary
setup choices are made. But intuitions are not abandoned entirely at this
stage, since the resulting analysis still has to fit with preconceived notions
of natural categories and interesting patterns in order to be of interest to
practitioners. Patterns found through random applications of TDA might
lead scientists to look for corresponding features of interest in a system, but
if these cannot be found, the shapes identified in the data remain merely
curiosities. In example 2, if barcodes did not track gender and age but some
other feature that we do not independently classify as a natural kind, they
would likely be omitted from the published analysis.
The difficulty of interpreting higher dimensional homology thus requires
extensive human discretion to be empirically useful. As TDA is a second-
line resource for data that is particularly intractable to analyze, which puts
creativity at the center of its application. We might wonder whether such
an informal process of intuitive speculation about the shape of data can be
incorporated into a formal epistemic story about the structure of topological
data models. Here, we can learn much from the vast literature on diagram-
12
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matic reasoning in Euclidean geometry. Critics of the rigor of reasoning from
diagrams in geometric ‘proofs’ point to the fact that such proofs use a partic-
ular illustration to make an inference about all possible illustrations. How-
ever, philosophers of mathematical practice have recently come to appreciate
the role of diagrams in generating and communicating geometric knowledge.
Manders (2008) argues that ancient geometers were careful to rely on dia-
grams only for demonstrations about what he calls co-exact features—those
that are relatively insensitive to the range of variation in possible visual rep-
resentations, such as part-whole and boundary-interior relationships (and of
course, homology). Mumma (2010) takes this a step further and develops
a formal account of Euclidean proofs that includes both sentential and dia-
grammatic components.
Similarly, data analysts are concerned with ensuring that inferences about
data rely only on real structural features of observations, rather than inci-
dental features of how data visualized. At issue is the level of generality
one can adopt when making inferences from a single visual representation of
data, picked somewhat arbitrarily from an ensemble of possible alternative,
equally valid representations. TDA resolves this issue by requiring that the
analyzed features of data models be functorial with respect to maps that
preserve what they take to be the relevant structural features of models, and
persistent across parameters when the “right” value is not known.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that the functoriality of homology is critical to TDA’s
utility in revealing and interpreting structural features of data sets. In brief,
topological features of data sets are visually salient to humans and aid in
our reasoning in understanding. The functoriality of persistent homology
ensures that reasons we had for thinking topological features were meaning-
ful are preserved in the translation from data cloud to homological barcode,
while enabling various robustness tests on the resulting analyses. There are
promising future directions for exploring the relationship between topological
data analysis and recent philosophical work on the content of and relation-
ships among physical theories.
13
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Causal specificity is a measure of how important a cause is relative to another. Waters (2007) has 
developed a theory of causation that deals with specificity. Weber (2006, 2017a, 2017b) has 
thoroughly criticized it. I defend Waters’s theory by showing that non-systematicity is 
unproblematic. I also argue that Weber’s desiderata for theories of causation are too restrictive and 
insensitive to developments in biological technology. I finally challenge the most fundamental 
assumption in the framework of causal specificity—that bijective functions are most specific—
thus calling for its reassessment. 
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Introduction 
Philosophers of biology debate whether some causes are more important than others in an 
explanation. The proponents of causal parity maintain that all causes of an effect are equally 
important. By contrast, the advocates of causal privilege argue that some causes are more important 
than others. According to the latter, a number of causes may be privileged and the degree to which 
each is privileged relative to others can differ (Waters, 2007; Weber, 2006; Woodward, 2003). I 
will explain the important aspects of this discussion using Waters’s (2007) terminology. 
Waters specifies conditions that a cause must meet in order to ‘make a difference’ in an 
effect (e.g., protein synthesis). The basic idea is that if a cause accounts for the variation in an 
effect (which occurs in a real population), then it is a difference maker with respect to that effect. 
Causes that counterfactually could have made a difference but that do not actually do so are called 
potential difference makers. Causes that do make a difference are called actual difference makers. 
If only one cause makes the difference, it is called the actual difference maker. If a number of 
causes make the difference, then each is an actual difference maker. Causes that actually make a 
difference are clearly more important than those that do so only potentially, since they account for 
the actual variation in the effect. The particularly difficult issue concerns the degree to which some 
given an actual difference maker is privileged relative to another. More precisely, let A:{x, y, z} 
denote the set of causes that actually make a difference in effect B. The crucial question is whether, 
say, x is privileged over y and z by degrees p and q, respectively. If so, we need to understand what 
this ‘degree’ is. 
The degree of causal privilege is measured in terms of causal specificity (defined in section 
I), a concept developed by Weber (2006) and Woodward (2010). The central idea is that the more 
‘closely’ the values of the cause variable map to those of the effect variable, the more specific the 
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said cause is with respect to the effect (as compared with its other causes). Waters (2007) claims 
that the causal specificity of the DNA is greater than that of the splicing agents vis-à-vis their 
common effect, mature mRNA. As a result, the DNA is the most privileged cause in this context. 
Although he largely supports the general framework of causal specificity, Marcel Weber (2006, 
2017a, 2017b) has systematically criticized Waters’s particular theory of causation. Specifically, 
he has argued that the theory’s focus on actual populations often prevents it from being systematic. 
I aim to accomplish three tasks in this paper. The first is to defend Waters’s theory of 
causation against Weber’s criticisms. The second is to examine the desiderata of theories of 
causation and argue that Weber’s conditions seem unreasonable. The third is to criticize a 
fundamental assumption about causal specificity that its proponents share. In the first section, I 
outline Weber’s (and Woodward’s) account of causal specificity and provide some empirical 
details from molecular biology to contextualize the discussion. In section two, I explain Weber’s 
criticism that Waters’s theory is not systematic. I defend Waters by showing that this problem is 
not unique to his theory but is a feature of the explananda that all theories of biological causation 
need to contend with. 1,2 In the third section, I discuss some general issues around the desiderata 
for theories of causation and argue that Weber’s conditions are unreasonable. The fourth section 
is concerned with criticizing the widespread assumption that bijective functions are causally most 
specific; I demonstrate that a type of non-bijective function can be more causally specific, thus 
 
1 I am focusing on Waters’s (2007) theory in part because it presupposes Woodward’s (2003), so 
a successful defense of the former entails a defense of the latter (cf. Weber, 2006). 
2 Despite Weber’s critique over the last decade or so, neither Waters nor Woodward has responded 
to him except for Woodward’s quick mention of Weber (2006) in a footnote (2010, 305, footnote 
17). At present, none of Weber’s papers on ‘causal specificity’ is cited by either Waters or 
Woodward. 
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suggesting that the framework’s core assumption be reassessed. In the final section, I briefly 
highlight some implications of my arguments for debates in philosophy of biology. 
I. Causal specificity and its relation to molecular biology 
Causal specificity is defined in terms of ‘functional mapping.’ Suppose cause C and effect E are 
discrete variables, each ranging over finite sets of values. The causal specificity of C corresponds 
with how ‘closely’ its values map to those of E. More precisely, suppose that C and E range over 
{c1, c2, …, cm} and {e1, e2, …, en}, respectively, and the function f maps C-values to E-values 
(Weber, 2006; cf. Woodward, 2010).3 The larger the number of C-values that map to their 
corresponding E-values, the more specific C is as a cause of E (as compared to its other causes). 
If each and every C-value maps to one and only one E-value, then the mapping is bijective, making 
C the most specific cause of E (Woodward, 2010).4 
The debate about the relative specificities of various causes emerged in the context of 
molecular biology. In eukaryotes, sequences of nucleotides on the DNA are transcribed into the 
pre-mRNA using certain enzymes, such as the RNA polymerase. The pre-mRNA molecule is 
broken down and reconstituted using ‘splicing agents,’ which work in conjunction with other 
enzymes and background ‘cellular machinery.’ The parts of the pre-mRNA that are excised are 
known as introns, while its remaining parts are known as exons. The exons are combined to 
constitute what is then called the mature mRNA, a molecule used in protein synthesis. 
 
3 The function presupposes Woodward’s (2003) manipulability theory of causation, according to 
which it should answer counterfactual questions such as, what would happen if C-value changes 
from c1 to c25. If f is counterfactually robust—as causal generalizations in biology should 
reasonably be—then E-value would change to e25. 
4 I am assuming that the sizes of the two sets are identical (i.e., m = n). 
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Waters (2007) claims that the DNA and splicing agents both make a difference in the 
mature mRNA molecule, but the former is causally more specific. That is, the number of DNA-
values mapping to the mature mRNA values is greater than the number of splicing agents’ values 
mapping to those of the mature mRNA. Therefore, genes are the most specific or privileged cause 
of the mature mRNA. 
II. Systematicity of Waters’s theory of causation 
Weber (2017b) argues that Waters’s theory is not systematic, because it focuses on actual 
populations. He points out that the frequency of a given causal variable differs radically from one 
biological context to the next. For example, the frequency of splicing agents is much higher in 
eukaryotes than in prokaryotes. As a result, their causal specificity is significantly greater in the 
former than in the latter. Waters’s theory purports to answer general questions, such as whether 
the causal specificity of the DNA is higher than that of the splicing agents. However, its focus on 
actual populations precludes it from treating a causal variable in a systematic fashion, thereby 
preventing it from answering general questions. Weber writes, “The main problem is that 
[Waters’s theory] is very sensitive to the relative abundance of a causal factor in some defined 
population. Thus, [the causal variable’s] values will be highly context dependent, to such an extent 
as to make any kind of systematic comparison across contexts difficult” (2017b, 578). The theory 
cannot therefore be used to answer general questions about a variable’s causal specificity, and 
consequently, it does not allow systematic, cross-contextual comparison between the specificities 
of two (or more) causal variables. No doubt, variables whose frequencies are relatively uniform 
across biological contexts (e.g., RNA) do not pose problems for Waters’s theory. So, to be precise, 
Weber’s claim is not that Waters’s theory can never treat a variable systematically. Instead, his 
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argument is that it cannot systematically analyse a causal variable whose frequency radically 
differs between contexts. 
According to the advocates of causal privilege, the central purpose of developing theories 
of causation is to explain why biologists choose certain causes over others when explaining some 
phenomena that occurs in real biological populations (Waters, 2007; Woodward, 2003). Now, it 
is not a feature of Waters’s theory that the frequency of splicing agents differs between eukaryotes 
and prokaryotes. Rather, this is a biological fact that all theories of causation must contend with. 
Consequently, there is nothing distinctive about Waters’s theory that warrants the charge of non-
systematicity. Consider a simple analogy. All empirical scientific theories face the problem of 
induction, the drawing of universal generalizations on the basis of finite evidence. This problem 
makes scientific theories fallible in principle, because there could exist some evidence that refutes 
the theory (Nola & Sankey, 2014). However, it would be peculiar to exclude some of the theories 
on this basis but spare others. 
If Weber’s criticism is to hold water, he needs to show that either (i) Waters’s account fails 
to be systematic as a result of its own theoretical shortcomings, or (ii) there is at least one other 
theory that systematically analyses causal specificity. If he attempts to show (i), he must do so by 
referring solely to Waters’s theory, not to its explananda. As I have argued, he relies on the 
intractability of the explananda to criticize the theory. Alternatively, Weber may demonstrate (i) 
by showing (ii), because the latter entails the former: if a theory can systematically analyze causal 
specificity, then the inability of Waters’s theory to do the same must be the result of its internal 
features (or of its application). In other words, if another theory can provide a systematic analysis, 
then this gives good reason for thinking that the explananda are tractable after all. Consequently, 
the failure of Waters’s theory to do the same cannot be the result of its explananda. Its failure 
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would arguably be the result of its theoretical apparatus. However, Weber’s criticism satisfies 
neither (i) nor (ii). Therefore, it does not provide reasonable grounds for deeming Waters’s theory 
uniquely problematic. 
III. Biological normality and desiderata for theories of causation 
My purpose here is to extend the foregoing discussion by analyzing the conditions Weber thinks 
theories of biological causation must meet. I will argue that Waters’s theory meets these 
conditions. I will also suggest that the conditions themselves are quite misplaced. 
Weber (2017b) claims that any plausible theory of causation must meet the conditions of 
‘biological normality.’ A causal intervention is biologically normal if it (a) results from natural 
processes with non-negligible probabilities and (b) is compatible with the ordinary biological 
functions of the organism. For instance, DNA transcription is a natural process with non-negligible 
probability and is compatible with the organism’s functions. I think Waters’s (2007) theory meets 
these conditions. The causal interventions in actual biological populations are by definition natural 
and compatible with the organism’s functioning. It is impossible to consider normal biological 
populations without also thinking about their causal relations as natural and compatible. 
Alternatively, the concept of actual populations would be vacuous, if not self-contradictory. 
Accordingly, Waters’s theory cannot fail to meet these conditions, because it explicitly focuses on 
and restricts itself to actual populations. Hence, the theory satisfies the conditions its critic thinks 
any acceptable theory of biological causation should meet. 
A particular reading of Waters (2007) makes it even more difficult for his theory to fail to 
meet Weber’s conditions. The conditional reading begins with the fact that biologists consider 
certain causes as more important than others when explaining some phenomena. The task of 
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Waters’s theory, on this reading, is to provide a principled account that explains their choices. In 
particular, its task is to answer questions of the following kind: given that a number of causes 
account for the variation in the effect, which of these is causally most specific? All of the ordinary 
causes a biologist invokes when explaining some phenomena are natural causes compatible with 
the organism’s functioning, thus satisfying Weber’s conditions (a) and (b), respectively. The 
conditional reading takes this as a given, and the purpose of the theory, on this reading, is to 
provide a principled account of the relative importance of various causes. Hence, on the conditional 
reading, Waters’s theory will always meet Weber’s conditions. 
Let us turn to a more general discussion of Weber’s conditions and examine whether these 
demands capture the intuitions about theories of causation that philosophers of biology have in 
mind. I will focus on Weber’s first condition, which states that a causal intervention is biologically 
normal if it (a) results from natural processes with non-negligible probabilities. This requirement 
is problematic for at least three reasons. First, natural processes with negligible probabilities 
remain philosophically unanalyzable even though they are ordinarily thought of as biologically 
normal. For instance, (successful) genetic mutations have very low probabilities. However, they 
are causally significant for explaining a wide variety of biological phenomena, such as phenotypic 
variation. In Waters’s terminology, genetic mutations are causes that make a difference, and 
biologists no doubt invoke them in their explanations. Yet, if condition (a) is accepted, genetic 
mutations (and other natural processes with negligible probabilities) would remain unanalyzable 
from the perspective of a philosophical theory of causation. In short, this condition wrongly 
excludes improbable factors that are nonetheless causally relevant. 
The second reason that this condition is problematic is that theories of causation which 
satisfy it will not analyze non-natural interventions. Interventions are usually thought of as “non-
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natural” if they cannot occur without the use of technology. Nonetheless, some non-natural 
interventions, such as in vitro fertilization or genomic editing, are often highly relevant for 
explaining biological phenomena. Indeed, the advent of technology allows biologists to intervene 
in very specific ways. A philosophical theory that fails to analyze this excludes important aspects 
of biological phenomena. Weber’s condition has precisely this effect: it deems as unacceptable 
philosophical theories that analyze non-natural but causally relevant interventions. Once again, the 
condition is too restrictive and, importantly, it is insensitive to developments in biological 
technology. 
Third, Weber’s condition is problematic because the boundaries between ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’ are more difficult to define than he assumes. For example, gene editing is arguably non-
natural because it is carried out using technology. However, edited genes are transcribed and 
translated into proteins using ‘natural’ processes. Only the initial cause in this chain of events is 
supposedly non-natural. The subsequent causes are perfectly natural. Indeed, gene editing 
technology meets the second condition that (b) the interventions be compatible with the rest of the 
organism’s functioning. However, by requiring that interventions be natural, condition (a) 
precludes theories of causation from selecting causally relevant factors in technologically altered 
populations. In other words, on this condition, theories of causation will altogether ignore 
populations with ‘non-natural’ interventions even if these interventions are causally fundamental 
(e.g., gene editing). Consequently, the condition is, once again, unduly restrictive and insensitive 
to developments in biological technology. 
Furthermore, Weber’s conditions are in tension with his criticism (presented in the previous 
section) that Waters’s theory fails to treat a causal variable systematically. On the one hand, his 
condition (a) requires theories of causation to focus only on actual populations. On the other hand, 
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his criticism of Waters’s account suggest that he requires theories of causation to be systematic, 
implying that they should not be susceptible to the changing reality of actual populations. A more 
charitable interpretation is that he requires the theories to be systematic despite the mutability of 
biological phenomena. However, as I argued in the previous section, it is difficult to see how a 
theory can be systematic when its explananda is highly mutable. This is surely the case with 
biological populations, as Weber himself claims. As a result, it is difficult to see how theories can 
restrict themselves to actual populations and be systematic. It seems, then, that these two 
requirements are in tension with one another. Minimally, the desiderata for theories of causation 
must be mutually agreeable. They would otherwise require theories to perform incompatible tasks. 
Weber’s requirements (of biological normality and systematicity) fail to meet even this demand. 
In light of these considerations, it is natural to ask Weber to explain how these two 
requirements are compatible. There are at least two courses of action available to him. First, he 
may argue that while no actual theory of causation has succeeded in satisfying these requirements, 
it is possible that some theory could meet them. Second, he may develop a theory that satisfies 
both requirements. However, no actual theory of causation (that I am aware of) meets these 
requirements, suggesting that they are overly restrictive. This rules out the second course of action. 
As for the first course, it needs to be shown how exactly a theory could be systematic and focus 
on actual populations. It is insufficient to stipulate conditions without providing at least a sketch 
of a possible solution. Weber has not provided a sketch of any kind. 
Finally, I want to return to the requirement of systematicity. I have already suggested that 
this requirement is overly demanding. Nevertheless, even if we assume for argument’s sake that it 
could be satisfied, the new insights gained from a systematic analysis of causal specificity do not 
sufficiently advance our understanding of biological causation. Generally speaking, philosophers 
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of biology no longer maintain that biological generalizations are universal. They recognize that 
the generalizations only distribute over well-defined domains (Waters, 2007). In my view, the case 
of causal specificity should be understood within this framework; there is no need for cross-
contextual, domain-general comparisons when domain-specific analyses suffice. For instance, it 
can be meaningfully asked whether the causal specificity of the DNA with respect to some effect 
is greater than that of the splicing agents with respect to the same effect within a well-defined 
population. If ‘yes,’ then we have reason for thinking that, in this particular context, the DNA is 
more causally important than the splicing agents with respect to a given effect. 
However, systematic analyses do not provide insights of this type. In particular, it is not 
very informative to compare the specificities of two (or more) causal variables with respect to 
different effects (in same or different contexts) or same effects (in different contexts). The former 
are uninformative because there is no relevant commonality based on which the differences could 
be meaningfully compared; the latter only tell us that a certain cause is more specific than its 
counterpart with respect to the same effect in a number of contexts. Yet, as Weber rightly points 
out, the frequencies of variables radically differ between biological contexts. So even if a 
systematic analysis generated new insights, it would remain largely uninformative when applied 
to genuine populations. In light this, it is clear that domain-general or systematic analysis is usually 
uninformative. Yet, that is precisely what the requirement of systematicity demands from theories 
of causation. Because this requirement is not conducive to advancing our understanding of 
causation in biology, it is best to altogether eliminate it. 
IV. Are bijective functions (causally) most specific? 
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The aim of this section is to challenge the fundamental idea in the framework of causal specificity: 
that bijective functions are causally most specific. I will introduce some technical terminology 
before explaining that a type of non-bijective function can be more specific. 
In the first section, I explained specificity in terms of mapping between variables. Let f be 
a function that maps C-values to E-values. f is considered a function if and only it meets the 
following conditions. First, all C-values must map to some E-value; there cannot be unmapped C-
values. Second, no C-value can map to more than one E-value; each C-value must map to at most 
one E-value. Nothing about E-values is relevant when determining whether f is a function. 
 A surjective (‘onto’) function is one in which all E-values are the image of some C-value 
under f, meaning that there are no unmapped E-values. A function is injective (‘one-to-one’) when 
each E-value is the image of at most one C-value under f. That is, given that some E-values are 
mapped, each of these is mapped by at most one C-value. A function is bijective if and only if it is 
surjective and injective. The following diagram summarizes these concepts: 
 
This framework can be used to map genuine causal relations in biology and to determine 
their relative specificities. The table below presents some bona fide causal relations alongside their 
respective mappings (Weber, 2017a, 17-8): 
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Stage of gene expression (C→E) Mapping f(C)=E 
1: DNA → DNA (replication) Bijective 
2: DNA → RNA (transcription in prokaryotes) Bijective 
3: RNA → DNA (reverse transcription) Bijective 
4: DNA → pre-mRNA (transcription in eukaryotes) Bijective 
5: pre-mRNA → mature mRNA (in eukaryotes) Not a function5 
6: exon parts → protein domains Surjective non-injective 
7: mature mRNA → proteins (translation in eukaryotes) Surjective non-injective 
 
In this framework, Weber favors a numerical interpretation of the specificity of these 
mappings. He writes, “Depending on the range of invariance and the number of values that the 
independent [C-values] and dependent [E-values] variables can take, we can speak of a relation 
being more or less causally specific” (2006, 606; my emphasis). He claims that “[t]he elements in 
the codomain [E-values] may be mapped onto by different number of arguments [values] from the 
domain [C-values] (in the surjective and non-injective cases), or different proportions of elements 
in the codomain may be mapped onto by an argument from the domain (in the injective and non-
surjective cases)” (2017a, 16; my emphasis). But in the same paper he distances himself from a 
proportional notion when he writes, “By “causally most specific” I mean that genes bear 
Woodward’s relation INF [influence] to proteins in the highest degree. By “the highest degree” I 
mean that the number of values that the variables on both sides of the INF relation can take is 
vastly higher (i.e., many orders of magnitude) than that of any other causal variables that bear the 
 
5 Because parts of the pre-mRNA are excised (introns), some of its values cannot map to those of 
the mature mRNA. Consequently, pre-mRNA to mature mRNA mapping does not constitute a 
function. 
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relation INF to protein sequences (e.g., splicing agents)” (2017a, 32; my emphasis). Weber clearly 
favors a numerical conception of causal specificity, according to which one ought to count the 
number of mappings between C-values and E-values. The greater the number of mappings between 
C and E, the more specific the former is as a cause of the latter (as compared with its other causes). 
The functions that arguably exhibit the highest number of mappings are bijective, leading to the 
consensus view that they are causally most specific (Weber 2017b; Woodward, 2010). 
I want to argue that surjective non-injective functions can be more specific than bijective 
functions. If this is true, then the assumption that the DNA is causally most specific may need to 
be reevaluated. To be sure, I am not claiming that the DNA actually fails to be the most specific 
cause. Instead, my argument will try to show that the consensus view—that bijective functions are 
always causally most specific—is not correct. 
 Consider a cause F:{1, 2} and its effect Z:{a, b}. Suppose the function m:F→Z bijectively 
maps F to Z. Consider another cause G:{1, 2, 3} and its effect Z:{a, b}. Suppose the function 
n:G→Z surjectively non-injectively maps G to Z. Let G(x)=F(x) but let G(3)=G(1)=F(1), meaning 
that G-values ‘1’ and ‘3’ and F-value ‘1’ map to Z-value ‘a.’ Calculating causal specificities using 
Weber’s approach generates values 2 and 3 for m and n, respectively. That is, two values of F and 
three of G map to Z, meaning that the latter (surjective non-injective) is more specific than the 
former (bijective). Thus, the same effect can have two causes such that the one which maps to it 
bijectively—which is presumably the most specific mapping—is less specific than the one that 
maps to it surjectively non-injectively. This is particularly problematic for the proponents of causal 
privilege, because they regard some of the higher-order causal relations in biology (e.g., mature 
mRNA → proteins) as involving surjective non-injective mappings. They also consider the most 
fundamental and specific causes (e.g., DNA → primary transcript) as bijective. 
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Bijective functions being less causally specific than surjective non-injective functions 
provides a reason for re-examining the framework. The important intuition behind the idea that 
bijective functions are supposedly most specific is that nothing seems more specific than one cause 
giving rise to one and only one effect. This intuition seems prima facie correct. Nonetheless, the 
framework allows non-bijective functions to be more specific. Consequently, the issue is likely 
with the “number of values” conception used here. As a result, alterations may be required to make 
this approach work. One suggestion is that the mappings could be used without requiring that they 
be functions. This would provide more room for theoretical development. More radically, an 
altogether different approach may be developed that (quantitatively) captures the idea of causal 
specificity (cf. Griffiths et al., 2015). 
V. General implications and conclusion 
I will briefly highlight some implications of my arguments. First, the proponents of causal 
privilege (Waters, 2007; Weber, 2006; Woodward, 2003, 2010) agree that some causes are more 
important than others when explaining some phenomena. While there are differences about which 
cause matters to what degree in some context, the authors agree that some causes are definitely 
privileged over others. Waters’s (2007) theory, which relies on Woodward’s (2003) manipulability 
theory of causation, is one of the most thoroughgoing attempts at developing a theory of causal 
selection in biology. Its central purpose is to provide an alternative to causal parity, according to 
which all causes in an explanation are equally important. In this paper, I explained the criticisms 
of Weber, a proponent of causal privilege, against Waters’s theory. If my defense of the latter is 
successful, however, it may go some way in resolving issues internal to the framework of causal 
privilege. More optimistically, this defense could unify the various proponents of causal privilege, 
and a robust account of causal privilege as an alternative to causal parity may be developed. 
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 Second, I argued that Weber’s conditions for theories of biological causation are overly 
restrictive. I suggested that these conditions should not prevent theories of causation from 
analysing causal interventions made using technology. Given the widespread increase in genetic 
technology, it seems misplaced to regard as irrelevant factors that are causally significant in 
biological explanations. As such, the desiderata for theories of biological causation may need to 
be reassessed. 
To conclude, I explained what causal specificity is and how it relates to molecular biology. 
I tried to rebut Weber’s argument that Waters’s theory fails to be systematic. I also showed that 
the theory meets Weber’s conditions of biological normality, and I argued that his conditions are 
quite unreasonable. Finally, I showed that surjective non-injective functions can be more specific 
than bijective functions, thus suggesting the need for re-evaluating at least this tenet in the 
framework of causal specificity. 
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Currie (2019) has introduced a novel account of creativity within the social
epistemology of science. The account is intended to capture how conservatism can
be detrimental to the health of inquiry within certain scientific communities, given
the aims of research there. I argue that recent remarks by Rovelli (2018) put
pressure on the applicability of the account. Altogether, it seems we do not yet well
understand the relationship between creativity, conservatism, and the health of
inquiry in science.
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1 Introduction
Currie (2019) argues that research in existential risk (‘X-risk’) should be more creative
than it likely is, given the realities of contemporary scientific practice. In the course of
the argument, he introduces a general account of creativity in scientific discovery
(hereafter, ‘creativity’). This account is intended to capture how conservatism can be
detrimental to the health of inquiry in scientific communities, given certain aims of
research. It is also advertised as complementing the use of formal modeling in studying
policy initiatives within the social epistemology of science.
Independent of Currie’s project, Rovelli (2018) decries a “why not?” ideology he
reports is in vogue within his scientific community, engaged in fundamental physics
research. By his reckoning, this ideology promotes a method of guesswork. His concern is
that such a method is detrimental, given facts about his community and their research
aims.
Here, I will argue that Rovelli’s remarks, when interpreted in light of Currie’s
account, raise trouble for the general applicability of the latter. Evidently, Currie’s
account fails to countenance the possibility that revolutionary theorizing might be
valuable, as features in Rovelli’s argument. But since it is difficult to discern when
revolutionary theorizing is likely not valuable to a community, it is unclear when Currie’s
account may be deemed appropriate for studying the effects of conservatism on the
health of inquiry therein. This threatens to undermine the use of such an account in
arguments undergirding policies meant to respond to conservatism. It would be prudent
to seek out means of identifying what it is about any given scientific community that
could render Currie’s account appropriate there.
2
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2 Creativity in science
Stanford (2019) has argued that the structures and institutions of contemporary science
foster conservatism in research, stifling revolutionary theorizing. Currie (2019) is
concerned that the same conservatism is detrimental to inquiry within X-risk. This is
because, according to Currie, disciplines like X-risk are best pursued creatively. Arguing
that creativity is in tension with conservatism, Currie concludes that the scientific
communities focused on disciplines like X-risk are likely insufficiently creative— the
structures and institutions of science stack the deck against the disciplines’ prospects.
As just presented, Currie’s project depends essentially on his providing an explicit
account of creativity within a scientific community. The remainder of this section is
dedicated to describing the account he provides, as well as developing it further (where
necessary) in a friendly manner.
Consider the situation wherein there is some well-posed problem, whose solution a
scientific community agrees constitutes the aim of their collective research. The
statement of the problem places severe constraints on what counts as viable research
within that community, united by that aim. We may think of the statement of the
problem as characterizing the research program pursued by that community. And
associated with that problem is, following Currie, a collection of possible solutions. This
‘solution space’ is meant to be roughly coextensive with all professional moves available
to members of that community, engaged in that research program. The researchers
occupy points in the solution space, and they choose which points to occupy next.1
1In fact, there are other professional strategies that are ultimately available to researchers,
regarded as decision-making agents. Whether activity gets channeled into those other strategies,
rather than into moving between solutions, is an important degree of freedom in Currie’s account.
3
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Currie introduces into this picture the following two metaphors. ‘Hot searches’
through solution space are energetic; ‘cold searches’ are the opposite. A hot search refers
to a sequence of points, whose iterative selection by a theorist describes that theorist as
hopping around through the solution space. A cold search refers to a similar sequence of
points, except that it describes the behavior of a theorist who is nearly staying still.
To make these metaphors, Currie needs a notion of distance between points in the
space. He borrows from Bayesian epistemology to develop one. (I will have more to say
that is critical of this below.) By his reckoning, distances to solutions are relativized to
each individual at a time, and are indexed to that individual’s credences at that time.
So, roughly speaking, solutions assigned low priors are far, and solutions assigned high
priors are near.2
Currie does not elaborate on the interpretation of these priors. Evidently, he has in
mind something pragmatic: “Our priors serve to set expectations across a space of
possible solutions to a problem” [p. 6]. In this respect, the account is non-committal
about what it is that ultimately makes a solution worth visiting. We are free to suppose
that there is some unspecified constellation of virtues, possibly specific to the research
program at hand, that one hopes is jointly maximized (i.e. via some method of
aggregation) by whatever solution is visited next. On this picture, hot searches are
sequences for which the researcher’s decisions are insensitive to their beliefs about where
it will be prudent to visit. Oppositely, cold searches occur when the researcher’s choices
correlate strongly with those beliefs.
Currie then defines an agent’s creativity in terms of their propensity for hot searches.
2As will become clear, it may be that we ought to insert a ceteris paribus clause here. If so,
we would say that whatever are otherwise the distances to solutions, those numerical values are
then systematically deformed to reflect comparative facts about one’s priors over each solution.
4
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -516-
In other words, an agent is creative in proportion to the unconditional probability that
they attempt a distant, low-credence solution. A community’s creativity, meanwhile, is
defined to correspond with what would generally occur if the members of the community
were all individually creative. The upshot is that a community’s creativity is defined as
proportional to the efficiency with which they explore solution space widely. (What it
means to explore widely is, of course, agent-relative. Here, we might assume that a
community explores widely when it does so by the lights of most of its members.)
This wide exploration of solution space is in contrast with what, following Currie, we
may call ‘pooling’. Intuitively, pooling occurs when individuals within the community
fail to be creative, each favoring cold searches instead of hot searches. But, as Currie
notes, pooling may be avoided in such a case, provided that the community is cognitively
diverse. So long as cognitive diversity is understood in terms of diverse distributions of
priors, cognitively diverse individuals engaging in cold searches will, collectively, explore
widely. This community would count as creative, according to Currie, even though the
individuals who comprise it do not.
The creativity of a community is therefore not uniquely determined by facts about
the creativity of its constituents. Their propensity for peer disagreement (and so, the
social structure of science, etc.) also matters. And according to this view, a community
may be made more creative in various ways. One way is by interventions to promote
sustained cognitive diversity, as we have understood it here. Another is by incentivizing
hot searches, or increasing creativity at the individual level. In both cases, pooling is
reduced, in favor of wider exploration.3
3A third way to increase creativity, noted by Currie, is to impose on the community a diverse
collection of search algorithms. But this raises a question: what distinguishes, in practice, our
imposing a diverse collection of search algorithms from our incentivizing hot searches? At the
5
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Building on recent work by Stanford (2019), such interventions are, according to
Currie, in contrast with the unchecked effects of conservatism in professional science
today. This is because, according to Currie, conservatism promotes pooling, as we have
understood it here. But depending on the given research program, it may or may not be
detrimental that science today is, generally, conservative. This is because a research
program ought to be assessed individually, according to the “local details” [p. 3] relevant
to it. Those details determine, for instance, whether the community is better off
investing in strategies other than those relevant to scientific discovery (cf. footnote 1
above). If so, any resulting pooling according to shared priors need not be unhealthy.
As just stated, the utility of Currie’s account is ultimately going to rest on certain
further facts: which kinds of local details ought we to recognize as rendering creativity—
as opposed to pooling— a standard of good epistemic health in the community? Such
local details are encoded, we may suppose, in the statement of the problem that
constitutes the aim of that community’s research. Recall that it is from this problem
that, in principle, we may extract the parameters of the solution space we envision the
community to explore. It follows that assessments of the local details of a research
program will generally shape our expectations about the solution space associated with
the problem. Likewise, facts about a solution space can correlate with facts about
whether pooling or creativity is preferred in the corresponding research program.
Unfortunately, Currie does not state how such a correlation would work. This
omission could suggest that we ought not to regard local details as shaping our
level of analysis presently provided, it is unclear that there is any distinction. As suggested in
footnote 2, it may be that we should ultimately think of solution space as admitting some intrinsic
structure, independent of credences. In that case, search algorithms could be defined with respect
to that intrinsic structure, and would generally result in searches that appear hot.
6
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expectations about solution space (besides via shaping our priors). But this would
render Currie’s account in tension with the standard interpretation of formal landscape
models. Currie regards the use of such models within the social epistemology of science
as complementing his approach (cf. p. 11 in the article). In such models, one typically
regards the intrinsic structure of the landscape as an independent variable, whose
possible values encode arbitrary research environments. So too, we might conclude, the
structure of a solution space should reflect facts about the corresponding research
program.
In light of this, I think it is appropriate to regard Currie’s discussion of X-risk as
illustrating the reasoning that would shape the relevant solution space. His ultimate
conclusion is that X-risk should be creative because it should be “multi-disciplinary,
pluralistic, and opportunistic” [p. 26]. We might speculate, on the basis of this, that the
local details relevant to the problem of X-risk render the solution space as unusually
vast.4 In a vast solution space, cold searches could seem unfruitful, no matter how
cognitively diverse we may plausibly imagine are the researchers. Consequently,
creativity is generally preferred in such a case, consistent with Currie’s reasoning about
X-risk.
To recap: treating research programs as solution spaces, creativity is a matter of how
the relevant communities explore those spaces, given priors. Conservatism encourages
pooling according to shared priors, which is opposite creative exploration. But specific
facts about the solution space at hand can determine, in a given community, which of
4There is room for disagreement here. For instance, Currie’s discussion of X-risk places some
emphasis on its normative aspect— i.e. threat mitigation— and its role in the public eye. It
is not clear what these would have to do with the size of the solution space. This ambiguity
motivates a revisionist attitude toward distances in the space. (See also footnotes 2 and 3 above.)
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creativity or pooling is likely preferred. Those facts are ultimately grounded in the
statement of the problem identified by that community as constituting their research
program.
3 The situation in fundamental physics
Consider now the article by Rovelli (2018). Rovelli is a theoretical physicist focused on
quantum gravity, the problem that characterizes fundamental physics research today.5
Indeed, we may understand the problem of quantum gravity to be that which shapes the
relevant solution space, against which creativity in fundamental physics is to be assessed.
In what follows, I take Rovelli to have expertise regarding that solution space, as well as
privileged access to it.
Rovelli’s article is adversarial. Our attention is best directed to a passage that comes
in the middle, immediately following his presentation of what he calls the “why not?”
ideology. According to Rovelli, this uncritical ideology is responsible for the rise of a
damaging method of guesswork in contemporary fundamental physics practice.
According to the method, reason need not be (nor can be, fruitfully) given to merit the
study of any new research proposal. The criticism of the method proceeds as follows [p.
7]:
Arbitrary jumps in the unbounded space of possibilities have never been
an effective way to do science. The reason is twofold: first, there are too
many possibilities, and the probability of stumbling on a good one by pure
5This is, of course, a massive simplification. But so too is the problem characterizing X-risk
in Currie’s project. Whether the simplification is tolerable despite such objections depends on
the particular context of its use.
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chance is negligible; but more importantly, nature always surprises us and
we, the limited critters that we are, are far less creative and imaginative than
we may think. When we consider ourselves to be “speculating widely”, we are
mostly playing out rearrangements of old tunes: true novelty that works is
not something we can just find by guesswork.
As in Currie’s article, we have here a spatial account of scientific discovery. Scientists
decide how to move amongst points in the space (now, of ‘possibilities’, rather than
‘solutions’). The role of the “why not?” ideology is to support a method of guesswork.
We can understand this method as a decision procedure, the repeated execution of which
amounts to “arbitrary jumps” in the space. (More formally, we might think of such a
method as analogous to Monte Carlo sampling, with respect to some unspecified
probability distribution on the space. Based on the context surrounding the quoted
passage, Rovelli clearly has in mind a distribution that is meant to be uncorrelated with
one’s priors.) But absent any greater detail about the account Rovelli envisages, it is
unclear why such a method should be as damaging as he claims. Prima facie, Currie’s
account of creativity should be helpful as a means to interpret the argument.
In Currie’s framework, Rovelli’s ‘space of possibilities’ may be understood as a
solution space for the problem of quantum gravity. The solutions to the problem are,
then, candidates for what may turn out to be a satisfying theory of quantum gravity.
Given this reading, Rovelli’s principal claim about the space is that it is vast. This seems
right. In other contexts, this space is taken to be synonymous with ‘theory space’, the
collection of all possible fundamental theories (see, e.g. (Dardashti, 2019)). From here
onward, I will adopt this ‘theory space’ language when talking about the space of
9
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -521-
solutions relevant to the problem of quantum gravity.6
Recall that creativity at the community level is spelled out, on Currie’s account, in
terms of exploring widely in the relevant solution space. I have suggested that we
understand Rovelli’s remarks in terms of fundamental physicists exploring the vast
theory space corresponding to the problem of quantum gravity. Since the space is vast,
by the argument at the end of the previous section, creativity is likely preferred to
pooling. In other words, a more creative community is likely better off, given the local
details of the problem of quantum gravity. Wider exploration should be good here.
Meanwhile, fundamental physicists are, according to Rovelli, uncreative (or, at least,
are “far less creative” than they may think).7 On the present interpretation, this would
suggest that fundamental physicists fail to explore widely. Increasing creativity should
be desirable.
Naively, guesswork is one such method to do so. (As described above, except if the
sampling is with respect to a probability distribution correlated with one’s priors,
guesswork will generally produce hot searches.) On Currie’s account, we may thereby
understand Rovelli to hold the view that the method of guesswork happens to be
implemented poorly by his community. Moreover, according to Rovelli, when his
community engages in guesswork, they fail to speculate as “widely” as they typically
believe themselves to speculate. So: the community does not explore widely, and they
fail to recognize that this is the case.
This seems to provide a sufficient reason that the method is, according to Rovelli,
6In (Schneider, 2020), I criticize the relevance of this ‘theory space’ view in assessing the
methodology of quantum gravity research.
7What relation this testimony could bear to the broader conversation about conservatism in
science is interesting to consider, but a tangent at present.
10
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -522-
damaging. Because theory space is vast, creativity constitutes a standard of good
epistemic health in contemporary fundamental physics. Meanwhile, the community’s
poor implementation of guesswork fosters an exaggerated perspective as to how healthy
their inquiry really is. Our initial hunch was correct: Currie’s account of creativity can
help us get traction on Rovelli’s argument.
Yet, there is something unsatisfying about this interpretation of the argument.
Consider the reason that Rovelli supplies for his testimony that the community
implements the method of guesswork poorly. The poor implementation is due to the fact
that “we, limited critters that we are, are far less creative and imaginative than we may
think”. In other words, guesswork is implemented poorly by his community, because
their being limited ensures that they cannot implement it well. In particular, it his
community’s lacking creativity (and imagination), on this interpretation, that ultimately
bears responsibility for the method being damaging.
Whether Rovelli’s argument is compelling, so interpreted, is therefore going to turn
on whether a community’s lacking creativity can be understood to intervene on the
efficacy of a method they attempt to employ. And here, Currie’s account provides little
guidance. Facts about the community’s pooling with respect to shared priors cannot
obviously prohibit researchers, all of whom are willing to speculate irrespective of their
priors, from doing so. In this respect, Rovelli’s argument depends on creativity (or the
lack thereof) playing a further role in the social epistemology of his community than is
readily countenanced by Currie’s account.
Note that this observation does not present an objection to Currie’s argument, as his
argument does not require that his account of creativity be complete. Nonetheless, as I
will now discuss, Rovelli’s argument is ultimately compelling, provided that we attribute
11
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -523-
to Rovelli the view that revolutionary theorizing is valuable in contemporary
fundamental physics. And recognizing the importance of such a view to Rovelli’s
argument should make us wary about assertions that Currie’s account is applicable in
any particular epistemic situation. Currie’s account cannot merely be assumed to
capture how to assess the epistemic impact of conservatism on a research program, for
which creativity is healthy. A further question about whether or not revolutionary
theorizing is valuable complicates the assessment.
4 Revolutionary theorizing and the health of inquiry
Suppose that there exist possibilities in theory space that are assigned prior probabilities
of zero by all members of the community. Whereas many possibilities are accessible to
the community, in virtue of being assigned non-zero priors by someone, these further
possibilities are inaccessible. On Currie’s terms, these are possibilities that are located
an infinite distance away from the community, and are regarded as infinitely less
promising to visit than any accessible possibility.8
In such a case, no matter how creative the community is regarding the accessible
possibilities, some of theory space will never be explored. So, provided that guesswork
fails to be defined over inaccessible possibilities, the method could fail to spread the
community as wide as might, ultimately, be desired. This idealized setup sounds
8Assignments of zero-probability priors to non-contradictions are antithetical to an orthodox
Bayesian epistemology. So, it is not obvious that the present supposition, in the case of theory
space, is faithful to Currie’s project. Nonetheless, given some other structure to the space (cf.
footnotes 2-4), we may understand zero-probability priors as an idealization that “pushes off to
infinity” the corresponding possibilities. They are, in effect, disconnected from the accessible
ones. No amount of information gleaned from work on the latter could ever reign them in.
12
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promising as a means to recover why, according to Rovelli, his community cannot
implement guesswork well. We need only to attribute to Rovelli two further claims. The
first is that his community’s lack of creativity results in there being some possibilities
that are inaccessible. The second is that at least some of those inaccessible possibilities
are important to the aims of his community’s research.
Evidence that Rovelli would endorse each of these claims may be found within the
passage already quoted. Namely, what is inadequate about guesswork, says Rovelli, is
that it does not yield “true novelty that works”. This is because employing it results
(instead) in “playing out rearrangements of old tunes”. If we interpret the
rearrangements of old tunes as the accessible possibilities, his claim is this: what there is
to be sought in fundamental physics— i.e. true novelty that works— in fact resides in
the inaccessible part of theory space.
Suppose that this reading is correct, and what there is to be sought in fundamental
physics is, according to Rovelli, presently inaccessible. Then it is a symptom of the
community’s not being creative, according to Rovelli, that the implementation of
guesswork necessarily fails to engender wide enough exploration. This is because the
relevant sampling procedures fail to be defined over the whole of what is worth exploring.
We have thereby found a means to articulate the lingering part of Rovelli’s argument,
which we were unable to do in the previous section. Namely, says Rovelli: what is worth
exploring fails to be coextensive with the accessible part of theory space. As a result,
guesswork is ineffectual. Worse, employing the method misleads the community in their
self-assessment of whether they are sufficiently creative, consonant with their research
aims. This is because the method only promotes wide exploration of a kind that is
unsuitable for assessing the health of inquiry in fundamental physics. It only
13
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countenances that which is conceived as worth exploring (i.e. rather than what is).
If this is how we are to understand Rovelli’s argument, it is easy to generalize the
lesson. Consider any context wherein one has reason to regard the accessible part of
solution space as failing to include some of what is worth exploring (putting off, at least
for another few paragraphs, the issue of what it means for something to be worth
exploring). This is a context in which genuinely revolutionary theorizing is needed,
which renders accessible more of the space. In other words, if a community has reason to
value revolutionary theorizing in their research, no amount of hot searching amidst that
which is conceivable will amount to healthy inquiry. This is despite creativity remaining
a standard of good health in that community, given their research aims.
But such a conclusion spells trouble for the applicability of Currie’s account in
arguments about policy. Currie’s observation, as discussed above, is that conservatism
promotes pooling with respect to shared priors. To the extent that creativity is
anticorrelated with such pooling, Currie concludes research programs that ought to be
creative likely suffer, in virtue of conservatism. Therefore, interventions that would
promote creativity in the relevant communities would be well motivated, given the
broader context of science today. (Indeed, this is just what Currie calls for in the case of
X-risk.)
But now, there is cause to doubt that creativity has anything to do systematically
with pooling, as defined with respect to shared priors. Creativity may, for instance, be
anticorrelated with an entirely different kind of failure to explore, measured against an
entirely different distance measure on the space. At least when revolutionary theorizing
is valued, this seems to be the case. Indeed, one might even imagine situations wherein
pooling, as measured against priors, provides explicit means of playing with what it is
14
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that we conceive as worth exploring. (Rovelli seems to have something like this in mind
in his advocating for a method built on continuity, in order to break away from playing
rearrangements of old tunes.)
If so, interventions to promote creativity cannot be motivated against a background
of conservatism, at least as Currie has presented the topic. In cases such as these, we
require a different sort of reason to motivate interventions in response to conservatism
(when, still, creativity is important). For instance, suppose that the conclusion is
warranted: conservatism deprives the relevant community of access to much of solution
space (cf. footnote 7). Then it is plausible that what is sought by the community is
inaccessible, in which case revolutionary theorizing might be valuable. Policies intended
to promote creativity in that community could then be motivated, given the broader
conservatism of science today. (And enacting such policies would be all the more
important if, following Stanford, we further regard conservatism as stifling revolutionary
theorizing.)
On the other hand, we might imagine some cases (perhaps that of X-risk) in which
Currie’s account adequately captures the effects of conservatism on inquiry. These are
cases where we regard a community’s capacity for revolutionary theorizing as,
antecedently, unimportant to assessing the health of inquiry therein.
Such cases may arise in practice. But if they do, it is very difficult— if not
impossible— to reliably identify them as such. What is up for grabs here is our epistemic
access to whether that which we presently conceive as worth exploring happens to be
coincident with that which is worth exploring. This is one lesson of Stanford’s original
project, which foremost concerned our means of evaluating the contemporary threats
posed by the problem of unconceived alternatives. The upshot is that there may turn out
15
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to be no problem inherent in the applicability of Currie’s account in certain cases. Yet,
there is a severe problem in asserting when we are reliably in such a case. This matters
for the argumentative force of any call for new incentives to promote creativity in any
particular community, based on his account. Namely, one must commit to the belief
that, whatever it means for a solution to be worth exploring— i.e. given the ultimate
aims of the community’s research, the individuals’ understandings of the problem that
shapes that research, and so on— that solution is presently conceived as such.
Whether Currie’s account can provide insight into the effect of conservatism on
inquiry will therefore require a more sophisticated understanding of creativity. Such an
understanding would need to provide a reliable means of picking out those situations
wherein the benefits of creativity are not to do with revolutionary theorizing. In those
situations, Currie’s account could give us some grasp of how to evaluate the epistemic
health of the relevant community. But the grounds for that evaluation would ultimately
reside in the more sophisticated account. This is because only according to that more
sophisticated account could we explain in virtue of what revolutionary theorizing is, in
the particular case at hand, rendered unimportant.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that Rovelli’s remarks ultimately uncover a shortcoming of Currie’s
account of creativity. This shortcoming concerns the possible value of revolutionary
theorizing to the aims of a research program. Lacking a more sophisticated account of
creativity, it is difficult to assess a variety of claims of independent interest. For instance,
what commitments does Rovelli make about the problem of quantum gravity, in order to
16
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claim that revolutionary theorizing is valuable within contemporary fundamental
physics? And when is it appropriate to focus questions about creativity exclusively on
just what is conceived as worth exploring? After all, Currie is unequivocal about the
relevance of his more narrow account of creativity in the case of X-risk. He states: “...it
is this kind of creativity which scientific study of existential risk requires” [p. 8]. So, by
what reasons do the local details of X-risk entitle us to restrict our study to an account
that disregards the possibility that revolutionary theorizing matters?
Currie anticipates the possibility that a more sophisticated notion of creativity might
ultimately be demanded. By his reckoning, this is because his account does not capture
‘ingenuity’ (p. 8), failing to distinguish creative searches from chaotic ones. Currie then
suggests that a new account of creativity, built on the notion of creative ‘flair’ developed
by Gaut (2010), might capture such a distinction.
This suggestion strikes me as promising. For instance, creative searches might be
those hot searches that enable the community to subsequently achieve novelty in
research (e.g. at the end of some iterative process). But I would like to conclude by
noting one major obstruction to developing the suggestion further. Following Currie, the
first step in articulating an account of creativity would be to specify how to extrapolate
from the individual to the community level. Such a move is essential to an
understanding of the relationship between the social structure of science and creativity,
like we have understood it here. (Of particular interest is whether conservatism can be
responsible for reliably depriving us of access to much of a solution space, within the
developed account.) But extrapolating from the individual to the community level is no
small challenge. Creative flair is an irreducibly agential notion, concerning an
individual’s familiarity with their own goals. It is unclear at present what would mark a
17
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -529-
community that, as a whole, is creative in this refined, goal-sensitive respect.
There is, it seems, still much work to be done.
18
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Abstract: 
Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. 
In the first section of the paper we point out disadvantages of orthodox Bayesian so-
lution proposals to this problem and develop an alternative solution based on a 
strengthened concept of probabilistic confirmation, called genuine confirmation. In 
the second section we illustrate the application of the concept of genuine confirma-
tion to Goodman-type counter-inductive generalizations and to post-facto specula-
tions. In the final section we demonstrate that genuine confirmation is a necessary 
condition for Bayesian convergence to certainty based on the accumulation of condi-
tionally independent pieces of evidence.  
 
 
1. From Tacking by Conjunction To Genuine Confirmation 
 
Tacking by conjunction is a deep problem of orthodox Bayesian confirmation theory. 
It is based on the insight that to each hypothesis H that is confirmed by a piece of ev-
idence E one can 'tack' an irrelevant hypothesis X so that HX is also confirmed by 
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E, in the Bayesian sense of "confirmation" as probability-raising, i.e. P(H|E) > P(H) 
("P" for "probability"). To illustrate, according to the orthodox account each piece of 
evidence that confirms Newtonian mechanics also confirms the conjunction of New-
tonian mechanics and creationism, although creationism is irrelevant to both Newto-
nian mechanics and the given evidence. This does not accord well with the pre-
theoretic notion of confirmation that Bayesians purport to explicate.  
 Particularly counterintuitive is the special case of tacking by conjunction in which 
the irrelevant hypothesis is directly tacked to the evidence. Thus E confirms EX for 
every arbitrary hypothesis X, provided only that E and EX are P-contingent, where 
a proposition is called "P-contingent" if its probability is different from 0 and 1. For 
example, "snow is white" confirms "snow is white and creationism". Author (2014) 
calls this type of 'confirmation' "pseudo-confirmation". The probabilistic fact under-
lying pseudo-confirmation is simple (Proof in appendix A1): 
 
Theorem 1 (Fact underlying pseudo-confirmation):  
Assume H and E are P-contingent. Then E confirms H iff P(E|H) > P(E). Subcase: E 
|== H. Special case: H = EX. 
  
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the tacking by conjunction problem. 
Existing Bayesian solution proposals try to soften the negative impact of this result 
by showing that although HX is confirmed by E, it is so only to a lower degree (cf. 
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Fitelson 2002; Hawthorne and Fitelson 2004, and Crupi and Tentori 2010 who ex-
tended the focus to cases where H is disconfirmed by the evidence). Although these 
solution proposals provide important insights to the Bayesian confirmation model, 
they suffer from two drawbacks:  
 (1.) In application to the special case of the tacking problem in which X is directly 
tacked to E one would intuitively expect the tacked-on hypothesis "EX" to not be 
confirmed at all, but it counts as confirmed according to 'diminished confirmation' 
proposals. 
 (2.) These proposals are measure-sensitive in the sense that the 'diminished con-
firmation' claim holds only for some of the prominent Bayesian confirmation 
measures, but is violated for others (cf. co-author and author 2019).  
 One can easily see, however, that E increases the probability of EX only because 
E is a content element of EX and increases its own probability to 1 (P(E|E) = 1), 
while E does not increase the probability of the content element X that logically 
transcends E, which means by definition that X is not entailed by E. More generally 
speaking, E does not need to raise the probability of the E-transcending content ele-
ments of a hypothesis H, in order to confirm H in the Bayesian sense. Gemes and 
Earman (Earman 1992, 98n5) have called this type of pseudo-confirmation "confir-
mation by (mere) content-cutting". To avoid this problem one ought to require that 
the confirmation takes place in those content elements of the hypothesis that are not 
logically contained in the evidence. Thus, in order for E to count as genuine confir-
mation of EX, E has to confirm X. This is the idea of genuine confirmation devel-
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oped in author (2014a) and co-author and author (2019).  
 The notion of genuine confirmation is based on the notion of a content element. A 
definition of this notion for predicate languages has been given in co-author and au-
thor (2017, def. 4.2) and Author 2014b, def. 3.12-2) as follows (where propositional 
variables count as 0-placed predicates):  
 
Definition 1: C is a content element of (hypothesis) H iff (i) H logically entails C (H 
|== C), (ii) no predicate in C is replaceable by an arbitrary new predicate with the 
same place number, salva validitate of H |== C, and (iii) C is elementary in the sense 
that C is not L(ogically) equivalent with a conjunction C1C2 of conjuncts both of 
which are shorter than C.  
 
The shortness criterion is related to the well-known concept of minimal description 
length in machine learning (Grünwald 2000); it is relativized to an underlying lan-
guage with , , , and  as primitive logical symbols, assuming that defined sym-
bols are eliminated by their definitions. In propositional logic an equivalent version 
of this definition has been given in terms of shortest clauses (co-author and author 
2017, def. 4.1; 2019, def. 3). Note that (pq)(pq) is not an admissible conjunc-
tive decomposition of p, which avoids the Popper-Miller (1983) objection to induc-
tive confirmation, which runs as follows: every hypothesis H is logically equivalent 
to the conjunction (HE)(HE). But HE is entailed by E and HE is provably 
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disconfirmed by E, so "inductive" confirmation is impossible. But neither (HE) nor 
(HE) are content elements of H. 
 Other technical definitions of content elements are possible  examples are Fried-
man's (1974) "independently acceptable elements", Gemes' (1994) "content parts" 
and Fine's (2017) "verifiers". The technical details don't matter as long as the core 
idea is captured, namely the decomposition of a hypothesis into a set of smallest con-
tent elements that are not further conjunctively decomposable in relevant ways and 
whose conjunction is L-equivalent to the original hypothesis.  
 The notion of genuine confirmation (GC) has been explicated by co-author and 
author (2019)  in three versions: qualitative full GC, qualitative partial GC and quan-
titative GC: 
 
Definition 2: Assume E does not entail H.1 Then: 
1.1 Qualitative full GC: E fully genuinely confirms H iff (i) P(X|E) > P(X) holds for 
all E-transcending content elements X of H.  
 1.2 Qualitative partial GC: E partially genuinely confirms H iff P(X|E)  P(X) holds 
for all and P(X|E) > P(X) holds for some E-transcending content elements X of H.  
1.3 Quantitative GC: The degree of genuine confirmation that E provides for H is the 
                                                 
1  We leave it open whether one wants to count logical entailment (E |== H) as a 
case of 'genuine confirmation' or not. In this case, H has no E-transcending content 
elements. 
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sum of the confirmation degrees, conf(E,H), over all E-transcending content elements 
X of H, divided by their number (where "conf(E,H)" is one of the standard Bayesian 
confirmation measures, e.g., the difference measure). 
 
Note that although the notion of genuine confirmation (in particular that of genuine 
full confirmation) strengthens ordinary Bayesian confirmation considerably, it is 
spelled out within the ordinary Bayesian framework. 
 
2. Applications of Genuine Confirmation  
 
In co-author and author (2019) it is shown that the so-defined measure has a number 
of attractive features. For example, it can solve problem of measure sensitivity. 
Moreover, qualitative partial GC implies positive quantitative GC; thus the qualita-
tive and the quantitative notions of GC are in coherence. In this paper we elaborate 
some attractive features of qualitative confirmation.   
 Partial (qualitative) genuine confirmation is sufficient to rule out the special case 
of tacking by conjunction in which the irrelevant hypothesis X is directly tacked on 
the evidence. This includes an important subcase, namely the problem of Bayesian 
pseudo-confirmation of Goodman-type counter-inductive generalizations. Let E be 
the evidence that all observed emeralds have been green, H1* the hypothesis that all 
unobserved emeralds will be green and H2* the hypothesis that call unobserved emer-
alds will be red. Then the inductive generalization H1 is L-equivalent with EH1* and 
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the counter-inductive generalization H2 is L-equivalent with EH2*. Now, following 
from theorem 1, E confirms both H1 and H2 in the pseudo-sense. However, E's con-
firmation of H2 is not a genuine one, because E does not confirm H2's E-transcending 
content element H2*. Moreover, note that E will only confirm the E-transcending in-
ductive projection H1* of E, and thus genuinely confirm H1, if the underlying proba-
bility function P satisfies certain additional inductive principles, such as de Finetti's 
exchangeability (invariance of P under permutation of individual constants) and regu-
larity (P(S) ≠ 0, 1 for every analytically contingent S). 
 For ruling out all sorts of tacking by conjunction, full (qualitative) genuine con-
firmation is needed. A further important application of full GC is the elimination of 
the pseudo-confirmation of post-facto speculations. By this we mean the confirma-
tion of hypotheses that contain  theoretical concepts or, more generally, latent varia-
bles that are not present in the evidence. By postulating sufficiently many latent vari-
ables and suitable principles connecting them with the observed variables, one can 
explain any observation whatsoever. For example, the fact that grass is green (E) 
pseudo-confirms the hypothesis (H) that "God wanted that grass is green and whatev-
er God wants, happens". Here "God's wishes" figure as the latent variable. Author 
(2014a) suggests to understand the pseudo-confirmation of post-facto speculations 
based on Worrall's (2016) concept of use-novel evidence. Worrall's account starts 
from the observation that the values of the latent variables of a general type of hy-
pothesis are fitted towards the evidence. Author (2014a) argues that the unfitted hy-
pothesis Hunfit should be understood as a content element of the fitted hypothesis Hfit, 
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which is obtained as the existential quantification over the possible values of the la-
tent variables. If Hunfit is so general that it can be fitted to every evidence, then Hunfit 
cannot be said to be confirmed merely by the fact that Hunfit was fitted to a particular 
evidence E1, leading to Hfít (although by theorem 1 Hfit's probability has increased, 
P(Hfit|E1) > P(Hfit)). For example, in the case of the "God-has-wanted-it" hypothesis, 
Hunfit would be the hypothesis "X(God wants X and whatever God wants, happens)". 
According to our account, this hypotheses cannot be genuinely confirmed by theolog-
ical post-facto explanations of events. This follows straightforwardly from P(E1|Hunfit) 
= P(E1|Hunfit), which holds because Hunfit can be fitted to any evidence whatsoever. 
Only if the fitted hypotheses is confirmed by a second use-novel piece of evidence E2, 
i.e. one to which Hunfit has not been fitted and which Hfit could have predicted, then 
Hunfit can be said to be confirmed via the confirmation of Hfit by E1 and E2. For obvi-
ously it is not possible to fit Hunfit to a given evidence E1 and then to confirm the so-
obtained Hfit  by any other evidence E2 whatsoever. In this way, the concept of genu-
ine confirmation provides a probabilistic justification of Worrall's criterion of use 
novelty. As a side remark we mention that the use-novelty criterion is by no means a 
purely philosophical invention, but is employed in a famous computational learning 
method, namely cross validation (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David 2014, sec. 11.2). 
 When we argued above that the probability of an E-transcending content element 
of H is or is not raised conditional on an evidence E that raises H's probability, we 
frequently argued by considerations of intuition. Probability theory itself does not tell 
us the value of P(E|C). Based on the considerations above we suggest the following  
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rationality criteria for the spread of the evidence-induced probability increase from a 
hypothesis H to its E-transcending content elements.: 
 
Necessary criteria for spread of probability increase:  
If H increases E’s probability, then the resulting probability increase of H by E 
spreads from H to an E-transcending content element C of H (P(C|E) > P(C)) only if: 
 (1.) C is necessary within H to make E probable, i.e., there exists no conjunction 
H* of content elements of H that makes E at least equally probable (P(E|H*)  
P(E|H)) but does not entail C, and  
 (2.) it is not the case that C is an existential quantification, C = xH(x), and H re-
sults from a parameter-adjustment of xin H(x) towards the evidence E, such that an 
equally good fitting ofH(x) would have been possible for every possible alternative 
evidence E'. 
 
 In the next section be explain a particular important application of the concept of 
genuine confirmation: it is a precondition for an important form of Bayesian conver-
gence. 
 
3. From Genuine Confirmation to Bayesian Convergence 
 
An important part of  Bayesian epistemology are convergence theorems. According 
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to them the conditional probability of a hypotheses can be driven to near certainty, if 
many confirming and mutually conditionally independent pieces of evidence for this 
hypotheses are accumulated (Earman 1992, 141ff.). Most versions of Bayesian con-
vergence theorems have been formulated for hypotheses not containing latent varia-
bles, typically hypotheses that are obtainable from the evidence by enumerative in-
duction. For example, it has been shown that if P is countably additive, then 
limnP(p(Fx)=r | (E1En)) = 1, where each Ei is Fai or Fai and F's frequency 
limit in the sequence (E1En) is r (this is a consequence of the theorem of Gaif-
man and Snir 1982). More important, however, is convergence theorem for hypothe-
ses containing latent variables. A well-known convergence theorem for this case is 
the following (proof in appendix A2): 
 
Theorem 2 - convergence to certainty: 
If a P-contingent hypothesis H satisfies the following conditions 
(a) H is confirmed by each of the P-contingent pieces of evidence E1,,En (i.e., 
P(Ei|H) > P(Ei) for all i{1,,n}),  
(b) the pieces of evidences are mutually independent conditional on H, i.e., 
P(Ei|HE1i = P(Ei|H for all i {1,,n} (and some ordering of the Ei's), 
(c) and they are also mutually independent conditional on H, 
then limnP(H|E1En) = 1. 
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Convergence to certainty in spite of a small prior probability is the ideal case of sci-
entific confirmation. The confirmation of Darwinian evolution theory by multiple 
pieces of evidence constitutes an example. Theorem 2 is  a reformulation of the Con-
dorcet jury theorem, with the agreeing reports of the independent witnesses being 
equated with the independent evidences (Bovens and Hartmann 2003; List 2004). 
Surprisingly, however, a necessary condition for convergence to certainty is full gen-
uine confirmation. The existence of only one E-transcending content element of H, 
call if C, that is not confirmed by any one of the evidences Ei, is sufficient to prevent 
convergence to certainty. Since C's probability is not raised by any of the Ei it holds 
that P(C|E1En) = P(C). But P(C|E1En) = P(C) is an upper bound of 
P(H|E1En), since H entails C. Thus P(H|E1En) is forced to stay below P(C), 
which is small, and cannot approach certainty.   
 
Theorem 3  failure of convergence to certainty: 
If a hypotheses H satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of theorem 2, but contains a content 
element C that is not confirmed by any of the evidences Ei, then 
(i) limnP(H|E1En)  P(C), and 
(ii) condition (c) of theorem 2 fails. 
 
 Note that if case of theorem 3(i) obtains and H starts from a low prior, then H's 
probability is still increasing conditional on the accumulating pieces evidence, how-
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ever, it does not converge to 1, but to P(C) (from below). 
  In conclusion, genuine confirmation is a precondition for the sustainable confirma-
tion of hypotheses that are allowed to contain latent variables. While the proof of the-
orem (i) is obvious from the arguments above, it is prima facie puzzling how this re-
sult squares with theorem 2. It turns out that entailment of an irrelevant content ele-
ments undermines the independence of the pieces of evidence conditional on the ne-
gation of the hypothesis, which is the content of theorem 3(ii). Theorem 3(ii) points 
towards a general limitation of the convergence theorem 3; because of its importance 
we state the proof right here in the text (not in the appendix). For whenever the nega-
tion of the hypotheses, H, can be decomposed into a partition of finer hypotheses 
that convey different probabilities to the evidence, then the independence of the piec-
es of evidence conditional on H fails. For example, assume H splits into two dis-
joint hypotheses H2, H3 such that P(Ei|H2) is much larger than P(Ei|H3) (for all i), alt-
hough (Ei|H2H3) = P(Ei|H) < P(Ei), which follows from P(Ei) < P(Ei|H) and the P-
contingency of Ei and H. Then P(Ej|HEi) > P(Ej|H) will hold, because the fact 
that Ei obtained makes it more probable that H2 and not H3 obtained, which in turn  
makes Ej more probable.  
 Now assume that H is a hypothesis that has an irrelevant content element C, H = 
H1C, where P(Ei|H1) > P(Ei) and C is irrelevant for Ei both unconditionally and con-
ditionally on H1. In this case the negation (H1C) splits into the finer partition 
H1C, H1C and H1C. While P(Ei|H1C) < P(Ei) holds for both C = C and 
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C = C, the third element of the partition behaves differently, namely P(Ei|H1C) 
> P(Ei|H1), and this destroys the independence of the evidence conditional on 
(H1C). 
 Fortunately there is a generalized version of theorem 3 that is relativized to a given 
possibly large partition of hypotheses that are assumed to be sufficiently strong to 
guarantee mutual conditional independence of the pieces of evidence (proof in ap-
pendix A3): 
 
Theorem 4 - generalized convergence to certainty:  
Assume a P-contingent hypothesis H1 belongs to a partition of hypotheses 
{H1,,Hm} satisfying the following conditions: 
(a) every piece of evidence favors H1 over every other hypothesis by at least (for 
some >0), i.e., P(Ei|H1)  P(Ei|Hr)+for all r>1 and i{1,,n}, and 
(b) the pieces of evidences are mutually independent conditional on every Hk 
(k{1,,m}), i.e., P(Ei|HkE1i = P(Ei|H for all i (i{1,,n}), 





(ii) limnP(H1|E1En) = 1. 
 
If we apply theorem 4 to hypotheses that are conjunctions of several content ele-
ments, H = H1Hk, then the smallest partition of competing hypotheses that has 
to be checked in regard to conditional independence of the pieces of evidence is the 
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partition{H1Hk: Hi  {Hi,Hi}, 1ik}, which contains 2k elements 
 
Appendix: Proof of theorems: 
 
A1. Proof of theorem 1: 
This is well-known: Assuming H and E are P-contingent, then 
P(H|E) = P(H)P(E|H)/P(E), and P(E|H)P(H)/P(E) > P(H) iff P(E|H) > P(E). Q.E.D. 
 
A2. Proof of theorem 2:  
Theorem 2 follows from theorem 4 by substituting {H,H} for {H1,,Hm}. Note 
that for P-contingent E and H, P(E|H) > P(E) entails P(E) > P(E|H), which follows 
from the fact that P(E) = P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|H)P(H). Thus there exists a  such 
that P(E|H)  P(E|H)+, which is the assumption of theorem 3. Q.E.D. 
 
A3. Proof of theorem 4: 
We abbreviate P(Ei|H1) as pi and write {x1,,xn} and {x1,,xn} for the sum and 
the product of the numbers x1,,xn, respectively. We calculate as follows. By Bayes' 
theorem:  
 P(H1|E1En)  =  P(E1En|H1)P(H1)/{P(E1En|Hr)P(Hr): 1 < r  m}. 
Since P(E1En|Hr) = {P(Ei|HrE1Ei1): 1in} and condition (b) of theo-
rem 4 we continue: 
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   (1n we obtain the claim of theorem 4 (i), which 
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Abstract: Our account provides a local, realist and fully non-causal principle explanation for EPR
correlations, contextuality, no-signalling, and the Tsirelson bound. Indeed, the account herein is fully
consistent with the causal structure of Minkowski spacetime. We argue that retrocausal accounts of
quantum mechanics are problematic precisely because they do not fully transcend the assumption
that causal or constructive explanation must always be fundamental. Unlike retrocausal accounts, our
principle explanation is a complete rejection of Reichenbach’s Principle. Furthermore, we will argue
that the basis for our principle account of quantum mechanics is the physical principle sought by
quantum information theorists for their reconstructions of quantum mechanics. Finally, we explain
why our account is both fully realist and psi-epistemic.
Keywords: EPR correlations; relativity principle; principle explanation; Reichenbach’s Princi-
ple; retrocausality; locality; contextuality; no preferred reference frame; causal modelling; no-
signalling; quantum information theory; reconstructions of quantum mechanics; Tsirelson bound;
realist psi-epistemic
1. Introduction
There is a class of interpretations or accounts of quantum mechanics (QM) called
retrocausal theories (for more historical background and comparisons of different models,
see [1,2]). Such models vary wildly, and it would seem that the only thing they have in
common is that the future determines the past or present as much as the past or present
determines the future, at least with respect to some QM phenomena. However, many of the
purveyors of retrocausal accounts do have similar motives. Namely, to show that QM does
not, contrary to certain “no-go theorems,” entail non-locality, contextuality and realism
about the wavefunction and QM states. Furthermore, defenders generally agree that a
retrocausal account ought to be nonetheless a realist account of QM. It is for this reason
that we cannot avoid delving into some detail on the question of what constitutes a realist
account of QM. Furthermore, the discussion of this topic will come in handy in explaining
why our account is realist and psi-epistemic.
What exactly makes an interpretation of QM a realist one is up for debate, but at the
very least, it is generally believed that realist interpretations cannot be purely epistemic.
For example, according to QBism, QM probabilities are not about objective reality, rather
they are about updating the belief states of single epistemic agents. Healey’s pragmatist
account of QM [3] and Rovelli’s relational account of QM [4] both hold that the QM state is
not a description of the physical world, but only exists to generate QM probabilities. Unlike
QBism, both pragmatist accounts and relational accounts of QM are relative-state theories in
a sense, the difference is that in the pragmatist account a quantum state ascription is relative
only to the perspective of an actual or potential agent, whereas in relational QM values are
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objective and relative to any physical system—information is relative information that one
physical system has about another, as with a third physical system observing two other
entangled systems, etc.
The point is that in relational QM, all information is purely relational and this need
have nothing to do with ‘agents’ even in the neutral sense of agent in which a non-conscious
A.I. might be observing and measuring outcomes in QM experiments. However, Healey is
clear that a QM state can only be ascribed to an agent in the context of an experimental
set-up that defines the perspective of that agent; in this respect Healey’s pragmatist QM is
a kind of half-way house between QBism and relational QM. In spite of the agent-centric
talk in QBism and the pragmatist account, these accounts do not require conscious agents.
An epistemic agent could be a non-conscious machine of some sort. What makes all three
of these accounts epistemic is that they all hold the QM state is not a description of the
physical world, but only exists to generate QM probabilities. That is, in addition to being
explicitly psi-epistemic, none of these accounts provides an ontology or what Bell called [5]
“beables,” that are allegedly hiding behind the veil of the ‘observables’ and explain the
phenomenology in question. The beables, such as particles, fields or waves of some sort,
are supposed to tell us exactly what happens, say, between the initiation and termination of
some QM experiment, such as a Bell-type experiment or twin-slit type experiment. Clearly
this notion of beables presupposes what we will shortly define as a dynamical or causal
explanatory bias.
It is sometimes further claimed that beables must have some metaphysical auton-
omy/independence and some intrinsic properties. If that is so, then relational QM fails to
be a realist theory for yet another reason. As Laudisa and Rovelli put it [4]:
For RQM (relational quantum mechanics), the lesson of quantum theory is that
the description of the way distinct physical systems affect each other when they
interact (and not the way physical systems ‘are’) exhausts all that can be said
about the physical world. The physical world must be described as a net of
interacting components, where there is no meaning to ‘the state of an isolated
system’, or the value of the variables of an isolated system. The state of a physical
system is the net of the relations it entertains with the surrounding systems. The
physical structure of the world is identified as this net of relationships.
Thus, if relational QM is true, there are no such things as beables so defined. We will
return to such questions in the Discussion and Postscript wherein we will take up the topic
of contextuality and realism more explicitly. Therein, we will explain why our principle
account of QM is a realist, psi-epistemic account, as well as our take on beables, etc.
Finally, in perhaps the most egregious violation of realism, some of these accounts,
such as relational QM, are labeled subjectivist because they allegedly entail that, at least in
certain situations such as Wigner’s friend type set-ups, different observers can consistently
give different accounts of the same set of events such as the outcomes of measurements.
For example, in a particular Schrödinger’s Cat type set-up, even without invoking the
branching structure of the Many-Worlds interpretation, observer X can report seeing a live
cat and observer Y can report seeing a dead cat, allegedly the very same cat, and both
can be correct without contradiction [6] (pp. 116–117). That is, such subjectivist accounts
allegedly violate what is sometimes called, The Absoluteness of Observed Events [7]. For a
detailed explanation of why our principle account of QM rules out such absurdities see the
Postscript and [8].
Many purveyors of retrocausal models of QM are hoping to construct realist models
in the sense of being housed strictly in spacetime and requiring nothing but beables such
as particles, semi-classical fields or semi-classical waves. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising
that most retrocausal accounts, even those that have a block universe picture firmly in
mind, still insist that the best explanation for EPR correlations must be a causal explanation
of some sort. The idea here being that what it means to provide a realist account of said
correlations is to provide a causal account of some sort. Whatever their motivations and
whatever their particular account of retrocausation might be, such theorists still adhere
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to some version of Reichenbach’s Principle, which states that if two events are correlated,
then either there is a causal connection between the correlated events that is responsible
for the correlation or there is a third event, a so-called common cause, which brings about
the correlation.
When it comes to how retrocausal accounts might thwart various no-go theorems, the
focus is on the statistical “measurement independence” assumption in Bell’s theorem, i.e.,
the assumption that outcomes in EPR-type experiments do not causally depend on any
future measurement settings. If one could construct a fully time-like retrocausal account
of QM that fully explained EPR correlations with no remaining fatal flaws and which
reproduced the statistics of QM, then perhaps locality (what Bell calls “local causality”)
could be saved. Furthermore, if one can tell such a retrocausal account, then perhaps
contrary to the Kochen–Specker theorem and others like it [9], non-contextuality can
be saved as well: the claim that physical properties of QM systems exist prior to and
independently of the act of measurement. As Friederich and Evans put it [1]:
Retrocausality renders Kochen-Specker-type contextuality potentially explainable
as a form of “causal contextuality”. If there is a backward-directed influence
of the chosen measurement setting (and context) on the pre-measurement ontic
state, it is no longer to be expected that the measurement process is simply
uncovering an independently existing definite value for some property of the
system, rather the measurement process can play a causal role in bringing about
such values (the measurement process is retrocausal rather than retrodictive).
Indeed, one might argue contextuality of measured values is just what one might
expect when admitting retrocausal influences. As Wharton (2014: 203) puts it,
“Kochen-Specker contextuality is the failure of the Independence Assumption”,
i.e., the failure of measurement independence.
Finally, the idea is that if retrocausation can thwart non-locality and contextuality,
then perhaps it provides the basis for a realist, psi-epistemic account of QM in spacetime
alone, with counterfactual definiteness and determinate physical properties throughout
the worldtube of every QM system. Of course, while many retrocausal accounts adhere to
Reichenbach’s Principle in some form, the nature of the causal relation itself varies across
different retrocausal explanations. However, retrocausal explanations tend to invoke one
of two (or both) notions of causation. The first kind of causation is a “causal processes
account,” wherein chains of events are related by causal interactions (“action-by-contact”),
that involve local exchanges of a conserved quantity. Such causal influences extend through
spacetime via contiguously mediated connections between local beables, as with classical
fields [10]. The trick for retrocausal accounts espousing this type of causation is to thwart
non-locality (faster-than-light causal connections between space-like separated events,
i.e., “spooky actions at a distance” [11] (p. 158)), by telling a story whereby such causal
processes are purely time-like. Such causal processes are often described as making a
time-like “zig-zag” pattern in spacetime between the two space-like separated detectors
in a standard EPR-type setup [12–14]. We should note that some such accounts are still
realist about the QM wavefunction or at least about semi-classical waves in spacetime (the
general idea here is that wavefunctions evolve both forwards and backwards in time), but
not all [15,16].
The second type of causation is called the “interventionist” or “manipulability” ac-
count of causation [17]. The central idea is that X is a cause of Y if and only if manipulating
X is an effective means of indirectly manipulating Y. According to retrocausal accounts
of QM espousing an interventionist account of causation, manipulating the setting of a
measurement apparatus now can be an effective means of manipulating aspects of the past.
The formal machinery of causal modelling has the interventionist account of causality as
its foundation [18].
Price and Wharton, two key defenders of retrocausal accounts of QM, embrace a subset
of interventionism known as the “agent” or “perspectivalism” account of causation [19–21].
On this view, causal relations are relations that can be used for control or manipulation,
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from the perspective of the agent in question of course. This is an understandably appealing
notion of causation for those such as Price and Wharton who espouse a block universe
picture, wherein causation talk cannot possibly be about changing or bringing about events
(past, present or future) in any robust sense of those terms. In our language [22], agent
causation focuses on the “ant’s-eye” view of explanation from within the block universe, as
opposed to the “God’s-eye” view that would seek a purely objective explanation for EPR
correlations external to a perspective from within the block universe, an explanation that
transcends and subsumes perspectival causation, such as conservation laws.
In addition to the specific problems faced by particular retrocausal models, the con-
sensus is that, as of yet, no realist retrocausal account manages to successfully save locality,
non-contextuality and a psi-epistemic account of the wavefunction [1]. The most general
concern however is that retrocausal accounts fail to provide a robust or coherent causal
explanation of EPR correlations and contextuality. The most general form of this concern is
that, at least from the God’s-eye point of view, the very idea of retrocausation in a block
universe makes very little physical or explanatory sense [13,23,24]. Many (though not
all [13]) believe that retrocausation demands a block universe. This is because it is hard to
see how the future or future boundary conditions could cause anything or participate in
any type of explanation of EPR correlations, if the future does not exist. Yet, when we think
of the block universe from the God’s-eye point of view, it is clear that causation cannot be
about bringing new events into being that did not formerly exist, because from a God’s-eye
point of view it is all just ‘there’, including EPR-experiments from initiation (source) to
termination (detector). The very idea of “causality flowing backwards in time” as with
the “causal processes account,” simply seems superfluous or redundant in such a world.
For example, as Cramer says himself, the backwards-causal elements of his transactional
interpretation are “only a pedagogical convention,” and that in fact “the process is atempo-
ral” [25] (p. 661). But the idea of an “atemporal process” seems like a non-sequitur. In a
block universe, why bother trying to add some new mechanism (such as waves from the
future) to account for how information from the future got to the emission event in the
past? Again, from a God’s-eye point of view the relevant information at every point in
the “process” from source to detector, is all just ‘there’. Aside from thwarting non-locality,
how is this backward brand of causation any better at saving constructive or commonsense
notions of causation than “instantaneous causation” between space-like separated events?
Those who advocate for an interventionist or perspectivalist account of causation
would argue that such an account of causation still makes sense even in a block universe.
However, there are problems with this account of causation as well. As Friederich and
Evans note [1]:
Two of the more significant assumptions are (i) the causal Markov condition,
which ensures that every statistical dependence in the data results in a causal
dependence in the model—essentially a formalization of Reichenbach’s common
cause principle—and (ii) faithfulness, which ensures that every statistical inde-
pendence implies a causal independence, or no causal independence is the result
of a fine-tuning of the model.
It has long been recognized (Butterfield 1992; Hausman 1999; Hausman and
Woodward 1999) that quantum correlations force one to give up at least one of
the assumptions usually made in the causal modeling framework. Wood and
Spekkens (2015) argue that any causal model purporting to causally explain
the observed quantum correlations must be fine-tuned (i.e., must violate the
faithfulness assumption). More precisely, according to them, since the observed
statistical independences in an entangled bipartite quantum system imply no
signalling between the parties, when it is then assumed that every statistical
independence implies a causal independence (which is what faithfulness dic-
tates), it must be inferred that there can be no (direct or mediated) causal link
between the parties. Since there is an observed statistical dependence between
the outcomes of measurements on the bipartite system, we can no longer account
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for this dependence with a causal link unless this link is fine tuned to ensure that
the no-signalling independences still hold. There is thus a fundamental tension
between the observed quantum correlations and the no-signalling requirement,
the faithfulness assumption and the possibility of a causal explanation.
We would say that even if interventionist and causal modelling accounts of causation could
be applied to EPR correlations with nothing like the preceding concerns, there is still little
reason to find such explanations deeply satisfying. Is there really no more fundamental
and objective, God’s-eye explanation for EPR correlations that transcends and subsumes
perspectival causation? Such interventionist explanations strike us as too cheap and easy,
and not very deep from the perspective of fundamental physics.
In addition to the foregoing concerns, there are recent no-go theorems which allege
that no account of QM can escape contextuality, because it is necessary to reproduce the
observed statistics of quantum theory [9]. More recent no-go theorems allege to show
that not even accounts that give up measurement independence, such as retrocausal,
superdeterministic or even non-local models of QM can escape one or another strong form
of contextuality, going so far as to claim that what is contextual is not just the QM state, but
many other features of QM, such as what counts as a system, dynamical law and boundary
conditions [26]. Going even further, Bong et al. [7] allege to provide a new and more
powerful no-go theorem that we must give up at least one of the following assumptions [7]:
• Assumption 1 (Absoluteness of Observed Events-AOE): An observed event is a real
single event, and not relative to anything or anyone (realism and non-contextuality).
• Assumption 2 (No-Superdeterminism-NSD): Any set of events on a space-like hy-
persurface is uncorrelated with any set of freely chosen actions subsequent to that
space-like hypersurface.
• Assumption 3 (Locality-L): The probability of an observable event e is unchanged by
conditioning on a space- like-separated free choice z, even if it is already conditioned
on other events not in the future light-cone of z.
• Assumption 4 (The completeness of QM-COMP): QM unmodified applies to any and
all macroscopic measuring devices including human observers.
Based on these and similar results, other people make even stronger claims about what
the new no-go theorems and experiments show. For example, Renner claims the new
theorems are telling us that QM needs to be replaced [27]. Herein, we do not address any
of these new no-go theorems directly, we simply note that if these no-go results stand
and if the primary goal for most retrocausal accounts is to save locality, non-contextuality,
psi-epistemic, and something like classical realism, things are looking increasingly grim.
One might think that advocates of retrocausal accounts would take heart from the
Bong et al. results [7], because at least it leaves superdeterminism as an option, and
superdeterminism is one way to give up measurement independence. While retrocausal
accounts are often labeled as superdeterministic it is important to see that they are different.
Technically speaking, in a superdeterministic world, measurement independence is violated
via a past common cause, for example, a common cause of one’s choice of measurements
and the particle spin properties in the case of Bell correlations. Thus, superdeterminism is
a conspiratorial theory with only past-to-future causation. It is true that superdeterminism
entails that experimenters are not free to choose what to measure without being influenced
by events in the distant past, and thus it does give up measurement independence, however,
it does so in a particularly spooky way. Superdeterminism forces us to accept some very
special conditions at the big bang as a brute fact or seek some sort of physically acceptable
explanation for those initial conditions, that is presumably not some sort of supernatural
conspiracy. While there are those who defend superdeterminism [28], most retrocausal
theorists want to avoid it for the foregoing reasons.
In our book, we noted that most people are predisposed to think dynamically/causally
because our perceptions are formed in a time-evolved fashion. Therefore, we want to
understand/explain what we experience dynamically/causally [22]. We call this the
dynamical or causal explanatory bias. It is not surprising that most people, including
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philosophers and physicists, have this bias. What is maybe somewhat surprising is that,
as we have just seen, even retrocausal thinkers and blockworlders share this bias, i.e.,
they embrace the causal processes model and/or the perspectival causation model of
explanation as fundamental or essential in some way. Take the following admonition from
Price and Wharton [29] (p. 123):
In putting future and past on an equal footing, this kind of approach is different
in spirit from (and quite possibly formally incompatible with) a more familiar
style of physics: one in which the past continually generates the future, like
a computer running through the steps in an algorithm. However, our usual
preference for the computer-like model may simply reflect an anthropocentric
bias. It is a good model for creatures like us, who acquire knowledge sequentially,
past to future, and hence find it useful to update their predictions in the same way.
But there is no guarantee that the principles on which the universe is constructed
are of the sort that happens to be useful to creatures in our particular situation.
Physics has certainly overcome such biases before—the Earth isn’t the center of
the universe, our sun is just one of many, there is no preferred frame of reference.
Now, perhaps there’s one further anthropocentric attitude that needs to go: the
idea that the universe is as “in the dark” about the future as we are ourselves.
We share their sentiment, but even leading retrocausalists Price and Wharton are committed
to causal explanations of EPR correlations of either the causal processes account or the
interventionist/perspectivalist account [1].
As Friederich and Evans suggest and we concur, aside from ourselves, Wharton and
Price have come the farthest in moving away from the dynamical/causal explanatory bias.
Here is how they describe Wharton’s view [1]:
The account is a retrocausal picture based on Hamilton’s principle and the sym-
metric constraint of both initial and final boundary conditions to construct equa-
tions of motion from a Lagrangian, and is a natural setting for a perspectival
interventionist account of causality. Wharton treats external measurements as
physical constraints imposed on a system in the same way that boundary con-
straints are imposed on the action integral of Hamilton’s principle; the final
measurement does not simply reveal preexisting values of the parameters, but
constrains those values (just as the initial boundary condition would). Wharton’s
model has been described as an “all-at-once” approach, since the dynamics of
physical systems between an initial and final boundary emerges en bloc as the
solution to a two-time boundary value problem.
On this interpretation, one considers reality exclusively between two temporal
boundaries as being described by a classical field φ that is a solution to the
Klein-Gordon equation: specification of field values at both an initial and final
boundary (as opposed to field values and their rate of change at only the initial
boundary) constrains the field solutions between the boundaries.
While Wharton’s “all-at-once” or “Lagrangian” model goes some way toward relinquishing
said bias, as noted above, it still falls within the causal processes account and the inter-
ventionist/perspectivalist account of causal explanation. After all, one goal of Wharton’s
retrocausal Lagrangian method is to “fill in” the classical field between initial (source) and
final boundary conditions (detector). The Lagrangian method begins describing the space
of possible space-time trajectories of the system between two boundary conditions, and
then a least action principle such as the path of least time—a global constraint—is used to
fix which of these trajectories is actual. More recently Wharton has focused on constructing
ignorance-based interpretations of the path integral formalism [15]. The bottom line is that
Reichenbach’s Principle is still the “axiom of choice” even when it comes to “all-at-once”
or “Lagrangian” models of EPR correlations.
As we said, there is as of yet no retrocausal model that recovers the statistics of QM
and also saves locality, non-contextuality, psi-epistemic, and classical realism. Over the
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years we have argued that the problem with retrocausal accounts is that they do not go far
enough in relinquishing their dynamical/causal explanatory bias [2,22,23]. It is not enough
for such models to be temporally symmetric, but rather when it comes to EPR correlations
we ought to cast off the dynamical and causal mode of explanation completely, in favor of
explanation a la adynamical and acausal global constraints (AGC). For example, we need
not worry about the traces particles carry of their dynamical interactions, whether past
or future. For us, the explanatory requirement of a particle traveling along a determinate
trajectory is a holdover from the dynamical/causal bias as exemplified by the causal
processes account of explanation. Rather, we should seek a quantum event or action
connecting the source and detector. Lewis gets us exactly right in his description of our
view as follows [30] (p. 187):
The idea is to give up the search for forward-acting and backward- acting dynam-
ical laws that can somehow “fit together” in a consistent way to yield quantum
phenomena. Rather, we derive quantum phenomena directly from a global con-
straint, without any appeal to the dynamical evolution of particle properties or
wave functions.
We are primarily inspired to construct an AGC-based physical model by the belief that
what both relativity and QM are trying to tell us, is that sometimes AGC-type explanations
and contextuality are more fundamental than causal or dynamical explanation. In terms
of our specific motivations as regards QM, we are primarily interested in constructing
a realist, psi-epistemic, local account of QM, that fully comports with a realist view of
Minkowski spacetime. That is, we do not believe in Hilbert space/wavefunction realism
and we do not believe there is any action-at-a-distance that violates the causal structure
(the light-cone structure) of special relativity (SR). Obviously, for us, a realist account of QM
need not involve causal or dynamical explanation; we are perhaps alone in fully rejecting
Reichenbach’s Principle for such cases. However, a realist account of QM ought to explain
why EPR correlations exist in Minkowski spacetime. Equally obvious, if we are right in
fully rejecting Reichenbach’s Principle and the dynamical/causal explanatory bias in QM,
then all of these debates about the various problems of retrocausal models are a red herring.
It is one thing to posit explanations in terms of adynamical and acausal global con-
straints, but it is quite another to cook up a specific model. In our book [22], we posited
an ontology of four-dimensional entities that do not move or change but make up the
block universe. We also posited an AGC mode of explanation for EPR correlations, among
other things, that uses the initial and final states of the system, plus the AGC, to pro-
vide a spatiotemporal explanation of said correlations. However, even those somewhat
open to our relatively “radical” project of completely jettisoning Reichenbach’s Principle
and the dynamical and causal explanatory bias behind it, found our specific account for-
mally daunting, vague, and insufficiently precise. Lewis expresses a common concern [30]
(p. 188):
But the way is not altogether clear. Classical adynamical techniques, such as
least-action calculations, output a determinate trajectory between two points. But
quantum adynamical techniques, such as Feynman’s path-integral calculation,
output a probability value based on a sum over all possible trajectories between
the two points. Which trajectory does the particle take? And what does the
probability represent?
Silberstein, Stuckey and McDevitt take this situation to point to direct action
between the source and the detector: But what of the probability? A global
constraint that rules out non-parabolic baseball trajectories is easy to comprehend.
But it is harder to figure out how to understand a probabilistic global constraint.
What is constrained, exactly? The frequency of this kind of event?
Take the following even more telling reaction to our book [31] (p. 344):
I am not sold that the adynamical picture is truly explanatory. Philosophers of
science have proposed objective accounts of explanation, but they all recognize
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there’s a strong sense in which explanation is ‘explanation for us,’ and any ac-
count should capture our intuition that explanation is fundamentally dynamical.
This is connected with causation: intuitively, we explain an event because we
find its causes; causes happen before their effects and ‘bring them about.’ An
empiricist will be skeptical of causation, like presumably SSM. However, as is
well known, one can dispense of causation and propose models of explanations
in which laws of nature and unification of phenomena play an important role.
Should I think of SSM’s adynamical view in this sense? Or should I connect their
view with the distinction between constructive and principle theories, proposed
by Einstein (1919)? According to Einstein, principle theories (like thermodynam-
ics) are formulated in terms of principles that systematize the phenomena; so
that one has explained an event if it follows from the principles. In contrast, in a
constructive theory (as kinetic theory) a phenomenon is explained when it fits
into the ‘mechanical’ model of the theory. Should I understand SSM’s view as a
principle theory? (But if so, which are the principles?).
In the preceding passage, Allori beautifully expresses the aforementioned recalcitrance of
the dynamical and causal explanatory bias. However, more importantly, Allori suggests
another way to conceive of our project in terms of providing a principle versus constructive
account of QM generally and EPR correlations specifically. This is precisely what we have
done in recent subsequent work [32–34], and we will expand upon those results herein.
Finally, our principle account of QM introduced in Section 3 shows a profound unity
between QM and SR that is generally unappreciated, especially since by “QM” we are
referring to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We begin in Section 2, with an overview
of principle versus constructive explanation in general and the recent history of that debate
within QM itself. We present our principle account of QM in Section 3, showing how
it resolves a number of QM mysteries. We conclude with Section 4, where we defend
our principle account of QM and its obvious implication for causality in physics. In the
Postscript we will return to the question of why our principle account is both realist and
psi-epistemic, the place of contextuality, etc.
2. Principle Versus Constructive Explanation
Here, we begin with some background needed to appreciate our explanatory project.
As we will see, some theorists in QM, such as Fuchs and Hardy, point to the postulates of
SR as an example of what quantum information theorists (QIT) seek for QM, and SR is a
“principle theory” [35]. That is, the postulates of SR are constraints without a corresponding
“constructive” or causal explanation. Here, Einstein explains the difference between the
two [36]:
We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are con-
structive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena
out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start
out. [Statistical mechanics is an example.] ...
Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will
call “principle-theories.” These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method.
The elements which form their basis and starting point are not hypothetically
constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural
processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which
the separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy.
[Thermodynamics is an example.] ...
The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and
clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the
foundations. The theory of relativity belongs to the latter class.
Concerning his decision to produce a principle theory instead of a constructive theory of
SR, Einstein writes [37] (pp. 51–52):
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By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws by means of
constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer and the more despairingly
I tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the discovery of a universal
formal principle could lead us to assured results.
That is, “there is no mention in relativity of exactly how clocks slow, or why meter sticks
shrink” (no “constructive efforts”), nonetheless the principles of SR are so compelling that
“physicists always seem so sure about the particular theory of Special Relativity, when so
many others have been superseded in the meantime” [38].
Today, we find ourselves in a similar situation with QM. That is, 85 years after the
famous EPR paper [39] we still have no consensus constructive account of QM. This
prompted Smolin to write [40] (p. 227):
So, my conclusion is that we need to back off from our models, postpone conjec-
tures about constituents, and begin talking about principles.
Fuchs writes [41] (p. 285):
Compare [quantum mechanics] to one of our other great physical theories, special
relativity. One could make the statement of it in terms of some very crisp and
clear physical principles: The speed of light is constant in all inertial frames, and
the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames. And it struck me that if
we couldn’t take the structure of quantum theory and change it from this very
overt mathematical speak ..., then the debate would go on forever and ever. And
it seemed like a worthwhile exercise to try to reduce the mathematical structure
of quantum mechanics to some crisp physical statements.
And, Hardy writes [42]:
The standard axioms of [quantum theory] are rather ad hoc. Where does this
structure come from? Can we write down natural axioms, principles, laws, or
postulates from which we can derive this structure? Compare with the Lorentz
transformations and Einstein’s two postulates for special relativity. Or compare
with Kepler’s Laws and Newton’s Laws. The standard axioms of quantum theory
look rather ad hoc like the Lorentz transformations or Kepler’s laws. Can we
find a natural set of postulates for quantum theory that are akin to Einstein’s or
Newton’s laws?
Along those lines, QIT have produced several reconstructions of QM, but they are so
far not compelling. Dakic and Brukner write [43] :
The vast majority of attempts to find physical principles behind quantum theory
either fail to single out the theory uniquely or are based on highly abstract
mathematical assumptions without an immediate physical meaning (e.g., [18]).
...
While [the instrumentalist] reconstructions are based on a short set of simple
axioms, they still partially use mathematical language in their formulation. ...
It is clear from the previous discussion that the question on basis of which
physical principles quantum theory can be separated from the multitude of
possible generalized probability theories is still open.
Another problem with the reconstructions of QIT is noted by Van Camp [44]:
However, nothing additional has been shown to be incorporated into an information-
theoretic reformulation of QM beyond what is contained in QM itself. It is hard
to see how it could offer more unification of the phenomena than QM already
does since they are equivalent, and so it is not offering any explanatory value on
this front.
Moreover, Fuchs quotes Wheeler, “If one really understood the central point and its
necessity in the construction of the world, one ought to state it in one clear, simple sentence”
[41] (p. 302). Asked if he had such a sentence, Fuchs responded, “No, that’s my big
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failure at this point” [41] (p. 302). Herein, we answer the desideratum of QIT explicitly by
showing how the relativity principle, aka “no preferred reference frame” (NPRF), is the
physical principle corresponding to the reconstructions of QM, just as it is for the Lorentz
transformations of SR.
Our claim about principle explanation being “fundamental” deserves some unpack-
ing. Obviously, the question of what makes an explanation relatively “fundamental” is
multifaceted (i.e., there are multiple senses of “fundamental”) and value laden. Our claim
about the fundamentality of principle explanation in this case amounts to this:
1. The principle explanation on offer is compatible with a number of different construc-
tive interpretations of QM and will not be nullified or made redundant by any of
them, just as with SR and thermodynamics. Thus, the principle explanation on offer
is fundamental in the sense that it is more general, universal and autonomous than
any particular constructive explanation or interpretation.
2. As with the case of SR, the principle explanation on offer suggests the possibility that
there will never be and need never be, any constructive theory to underwrite it or
subsume it. Dynamical and causal bias aside, there is no reason to rule out this possi-
bility a priori, and SR looks to be such a case already. Thus, the principle explanation
herein would be fundamental in the sense that it does not even in principle reduce to
some constructive theory or explanation.
One might ask, does our principle explanation at least rule out any particular con-
structive interpretations of QM, or make them redundant? To which we would reply, does
thermodynamics rule out or make redundant statistical mechanics or particular alternative
microphysical theories? Is the converse true? Does SR rule out or make redundant alterna-
tive constructive accounts about phenomena such as Lorentz contractions? Is the converse
true? Regardless of one’s larger metaphysical commitments, the consensus answer to all
these questions is in the negative. Let us return the focus to QM. The Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian formulations of QM do not rule each other out or make one another redundant.
And this claim is perfectly compatible with a psi-epistemic account of the wavefunction
(see the Postscript for more details). What a principle account does is constrain constructive
theories, beyond the constraints in question, it does not necessarily rule them out or make
them redundant. However, a principle theory can make constructive accounts redundant,
as with the case of SR and the luminiferous ether. But as we note in the Discussion, while
people have abandoned theories of the luminiferous ether, some still insist there must be
an underlying constructive explanation for relativistic effects such as length contraction.
We disagree, but we have no way of ruling out this possibility in principle. However, as we
noted above in point 1, even if there is such a constructive explanation forthcoming, SR
would still be fundamental in the sense of generality, universality and autonomy.
Regardless of where one stands on these matters, there is no denying the fact that
SR, with its principle explanation, has led to profound advancements in physics and we
are offering a similar possibility for QM. Of course, this is not to say that our principle
account creates no tension whatsoever with certain constructive accounts of, say, EPR
correlations. If one is willing to accept the possibility that a principle explanation such as
ours will never be reduced or underwritten by a causal or dynamical constructive account,
then we have a completely local, adynamical and acausal explanation for EPR correlations
that dissolves any tension between QM and SR. In short, if we are right and our principle
explanation is fundamental as characterized by point 2 above, then we simply do not
need constructive non-local accounts of EPR correlations, such as Bohmian mechanics
and spontaneous collapse accounts. [See the Postscript for our broader interpretative
commitments regarding QM.]
However, our own view aside, for those who hold that fundamental explanation must
be constructive and realist in Einstein’s sense of those words, none of the mainstream
interpretations neatly fit the bill. Not only do most interpretations entail some form of QM
holism, contextuality, and/or non-locality, the remainder invoke priority monism and/or
multiple branches or outcomes. The problem with attempting a constructive account of
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QM is, as articulated by Van Camp, “Constructive interpretations are attempted, but they
are not unequivocally constructive in any traditional sense” [44]. Thus, he states [44]:
The interpretive work that must be done is less in coming up with a constructive
theory and thereby explaining puzzling quantum phenomena, but more in ex-
plaining why the interpretation counts as explanatory at all given that it must
sacrifice some key aspect of the traditional understanding of causal-mechanical
explanation.
If statistical mechanics is the paradigm example of constructive explanation, then it is hard
to imagine Einstein would approve of any mainstream interpretations of QM.
Let us also note again that contrary to certain others, we are arguing that principle
explanation need not ever be discharged by a constructive explanation or interpretation–
causal or otherwise in SR [45–48] or in QM [49]. For example, our principle explanation
avoids the complaints about Bub’s proposed principle explanation of QM leveled by
Felline [49]. That is, the principle being posited herein does not require a solution to the
measurement problem nor again does it necessarily beg for a constructive counterpart.
Figure 1. A pair of Stern–Gerlach (SG) spin measurements each showing the two possible outcomes, up (+ h̄2 ) and down
(− h̄2 ) or +1 and −1, for short. In this set up, the first SG magnets (oriented at ẑ) are being used to produce an initial state
|ψ〉 = |u〉 for measurement by the second SG magnets (oriented at b̂). An important point to note here is that the classical
analysis predicts all possible deflections between the target points on the detector, not just the two that are observed. The
difference between the classical prediction and the quantum reality uniquely distinguishes the quantum joint distribution
from the classical joint distribution for the Bell spin states [50].
To be specific, we extend NPRF from its application to the measurement of the speed of
light c to include the measurement of another fundamental constant of nature, Planck’s con-
stant h. As Weinberg has noted, measuring an electron’s spin via Stern–Gerlach (SG) mag-
nets constitutes the measurement of “a universal constant of nature, Planck’s constant” [51]
(Figure 1). Thus, if NPRF applies equally here, everyone must measure the same value for
Planck’s constant h regardless of their SG magnet orientations relative to the source, which
is an “empirically discovered” fact just like the light postulate. By “relative to the source,”
we mean relative to the plane perpendicular to the particle beam (Figure 1). In this case, the
spin outcomes ± ℏ2 represent fundamental (indivisible) units of information per Dakic and
Brukner’s first axiom in their reconstruction of quantum theory, “An elementary system
has the information carrying capacity of at most one bit” [43]. Therefore, the different SG
magnet orientations relative to the source constitute different “reference frames” in QM,
just as the different velocities relative to the source constitute different “reference frames”
in SR.
To make the analogy more explicit, one could have employed NPRF to predict the light
postulate as soon as Maxwell showed electromagnetic radiation propagates at c = 1√µoǫo .
All they would have had to do is extend the relativity principle from mechanics to elec-
tromagnetism. However, given the understanding of waves at the time, everyone rather
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began searching for a propagation medium, i.e., the luminiferous ether. Likewise, one could
have employed NPRF to predict spin angular momentum as soon as Planck published
his wavelength distribution function for blackbody radiation. All they would have had to
do is extend the relativity principle from mechanics and electromagnetism to blackbody
radiation. However, given the understanding of angular momentum and magnetic mo-
ments at the time, Stern and Gerlach rather expected to see their silver atoms deflected in
a continuum distribution after passing through their magnets (Figure 1). In other words,
they discovered spin angular momentum when they were simply looking for angular mo-
mentum. However, had they noticed that their measurement constituted a measurement of
Planck’s constant (with its dimension of angular momentum), they could have employed
NPRF to predict the spin outcome with its qubit Hilbert space structure (Figures 1 and 2)
and its ineluctably probabilistic nature, as we detail in Section 3.
We can certainly imagine a world where NPRF did not apply to c and h. In the
former case, c would only be measured in the “hidden” preferred frame of the luminiferous
ether. In that case, the kinematic and causal structure of Minkowski spacetime would not
obtain. In the latter case, h would only be measured in the “hidden” preferred frame of
the orientation of the electron’s angular momentum. In that case, the non-Boolean qubit
Hilbert space structure would not obtain. Bub and Pitowski have pointed out the analogy
between Minkowski spacetime and Hilbert space [52–54] in an attempt to explain EPR
correlations. Bub sums it up nicely [55]:
Hilbert space as a projective geometry (i.e., the subspace structure of Hilbert
space) represents the structure of the space of possibilities and determines the
kinematic part of quantum mechanics. ... The possibility space is a non-Boolean
space in which there are built-in, structural probabilistic constraints on correla-
tions between events (associated with the angles between the rays representing ex-
tremal events) – just as in special relativity the geometry of Minkowski space-time
represents spatio-temporal constraints on events. These are kinematic, i.e., pre-
dynamic, objective probabilistic or information-theoretic constraints on events
to which a quantum dynamics of matter and fields conforms, through its sym-
metries, just as the structure of Minkowski space-time imposes spatio-temporal
kinematic constraints on events to which a relativistic dynamics conforms.
But as a mere analogy, it lacks explanatory power. Herein we complete their explanatory
project by showing why both aspects of their analogy follow from a common principle,
NPRF.
Since QIT reconstructions of QM are based fundamentally in composite fashion on
the qubit [42,43], the “very crisp and clear physical principle” of NPRF underwriting the
qubit Hilbert space structure therefore underwrites the QIT reconstructions of QM. This
advances QM from a mere operational theory to a proper principle theory, at least Hardy
and Dakic and Brukner’s reconstructions thereof. Indeed, NPRF as the physical principle
behind the reconstructions of QM provides more than a mere analogy between the Lorentz
transformations and the postulates of SR. That is, NPRF is to the QIT reconstructions of QM
as NPRF is to the Lorentz transformations of SR. And, the fundamental transformation for
the qubit at the foundation of QIT reconstructions is SO(3) [43], so we see that SO(3) and the
Lorentz boosts close as a transformation group (the restricted Lorentz group) relating differ-
ent reference frames in QM and SR, respectively. This also motivated Dakic and Brukner’s
axiom 3, which was “assumed alone for the purposes that the set of transformations builds
a group structure” [43].
Essentially, we resolve the primary problem with QIT attempts to “find physical
principles behind quantum theory,” i.e., that they “either fail to single out the theory
uniquely or are based on highly abstract mathematical assumptions without an immediate
physical meaning,” by explaining the qubit Hilbert space structure using constraints on QM
processes in spacetime, i.e., “average-only” projection and “average-only” conservation
per NPRF, rather than the converse. Thus, analogous with the structure of spacetime in SR,
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -559-
Entropy 2021, 23, 114 13 of 29
our principle account of QM shows how the qubit Hilbert space structure follows from the
relativity principle in spacetime, as opposed to the converse.
At the outset of Section 3, we articulate the connection between NPRF and the
qubit Hilbert space structure, quantum contextuality, and the ineluctably probabilistic
nature of QM. We then extrapolate this result to biparite entangled qubit systems to
show why the mystery of Bell state entanglement results from conservation per NPRF in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This will make it clear how conservation per NPRF rules out what
Dakic and Brukner call “mirror quantum mechanics” in their reconstruction of QM.
3. QM from NPRF Whence Bell State Entanglement
We will refer explicitly to SG spin measurements for visualization purposes, but this
can be understood to represent any measurement with a binary outcome in the symmetry
plane. The only other outcome pair would be perpendicular to the symmetry plane, as in
“V” (+1) or “H” (−1) outcomes with photons and polarizers, in which case one thinks of
“intensity of the transmitted beam” rather than “projection of the transmitted vector” [32].
The binary outcome still represents the invariant measure of the fundamental unit of ac-
tion h with respect to the SO(3) transformations between QM reference frames, as in all
quantum exchanges [34]. Again, SO(3) with Lorentz boosts then complete the restricted
Lorentz transformation group between reference frames. As shown explicitly by Dakic and
Brukner [43], the SO(3) transformation group uniquely identifies the fundamental proba-
bility structure of QM amid those of classical probability theory and higher-dimensional
generalized probability theories.
Figure 2. The spin angular momentum of Bob’s particle ~S projected along his measurement direction
b̂. This does not happen with spin angular momentum due to no preferred reference frame (NPRF).
If we create a preparation state oriented along the positive z axis as in Figure 1, i.e.,
|ψ〉 = |u〉, our spin angular momentum is ~S = +1ẑ (in units of h̄2 = 1). Now proceed to
make a measurement with the SG magnets oriented at b̂ making an angle β with respect to
ẑ (Figure 1). According to classical physics, we expect to measure ~S · b̂ = cos (β) (Figure 2),
but we cannot measure anything other than ±1 due to NPRF (contra the prediction by
classical physics), so we see that NPRF answers Wheeler’s “Really Big Question,” “Why
the quantum? [56,57]” in “one clear, simple sentence” to convey “the central point and its
necessity in the construction of the world.” As a consequence, we can only recover cos (β)
on average (Figure 3), i.e., NPRF dictates “average-only” projection
(+1)P(+1 | β) + (−1)P(−1 | β) = cos(β) (1)
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -560-
Entropy 2021, 23, 114 14 of 29
Solving simultaneously with P(+1 | β) + P(−1 | β) = 1, we find that













When talking about the longitudinal outcomes [58] (“click” or “no click”), we have
P(V | β) = cos2(β) (4)
and
P(H | β) = sin2(β) (5)
so that our average outcome at β (orientation of polarizer with respect to initial polarization
state) is given by
(+1)cos2(β) + (−1)sin2(β) = cos2(β)− sin2(β) (6)
This is the naively expected Malus law per classical physics for the intensity of electromag-
netic radiation transmitted through a polarizer if “pass” is +1 and “no pass” is −1 (instead
of 0). As with the transverse mode NPRF rules out “fractional outcomes,” again contra the
prediction by classical physics, so the classical result obtains only on average when β 6= 0.
This explains the ineluctably probabilistic nature of QM, as pointed out by Mermin [59]:
Quantum mechanics is, after all, the first physical theory in which probability is
explicitly not a way of dealing with ignorance of the precise values of existing
quantities.
So, we have answered Lewis’ question cited earlier, “What does the probability represent?” [30]
(p. 188). Of course, these “average-only” results due to “no fractional outcomes per NPRF”
hold precisely for the qubit Hilbert space structure of QM.
Figure 3. A spatiotemporal ensemble of 8 SG measurement trials. The blue arrows depict SG magnet orientations and the
yellow dots represent the two possible measurement outcomes for each trial, up (located at arrow tip) or down (located at
bottom of arrow). The vertical arrow can represent an initial state |ψ〉 = |u〉 in which case the other arrow represents an SG
measurement at θ = 60◦ of |ψ〉. In that case, we see that the average of the ±1 outcomes equals the projection of the initial
spin angular momentum vector ~S = +1ẑ in the measurement direction b̂, i.e., ~S · b̂ = cos (60◦) = 12 . The figure can also
depict two SG measurements of a spin triplet state showing Bob’s(Alice’s) outcomes corresponding to Alice’s(Bob’s) +1
outcomes when θ = 60◦. For the triplet state measurements, spin angular momentum is not conserved in any given trial,
because there are two different measurements being made, i.e., outcomes are in two different reference frames, but it is
conserved on average for all 8 trials (six up outcomes and two down outcomes average to cos (60◦) = 12 ). It is impossible
for spin angular momentum to be conserved explicitly in each trial since the measurement outcomes are binary (quantum)
with values of +1 (up) or −1 (down) per NPRF. The “SO(3) conservation” at work here does not assume Alice and Bob’s
measured values of spin angular momentum are mere components of some hidden angular momentum (Figure 2). That is,
the measured values of spin angular momentum are the angular momenta contributing to this “SO(3) conservation.”
We ask for the reader’s indulgence while we explicitly review how the qubit Hilbert
space structure represented by the Pauli spin matrices evidences the relationship between
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−1. All spin matrices have the same ±1 eigenvalues (measurement outcomes),
which reflects the fact that there are no fractional outcomes per NPRF. We denote the
corresponding eigenvectors (eigenstates) as |u〉 and |d〉 for spin up (+1) and spin down










, we see that σz|u〉 = |u〉, σz|d〉 = −|d〉, σx|u〉 = |d〉, σx|d〉 = |u〉, σy|u〉 = i|d〉,
and σy|d〉 = −i|u〉. If we change the orientation of a vector from right pointing (ket)
to left pointing (bra) or vice-versa, we transpose and take the complex conjugate. For









= −i〈u|. Therefore, any spin
matrix can be written as (+1)|u〉〈u|+ (−1)|d〉〈d| where |u〉 and |d〉 are their up and down
eigenstates, respectively. A qubit is then constructed from this two-level quantum system,
i.e., |ψ〉 = c1|u〉+ c2|d〉 where |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1.
An arbitrary spin measurement σ in the b̂ direction is given by the spin matrices
σ = b̂ ·~σ = bxσx + byσy + bzσz (7)
Again, preparation states |ψ〉 are created from linear combinations of the Pauli spin eigen-
states. The average outcome (all we can obtain per NPRF) for a measurement σ on state
|ψ〉 is given by
〈σ〉 := 〈ψ|σ|ψ〉 (8)
For example, in Figure 1 we have |ψ〉 = |u〉 (prepared by the first SG magnets) and
σ = sin (β)σx + cos (β)σz (per the second SG magnets), so 〈σ〉 = cos (β) in accord with
Equation (1).
Finally, the probability of obtaining a +1 or −1 result for σ is just













where |ũ〉 and |d̃〉 are the eigenvectors of σ and β2 is the angle between |ψ〉 and |ũ〉 in
Hilbert space. This agrees with the result from NPRF in Equations (2) and (3). Thus, per
Einstein’s definition of a principle theory, “we have an empirically discovered principle
that gives rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the
theoretical representations of them have to satisfy.”
Again, the Pauli spin matrices are created from the possible measurement outcomes
±1 and the outer products of their eigenstates. Thus, we see that the entire qubit state and
measurement structure is operationally self-referential (contextual) in that the preparation
states and the measurement operators are not independent. We also see how the principle
of NPRF underwrites the QM operational structure for qubits and, therefore, the QIT re-
constructions of QM built upon the qubit. In the following, we will review the SU(2)/SO(3)
transformation property for qubits via their bipartite entanglement in the Bell spin states.
3.1. The Bell Spin States
With that review of the implicit contextuality in the qubit operational formalism and
its basis in NPRF, let us explore the conservation being depicted by the Bell spin states
and relate it to the correlation function. When considering two-particle states, we will
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use the juxtaposed notation for our spin states and matrices. Thus, σxσz|ud〉 = −|dd〉 and
σxσy|ud〉 = −i|du〉, for example. Essentially, we are simply ignoring the tensor product
sign ⊗, so that (σx ⊗ σz)||u〉 ⊗ |d〉〉 = σxσz|ud〉. It is still easy to see which spin matrix is
acting on which Hilbert space vector via the juxtaposition.














in the eigenbasis of σz. The first state |ψ−〉 is called the “spin singlet state” and it represents
a total conserved spin angular momentum of zero (S = 0) for the two particles involved.
The other three states are called the “spin triplet states” and they each represent a total
conserved spin angular momentum of one (S = 1, in units of ℏ = 1). In all four cases,
the entanglement represents the conservation of spin angular momentum for the process
creating the state.
Assuming that Alice is making her spin measurement σ1 in the â direction and Bob is
making his spin measurement σ2 in the b̂ direction (Figure 4), we have
σ1 = â ·~σ = axσx + ayσy + azσz
σ2 = b̂ ·~σ = bxσx + byσy + bzσz
(12)
Per the formalism explicated above, the correlation functions are given by (again, omitting ⊗)
〈ψ−|σ1σ2|ψ−〉 = −axbx − ayby − azbz
〈ψ+|σ1σ2|ψ+〉 = axbx + ayby − azbz
〈φ−|σ1σ2|φ−〉 = −axbx + ayby + azbz
〈φ+|σ1σ2|φ+〉 = axbx − ayby + azbz
(13)
We now review the conservation being depicted by the Bell spin states, starting with the
singlet state |ψ−〉.
Figure 4. Alice and Bob making spin measurements on a pair of spin-entangled particles with their
Stern–Gerlach (SG) magnets and detectors.
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The spin singlet state is invariant under all three SU(2) transformations. For example,
|ψ−〉 → |ψ−〉 when we transform our basis per
|u〉 → cos(Θ)|u〉+ sin(Θ)|d〉
|d〉 → − sin(Θ)|u〉+ cos(Θ)|d〉
(14)
where Θ is an angle in Hilbert space (as opposed to the SG magnet angles in real space).
To see what this means in real space, we construct the corresponding spin measurement
operator using these transformed up |ũ〉 and down |d̃〉 vectors





= cos(2Θ)σz + sin(2Θ)σx (15)
Thus, the invariance of the state under this Hilbert space SU(2) transformation means we
have rotational (SO(3)) invariance for the SG measurement outcomes in the xz-plane of real
space. Specifically, |ψ−〉 tells us that when the SG magnets are aligned in the z direction
(Alice and Bob are in the same reference frame) the outcomes are always opposite ( 12 of
the time ud and 12 of the time du). Since |ψ−〉 has that same functional form under an
SU(2) transformation in Hilbert space representing an SO(3) rotation in the xz-plane per
Equations (14) and (15), the outcomes are always opposite ( 12 ud and
1
2 du) for aligned
SG magnets in the xz-plane. That is the “SO(3) conservation” associated with this SU(2)
symmetry.
Equation (15) shows us that when the angle in Hilbert space is Θ, the angle θ of the
rotated SG magnets in the xz-plane is θ = 2Θ. The physical reason for this factor of 2
between Θ in Hilbert space and θ in real space can be seen in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 5. Average View for the Spin Singlet State. Reading from left to right, as Bob rotates his SG magnets relative to
Alice’s SG magnets for her +1 outcome, the average value of his outcome varies from −1 (totally down, arrow bottom) to 0
to +1 (totally up, arrow tip). This obtains per conservation of spin angular momentum on average in accord with NPRF.
Bob can say exactly the same about Alice’s outcomes as she rotates her SG magnets relative to his SG magnets for his +1
outcome. That is, their outcomes can only satisfy conservation of spin angular momentum on average in different reference
frames, because they only measure ±1, never a fractional result. Thus, just as NPRF in SR leads to a principle explanation of





for all measurements leading to a principle explanation of Bell state entanglement.
Figure 6. Average View for the Spin Triplet States. Reading from the left, as Bob(Alice) rotates his(her) SG magnets
relative to Alice’s(Bob’s) SG magnets for her(his) +1 outcome, the average value of his(her) outcome varies from +1 (totally
up, arrow tip) to 0 to −1 (totally down, arrow bottom).
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Equation (14) is the Hilbert space SU(2) transformation that represents an SO(3)










































In addition, the SU(2) transformation that represents an SO(3) rotation about the z axis in







cos(Θ) + i sin(Θ) 0











The invariance of |ψ−〉 under all three SU(2) transformations is reasonable, since
the spin singlet state represents the conservation of a total, directionless spin angular
momentum of S = 0 and each SU(2) transformation in Hilbert space corresponds to an
element of SO(3) in real space. This explains why its correlation function is −â · b̂, as shown
in Equation (13). Now let us look at the spin triplet states.
Starting with |φ+〉, the only SU(2) transformation that takes |φ+〉 → |φ+〉 is Equation (14).
That means this state reflects rotational (SO(3)) invariance for our SG measurement out-
comes in the xz-plane. Specifically, |φ+〉 means when the SG magnets are aligned in the z
direction (measurements are being made in the same reference frame) the outcomes are
always the same ( 12 of the time uu and
1
2 of the time dd). Since |φ+〉 has that same functional
form under an SU(2) transformation in Hilbert space representing an SO(3) rotation in the
xz-plane per Equations (14) and (15), the outcomes are always the same ( 12 uu and
1
2 dd) for
aligned SG magnets in the xz-plane. That is the “SO(3) conservation” associated with this
SU(2) symmetry and it applies only for measurements made at the same angle (in the same
reference frame). Here, |φ+〉 is only invariant under Equation (14), so we can only expect
rotational invariance for our SG measurement outcomes in the xz-plane. This agrees with
Equation (13) where we see that the correlation function for arbitrarily oriented σ1 and σ2 is
axbx − ayby + azbz. Therefore, unless we restrict our measurements to the xz-plane, we do
not have the rotationally invariant correlation function â · b̂ as with to the spin singlet state.
For the state |φ−〉, we find that the only SU(2) transformation leaving it invariant
is Equation (17). Therefore, this state means we have rotational (SO(3)) invariance for
the SG measurement outcomes in the yz-plane. Given that |φ−〉 is only invariant under
Equation (17), we can only expect rotational invariance for our SG measurement outcomes
in the yz-plane. This agrees with Equation (13) where we see that the correlation function
for arbitrarily oriented σ1 and σ2 for |φ−〉 is given by −axbx + ayby + azbz. So, unless
we restrict our measurements to the yz-plane, we do not have the rotationally invariant
correlation function â · b̂ as with the spin singlet state.
Finally, |ψ+〉 is only invariant under the SU(2) tranformation of Equation (18). There-
fore, this state means we have rotational (SO(3)) invariance for our SG measurement
outcomes in the xy-plane. However, unlike the situation with |ψ−〉, we need to trans-
form |ψ+〉 to either the σx or σy eigenbasis to find the rotationally invariant outcome in
the xy-plane. Doing so we find that the outcomes are always the same ( 12 of the time
uu and 12 of the time dd) in the xy-plane [33]. This agrees with Equation (13) where we
see that the correlation function for arbitrarily oriented σ1 and σ2 for |ψ+〉 is given by
axbx + ayby − azbz. Therefore, unless we restrict our measurements to the xy-plane, we do
not have the rotationally invariant correlation function â · b̂ as with the spin singlet state.
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What does all this mean? Obviously, the SU(2) invariance of each of the spin triplet
states in Hilbert space represents the SO(3) invariant conservation of spin angular mo-
mentum S = 1 for each of the planes xz (|φ+〉), yz (|φ−〉), and xy (|ψ+〉) in real space.
Specifically, when the measurements are being made in the same reference frame (SG
magnets are aligned) anywhere in the respective symmetry plane the outcomes are always
the same ( 12 of the time uu and
1
2 of the time dd). That is, we have a planar conservation
and our experiment would determine the plane. If you want to model a conserved S = 1
for some other plane, you simply expand in the spin triplet basis.
With this understanding of the conservation principle at work for entangled qubits,
we see why the so-called “mirror quantum mechanics” of Dakic and Brukner [43] does
not make sense physically. The “mirror” solution of their reconstruction is regular, but
cannot be consistently constructed for systems of three bits. Thus, Dakic and Brukner rule
it out for mathematical reasons. We can rule it out already at the level of the two-qubit
system because its correlation functions are simply −1 times those in Equation (13). That
means the mirror singlet state has total spin angular momentum of 1 instead of zero while
the mirror triplet states have total spin angular momentum of zero instead of 1. Thus, the
entire structure of rotational invariance shown above for standard QM, which makes sense
physically, because S = 0 is directionless while S = 1 is directional, becomes nonsense
physically in “mirror quantum mechanics.”
In conclusion, we point out that the conservation at work here deals with the mea-
surement outcomes proper. Per Dakic and Brukner’s axiomatic reconstruction of quantum
theory [43], the Bell spin states represent measurement outcomes on an entangled pair of
“elementary systems,” and “An elementary system has the information carrying capacity
of at most one bit.” Thus, the measurement outcomes do not represent the observed part
of some hidden information carried by an underlying quantum system. Colloquially put,
Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes constitute all of the available information.
3.2. NPRF and the Bell State Correlation Function
We now extrapolate our understanding of the qubit Hilbert space structure that follows
from NPRF to the correlation functions for the Bell spin states of entangled qubit pairs.
Assuming only that Alice and Bob each measure +1 and −1 with equal frequency at any








where BA+ is the average of Bob’s outcomes when Alice measured +1 (denoted (+1)A)
and BA− is the average of Bob’s outcomes when Alice measured −1 (denoted (−1)A).
That is, we have partitioned the data per Alice’s equivalence relation, i.e., Alice’s +1 results
and Alice’s −1 results. Note that this correlation function is independent of the formalism
of QM, all we have assumed is that Alice and Bob each measure +1 and −1 with equal
frequency for all measurement settings per NPRF. We now analyze the situation from
Alice’s perspective.
We will explain the case of the spin triplet state, as the case of the spin singlet state
is analogous [33] (Figures 5 and 6). As with the single-particle state, classical intuition
leads us to expect the projection of the spin angular momentum vector of Alice’s particle
~SA = +1â along b̂ is ~SA · b̂ = + cos(θ) where again θ is the angle between the unit
vectors â and b̂ (Figure 4). Again, this is because the prediction from classical physics is










are possible outcomes for a measurement of
angular momentum. According to Alice, had Bob measured at her angle, i.e., oriented
his SG magnets in the same direction, he would have found the spin angular momentum
vector of his particle was ~SB = ~SA = +1â per conservation of spin angular momentum.
Since he did not measure the spin angular momentum of his particle in her reference
frame (same angle), he should have obtained a projected fraction of the length of ~SB, i.e.,
~SB · b̂ = +1â · b̂ = cos (θ) (Figure 2). But according to NPRF, Bob only ever obtains +1
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or −1 just like Alice, so he cannot measure the required fractional outcome to explicitly
conserve spin angular momentum per Alice. Therefore, as with the single-particle case,
NPRF means that Bob’s outcomes must satisfy “average-only” projection (Figures 3 and 6),
which means
BA+ = cos(θ) (20)
Given this constraint per NPRF, as with the single-particle case, we can now use NPRF
to find the joint probabilities for Alice and Bob’s outcome pairs. Looking at Table 1, the
rows and columns all sum to 12 because both Alice and Bob must observe +1 half of the
time and −1 half of the time per NPRF, which also asserts that the table is symmetric so that
P(−1,+1 | θ) = P(+1,−1 | θ). The average of Bob’s outcomes given that Alice observes a
+1 is
BA+ = 2P(+1,+1 | θ)(+1) + 2P(+1,−1 | θ)(−1) = cos(θ) (21)
using conservation per NPRF. Together with the constraints on the rows/columns
P(+1,+1 | θ) + P(+1,−1 | θ) =
1
2




we can uniquely solve for the joint probabilities



















Now we can use these to compute BA−
BA− = 2P(−1,+1 | θ)(+1) + 2P(−1,−1 | θ)(−1) = − cos(θ) (24)







(−1)A(−cos(θ)) = cos(θ) (25)
which is precisely the correlation function for a spin triplet state in its symmetry plane
found in Section 3.1.
Of course, Bob could partition the data according to his equivalence relation, i.e.,
his reference frame, so that it is Alice who must average her results, as obtained in her
reference frame, to conserve spin angular momentum. Thus, the mathematical structure is
again consistent with NPRF. In addition, this symmetry in perspectives requiring that Alice
and Bob measure ±1 with equal frequency for all settings, plus the average-only nature
of the correlations, is precisely what precludes signalling, regardless of whether Alice’s
measurement settings and outcomes are spacelike or timelike related to Bob’s.
Table 1. Joint probabilities for Alice and Bob’s outcome pairs for the entangled particle experi-




+1 P(+1,+1 | θ) P(+1,−1 | θ) 1/2
−1 P(+1,−1 | θ) P(−1,−1 | θ) 1/2
Total 1/2 1/2 1
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Finally, since it is precisely this correlation function that is responsible for the Tsirelson
bound [60–62], we see that NPRF is ultimately responsible for the Tsirelson bound. This
answers Bub’s question, “why is the world quantum and not classical, and why is it
quantum rather than superquantum, i.e., why the Tsirelson bound for quantum corre-
lations?” [53,63,64] (Figure 7). This also tells us why higher-dimensional generalized
probability theories are not realized in Nature, i.e., the conservation principle for the
fundamental two-bit system must be a qubit to accord with NPRF.
Figure 7. The “constraint” is conservation per no preferred reference frame.
4. Discussion
We have offered a principle account of EPR correlations (quantum entanglement)
and quantum contextuality by applying a generalization of the relativity principle (“no
preferred reference frame,” NPRF) to the measurement of Planck’s constant h to underwrite
the qubit Hilbert space structure with its SU(2)/SO(3) transformation properties. That
is, the qubit structure is the foundation of “Hilbert space as a projective geometry (i.e.,
the subspace structure of Hilbert space)” whence the EPR correlations. In doing so, we
see that NPRF is to Hardy and Dakic and Brukner’s reconstructions of QM, as NPRF is
to the Lorentz transformations of SR, since the postulates of SR can be stated as NPRF
applied to the measurement of the speed of light c. This answers Allori’s question cited
earlier, “Should I understand SSM’s view as a principle theory? (But if so, which are the
principles?)” [31] (p. 344).
Conservation per NPRF then accounts for no-signalling and the violations of the Bell
inequality precisely to the Tsirelson bound [32], which explains why so-called “superquan-
tum correlations” [65] and higher-dimensional generalized probability theories are not
realized in Nature. Conservation per NPRF also shows so-called “mirror quantum mechan-
ics” to be nonphysical already at the level of the two-qubit system. Thus, besides revealing
a deep unity between SR and QM (Table 2), NPRF resolves many quantum mysteries.
This certainly is not what QIT had in mind for their reconstruction project. That is,
they intended their reconstructions of QM would be to the “standard axioms of [quantum
theory]” as “Einstein’s postulates of SR are to the Lorentz transformations.” As things
stand now, there is no obvious connection between the interpretation-project of QM and
the QIT-project [66]. In this regard, keep in mind that the postulates of SR are about the
physical world in spacetime; thus, in keeping with this analogy, QIT must eventually
make such correspondence to reach their lofty goals and escape the clever, but inherent
instrumentalism of standard QM. Our principle account of QM, whereby NPRF is to the
QIT reconstructions of QM as NPRF is to the Lorentz transformations of SR, precisely
addresses the need for QIT to make correspondence with phenomena in spacetime. While
these QM reconstructions do not account for all of quantum phenomena, they certainly
cover bipartite qubit entanglement whence the mysteries of quantum entanglement and
quantum contextuality. But, most importantly, QM reconstructions built upon the qubit
Hilbert space structure explicate the essential mathematical framework for rendering QM
a principle theory via NPRF.
The general idea here is that in order to make progress in the foundations of QM and
in unifying QM and SR, we cannot merely continue to provide constructive empirically
equivalent interpretations that lead neither to new predictions, new unifying insights, nor
to underwriting QM itself. This is what we are attempting to do here. It may seem a bit
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counterintuitive that NPRF underwrites both SR and QM, since quantum entanglement has
been alleged by some to imply faster-than-light influences contra SR [67–69]. Per Popescu
and Rohrlich [65]:
Quantum mechanics, which does not allow us to transmit signals faster than
light, preserves relativistic causality. But quantum mechanics does not always
allow us to consider distant systems as separate, as Einstein assumed. The failure
of Einstein separability violates, not the letter, but the spirit of special relativity,
and left many physicists (including Bell) deeply unsettled.
Obviously QM (non-relativistic quantum mechanics) is not Lorentz invariant, so it certainly
differs from SR in that regard. QM follows from Lorentz invariant quantum field theory
only in the low energy approximation [70] (p. 173). However, claiming that SR and QM are
somehow at odds based on quantum entanglement has empirical consequences, because
we have experimental evidence verifying the violation of the Bell inequality in accord with
quantum entanglement. Thus, if the violation of the Bell inequality is problematic for SR,
then SR is being empirically challenged in some sense, hence Bell’s unease.
For example, Newtonian mechanics deviates from SR because it is not Lorentz in-
variant. Accordingly, Newtonian mechanics predicts that velocities add in a different
fashion than in SR, so imagine we found experimentally that velocities add according to
Newtonian mechanics. That would not only mean Newtonian mechanics and SR are at
odds, that would mean SR has been empirically refuted. Bell’s unease aside, clearly, few
people believe that QM has literally falsified SR. But we have gone further to show that
not only is there no tension between QM and SR in substance or spirit, NPRF provides
a completely local principle account of EPR correlations. Indeed, even the no-signalling
feature of entangled qubits follows necessarily from NPRF. Thus, far from being incompat-
ible, SR and QM share a deep coherence via NPRF (Table 2). This principle explanation
for EPR correlations requires no violation of the causal structure of SR and it does not
require the addition of a preferred frame as some non-local interpretations do, such as
Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse interpretations. Furthermore, this principle
explanation for EPR correlations requires no causal or constructive explanation whatsoever,
and that includes retrocausal mechanisms and processes. Indeed, this principle account of
QM does not even require a metaphysical commitment to the block universe.
Table 2. Comparing special relativity with quantum mechanics according to no preferred reference frame (NPRF).
Because Alice and Bob both measure the same speed of light c, regardless of their motion relative to the source per NPRF,
Alice (Bob) may claim that Bob’s (Alice’s) length and time measurements are erroneous and need to be corrected (Lorentz






, regardless of their SG magnet orientation relative to the source per NPRF, Alice (Bob) may claim that Bob’s (Alice’s)
individual ±1 values are erroneous and need to be corrected (averaged, Figures 3, 5 and 6). In both cases, NPRF resolves the
mystery it creates. In SR, the apparently inconsistent results can be reconciled via the relativity of simultaneity. That is, Alice
and Bob each partition spacetime per their own equivalence relations (per their own reference frames), so that equivalence
classes are their own surfaces of simultaneity and these partitions are equally valid per NPRF. This is completely analogous
to QM, where the apparently inconsistent results per the Bell spin states arising because of NPRF can be reconciled by NPRF
via the “relativity of data partition.” That is, Alice and Bob each partition the data per their own equivalence relations
(per their own reference frames), so that equivalence classes are their own +1 and −1 data events and these partitions are
equally valid per NPRF.
Special Relativity Quantum Mechanics






regardless of their motion relative to the source regardless of their SG orientation relative to the source
Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must correct his(her) Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must average his(her)
length and time measurements ±1 outcomes for projection/conservation
NPRF: Relativity of simultaneity NPRF: Relativity of data partition
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Despite the fact that this principle explanation supplies a unifying framework for
both QM and SR, some might demand a constructive explanation with its correspond-
ing “knowledge of how things in the world work, that is, of the mechanisms (often
hidden) that produce the phenomena we want to understand” [71] (p. 15). This is “the
causal/mechanical view of scientific explanation” per Salmon [71] (p. 15). Thus, as with
SR, not everyone will consider our principle account of QM to be explanatory since, “By
its very nature such a theory-of-principle explanation will have nothing to say about the
reality behind the phenomenon” [72] (p. 331). As Lorentz famously complained about
SR [73] (p. 230):
Einstein simply postulates what we have deduced, with some difficulty and not
altogether satisfactorily, from the fundamental equations of the electromagnetic
field.
And, Albert Michelson said [74]:
It must be admitted, these experiments are not sufficient to justify the hypothesis
of an ether. But then, how can the negative result be explained?
In other words, neither was convinced that NPRF was sufficient to explain time dilation
and Lorentz contraction. More recently Brown has made a similar claim [46] (p. 76):
What has been shown is that rods and clocks must behave in quite particular
ways in order for the two postulates to be true together. But this hardly amounts
to an explanation of such behaviour. Rather things go the other way around. It is
because rods and clocks behave as they do, in a way that is consistent with the
relativity principle, that light is measured to have the same speed in each inertial
frame.
In other words, the assumption is that the true or fundamental “explanation” of EPR
correlations must be a constructive one in the sense of adverting to causal processes or
causal mechanisms. Apparently for people with such a Reichenbachian or constructive
mind-set, any principle explanation must be accounted for by some such story, e.g., the
luminiferous ether. Indeed, contrary to all accepted physics, Brown and Pooley [46] have
recently called for such a constructive explanation even in SR. Brown and Pooley like
to make this a debate about constructive versus “geometric” explanation. They believe
that the principle explanation of Lorentz contractions in SR is underwritten only by the
geometry of Minkowski spacetime.
We think this misses the point, as one could believe that SR provides a principle
explanation of Lorentz contractions without being a realist or a substantivialist about
Minkowski spacetime. Notice, there is nothing inherently geometric about our principle
explanation of EPR correlations in particular, or of NPRF in general. We would say that
Brown and Pooley got it exactly wrong. It is QM that needs to become explicitly more like
SR, not the other way around. Indeed, as noted in Section 2, neither textbook QM nor any
of its constructive interpretations, ever made for very convincing constructive theories
anyway. If QM had struck people as being like statistical mechanics, there would be no
cottage industry of cooking up constructive interpretations and no need for anything like
QIT reconstructions. We hope to have shed some light on why QM actually works as it
does.
After Einstein published SR in 1905, physicists gradually lost interest in theories of
the luminiferous ether, preferred reference frames, or any other causal account of Lorentz
contractions and time dilation. Even Lorentz seemed to acknowledge the value of this
principle explanation when he wrote [73] (p. 230):
By doing so, [Einstein] may certainly take credit for making us see in the neg-
ative result of experiments like those of Michelson, Rayleigh, and Brace, not a
fortuitous compensation of opposing effects but the manifestation of a general
and fundamental principle.
Thus, 85 years after the publication of the EPR paper without a consensus constructive
or causal account of EPR correlations, perhaps it is time to consider the possibility that
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physicists will eventually likewise stop looking for constructive accounts of EPR correla-
tions. After all, we now know that the widely accepted relativity principle is precisely the
principle that resolves a plethora of QM mysteries. And, as Pauli once stated [75] (p. 33):
‘Understanding’ nature surely means taking a close look at its connections, being
certain of its inner workings. Such knowledge cannot be gained by understanding
an isolated phenomenon or a single group of phenomena, even if one discovers
some order in them. It comes from the recognition that a wealth of experiential
facts are interconnected and can therefore be reduced to a common principle. In that case,
certainty rests precisely on this wealth of facts. The danger of making mistakes is
the smaller, the richer and more complex the phenomena are, and the simpler is
the common principle to which they can all be brought back. ... ‘Understanding’
probably means nothing more than having whatever ideas and concepts are
needed to recognize that a great many different phenomena are part of a coherent
whole. [Italics ours.]
One could hardly ask for a “simple common principle” or “one clear, simple sentence”
more compelling than “no preferred reference frame” to convey “the central point and
its necessity in the construction of the world.” Perhaps causal accounts of quantum
entanglement and quantum contextuality are destined to share the same fate as theories
of the luminiferous ether. Perhaps this principle account will finally cause us to let go of
the Reichenbachian past, and go back to the future with Einstein’s insights about principle
explanation.
Postscript
We understand how deep the causal and dynamical explanatory bias goes and thus
we know that people will feel like we’ve dodged something important by not saying
more about our ontology/beables and more about what the role of the wavefunction is
on our account. That is, our answer to the challenge to causality by the EPR correlations
resides in the probability structure of QM alone, “the kinematic part of QM” per Bub [55],
so we have not offered anything concerning QM dynamics. And of course when people
demand to know your “ontology,” they mean that in the constructive, causal and dynamical
sense of the word. Part of the causal and dynamical bias, the very reason many people
think constructive explanation must be fundamental, is because they assume the world is
composed of or otherwise determined by such beables. That is, they want to know what
the world is made of or what matter is. Herein, we will briefly provide our answers to
those questions by explaining how our principle account of QM is a realist, psi-epistemic
account. Let us note however that one need not share all our commitments herein to find
our preceding principle account compelling.
Let us begin with the psi-epistemic part. Explaining what this means for us requires
going beyond the scope of this paper, as the question of Schrödinger dynamics differs from
the question of the probability structure of QM [8,22]. If one constructs the differential
equation (Schrödinger equation) corresponding to the Feynman path integral, the time-
dependent foliation of spacetime gives the wavefunction ψ(x, t) in concert with our time-
evolved perceptions and the fact that we do not know when the outcome is going to occur.
Once one has an outcome, both the configuration xo, that is the specific spatial locations
of the experimental outcomes, and time to of the outcomes are fixed, so the wavefunction
ψ(x, t) of configuration space becomes a probability amplitude ψ(xo, to) in spacetime, i.e.,
a probability amplitude for a specific outcome in spacetime. Again, the evolution of the
wavefunction in configuration space before it becomes a probability amplitude in spacetime
is governed by the Schrödinger equation.
However, the abrupt change from wavefunction in configuration space to probabil-
ity amplitude in spacetime is not governed by the Schrödinger equation. In fact, if the
Schrödinger equation is universally valid, it would simply say that the process of measure-
ment should entangle the measurement device with the particle being measured, leaving
them both to evolve according to the Schrödinger equation in a more complex configuration
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space (as in the relative-states formalism shown below). Certain interpretations of QM
notwithstanding, we do not seem to experience such entangled existence in configuration
space, which would contain all possible experimental outcomes. Instead, we experience a
single experimental outcome in spacetime.
This contradiction between theory and experience is called the “measurement prob-
lem.” However, the time-evolved story in configuration space is not an issue with the path
integral formalism as we interpret it, because we compute ψ(xo, to) directly. That is, in ask-
ing about a specific outcome we must specify the future boundary conditions that already
contain definite and unique outcomes. Thus, the measurement problem is a non-starter for
us. When a QM interpretation assumes the wavefunction is an epistemological tool rather
than an ontological entity, that interpretation is called “psi-epistemic.” In our path integral,
contextuality-based account the wavefunction in configuration space is not even used,
so our account is trivially psi-epistemic. Thus, our account of the wavefunction is very
much like Rovelli’s as we described it earlier in the paper. Our view is a complete rejection
of Hilbert space realism and the like. In short, we would say that the operational recipe
of textbook Hamiltonian-based QM with its Schrödinger dynamics, is from the ant’s-eye
perspective, the very best one could do given that the primary goal is prediction of the
temporal evolution of the QM state, regardless of its ultimate ontic status.
This covers the psi-epistemic part of our view, but what about the realist part? Of
course, again, this begs the question of what is required for a realist account of QM.
Let us begin with the obvious. Unless one is begging the question, there is nothing
inherently anti-realist or subjectivist about principle explanation. After all, NPRF generally,
and “average-only” conservation specifically, are real, mind-independent and perspective-
independent facts about spacetime. Indeed, by this measure, our principle explanation for
EPR correlations and the like, is much more realist than the retrocausal perspectival causal
explanations and also more realist than most of the psi-epistemic accounts on offer. This
bears repeating. What is doing the explanatory work on our principle account of QM, just
as with SR, are mind and perspective-independent facts about the world.
Again, one might nonetheless feel that our account fails to be realist because it does
not provide a specific constructive ontology, such as particles, fields or waves. The first
thing to note here is that the whole point of principle explanation is that it is compatible
with any number of such ontologies, and that it is not incumbent upon the purveyor of
such explanations to provide a constructive ontology, because such an ontology is not
relevant to the explanation at hand. Indeed, as we have pointed out on numerous occa-
sions, our principle explanation of EPR correlations is even compatible with unmediated
exchanges/direct action between source and detector, i.e., the idea that there are no world-
lines of counterfactual definiteness that connect the source and the detector. But we get it,
many people will feel that something is missing if we cannot say exactly, in constructive
terms, what goes on between source and detector. From their perspective, so far, the only
thing we have told you is that the wavefunction and Hilbert space are not real, but not,
what is “real.” Is it particles, fields, waves in spacetime, or something else?
This is not an easy question to answer for many reasons. First, as is well known, the
standard definitions that provide the essence of “particles,” “waves” and “fields” are all
violated by one or another weirdness of QM, e.g., that particles are strictly point like, that
fields are a fully continuous and contiguous medium with all definite values at every point
in spacetime for which counterfactual definiteness obtains, and that waves (in spacetime at
least) must be fully and always wave-like in their behavior and be instantiated in some
material or energetic medium. Second, if contextuality is a fundamental fact about the
world as seems to be the case based on experimental evidence and several theorems, as
we noted earlier, this calls into question the very idea of classical objects composed of or
realized by autonomous self-existent QM entities with definite, intrinsic properties, and
what Einstein called “primitive thisness,” or what is sometimes called haecceity.
In accord with Rovelli’s relational QM, our conjecture, given all of the above, is that the
search for such a fundamental context-free ontology is misguided. Indeed, both relational
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QM and our view are inspired by the lessons of SR, that certain facts, entities and quantities
are reference frame dependent, and we also attempt to apply that idea to QM. There are
certainly other similarities as well, e.g., the idea that QM is complete, the psi-epistemic
take, the focus on information, and the invocation of contextuality. However, in order to
explain the EPR correlations, relational QM merely defers to the entangled qubit Hilbert
space structure, while QIT note that the mystery is, “Why the qubit structure? Why not
classical bits? Or, generalized higher-dimensional bits? The no-signalling requirement
does not suffice to rule them out.” And, that answer is not to be found in the conservation
represented by the Bell spin states when the measurements are made in the same reference
frame (SG magnets are at the same angle). Those perfect correlations are easily replicated
by assuming “hidden, definite values.” The answer resides in the conservation represented
by the Bell spin states when the measurements are made in different reference frames (SG
magnets are at different angles). It is there that one finds “average-only” conservation per
NPRF due to “average-only” projection per NPRF, as explained in Section 3. By taking
seriously NPRF and not just relationalism, we have underwritten QM and explained its
informational structure without giving up The Absoluteness of Observed Events, as is
entailed by relational QM in certain cases. NPRF and The Absoluteness of Observed Events
is the very heart of SR, and the very basis for its relationalism. Our diagnosis is that
Rovelli drops this insight because unlike explanation in SR, he has not fully transcended
the dynamical and causal explanatory bias.
As for fundamental ontology, we would say that multiscale contextuality itself is
fundamental, and sometimes, depending on various contextual features, reality (whatever
its ultimate metaphysical nature), behaves in a particle-like, field-like or wave-like fashion.
We think the twin-slit experiment alone is sufficient to see how this might be so. While all
this is beyond the scope of our paper, in our view, environmental decoherence, so called QM
non-separability, so called QM holism, so called QM relationalism, QM dispositionalism,
etc., are really just symptomatic of the fundamentality of multiscale contextuality. And
furthermore, while the contextuality in question is often manifested in dynamical and
causal interactions, the deeper contextuality that explains and underwrites certain aspects
of those interactions is sometimes non-causal, non-dynamical and spatiotemporal–what
we call adynamical global constraints. For example, as we demonstrated herein, the kind
of contextuality we see in the case of EPR correlations is a consequence of NPRF. We see
nothing inherently anti-realist about this view, as again, conservation laws and multiscale
contextuality are real mind and perspective-independent facts about the world. What QM
and relativity are really telling us is that to exist, i.e., to be a diachronic entity in space
and time, is to interact with the rest of the universe creating a consistent, shared set of
classical information constituting the universe [8,34]. Again, this is another way in which
our view is a fully realist one, given that NPRF is at the core of our account of the physical
world [8,34], as with SR itself, The Absoluteness of Observed Events can never be violated
on our view.
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Abstract
Many in quantum foundations seek a principle explanation of Bell state
entanglement. While reconstructions of quantum mechanics (QM) have
been produced, the community does not find them compelling. Herein
we offer a principle explanation for Bell state entanglement, i.e., conser-
vation per no preferred reference frame (NPRF), such that NPRF unifies
Bell state entanglement with length contraction and time dilation from
special relativity (SR). What makes this a principle explanation is that
it’s grounded directly in phenomenology, it is an adynamical and acausal
explanation that involves adynamical global constraints as opposed to dy-
namical laws or causal mechanisms, and it’s unifying with respect to QM
and SR.
1 Introduction
Many physicists in quantum information theory (QIT) are calling for “clear
physical principles” [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016] to account for quantum mechan-
ics (QM). As [Hardy, 2016] points out, “The standard axioms of [quantum the-
ory] are rather ad hoc. Where does this structure come from?” Fuchs and
Hardy point to the postulates of special relativity (SR) as an example of what
QIT seeks for QM [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016, Hardy, 2016] and SR is a principle
theory [Felline, 2011]. That is, the postulates of SR are constraints offered with-
out a corresponding constructive explanation. In what follows, [Einstein, 1919]
explains the difference between the two:
We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of
them are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the
more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple
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formal scheme from which they start out. [The kinetic theory of
gases is an example.] ...
Along with this most important class of theories there exists a
second, which I will call “principle-theories.” These employ the
analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form
their basis and starting point are not hypothetically constructed
but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural
processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated
criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representa-
tions of them have to satisfy. [Thermodynamics is an example.] ...
The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adapt-
ability, and clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfec-
tion and security of the foundations. The theory of relativity belongs
to the latter class.
It is worth noting the irony that in the past two decades, just as some
have sought a principle explanation of QM, others have sought a constructive
explanation of SR [Brown, 2005, Brown and Pooley, 2006]. While we cannot
go into detail on such matters, we note that reasons for seeking a principle
explanation of QM include not just the ad hoc nature of the postulates, but the
fact that there is no agreement on “constructive interpretations,” in part because
they do nothing but recover what is already in textbook QM, and therefore lead
to no new physics or unification. Indeed, non-local interpretations of QM only
make unification with SR more problematic.
For those who believe the fundamental explanation for QM phenomena
must be constructive, at least in the sense envisioned by Einstein above,
none of the mainstream interpretations neatly fit the bill. Not only do most
interpretations entail some form of QM holism, contextuality, and/or non-
locality, the remainder invoke priority monism and/or multiple branches or
outcomes. The problem with attempting a constructive account of QM is, as
articulated by [Van Camp, 2011], “Constructive interpretations are attempted,
but they are not unequivocally constructive in any traditional sense.” Thus,
[Van Camp, 2011] states:
The interpretive work that must be done is less in coming up with a
constructive theory and thereby explaining puzzling quantum phe-
nomena, but more in explaining why the interpretation counts as
explanatory at all given that it must sacrifice some key aspect of the
traditional understanding of causal-mechanical explanation.
It seems clear all of this would be anathema to Einstein and odious with respect
to constructive explanation, especially if say, the kinetic theory of gases is the
paradigm example of constructive explanation. Thus, for many it seems wise to
at least attempt a principle explanation of QM, as sought by QIT. The problem
with QIT’s attempts is noted by [Van Camp, 2011]:
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However, nothing additional has been shown to be incorporated into
an information-theoretic reformulation of QM beyond what is con-
tained in QM itself. It is hard to see how it could offer more uni-
fication of the phenomena than QM already does since they are
equivalent, and so it is not offering any explanatory value on this
front.
Nonetheless, QIT continues to seek “the reconstruction of quantum theory”
via a constraint-based/principle approach [Chiribella and Spekkens, 2016]. In-
deed, QIT has produced several different sets of axioms, postulates, and “phys-
ical requirements” in terms of quantum information, which all reproduce quan-
tum theory. Along those lines, [Bub, 2004, Bub, 2012, Bub, 2016] has asked,
“why is the world quantum and not classical, and why is it quantum rather
than superquantum, i.e., why the Tsirelson bound for quantum correlations?”
Despite all the success of QIT, the community does not find any of the re-
constructions compelling. [Cuffaro, 2017], for example, argues that information
causality needs to be justified in some physical sense. And, as Hardy states,
“When I started on this, what I wanted to see was two or so obvious, com-
pelling axioms that would give you quantum theory and which no one would
argue with” [Ball, 2017]. Fuchs quotes Wheeler, “If one really understood the
central point and its necessity in the construction of the world, one ought to
state it in one clear, simple sentence” [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016, p. 302]. Asked
if he had such a sentence, Fuchs responded, “No, that’s my big failure at this
point” [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016, p. 302]. As we will show, the same principle
responsible for the kinematic structure of SR is also responsible for the qubit
Hilbert space structure at the foundation of Hardy’s and Dakic & Brukner’s
reconstructions of quantum theory [Hardy, 2016, Dakic and Brukner, 2009],
which uniquely produces the Tsirelson bound [Cirel’son, 1980, Landau, 1987,
Khalfin and Tsirelson, 1992], viz., “no preferred reference frame” (NPRF, aka
the relativity principle) (Figure 1). That is, NPRF applied to the measurement
of the speed of light c gives the light postulate and leads to the geometry of
Minkowski spacetime whence the Lorentz transformations of SR, while NPRF
applied to the measurement of Planck’s constant h gives “average-only” projec-
tion and leads to the qubit Hilbert space structure whence the QIT reconstruc-
tions of QM.
The term “reference frame” has many meanings in physics related to micro-
scopic and macroscopic phenomena, Galilean versus Lorentz transformations,
relatively moving observers, etc. The difference between Galilean and Lorentz
transformations resides in the fact that the speed of light is finite, so NPRF
entails the light postulate of SR [Serway and Jewett, 2019, Knight, 2008], i.e.,
that everyone measure the same speed of light c, regardless of their motion rel-
ative to the source. If there was only one reference frame for a source in which
the speed of light equaled the prediction from Maxwell’s equations (c = 1√
µoǫo
),
then that would certainly constitute a preferred reference frame. Essentially,
Einstein merely extended the relativity principle from mechanics to electromag-
netism. Herein, we further extend NPRF to include the measurement of another
3
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Figure 1: Answer to Bub’s question, “Why the Tsirelson bound?” The
“constraint” is conservation per no preferred reference frame.
fundamental constant of nature, Planck’s constant h (= 2πh̄).
As Steven Weinberg points out, measuring an electron’s spin via Stern-
Gerlach (SG) magnets constitutes the measurement of “a universal constant
of nature, Planck’s constant” [Weinberg, 2017] (Figure 2). So if NPRF applies
equally here, everyone must measure the same value for Planck’s constant h
regardless of their SG magnet orientations relative to the source, which like the
light postulate is an “empirical discovered” fact. By “relative to the source” of
a pair of spin-entangled particles, we might mean relative “to the vertical in the
plane perpendicular to the line of flight of the particles” [Mermin, 1981, p. 943]
(ẑ in Figure 3, for example). Here the possible spin outcomes ± h̄
2
represent a
fundamental (indivisible) unit of information per Dakic and Brukner’s first ax-
iom in their reconstruction of quantum theory, “An elementary system has the
information carrying capacity of at most one bit” [Dakic and Brukner, 2009].
Thus, different SG magnet orientations relative to the source constitute differ-
ent “reference frames” in QM just as different velocities relative to the source
constitute different “reference frames” in SR. Borrowing from [Einstein, 1936],
NPRF might be stated:
No one’s “sense experiences,” to include measurement outcomes, can
provide a privileged perspective on the “real external world.”
This is consistent with the notion of symmetries per [Hicks, 2019]:
There are not two worlds in one of which I am here and in the other
I am three feet to the left, with everything else similarly shifted.
Instead, there is just this world and two mathematical descriptions of
it. The fact that those descriptions put the origin at different places
does not indicate any difference between the worlds, as the origin
in our mathematical description did not correspond to anything in
the world anyway. The symmetries tell us what structure the world
does not have.
4
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Figure 2: A Stern-Gerlach (SG) spin measurement showing the two possible out-
comes, up (+ h̄
2
) and down (− h̄
2
) or +1 and −1, for short. The important point
to note here is that the classical analysis predicts all possible deflections, not just
the two that are observed. The difference between the classical prediction and
the quantum reality uniquely distinguishes the quantum joint distribution from
the classical joint distribution for the Bell spin states [Garg and Mermin, 1982].
That is, there is just one “real external world” harboring many, but always equal
perspectives as far as the physics is concerned [Silberstein and Stuckey, 2020].
We have shown elsewhere that the quantum correlations and quantum states
corresponding to the Bell states, which uniquely produce the Tsirelson bound
for the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) quantity, can be derived from
conservation per NPRF [Stuckey et al., 2019]. Thus, Bell state entanglement is
ultimately grounded in NPRF just as SR [Stuckey et al., 2020]. As summarized
in Figure 1, the quantum correlations responsible for the Tsirelson bound satisfy
conservation per NPRF while both classical and superquantum correlations can
violate this constraint. Therefore a principle explanation of Bell state entangle-
ment and the Tsirelson bound that be stated in “one clear, simple sentence” is
“conservation per no preferred reference frame” (Figure 1).
What qualifies as a principle explanation versus constructive turns out to be
a fraught and nuanced question [Felline, 2011] and we do not want to be side-
tracked on that issue as such. Let us therefore state explicitly that what makes
our explanation a principle one is that it is grounded directly in phenomenology,
it is an adynamical and acausal explanation that involves adynamical global con-
straints as opposed to dynamical laws or causal mechanisms, and it is unifying
with respect to QM and SR.
Let us also note that while contrary to certain others [Brown, 2005,
Brown and Pooley, 2006, Norton, 2008, Menon, 2019], we are arguing that con-
servation per NPRF need not ever be discharged by a constructive explanation
or interpretation. This is at least partially distinct from the question in SR
5
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Figure 3: In this set up, the first SG magnets (oriented at ẑ) are being used to
produce an initial state |ψ〉 = |u〉 for measurement by the second SG magnets
(oriented at b̂).
for example, of whether facts about physical geometry are grounded in facts
about dynamical fields or vice-versa. Furthermore, this principle explanation
is consistent with any number of “constructive interpretations” of QM. For ex-
ample, this principle explanation avoids the complaints about Bub’s proposed
principle explanation of QM leveled by [Felline, 2018]. That is, the principle
being posited herein does not require a solution to the measurement problem
nor again does it necessarily beg for a constructive counterpart.
In Section 2 we provide a quick review of length contraction, time dila-
tion, the relativity of simultaneity, and Lorentz transformations per SR. In
Section 3 we review how the qubit Hilbert space structure follows from NPRF
[Silberstein et al., 2021] and how that leads to conservation per NPRF respon-
sible for Bell state entanglement [Stuckey et al., 2020] whence the Tsirelson
bound [Stuckey et al., 2019]. In Section 4 we argue that principle explana-
tion for these mysteries suffices despite the fact that there is no constructive
counterpart.
2 NPRF and Special Relativity
Suppose there are three women moving together at 0.6c with respect to two
men. The men and women agree on the details of the following four Events
(men’s coordinates are lower case and women’s coordinates are upper case):
• Event 1: Joe meets Sara at X1 = x1 = 0, T1 = t1 = 0.
• Event 2: Bob meets Kim at X2 = 1250km, T2 = −0.0025s, x2 = 1000km,
t2 = 0.
• Event 3: Bob meets Alice at X3 = 800km, T3 = 0, x3 = 1000km, t3 =
0.002s.
6
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Figure 4: Events 1 and 2 are simultaneous for the men and are spaced at a
distance of 1000km. The women say the distance between Sara and Kim is
1250km. Thus, the men say the women’s meter sticks are short.
• Event 4: Bob meets Sara at X4 = 0, T4 = 0.0044s, x4 = 1000km, t4 =
0.0055s.
The lower-case and upper-case coordinates for each Event are related by Lorentz
transformations with γ = 1.25. Here is the story according to the men.
The women are moving in the positive x direction at 0.6c. Events 1 and
2 are simultaneous (t1 = t2 = 0), so the distance between Sara and Kim is
x2 = 1000km. The women say the distance between Sara and Kim is X2 =
1250km, so their proper distance has been length contracted by γ (Figure 4).
Event 4 happens t4 = 0.0055s after Events 1 and 2, but Sara’s clock has only
ticked off T4 = 0.0044s, so her proper time has been dilated by a factor of γ
(Figure 5). Therefore, the men say the women’s meter sticks are short (length
contraction) and the women’s clocks are running slow (time dilation). Here is
the story according to the women.
The men are moving in the negative X direction at 0.6c. Events 1 and 3 are
simultaneous (T1 = T3 = 0), not Events 1 and 2 as the men claim (relativity
of simultaneity). Thus, the distance between Joe and Bob is X3 = 800km, not
x3 = 1000km as the men claim (Figure 6). Again, the proper distance has been
length contracted by γ. Event 3 happens 0.0025s after Event 2, but Bob’s clock
has only ticked off t3 = 0.002s, so his proper time has been dilated by a factor
of γ (Figure 6). Therefore, the women say the men’s meter sticks are short and
the men’s clocks are running slow.
In summary, NPRF gives the postulates of SR whence the Lorentz trans-
formations, time dilation, length contraction, and the relativity of simultaneity.
Since Alice and Bob always measure the same speed of light c regardless of their
relative motion per NPRF, Alice says Bob’s temporal and spatial measurements
need to be corrected per time dilation and length contraction while Bob says
7
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Figure 5: According to the men, Event 4 happens t4 = 0.0055s after Events 1
and 2, but Sara’s clock has only ticked off T4 = 0.0044s. Thus, the men say the
women’s clocks are running slow.
Figure 6: According to the women, Events 1 and 3 are simultaneous not Events
1 and 2 as the men claim (relativity of simultaneity). Thus, the distance between
Joe and Bob is X3 = 800km, not x3 = 1000km as the men claim, i.e., the women
say the men’s meter sticks are short. Also, Event 3 happens 0.0025s after Event
2, but Bob’s clock has only ticked off t3 = 0.002s, so the women say the men’s
clocks are running slow.
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the same thing about Alice’s measurements. But, if NPRF is true and funda-
mental, then neither need to be corrected (relativity of simultaneity). Thus,
the mysteries of length contraction and time dilation in SR ultimately reside
in NPRF starting with the fact that everyone measures the same value for the
fundamental constant c. Now let us relate this mystery to the mystery of Bell
state entanglement in QM.
3 NPRF and Quantum Mechanics
3.1 “Average-Only” Projection per NPRF
While we will refer explicitly to SG spin measurements, this can be under-
stood to represent any measurement with a binary outcome in the symmetry
plane. The other possible outcome is normal to the symmetry plane, as in
“V ” (+1) or “H” (−1) outcomes with photons and polarizers, where one has
“intensity of the transmitted beam” rather than “projection of the transmit-
ted vector” [Stuckey et al., 2019]. In either case, the outcome represents the
invariant measure of the fundamental unit of action h with respect to the SO(3)
transformations between QM reference frames, as in all quantum exchanges
[Silberstein and Stuckey, 2020]. SO(3) with Lorentz boosts then complete the
restricted Lorentz transformation group between reference frames. As shown
explicitly by Dakic & Brukner [Dakic and Brukner, 2009], the SO(3) transfor-
mation group uniquely identifies the fundamental probability structure of QM
amid those of classical probability theory and higher-dimensional generalized
probability theories [Silberstein et al., 2021].
If we create a preparation state oriented along the positive z axis as in Figure
3, i.e., |ψ〉 = |u〉, our spin angular momentum is ~S = +1ẑ (in units of h̄
2
= 1).
Now proceed to make a measurement with the SG magnets oriented at b̂ making
an angle β with respect to ẑ (Figure 3). According to classical physics, we expect
to measure ~S · b̂ = cos (β) (Figure 7), but we cannot measure anything other
than ±1 due to NPRF (contra the prediction by classical physics), so we see
that NPRF answers Wheeler’s “Really Big Question,” “Why the quantum?”
[Wheeler, 1986, Barrow et al., 2004] in “one clear, simple sentence” to convey
“the central point and its necessity in the construction of the world.” As a
consequence, we can only recover cos (β) on average (Figure 8), i.e., NPRF
dictates “average-only” projection
(+1)P (+1 | β) + (−1)P (−1 | β) = cos(β) (1)
Solving simultaneously with P (+1 | β) + P (−1 | β) = 1, we find that
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Figure 7: The spin angular momentum of Bob’s particle ~S projected along his
measurement direction b̂. This does not happen with spin angular momentum
due to NPRF.
When talking about the longitudinal outcomes [Dehlinger and Mitchell, 2002]
(“click” or “no click”), we have
P (V | β) = cos2 (β) (4)
and
P (H | β) = sin2 (β) (5)
so that our average outcome at β (orientation of polarizer with respect to initial
polarization state) is given by
(+1) cos2 (β) + (−1) sin2 (β) = cos2 (β)− sin2 (β) (6)
This is the naively expected Malus law per classical physics for the intensity
of electromagnetic radiation transmitted through a polarizer if “pass” is +1
and “no pass” is −1 (instead of 0). As with the transverse mode NPRF rules
out “fractional outcomes,” again contra the prediction by classical physics, so
the classical result obtains only on average when β 6= 0. This explains the in-
eluctably probabilistic nature of QM, as pointed out by Mermin [Mermin, 2019,
p. 10]:
Quantum mechanics is, after all, the first physical theory in which
probability is explicitly not a way of dealing with ignorance of the
precise values of existing quantities.
Of course, these “average-only” results due to “no fractional outcomes per
NPRF” hold precisely for the qubit Hilbert space structure of QM.
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Figure 8: An ensemble of 4 SG measurement trials for β = 60◦ in Figure 3.
The tilted blue arrow depicts an SG measurement orientation and the vertical
arrow represents our preparation state |ψ〉 = |u〉. The yellow dots represent the
two possible measurement outcomes for each trial, up (located at arrow tip) or
down (located at bottom of arrow). The expected projection result of cos (β)
cannot be realized because the measurement outcomes are binary (quantum)
with values of +1 (up) or −1 (down) per NPRF. Thus, we have “average-only”
projection for all 4 trials (three up outcomes and one down outcome average to
cos (60◦) = 1
2
). That is, the average of the ±1 outcomes equals the projection
of the initial spin angular momentum vector ~S = +1ẑ in the measurement
direction b̂, i.e., ~S · b̂ = cos (60◦) = 1
2
.
Let’s explicitly review the qubit Hilbert space structure represented by the



















−1. All spin matrices have the same ±1 eigenvalues (measure-
ment outcomes), which reflects the fact that there are no fractional outcomes
per NPRF. We denote the corresponding eigenvectors (eigenstates) as |u〉 and
|d〉 for spin up (+1) and spin down (−1), respectively. Using the Pauli spin










, we see that σz|u〉 = |u〉,
σz|d〉 = −|d〉, σx|u〉 = |d〉, σx|d〉 = |u〉, σy|u〉 = i|d〉, and σy|d〉 = −i|u〉. If
we change the orientation of a vector from right pointing (ket) to left pointing
(bra) or vice-versa, we transpose and take the complex conjugate. For example,









= −i〈u|. Therefore, any spin matrix
can be written as (+1)|u〉〈u| + (−1)|d〉〈d| where |u〉 and |d〉 are their up and
down eigenstates, respectively. A qubit is then constructed from this two-level
quantum system, i.e., |ψ〉 = c1|u〉+ c2|d〉 where |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1.
An arbitrary spin measurement σ in the b̂ direction is given by the spin
matrices
σ = b̂ · ~σ = bxσx + byσy + bzσz (7)
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Again, preparation states |ψ〉 are created from linear combinations of the Pauli
spin eigenstates. The average outcome (all we can obtain per NPRF) for a
measurement σ on state |ψ〉 is given by
〈σ〉 := 〈ψ|σ|ψ〉 (8)
For example, in Figure 3 we have |ψ〉 = |u〉 (prepared by the first SG magnets)
and σ = sin (β)σx + cos (β)σz (per the second SG magnets), so 〈σ〉 = cos (β) in
accord with Eq. (1).
Finally, the probability of obtaining a +1 or −1 result for σ is just













where |ũ〉 and |d̃〉 are the eigenvectors of σ and β
2
is the angle between |ψ〉 and
|ũ〉 in Hilbert space. This agrees with the result from NPRF in Eqs. (2) &
(3). Thus, we see how the principle of NPRF underwrites the QM operational
structure for qubits and, therefore, the QIT reconstructions of QM built upon
the qubit. In the following, we briefly review the SU(2)/SO(3) transformation
property for qubits via their bipartite entanglement in the Bell spin states and
show how this Hilbert space structure also follows from NPRF.
3.2 “Average-Only” Conservation per NPRF
When considering two-particle states, we will use the juxtaposed notation for
our spin states and matrices. Thus, σxσz|ud〉 = −|dd〉 and σxσy|ud〉 = −i|du〉,
for example. Essentially, we are simply ignoring the tensor product sign ⊗, so
that (σx ⊗ σz) ||u〉 ⊗ |d〉〉 = σxσz|ud〉. It is still easy to see which spin matrix is
acting on which Hilbert space vector via the juxtaposition. The Bell states are
|ψ
−













in the eigenbasis of σz. The first state |ψ−〉 is called the “spin singlet state”
and it represents a total conserved spin angular momentum of zero (S = 0) for
the two particles involved. The other three states are called the “spin triplet
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states” and they each represent a total conserved spin angular momentum of one
(S = 1, in units of h̄ = 1 for spin- 1
2
particles). In all four cases, the entanglement
represents the conservation of spin angular momentum for the process creating
the state.
If Alice is making her spin measurement σ1 in the â direction and Bob is
making his spin measurement σ2 in the b̂ direction (Figure 9), we have
σ1 = â · ~σ = axσx + ayσy + azσz
σ2 = b̂ · ~σ = bxσx + byσy + bzσz (12)
The correlation functions are given by [Stuckey et al., 2020]
〈ψ
−
|σ1σ2|ψ−〉 = −axbx − ayby − azbz
〈ψ+|σ1σ2|ψ+〉 = axbx + ayby − azbz
〈φ
−
|σ1σ2|φ−〉 = −axbx + ayby + azbz
〈φ+|σ1σ2|φ+〉 = axbx − ayby + azbz
(13)
The spin singlet state is invariant under all three SU(2) transformations




du) for SG magnets at any
â = b̂ (Figure 9) and a correlation function of − cos(θ) in any plane of physical
space, where θ is the angle between â and b̂ (Eq. (13)). We see that the
conserved spin angular momentum (S = 0), being directionless, is conserved in
any plane of physical space. Again, â = b̂ means Alice and Bob are in the same
reference frame.
The invariance of each of the spin triplet states under its respective SU(2)
transformation in Hilbert space represents the SO(3) invariant conservation of
spin angular momentum S = 1 for each of the planes xz (|φ+〉), yz (|φ−〉),
and xy (|ψ+〉) in physical space. Specifically, when the SG magnets are aligned
(the measurements are being made in the same reference frame) anywhere in





dd). It is a planar conservation and our experiment would determine which
plane. If you want to model a conserved S = 1 for some other plane, you
simply create a superposition, i.e., expand in the spin triplet basis. And in
that plane, you’re right back to the mystery of Bell state entanglement per
conserved spin angular momentum via a correlation function of cos(θ), as with
any of the spin triplet states (Eq. (13)). We will now explain how the spin singlet
state correlation function follows from NPRF (the spin triplet state correlation
function is analogous).
That we have opposite outcomes when Alice and Bob are in the same ref-
erence frame is not difficult to understand via conservation of spin angular mo-
mentum, because Alice and Bob’s measured values of spin angular momentum
cancel directly when â = b̂ (Figure 9). But, when Bob’s SG magnets are rotated
by θ relative to Alice’s SG magnets, we need to clarify the situation.
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Figure 9: Alice and Bob making spin measurements on a pair of spin-entangled
particles with their Stern-Gerlach (SG) magnets and detectors in the xz-plane.
Here Alice and Bob’s SG magnets are not aligned so these measurements rep-
resent different reference frames. Since their outcomes satisfy NPRF in all
reference frames and satisfy explicit conservation of spin angular momentum
in the same reference frame, they can only satisfy conservation of spin angular
momentum on average in different reference frames.
14
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We have two subsets of data, Alice’s set (with SG magnets at angle α) and
Bob’s set (with SG magnets at angle β). They were collected in N pairs (data
events) with Bob’s(Alice’s) SG magnets at α− β = θ relative to Alice’s(Bob’s).
We want to compute the correlation function for these N data events which is
〈α, β〉 =
(+1)A(−1)B + (+1)A(+1)B + (−1)A(−1)B + ...
N
(14)
Now partition the numerator into two equal subsets per Alice’s equivalence











BA+ is the sum of all of Bob’s results (event labels) corresponding
to Alice’s +1 result (event label) and
∑
BA- is the sum of all of Bob’s results









with the overline denoting average. Eq. (16) is independent of the formalism of
QM, all we have assumed is that Alice and Bob each measure +1 and −1 with
equal frequency for all measurement settings per NPRF. Notice that to under-
stand the quantum correlation responsible for Bell state entanglement, we need
to understand the origins of BA+ and BA− for the Bell states. We now show
what that is for the spin singlet state (the spin triplet states are analogous in
their respective symmetry planes [Stuckey et al., 2020, Silberstein et al., 2021]).
In classical physics, one would say the projection of the spin angular momen-
tum vector of Alice’s particle ~SA = +1â along b̂ is ~SA · b̂ = +cos(θ) where again
θ is the angle between the unit vectors â and b̂. That’s because the prediction











outcomes for a spin angular momentum measurement (Figure 2). From Alice’s
perspective, had Bob measured at the same angle, i.e., β = α, he would have
found the spin angular momentum vector of his particle was ~SB = −~SA = −1â,
so that ~SA + ~SB = ~STotal = 0. Since he did not measure the spin angular
momentum of his particle at the same angle, he should have obtained a fraction
of the length of ~SB , i.e., ~SB · b̂ = −1â · b̂ = − cos(θ) (Figure 10). But according
to NPRF, Bob only ever obtains +1 or −1 just like Alice, so he cannot measure
the required fractional outcome to explicitly conserve spin angular momentum
per Alice. Therefore, as with the single-particle case, NPRF means that Bob’s
outcomes must satisfy “average-only” projection (Figure 11), which means
BA+ = −cos (θ) (17)
Given this constraint per NPRF, as with the single-particle case, we can
now use NPRF to find the joint probabilities for Alice and Bob’s outcome pairs.
Looking at Table 1, the rows and columns all sum to 1
2
because both Alice and
Bob must observe +1 half of the time and −1 half of the time per NPRF, which
15









Figure 10: The spin angular momentum of Bob’s particle ~SB = −~SA projected





+1 P (+1,+1 | θ) P (+1,−1 | θ) 1/2
−1 P (+1,−1 | θ) P (−1,−1 | θ) 1/2
Total 1/2 1/2 1
Table 1: Joint probabilities for Alice and Bob’s outcome pairs for the
entangled particle experiment in Figure 9. The table is symmetric due
to NPRF.
also asserts that the table is symmetric so that P (−1,+1 | θ) = P (+1,−1 | θ).
The average of Bob’s outcomes given that Alice observes a +1 is
BA+ = 2P (+1,+1 | θ)(+1) + 2P (+1,−1 | θ)(−1) = − cos(θ) (18)
using conservation per NPRF. Together with the constraints on the
rows/columns
P (+1,+1 | θ) + P (+1,−1 | θ) =
1
2




we can uniquely solve for the joint probabilities



















Now we can use these to compute BA−
BA− = 2P (−1,+1 | θ)(+1) + 2P (−1,−1 | θ)(−1) = cos(θ) (21)
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Figure 11: Average View for the Spin Singlet State. Reading from left to
right, as Bob rotates his SG magnets relative to Alice’s SG magnets for her +1
outcome, the average value of his outcome varies from −1 (totally down, arrow
bottom) to 0 to +1 (totally up, arrow tip). This obtains per conservation of spin
angular momentum on average in accord with no preferred reference frame. Bob
can say exactly the same about Alice’s outcomes as she rotates her SG magnets
relative to his SG magnets for his +1 outcome. That is, their outcomes can only
satisfy conservation of spin angular momentum on average in different reference
frames, because they only measure ±1, never a fractional result. Thus, just as
with the light postulate of SR, we see that no preferred reference frame leads






measurements and that leads to the mystery of “average-only” conservation.







(−1)A(cos (θ)) = −cos (θ) (22)
which is precisely the correlation function for the spin singlet state.
There are two important points to be made here. First, NPRF is just the
statement of an “empirically discovered” fact, i.e., Alice and Bob both always
measure ±1. Second, it is simply a mathematical fact that the “average-only”
conservation of Eqs. (18) & (21) yields the quantum correlation functions of Eq.
(13). In other words, to paraphrase Einstein, “we have an empirically discovered
principle that gives rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate
processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy.” That is why
this principle account of quantum entanglement provides “logical perfection and
security of the foundations.” Thus, we see how quantum entanglement follows
from NPRF applied to the measurement of h in precisely the same manner
that time dilation and length contraction follow from NPRF applied to the
measurement of c. And, just like in SR, Bob could partition the data according
to his equivalence relation (per his reference frame) and claim that it is Alice
who must average her results (obtained in her reference frame) to conserve spin
angular momentum (Table 2).
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Special Relativity Quantum Mechanics
Empirical Fact: Alice and Bob both
measure c, regardless of their
motion relative to the source






, regardless of their
SG orientation relative to the source
Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must
correct time and length
measurements
Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must
average results
NPRF: Relativity of simultaneity NPRF: Relativity of data partition
Table 2: Comparing SR with QM according to no preferred reference
frame (NPRF).
4 Principle versus Constructive Explanation for
Bell State Entanglement
As we saw in Section 2 for SR, if Alice is moving at velocity ~Va relative to a light
source, then she measures the speed of light from that source to be c (= 1√
µoǫo
,
as predicted by Maxwell’s equations). If Bob is moving at velocity ~Vb relative
to that same light source, then he measures the speed of light from that source
to be c. Here “reference frame” refers to the relative motion of the observer
and source, so all observers who share the same relative velocity with respect
to the source occupy the same reference frame. NPRF in this context means all
measurements produce the same outcome c.
As a consequence of this constraint we have time dilation and length con-
traction, which are then reconciled per NPRF via the relativity of simultaneity.
That is, Alice and Bob each partition spacetime per their own equivalence rela-
tions (per their own reference frames), so that equivalence classes are their own
surfaces of simultaneity. If Alice’s equivalence relation over the spacetime events
yields the “true” partition of spacetime, then Bob must correct his lengths and
times per length contraction and time dilation. Of course, the relativity of si-
multaneity says that Bob’s equivalence relation is as valid as Alice’s per NPRF.
This is completely analogous to QM, where Alice and Bob each partition
the data per their own equivalence relations (per their own reference frames),
so that equivalence classes are their own +1 and −1 data events. If Alice’s
equivalence relation over the data events yields the “true” partition of the data,
then Bob must correct (average) his results per average-only conservation. Of
course, NPRF says that Bob’s equivalence relation is as valid as Alice’s, which
we might call the “relativity of data partition” (Table 2).
Thus, the mysteries of SR (time dilation and length contraction) ultimately
follow from the same principle as Bell state entanglement, i.e., no preferred ref-
erence frame. So, if one accepts SR’s principle explanation of time dilation and
length contraction, then they should have no problem accepting conservation
per NPRF as a principle explanation of Bell state entanglement. Thus, the
relativity principle (NPRF) is a unifying principle for (non-relativistic) QM and
18
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SR, thereby addressing the desideratum of QIT in general and answering Bub’s
question specifically (Figure 1).
Despite the fact that this principle explanation supplies a unifying frame-
work for both QM and SR, some might demand a constructive explanation with
its corresponding “knowledge of how things in the world work, that is, of the
mechanisms (often hidden) that produce the phenomena we want to under-
stand” [Salmon, 1993, p. 15]. This is “the causal/mechanical view of scientific
explanation” per [Salmon, 1993, p. 15]. Thus, as with SR, not everyone will
consider our principle account to be explanatory since, “By its very nature
such a theory-of-principle explanation will have nothing to say about the reality
behind the phenomenon” [Balashov and Janssen, 2003, p. 331]. As stated by
[Brown and Pooley, 2006, p. 76]:
What has been shown is that rods and clocks must behave in
quite particular ways in order for the two postulates to be true
together. But this hardly amounts to an explanation of such be-
haviour. Rather things go the other way around. It is because rods
and clocks behave as they do, in a way that is consistent with the
relativity principle, that light is measured to have the same speed in
each inertial frame.
In other words, the assumption is that the true or fundamental “explanation”
of Bell state entanglement must be a constructive one in the sense of adverting to
causal mechanisms like fundamental physical entities such as particles or fields
and their dynamical equations of motion. Notice that while our account of
SR is in terms of fundamental principle explanation, that does not necessarily
make it a “geometric” interpretation of SR. For example, nothing we’ve said
commits us to the claim that if one were to remove all the matter-energy out
of the universe there would be some geometric structure remaining such as
Minkowski spacetime. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently geometric about
our principle explanation of Bell state entanglement in particular or of NPRF
in general.
Of course we do not have a no-go argument that our principle explanation
will never be subsumed by a constructive one. However, especially in light of
the unifying nature of our principle explanation, we think it is worth considering
the possibility that principle explanation is fundamental in these cases and per-
haps others [Silberstein et al., 2018, Stuckey et al., 2019, Stuckey et al., 2020,
Silberstein et al., 2021]. We think this is especially reasonable in light of the
current impasse in both QIT-based explanations of QM phenomena and in at-
tempts at constructive interpretations. Essentially, we are in a situation with
QM that Einstein found himself in with SR [Einstein, 1949, pp. 51-52]:
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws
by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer
and the more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction
that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us
to assured results. The example I saw before me was thermodynam-
ics.
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Thus we are offering a competing account of quantum entanglement for
any interpretation that fundamentally explains entanglement in the constructive
sense. As Einstein said, this gives us the advantage of “logical perfection and
security of the foundations” as our principle account could be true across a
number of different constructive interpretations. And, the principle we offer,
NPRF, is a unifying principle for QM and SR that holds throughout physics
[Silberstein and Stuckey, 2020]. As Pauli once stated [Heisenberg, 1971, p. 33]:
‘Understanding’ probably means nothing more than having what-
ever ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great many
different phenomena are part of a coherent whole.
Per [Hicks, 2019], NPRF is a principle that is accessible (“because it is sim-
ple”) and whence we can “infer lots of truths.” Inferring “lots of truths” implies
a unifying principle is superior to its subsumed constituents, since it implies (at
minimum) more truths than any proper subset of its subsumed constituents.
The point is, we are hypothesizing that the SO(3) symmetry with average-only
conservation as an explanation of Bell state entanglement, and Lorentz sym-
metry with relativity of simultaneity as an explanation of length contraction
and time dilation, are expressions of a deeper truth, NPRF, with seemingly
disparate multiple physical consequences. It has been suggested that perhaps
other unresolved phenomena in physics might be explained in a similar fashion
[Silberstein et al., 2018].
The bottom line is that a compelling constraint (who would argue with
conservation per NPRF?) explains Bell state entanglement without any obvious
corresponding ‘dynamical/causal influence’ or hidden variables to account for
the results on a trial-by-trial basis. By accepting this principle explanation
as fundamental, the lack of a compelling, consensus constructive explanation
is not a problem. This is just one of many mysteries in physics created by
dynamical and causal biases that can be resolved by constraint-based thinking
[Silberstein et al., 2018].
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Epistemic Risk in the Triangulation Argument for Implicit Attitudes 
Morgan Thompson 
 
One important strategy for dealing with error in our methods is triangulation, or the use  
multiple methods to investigate the same hypothesis. Current accounts of triangulation focus the 
conditions under which it succeeds, but ignore the many ways it can fail in practice. Instead, I 
argue that an account of triangulation focused on epistemic risk is better able to describe how 
triangulation fails and to normatively guide future triangulation research.  
 
In this paper, I defend the claim that a useful account of methodological triangulation needs 
to account for the ways triangulation is susceptible to failure in its practice rather than focusing 
primarily on how and why it succeeds in ideal cases. A theory or account of a practice should 
highlight potential failures in order to be useful. Consider some ethical theory that gives an account 
of right and wrong actions. In order to use this ethical theory to guide my actions, I need to know 
not just what makes an action right or wrong, but also some features of my moral psychology. 
What are the ways that I am likely to err? Should I be worried about having a weak will and lacking 
follow through for actions that I deem right? Knowledge of the ways in which I might err allows 
me to better use the ethical theory to guide my actions. Analogously, I argue that an account of 
triangulation that is useful in practice ought to explain not just why triangulation is successful in 
ideal cases, but also how it can fail in practice. To do so, I will appeal to the idea of epistemic risk 
from the literature on the types and roles of values in science, medicine, and technology. By 
identifying types of failure, this lays the groundwork for future normative work developing 
strategies to avoid or mitigate these risks in triangulation research.  
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -600-
To be presented at the 27th biennial Philosophy of Science Association meeting. 
 2 
1.1 Methodological Triangulation 
Methodological triangulation involves the use of multiple methods to examine the same 
research question. Current accounts of triangulation are cashed out in terms of its success.1 One 
view of triangulation sets out to: “identify at an abstract level the logic behind successful 
robustness arguments [and…] to determine what is required for a specific form of robustness 
analysis to be successful” (Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2016, 230). On another view, triangulation 
is defined as: “the use in empirical practice of multiple means of investigation to validate an 
experimental outcome” (Schickore and Coko 2013, 296). Current accounts agree on two success 
criteria: (i) the methods employed need to be sufficient diverse and (ii) the methods need to 
produce data about the same phenomenon.  
How would this received view of triangulation account for cases of failure in practice? 
There is substantial discussion of the failure to have sufficiently diverse methods (i), which is what 
Wimsatt (1981) called “illusory robustness.” Still these accounts of diversity are based on 
successful cases of triangulation (e.g., Schupbach 2018).  
We can also consider the other success criterion in triangulation: that each method produces 
data about the same phenomenon (ii). While most philosophers working on triangulation recognize 
that this is a success criterion, relatively little has been said about how researchers can know they 
 
1 One exception is Stegenga (2009) who considers various problems with the use of triangulation as a strategy to deal 
with the problem of epistemic uncertainty in science. However, many of his critiques are not internal to the practice 
of triangulation. Stegenga’s main concern is that philosophical accounts of triangulation provide no guidance when 
evidence both confirms and disconfirms the same hypothesis. But most centrally to this paper, Stegenga does not 
examine the epistemic risks triangulation arguments are subject to when they appear to be successful. These potential 
errors are all the more suspect because they mascaraed as successes. 
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have met this criterion.2 Even less has been said about how researchers can fail to meet this success 
criterion.  
1.1.1  Epistemic Risk 
In order to flesh out an account of triangulation that explains how it can fail in practice, I 
appeal to the concept of epistemic risk, which is “any risk of epistemic error that arises anywhere 
during knowledge practices” (Biddle and Kukla 2017, 218). There are many types of epistemic 
risk that occur at different parts of the research process. The most discussed kind of epistemic risk 
is inductive risk (Douglas 2016), which is particularly predominant in discussion about the role of 
values in science, medicine, and technology. Although the name implies it is any risk in inductive 
inferences, it is a technical term that refers specifically to the risk in inductive inferences from 
evidence to acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis.  
Following Biddle & Kukla (2017), I hold that focusing exclusively on inductive risk makes 
our philosophical accounts of epistemic risk deficient. Other types of epistemic risk include the 
risk in deciding whether to characterize some datum as evidence for a hypothesis, such as whether 
some particular slide contains tumors and whether the tumors were malignant (Biddle's (2016) 
interpretation of Douglas 2000, 569). Another example is risk in the inference from animal models 
to the target system of interest (usually in humans) as in research on exposure to bisphenol A in a 
particular rat model (Biddle's (2016) interpretation of Wilholt 2009).  
 
2 One exception is Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016), who argue that triangulation primarily consists in justifying 
data-to-phenomena inferences. Relying on Bogen and Woodward (1988), Kuorikoski and Marchionni argue that 
researchers can use empirical reasoning to justify these inferences, such as intervening on the phenomenon to 
determine whether there are corresponding differences in the data. While I think their view is on the right track, it is 
(1) susceptible to the criticism of not explaining why triangulation sometimes fails and (2) does not provide a 
sufficiently developed account of the practice of triangulation. I aim to rectify these two issues here. 
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Current accounts of triangulation focused on success can only account for two types of 
epistemic risk: the failure to have sufficiently diverse methods (or Wimsatt’s “illusory robustness”) 
and, on my view, inductive risk. I will argue that an account of triangulation that explains failure 
will need to make use of epistemic risk more broadly as not all instances fall neatly under the risk 
of illusory robustness or inductive risk.  
1.1.2  Schema for Triangulation in Practice 
In order to develop an account of triangulation that highlights points of failure, I turn away 
from abstract success conditions and to the details of knowledge production via triangulation. I 
highlight important steps in the practice of triangulation from the causal production of data to its 
transition to playing an evidential role to the increased credence in some hypothesis. In this section 
I provide a schema for the practice of triangulation. 
Let me first distinguish between data and phenomena (Bogen and Woodward 1988). Data 
are publicly observable reports that result from experimental or observational processes. They are 
not repeatable because they are the actual reports produced through experimentation or 
observation. Phenomena on the other hand are stable patterns in the world. Phenomena are often 
not directly observable and are characterized and explained by theory. 
In the practice of triangulation, researchers identify multiple methods that are likely to 
produce data relevant to the same phenomenon. Each method may include some sources of error, 
such as random error from sampling or systematic error due to the instruments and procedures of 
the method. Unfortunately, researchers are often unaware of all sources of error in their methods. 
And these errors causally impact what data is produced. Yet, it is this data produced by imperfect 
methods that is the input for our inferential reasoning. 
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Here let me make a further distinction between data and evidence. Rather than thinking of 
evidence as a separate kind of entity, we can think of it as a role that data play in confirming or 
disconfirming some hypothesis. In some cases of triangulation, this step may not be trivial: when 
data is produced in radically different experimental and theoretical contexts, many assumptions 
may be required to get from these different datasets to evidence that bears on (some particular) 
hypothesis. This problem about the evidential role of data is what Stegenga (2009) calls this the 
problem of incongruity.  
Consider also that the data may be used as evidence in relation to multiple hypotheses. That 
is, despite of the fact that it may have been collected with some particular purpose in mind, it can 
serve as evidence for or against other hypotheses. In the case of triangulation, we’re interested 
only in data that can be used as evidence for the same hypothesis. I’ll focus on hypotheses about 
the existence of a phenomenon, though triangulation can also be used to estimate parameters and 
constants (e.g., Avogadro’s number). At this point in the practice of triangulation, it needs to be 
demonstrated that all of the diverse datasets can serve as evidence for or against the same 
hypothesis.  
Then once the evidential role of the datasets with respect to the same hypothesis has been 
established, researchers can make an inference to accept or reject the hypothesis. Even if all of the 
datasets provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis, a judgement still needs to be made about 
whether sufficient evidence has been collected to accept the hypothesis.  
Theory can help reduce the uncertainty for some cases of triangulation. If researchers are 
triangulating on a claim about the existence of a phenomenon, then they should use some 
theoretical characterization of that phenomenon that describes its features. Researchers need a 
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sufficiently developed characterization of a phenomenon in order to distinguish between 
inferences to the phenomenon of interest from inferences to other phenomena. 
 
Figure 1. Schema of Triangulation 
1.2 Triangulation in Implicit Social Cognition 
Now that I’ve described the process of triangulation, I will demonstrate how it locates 
different types of epistemic risk. To do so, I will analyze the triangulation argument for implicit 
attitudes in social psychology. 
By the mid-1990s, the majority of participants in psychology studies no longer self-
reported holding explicitly racial attitudes (e.g., Dovidio and Gaertner 2000). In fact, many 
participants began to view racist acts as socially unacceptable and avoided committing racist 
actions themselves (Sue 2010). Yet, widespread racially discriminatory practices and racial 
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disparities in economic, social, and health spheres persisted. Social psychologists posited that an 
explanation for these apparently contradictory features was that individuals still held racially 
biased attitudes, but that they were not reporting them when asked directly about their attitudes. 
So, researchers developed new techniques to control for the social desirability of appearing 
egalitarian (e.g., the “bogus pipeline” Jones and Sigall 1971). Indirect measures get around 
participants’ ability and motivation to present themselves in a particular way to the researchers 
and instead measure their less controlled responses. As a result, researchers posited ‘implicit 
attitudes’ as a mental state or process. Implicit attitudes are automatically activated evaluative 
judgments about which participants are typically unaware or unable to control. 
1.2.1  The IAT and the Evaluative Priming Task 
The study of implicit attitudes bloomed. There are now nearly two dozen methods for 
measuring implicit attitudes. The two initial and most well-developed of these methods are the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) (e.g., Greenwald, McGee, and Schwartz 1998) and the evaluative 
priming task (EPT) (e.g., Fazio et al. 1986). I discuss each in turn. 
During a racial IAT, participants view stimuli from four categories: two racial groups and 
two evaluative groups. On any trial, each racial group is paired with a different evaluative category 
and these pairing are displayed on either side of the display screen. On typical racial IATs, two of 
the categories are stimuli related to two racial groups (e.g., faces of White and Black individuals) 
and two of the categories are evaluative stimuli (e.g., positive and negative words). Participants 
are asked to quickly categorize stimuli by pressing one of two keys on the corresponding to the 
disjunctive categories listed on the right and left sides of the display. Researchers can compare 
participants’ reaction times on trials in which Black-positive and White-negative are paired to 
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those in which Black-negative and White-positive are paired. A faster response time to the latter 
compared to the former is thought to indicate racial attitudes that more closely link Black people 
with negative concepts and White people with positive concepts (e.g., Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji 
2003).  
Evaluative priming tasks instead use stimuli from the categories of interest to prime 
participants before participants perform a categorization task on unrelated evaluative target 
stimuli. If researchers are interested in racial attitudes, they might use images of Black or White 
people to prime participants. Then during the categorization task, participants are asked to 
categorize positive- and negative-valence words (target stimulus). Researchers reason that reaction 
times on the categorization task will be influenced by the evaluative valence of the prime stimulus. 
If a participant holds negative attitudes towards White people, then after viewing a White stimulus 
prime, they will categorize negative target words more quickly than positive target words.  
1.2.2  The Triangulation Argument for Implicit Attitudes 
Social psychologists take indirect measures like the IAT and EPT to triangulate on the 
same phenomenon—implicit attitudes. Over time, theories about how to characterize implicit 
attitudes have changed, but the assumption that the triangulation argument for implicit attitudes is 
successful has remained. Here I will offer some evidence for this claim. 
Discussing the views of the field at the time in a review article on the nature of implicit 
attitudes, Gawronski, Hofmann, and Wilber (2006, 486; citations removed) state:  
A widespread assumption underlying the application of indirect measures is that they 
provide access to unconscious mental associations that are difficult to assess with standard 
self-report measures. Specifically, it is often argued that self-reported (explicit) evaluations 
reflect conscious attitudes, whereas indirectly assessed (implicit) evaluations reflect 
unconscious attitudes.  
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While Gawronski and colleagues go on to critique this widespread assumption (at least, its 
attribution of ‘unconscious’ to implicit attitudes), this quote demonstrates the ubiquitous 
assumption among implicit attitude researchers that first-generation indirect methods measured 
implicit attitudes.  
More recently social psychologists have developed a neutral characterization of implicit 
attitudes that does not commit to any particular view of ‘implicit’. This is to broadly 
accommodate issues that participants are able to predict the evaluative direction of their implicit 
attitudes (Hahn et al. 2014). As Greenwald and Lai write in a review article this year, “The 
currently dominant understanding of “implicit” among social cognition researchers is “indirectly 
measured.” The labels “indirectly measured attitude” and “implicit attitude” are used 
interchangeably in this review” (Greenwald and Lai 2020). Still the assumption remains: 
whatever indirect measures are measuring, it is the same phenomenon.  
1.3 Two Epistemic Risks in Triangulation 
In this section, I use my account of triangulation to highlight two examples of epistemic 
risks and where they arise in implicit attitude research. My account better explains what goes 
wrong in these cases than accounts of triangulation focused on success. That is, my account 
provides a better descriptive account of scientific practice, where triangulation does not always 
succeed. Here I identify two types of epistemic risk: (1) epistemic risk when data is taken to be 
evidence for some hypothesis and (2) inductive risk in determining a sufficient level of evidence 
for the acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis.  
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1.3.1  Moving from Data to Evidence 
One major epistemic risk in triangulation is that we may mistakenly think that the 
different datasets can serve as evidence for the same hypothesis. We are particularly at risk of 
this error when we do not justify the claim that our methods measure aspects theoretically related 
to the same hypothesis. Data do not automatically bear on hypotheses. A datum can be an image 
from electron microscopy, a mark selecting an answer on a survey, or recorded video of a 
researcher interacting with participants. So, data needs to be interpreted in relation to the 
hypotheses for which they may serve as evidence. In doing this, researchers must infer on the 
basis of data and some assumptions to the confirmation or disconfirmation of a hypothesis.  
I argue that this epistemic risk is relevant to the triangulation argument for implicit 
attitudes. The data produced and current assumptions in social psychology do not support the 
claim that the data produced by the IAT and EPT serve as evidence for the same hypothesis. In 
fact, according to some implicit attitude researchers, they serve as evidence for slightly different 
hypotheses.  
In IAT studies, the categories of interest are made explicit to the participant as the 
categories must be identified and paired to perform the categorization task. Thus, IAT scores are 
thought to measure attitudes toward the general social category. Thus, they can serve as evidence 
for hypotheses about associations between evaluative categories and social categories. 
In an evaluative priming task, on the other hand, the instructions do not explicitly 
determine the relevant categorical membership of the priming stimulus. It is generally accepted 
that due to this feature, evaluative priming tasks measure attitudes toward the stimuli rather than 
the category (Olson and Fazio 2003; Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji 2003). Consider that the 
priming stimulus is often an image of a person’s face. Researchers may wish to contrast Black 
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and White faces as priming stimuli in an evaluative priming task; however, as a feature of the 
images individuals represented will also belong to other social categories (e.g., attractiveness, 
gender). Because the categorization task is only along the evaluative dimension, it is not made 
salient which of these categories a participant is responding to. Consider the case of a participant 
who when primed with a particular image of a Black face, categorizes positive stimuli more 
slowly than when primed with an image of a White face. The response discrepancy could be 
caused by a negative evaluations of the person-represented-in-the-image’s perceived race, 
attractiveness, perceived gender, or any combination of these and other features.  
Good task design will control for these differences as much as possible, but due to the 
design of the task, it is impossible to identify what features influence the participant’s reaction 
times in the categorization task in any given case. The features that cause a response discrepancy 
may change over time even for the same participant because implicit attitudes are thought to be 
context dependent (Jost 2019) and the empirical findings that indirect measures generally have 
low test-retest validity (Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker 2000). 
In order to address this epistemic risk, researchers need to provide justification for the 
claim that the IAT and EPT produce data that can serve as evidence for the hypothesis that 
participants have a negative association with the social category of interest. For the IAT, this 
justification already exists. For the EPT, it is less obvious. So, using my account of triangulation, 
I have highlighted a particular weak point in the triangulation argument for implicit attitudes and 
emphasized a place for the development and elaboration of norms for successful triangulation. 
Note also that this epistemic risk does not fit neatly under the heading “illusory robustness” or 
inductive risk because the problem arises due to the differences in the methods and does not 
involve a judgement about accepting or rejecting a hypothesis. 
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1.3.2  Inductive Risk  
Once we know data can serve as evidence for the same hypothesis, we can ask: How do 
researchers know there is sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis? On my view, the epistemic 
risk of error here is best characterized as inductive risk. However, in the context of triangulation 
inductive risk takes a particular form. Specifically, researchers ought to be concerned about the 
risk of accepting the hypothesis when it is false. In cases where our hypothesis is about the 
existence of some phenomenon (as triangulation is often used), the inductive risk may be 
specifically sensitive to the error that data produced (and their evidential support) are actually for 
distinct phenomena. In other words, there is an inductive risk in accepting the hypothesis that some 
phenomenon of interest exists on the basis of triangulation, especially when we have not 
sufficiently ruled out the possible hypothesis that multiple phenomena are differentially driving 
the results. 
Psychologists evaluate the validity of their tests using psychometrics. Relevant to my 
arguments, convergent validity is the extent to which two methods that are predicted to measure 
the same phenomenon are in fact measuring the same phenomenon. Low convergent validity 
suggests that two methods measure different phenomena. Psychologists often assess convergent 
validity by examining correlation coefficients.3 If two methods measure the same phenomenon, 
they are expected to have high correlations in their scores. However, given that the two methods 
are distinct in some ways, there should not be a perfect correlation in their scores. There is no 
 
3 Other methods such as the multi-trait multi-method matrix (Campbell and Fiske 1959) have been used less frequently 
and less completely in the context of implicit attitudes. 
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well accepted threshold for what counts as sufficiently high convergent validity. But social 
psychologists hold that the IAT and EPT ought to have high convergent validity (e.g., Banaji 
2001). 
Unfortunately, researchers have found low correlations between the IAT and other 
implicit measures and thus, low convergent validity (Fazio and Olson 2003). The correlation in 
scores for the IAT and EPT range between r=.24 and r=.13. These are very low positive 
correlations. So, a participant’s score on the IAT provides very little information about their EPT 
score, and vice versa. 
One possible cause of the low correlations between IAT and EPT scores is the low 
reliability of EPT (De Houwer et al. 2009). Perhaps the scores do not correlate well due to 
noisiness in the data produced by unreliable methods rather than the methods measuring different 
phenomena. A recent comparison of seven indirect measures of attitudes Bar-Anan and Nosek 
(2014), the EPT had weak correlations with other indirect measures (including the IAT, r=.24).  
However, there are two reasons to remain neutral with respect to these explanations. 
First,  a measure need not be reliable for it to be valid (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and Van 
Heerden 2004). The measure could track a context-dependent phenomenon, of which implicit 
attitudes is probably an example (Jost 2019). Second, as Bar-Anan and Nosek (2014, 677, 
original emphasis) suggest, low convergent validity and low reliability may both contribute to 
the low correlations of scores on indirect measures of attitudes: 
the most likely explanation for this pattern, coupled with the similar rank ordering for 
internal consistency, is that [Affective Misattribution Priming] and EPT are both 
relatively distinct, and also less effective in reliably assessing the target evaluation than 
are the other measures. […] it could still be the case that both measures assess unique 
components of evaluation that are not assessed by other indirect measures (including each 
other).  
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Still one promising finding is that unlike the Affective Misattribution Priming task, Bar-Anan 
and Nosek (2014) do not find a strong correlation between the EPT and direct measures of racial 
attitudes (i.e., self-report on surveys), which would have indicated the potential influence of 
deliberate evaluation in the indirect measurement. So, while some of the low correlations 
between the measures may be due to the low reliability of the EPT, it is possible that both low 
reliability and low convergent validity are part of the picture. 
1.3.3  Why can’t these be understood as a failure of diversity? 
One potential objection is that the IAT and EPT are not sufficiently diverse methods. The 
basic idea is that whatever diversity criterion we accept (see Schupbach 2018), the IAT and EPT 
are too similar to count as distinct methods for the purposes of triangulation. I respond to this 
objection by clarifying that these methods historically descendant from different theories in 
psychology. In addition to my arguments that they produce data relevant to different hypotheses 
(section 1.3.1), this gives us some reason to think the methods are sufficiently diverse on any 
appropriate diversity criterion. 
The two methods I discuss were developed out of different historical traditions in 
psychology (Payne and Gawronski 2015). Drawing on Shiffrin and Schneider’s (Shiffrin and 
Schneider 1977) work on selective attention, Fazio and colleagues (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995) developed the evaluative priming task to distinguish automatic and controlled 
processing. Controlled processing requires attention and can be altered voluntarily, whereas 
automatic processing takes place on memories stored in long-term memory, is automatically 
activated given the appropriate inputs, and is difficult to suppress.  
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Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) work on implicit attitudes came out of cognitive 
psychological research on implicit memory, which describes the way that earlier experiences can 
influence current performance on learned tasks without conscious awareness of the past 
experiences. Most famously, the patient H.M., who had a medial temporal lobectomy and thus 
lacked bilateral hippocampi and other structures, was unable to create new episodic memories. 
However, H.M. demonstrated the formation of new implicit memories through the time-savings in 
relearning motor skill tasks (Corkin 2002). As Greenwald et al. (1998) constructed it, the IAT is a 
measurement of implicit memory. So, both measures were designed based on different theories. In 
short, the evaluative priming task was designed to measure a construct that is typically 
uncontrolled or automatic while the IAT is designed to measure a construct that is typically 
unconscious or about which the individual is unaware. 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have provided an account of triangulation that highlights locations and types 
of epistemic risk. In particular, I diagnosed two epistemic risks in implicit attitude research: (1) 
the risk that data do not serve as evidence for the same hypothesis, and (2) the particular inductive 
risk that there is insufficient evidence provided to conclude that there is a single phenomenon 
(given the plausibility of alternative hypotheses positing multiple phenomena). Neither is 
sufficiently described by illusory robustness and (1) is not a case of inductive risk either. Finally, 
I demonstrated that current accounts of triangulation focused on successful cases cannot provide 
explanations of why triangulation sometimes fails in practice and thus, do not develop sufficient 
norms to guide future triangulation research.  
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Living fossils, taxa with similar members now and in the deep past, have
recently come under scrutiny. Those who think the concept should be retained
have argued for its epistemic and normative utility. This paper extends the
epistemic utility of the living fossils concept to include ways in which a taxon’s
living fossil status can serve as evidence for other claims about that taxon. I will
use some insights from developmental biology to refine these claims. Insofar as
these considerations demonstrate the epistemic utility of the living fossils concept,
they support retaining the concept and using it in biological research.
Living fossils are taxa in which extant organisms morphologically resemble fossilized
organisms; paradigmatic examples include horseshoe crabs, coelacanths, and tuataras.
Recently the living fossil concept has received considerable criticism, with even
paradigmatic cases being contested. Some argue that the concept is not very useful for
biologists, since these diverse cases are unlikely to be the product of unified phenomena,
while others argue that the concept may be useful for certain epistemic and normative
1
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purposes. My aim in this paper is to address the epistemic value of living fossils. In
particular, I will address the following question: Given that a taxon is a living fossil,
what else do we know about it? Using considerations from developmental biology, I show
that many common inferences from morphological similarity fail in the context of living
fossils. I will argue, however, that there are some inferences that are justified. I conclude
that the living fossil concept has epistemic value, and hence should be retained.
After reviewing the recent literature (section 1), I will address three obvious
conclusions that we might want to draw about living fossils (section 2): (1)
non-morphological phenotypic similarity between the extant and past taxa, (2) the
existence of a persistent lineage that includes these taxa, and (3) a slow rate of
evolutionary change between these taxa. I will evaluate each of these inferences,
especially using insights from developmental biology (section 3).
1 Defining ‘living fossil’
Philosophers of biology have offered different characterizations of living fossils. Lidgard
and Love (2018) argue for ways in which the concept is useful in setting research
agendas, despite ambiguity in whether particular taxa should be classified as living
fossils. Turner (2019) suggests an explicit definition of living fossil, one which he believes
enables us to use living fossils to set conservation priorities. Specifically, Turner thinks
that living fossils are taxa which have:
1. Prehistorically deep morphological stability,
2. Few extant species, and
3. High contribution to phylogenetic diversity.
2
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Werth and Shear (2014) give a similar characterization of living fossils, picking out
“morphological conservatism” and “little taxonomic diversity” as relevant factors (434,
436).
Turner (2019) thinks there is epistemic value to the living fossil concept, including
that “observations of [extant organisms in a living fossil taxon] can surely tell us
something about the prehistoric ones” (11). The next two sections of this paper will
specify exactly what we might be able to learn about these prehistoric taxa on the basis
of their living fossil status. To sidestep debates about the specific definition of “living
fossil,” I will focus on the epistemic role of morphological similarity between past and
extant taxa, a feature unanimously associated with living fossils.
Note that this paper is concerned with the possibility that the living fossil concept is
epistemically valuable, although it may be valuable in other ways, including for
normative purposes (as Turner 2019 argues). One way in which the living fossils concept
might be epistemically valuable is that it helps us identify evolutionary episodes in need
of explanation. Lidgard and Love (2018) think this is one purpose of the concept. In this
case, a taxon’s living fossil status, or at least the various features associated with that
status, is the explanandum. However, in the remainder of this paper, I focus on another
possible epistemic role for the living fossils concept to serve: a taxon’s living fossil status
can serve as evidence for other claims about the members of that taxon.
2 Inferences from morphological similarity
To reject the arguments of skeptics who think we should do away with the living fossil
concept (e.g., Casane and Laurenti 2013, Mathers et al. 2013, Wagner et al. 2017), we
3
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should show what role the concept can play. Lidgard and Love and Turner recognize
this, although they have different ideas of what this role is. However, the authors seem
to be in agreement that part of what we want to be able to use the living fossil concept
for is making inferences from the fact that past and extant taxa are morphologically
similar to some other fact F about these taxa. For short:
morphological similarity → F (1)
Both Lidgard and Love and Turner agree that we should be able to use the living
fossil concept to make inferences of this form. Turner (2019) calls this the “epistemic
value” of focusing on the morphological resemblance of past to extant taxa (11).
One possible fact F that we may want to infer from morphological similarity between
two taxa is that these taxa are phenotypically similar in ways above and beyond their
morphological similarity. Take horseshoe crabs. Extant horseshoe crabs have hemocyanin
in their blood (they use copper rather than iron to transport oxygen). Turner (2019)
says, “the fossil record does not tell us that ancient horseshoe crabs had hemocyanin in
their blood. But that seems like a fairly safe inference, given our background knowledge
of phylogeny plus the observation that living ones do have hemocyanin in their blood”
(11). The general type of inference that Turner is making is something like:
morphological similarity → general phenotypic similarity (2)
So far, I have been talking about morphological similarity, rather than morphological
stability, the latter of which is used in Turner’s definition. Turner (2019) says that
showing morphological stability between past and extant taxa is equivalent to showing
4
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morphological similarity within a persistent lineage (3). If morphological similarity itself
was evidence for persistence of a lineage, then morphological similarity would be evidence
for morphological stability. In other words, the following inferences are equivalent:
morphologial similarity → persistence of lineage (3)
morphological similarity → morphological stability (4)
Finally, the living fossil concept may be useful for inferring rates of evolutionary
change:
morphological similarity → slow evolutionary rate (5)
It only makes sense to talk about a rate of evolution within a given lineage, so inference
3 is necessary for inference 5.
Inferences 2, 3, and 5 do not exhaust the possible inferences from morphological
similarity to F which we might make about living fossil taxa, but these examples show
the possibility of making inferences about living fossil taxa based on what else we know
about them. Thus these inferences provide good candidates if we want to demonstrate
the epistemic utility of the living fossil concept.
The following section will use some insights from developmental biology to evaluate
these inferences.
5
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3 Developmental considerations
Various concepts and theories in evolutionary biology have been revised in light of
results in developmental biology. For example, developmental plasticity provides a
possible explanation of speciation events, one compatible with the theory of punctuated
equilibrium (West-Eberhard 2003). On the basis of such results, some have even
suggested replacing the Modern Synthesis with the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
(e.g., Laland et al. 2015).
In this section, I will use some results in developmental biology to examine the
arguments using morphological similarity from section 2.
3.1 Non-morphological phenotypic similarity
Inference 2 says that we can infer from their morphological similarities that past and
extant taxa have phenotypic similarities above and beyond these morphological
similarities. For example, we would be able to infer the presence of hemocyanin in past
horseshoe crabs on the basis that they are morphologically similar to extant horseshoe
crabs.
Although I did not say this in section 2, one might have thought that the argument
relating morphological similarity to general phenotypic similarity was implicitly
assuming some relationship between morphological similarity and genetic similarity. If
morphological similarity was good evidence for genetic similarity, and genetic similarity
was good evidence for otherwise phenotypic similarity, then morphological similarity
would be good evidence for phenotypic similarity. Including the implicit step, inference 2
would become:
6
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morphological similarity → genetic similarity → general phenotypic similarity (6)
Even using a very rudimentary understanding of genetics, it is unlikely that inference
6 will work. The problem is that morphological similarity does not imply genetic
similarity. There is not, in general, a one-to-one correspondence between genes and
phenotypes, including morphology, so we can neither infer genetic information from
phenotypic information nor vice versa. The same genes can result in different
phenotypes, and the same phenotypes can be the result of different genes (e.g., Fusco
and Minelli 2010). The former is the result of developmental plasticity, whereby a variety
of environmental factors can affect phenotypic outcomes, for example by changing gene
expression. The latter can be explained by the interchangeability of genes and
environment in producing phenotypes,which West-Eberhard (2003) says “conflict[s] with
the habit of supposing that the specificity of the [developmental] response comes entirely
from the specificity of the gene” (117). If the argument from morphological similarity to
general phenotypic similarity depends on an inference from morphological similarity to
genetic similarity, the argument will fail, because the first half of inference 6 will turn
out to be false. Additionally, and perhaps more intuitively, whatever genetic similarity
might be implied by morphological similarity does not in itself imply the additional
genetic similarity required to generate phenotypic similarity above and beyond
morphology. In the case of the horseshoe crabs, different genes will be associated with
morphology than with presence of hemocyanin.
However, morphological similarity may imply otherwise phenotypic similarity more
7
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directly, as indicated in the original inference 2. For instance, we might think that certain
non-morphological phenotypes are strongly correlated with particular morphologies.
Whether this correlation is plausible is going to depend on the non-morphological
phenotype. For instance, whether extant horseshoe crabs’ blood is similar to past
horseshoe crabs’ will depend on whether features of blood are strongly correlated with
morphology. If we had independent evidence that the contents of blood and an
organism’s morphology were strongly correlated, then the inference from the horseshoe
crabs’ morphology to their blood phenotype would be unproblematic. However, as
Lidgard and Love (2018) say, “[r]etention of some phenotypic (traditionally
morphological) characters does not adequately explain change or the lack thereof in
other phenotypic characters” (766, emphasis in original). Fortey (2011) also thinks that
there can be “no final proof one way or the other” about whether the past horseshoe
crabs’ blood contained hemocyanin (27).
In fact, developmental biologists have recently stressed the modularity of phenotypes.
This refers to the separability of phenotypes, despite possible integration among them;
developmental modules are semi-independent and dissociable, meaning that various
traits can occur in different combinations in different organisms, with varying degrees of
interdependence between different traits (West-Eberhard 2003, chpt. 4). These modules
can then be selected for separately. For instance, terrestrial and arboreal salamanders
have distinct foot morphology; the developmental pathways that lead to these differences
are relatively independent from the salamanders’ other traits, which go (more or less)
unaffected (Gilbert 2000). This is made possible by the branching nature of
development: cell differentiation occurs at branching decision points, which can be
triggered by genetic or environmental switches. West-Eberhard (2019) says that
8
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modularity is a “universal property of organismic traits,” because this branching process
is ubiquitous (357). In the context of living fossils, and specifically inference 2,
modularity means that morphological similarity – which may be dissociable or
independent from other phenotypes – does not provide adequate evidence for similarity
of non-morphological traits.
Of course, some modules are more interdependent, and can be expected to co-occur.
For example, morphology can constrain behavior such that particular behavioral traits
are strongly correlated with particular morphological traits. Whether presence of one
phenotype provides good evidence for presence of another phenotype depends on having
independent evidence of the ways in which the different developmental modules may be
interdependent.
Therefore, the wholesale inference from morphological similarity to phenotypic
similarity above and beyond morphology is unlikely to be justified. This is not just a
general skepticism about our ability to infer the presence of some traits from the
observation of others; developmental modularity gives us good reason to believe that
many traits are dissociable. More specific cases, where a correlation between morphology
and other phenotypes is independently established, may allow for appropriate use of this
inference in living fossil taxa. Indeed, Lidgard and Love (2018) suggest that one of the
questions that research on living fossils might be able to answer has to do with the role
of developmental modularity in patterns of evolutionary stasis (766). In other words, we
may be able to come to a better understanding of the ways in which different traits are
combined in developmental modules by studying stasis of these traits in living fossil taxa.
9
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3.2 Persistence of lineage
Inference 3 concludes on the basis of morphological similarity that the taxa are
phylogenetically related such that they are both part of the same, persistent lineage, or,
equivalently, that they are morphologically stable.
Note that neither Lidgard and Love nor Turner make the “lineage” relationship
precise. Being part of the same lineage cannot require that the past fossil is an ancestor
of the extant organisms, exactly, because we want to permit the past taxon and the
extant one having an as-yet-unidentified common ancestor.1 Neither can the lineage
relationship be as broad as a whole clade; it would become meaningless to differentiate
living fossils from other cases of relatedness between past and extant taxa. Although it is
beyond the scope of this paper to more precisely say what a lineage is, I take it that it is
something between an ancestor-descendant relationship and a clade.
Setting this aside: does morphological similarity imply persistence of lineage or
morphological stability?
As in the case of phenotypic similarity, perhaps there is an implicit assumption
contained in inference 3 that involves a relationship between morphology and genetics.
Inference 3 could be justified on the basis of this relationship: if morphological similarity
implies genetic similarity, and genetic similarity implies the phylogenetic relationship
that would hold within a persistent lineage, then morphological similarity would imply
persistence of lineage. The resulting inference is:
1This is likely the case with horseshoe crabs – see Fortey (2011).
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morphological similarity → genetic similiarity → persistence of lineage (7)
I have already argued in section 3.1 that morphological similarity does not imply
genetic similarity, so inference 7 will not work.
However, we should consider whether morphological similarity implies persistence of
lineage without relying on a connection to genetic similarity. I will argue that there are
several reasons to think that it does not; however, morphological similarity is often the
best evidence we have of phylogenetic relationships.
First, morphological similarity and persistence of lineage do not exactly imply
morphological stability, because there is the possibility that the morphological trait was
lost and reemerged within the same lineage. Alternatively, if the past and extant taxa
are in the same clade but do not have an ancestor-descendant relationship, then it may
be possible that their common ancestor was not morphologically similar, in which case
the morphology would have had to emerge separately on two different branches of the
phylogenetic tree. This would be a case of convergent evolution, where the same traits
evolve twice. These considerations when checking for morphological stability are the
same as the well-known issues with testing for homology (similarity due to common
ancestry) in general.
Developmental biologists point out that developmental pathways, even if not
morphological traits, may be homologous (e.g., Nijhout 2019, 946). In these cases, which
are called parallelism (rather than convergence), the trait may appear to evolve
separately in two different branches, or may appear to be lost and reemerge, when in fact
11
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the mechanism by which the trait develops is actually homologous. It makes sense to
broaden our concept of homology to include parallel evolution and recurrence of traits
(West-Eberhard 2003, chpt. 25). I therefore concur with Turner (2019), although he does
not explicitly use these developmental considerations to argue that morphological
stability follows from morphological similarity.
Second, though, lack of morphological similarity may not be an indication of lack of
morphological stability; polymorphism within a single species is relatively common. Two
sample organisms from a species with morphologically distinct life stages may be
mistaken as organisms belonging to different species if the organisms are observed in
different of these life stages.2 Extreme cases of sexual dimorphism are also liable to being
mistaken for cases of multiple species. Note that both metamorphosis-induced life stages
and sexual dimorphism may be the result of the developmental modularity discussed
above (West-Eberhard 2003, 58, 75).
There is thus a risk of both false positives and false negatives in identifying
persistence of lineage if we focus on morphological similarity. If there were a better
indication of phylogenetic relationships than morphological similarity, we would use it
instead.
These considerations notwithstanding, morphological similarity is often the best
evidence we have for persistence of the same morphology over time, given that in the
context of fossils we only have sporadic sample organisms and not any direct evidence of
change over time.3 This is part of the explanation for why the morphological species
2Turner (2016) acknowledges this point explicitly (64). See also Currie 2016.
3Note that our ability to acquire genetic information about fossil specimens may im-
prove our epistemic position regarding phylogenetic relationships, if one thinks that the
12
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concept – rejected nearly unanimously as an adequate species concept for extant species
– is still used by paleontologists (e.g., Turner 2011, 49-50 and Werth and Shear 2014,
442-43). Often the best evidence we have for phylogenetic relationships involving fossils
is morphological similarities and differences, and persistence of lineage in the context of
living fossils is no different.
3.3 Evolutionary rates
The third candidate inference we might want to make from morphological similarity
within living fossil taxa is a slow rate of evolutionary change between the past and extant
taxa. Recall that the argument for a slow rate of evolutionary change requires that we
accept the inference to persistence of lineage. I have suggested that morphological
similarity is often the best evidence we can hope to have for persistence of lineage. In
this section I will assume that that inference is justified, and move on to examining
inference 5, from morphological similarity to a slow rate of evolutionary change.
As in sections 3.1 and 3.2, there is possibly an implicit assumption utilized here
involving genetics. Let’s ignore the possibility that the inference looks like this:
morphological similarity → genetic similarity → morphological stability → slow evolutionary rate
(8)
because we are assuming that morphological similarity is directly evidence for
morphological stability (and I have already argued that morphological similarity does
inference from genetic similarity to persistence of lineage is better than the inference from
morphological similarity. See Jablonski and Shubin (2015).
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not imply genetic similarity). In this case, the implicit justification for 5 is instead that
morphological stability implies genetic stability, which in turn implies a slow rate of
evolutionary change:
morphological similarity → morphological stability → genetic stability → slow evolutionary rate
(9)
Many of the arguments I have given already that morphological similarity will not
imply genetic similarity will be arguments against thinking that morphological stability
implies genetic stability. I will not rehearse these arguments, because there is further
reason to think that morphological stability does not imply genetic stability. Stabilizing
selection acting on plastic traits can maintain the same phenotype over time, without
necessarily having any effect whatsoever on rates of genetic change. For example,
developmental plasticity is expected, especially in cases of extremely plastic traits like
learning, to slow any directional increase or decrease in the propensity of a given
phenotype in a population, because there is not ample opportunity for selection to act on
any single phenotype (West-Eberhard 2003, 178). Furthermore, a process called
“phenotypic accommodation” allows organisms to maintain functional phenotypic traits
despite genetic mutation (West-Eberhard 2003, 51; see also West-Eberhard 2005).
The last step of inference 9 – from genetic stability to slow rate of evolutionary
change – is also problematic, although my critique here will be more controversial. An
intuitive view is that a slow rate of evolutionary change in a lineage just is a slow rate of
genetic change in that lineage, and that therefore the move from genetic stability to slow
rate of evolution is unproblematic (e.g., Schopff 1984, Ho 2008).
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But is this really what we mean by slow rates of evolutionary change? Cases of
stabilizing selection acting on phenotypes without causing a reduction in rates of genetic
change show that it does not make sense to equate evolutionary change with genetic
change. Traits on which stabilizing selection is acting should also be those traits which
we say have a slow rate of evolutionary change: “the rate and degree of modification of a
complex trait should be some positive function of its frequency of expression or use”
(West-Eberhard 2003, 169). Traits with stability in a given lineage are exactly the traits
with a slow rate of change. Therefore, there is no need to appeal to genetic stability to
make the case for slow rates for evolutionary change – we can infer slow rates of
evolutionary change directly from morphological stability.
Note that it is traits, and not lineages or taxa, to which we apply an evolutionary
rate. Selection acts on phenotypes, not on organisms, species, or lineages. Lidgard and
Love (2018) agree: “[c]haracters or character states are relatively more ancestral or
derived, not whole organisms or lineages” (761, citing Omland, Cook, and Crisp 2008).
Additionally, attribution of rates of change to traits rather than lineages is consistent
with the idea of developmental modularity.
One of Turner’s examples suggests that he thinks, in agreement with me, that
morphological stability, the first feature in his definition of living fossils, is a better
indication than molecular stability of slow rates of evolutionary change. Tuataras, a
reptile from New Zealand, were thought to be living fossils on the basis of morphological
stability, until researchers discovered that tuataras actually have a higher than average
rate of molecular evolution (Hay et al. 2008). Some have used this result to criticize
tuataras’ status as a living fossil (e.g., Carnall 2016). Turner (2019)’s first criticism of
this inference is that the Hay et al. (2008) study only uses mitochondrial DNA, which
15
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would not be expected to influence morphology (14). Turner’s next point is more relevant
for our purposes: he says that even if the study had used nuclear DNA, “developmental
processes might insulate morphology from rapid molecular change” and that “[r]apid
molecular change in the nuclear genome could also reflect selection pressures on aspects
of the organism, like the immune system, that never show up in the fossil record” (14).
These criticisms of the skeptics of tuataras’ living fossil status line up nicely with my
evaluation of the inference from morphological stability to genetic stability to a slow
evolutionary rate. Turner concludes that “in spite of the high rate of molecular change,
tuataras are a clear instance of a phylogenetic living fossil taxon” (15).4
However, Turner (2019) does not say that we can save the tuataras’ living fossil
status by appealing to a different idea of evolutionary rates. Indeed, his reconstruction of
the argument against tuataras counting as living fossils is that “living fossils must have
especially slow rates of evolutionary change, whereas the molecular evidence points
toward especially rapid evolution in tuataras” (14). Turner’s criticisms of this line of
reasoning challenge the idea that a slow rate of evolution is a necessary feature of a
living fossil taxa, rather than the idea that a slow rate of molecular change may not line
up with a slow rate of (character) evolution at all. Later, in discussing coelacanths
(another candidate for a living fossil taxon), Turner references “rates of morphological
change,” but does not equate these rates with rates of evolutionary change (16). Indeed,
Turner says that “morphological stability in certain characters is entirely compatible
with evolutionary change happening under the geological radar” (18). However, as I have
4Interestingly, Hay et al. (2008) also interpret their results about the faster-than-
expected rate of molecular evolution in tuataras as being evidence that “rates of neutral
molecular and phenotypic evolution are decoupled” (106).
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argued, morphological stability in certain characters is exactly not compatible with
evolutionary change happening on those characters. My suspicion is that Turner is
confusing rates of evolutionary change with rates of molecular change here.
Werth and Shear (2014) have a similar take on the case of tuataras. While Werth and
Shear do not think that evidence of a higher rate of molecular evolution in this lineage
disqualifies it as a living fossil taxon, they say that the high molecular rates “provide
strong evidence countering the misconception that living fossils have stopped evolving”
(438). In other words, Werth and Shear – like Turner – apparently want to maintain the
tuataras’ status as a living fossil by arguing that living fossils need not have a slow rate
of evolutionary change, rather than by claiming that rates of evolutionary change are
best measured at the level of traits and not genes, necessarily (although insofar as genes
are themselves traits, a rate of evolution could apply to them as well).5
One implication of focusing on the inference from morphological stability to slow
rates of evolutionary change is that it is not clear what the epistemic role evidence of
molecular stability in a lineage could have. Lidgard and Love (2018) say, “the primary
role of the living fossil concept is to mark out more precisely what requires explanation
in a given instance for a particular entity in order to account for morphological and
molecular stability or persistence over long periods of evolutionary time” (763, emphasis
added). If molecular stability does not let us infer an evolutionary rate (other than an
evolutionary rate at the molecular level itself), then why might we want to know about
5Note that Werth and Shear do acknowledge that “Some biologists speculate that mere
genetic change does not translate to evolutionary change” and that there is ”independence
between molecular and morphological evolution,” although they do not endorse this posi-
tion (439).
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molecular stability at all? Lidgard and Love have (at least) one interesting response: we
might want to know how molecular and morphological rates of change are related or
decoupled (766).
It is especially interesting that the inference to slow evolutionary rates from
morphological similarity is the most secure of those I have considered in this paper,
because Darwin (1859/1964)’s use of the term “living fossils” was in the context of
explaining why some lineages display slower rates of evolutionary change than others.
While Darwin’s explanation was that these lineages had been “exposed to less severe
competition” (107), and now we know that the reasons for stabilizing selection are more
complicated, he still made, by my account, the most reasonable inference from the
morphological similarity of extant and past taxa.
The various attempted inferences and critiques of these inferences examined in this
section are summarized in table 1.
4 Conclusion
This paper’s primary contribution has been to disambiguate the inferences that we can
justifiably make on the basis of classifying a taxon as a living fossil. In doing so, I have
specified some of the ways in which the living fossil concept may be epistemically useful.
This adds to claims that the living fossil concept is epistemically useful in other ways,
such as by identifying phenomena in need of explanation. I also intend to complement,
not supplant, accounts in which the living fossil concept is useful for non-epistemic
18
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Table 1: Summary.
reasons. One possible area for future research is identifying the ways in which the
epistemic and non-epistemic uses of the concept may interact. For instance, Turner
thinks that a living fossil taxon’s high contribution to phylogenetic diversity has
implications for conservation efforts. But we may need to address epistemic issues before
we are able to draw appropriate normative conclusions.
This paper has also served as an example of how developmental biology can be useful
for paleontologists. Historically, development hasn’t been given much consideration in
making claims about fossils, largely because fossil evidence does not include information
about developmental processes. Discussions of homology in general, which are relevant
19
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to persistence of lineage, involve the contributions of both paleontologists and
developmental biologists. Living fossils serve as another good example for how
considerations from developmental biology and paleontology could be productively
combined, because we have evidence about fossilized as well as living taxa. The
arguments I have made in this paper, such as those regarding developmental modularity,
may have other implications for paleontology outside of the context of living fossils, and
more generally point to the fertility of of exploring the intersection between
developmental biology and paleontology.
20
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Abstract 
Judging an act’s causal efficacy plays a crucial role in causal decision theory. A recent 
development appeals to the causal modeling framework with an emphasis on the analysis 
of intervention based on the causal Bayes net for clarifying what causally depends on our 
acts. However, few writers have focused on exploring the usefulness of extending 
structural causal models to decision problems that are not ideal for intervention analysis. I 
found that it is structural models, rather than intervention analysis, serves as a valuable 
formal tool for a range of realistic decision problems that involve mixed causal 
mechanisms. The thesis concludes that structural models provide a more general 
framework for rational decision-makers. 
 
1. Introduction  
Decision theories concern an agent’s rational choice in a decision problem, where 
the agent faces different acts to choose from but is uncertain about each act’s possible 
consequences. Suppose she knows about the possible consequences of her different acts, 















acquire the expected utility of each act by multiplying the probability and the utility of 
each possible consequence of an act, and then adding the results of all possible 
consequences of the act. Philosophers in decision theory contend that a rational choice for 
an agent is an option that maximizes expected utility. 
Causal decision theory (hereafter, CDT) endorses the principle of expected utility 
maximization, but holds that the agent must take the causal relevance of her acts to their 
outcomes into consideration. Proponents of CDT share the belief that rational agents 
should maximize expected utility based on the causal information relevant to their acts, 
but differ in what approach best captures an act’s causal efficacy.1 
Interventionist decision theory (hereafter, IDT) is a form of CDT because IDT also 
holds that the relevant information that matters to our decision should be causal, but IDT 
approaches an act’s causal efficacy through intervention analysis within the framework of 
causal modeling.2 Specifically, IDT holds that an agent should conceive of an act as an 
 
1 David Lewis, 1981, p. 11; James Joyce, 1999, pp. 146; Ralph Wedgwood, 2013, p. 2644; Arif Ahmed, 
2014, pp. 8-9; Paul Weirich, 2016. 
2 Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines (2000, pp. 47-53) and Judea Pearl (2009, pp. 23-4, 
70-4) claim that an intervention I as an external force sets X to certain values, and I neither causes any 
variable other than X nor is caused by any other variable in a causal model.  
More formally, intervention analysis is assessed by the theory of causal Bayes net. Variables 
(denoted by uppercase letters) represent tokens of events that serve as relata of (type level) causal relations, 
and these variables range over possible values (denoted by lowercase letters) that represent these events’ 
occurrence or non-occurrence, or a value if an event is of a quantity. A Bayesian causal model M is a triple 
<G, V, P>, where V is a set that contains variables whose causal relationships we are interested in studying, 
P is the probability distribution of each variable, and G is a directed acyclic graph. G consists of nodes that 
represent variables in M, and arrows between nodes that represent causal relations. If the value of a variable 
Y depends on X, then there will be a directed path from X to Y. P satisfies the causal Markov condition if 
and only if each variable Xi in V is independent of all other variables except Xi’s descendent given Xi’s 
parent PAi, where “Xi’s descendent” stands for the other variables in V that are causally downstream from 
Xi and “Xi’s parents” stand for Xi’s immediate causes. More specifically, P satisfies the causal Markov 
condition if and only if the following condition holds: P(X1, …, Xn) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝐴(𝑋𝑖))𝑖 , where X1, …, Xn 
are all variables in V, and “PAi” stands for “parents of Xi.”  
An intervention on Xj removes all its pre-existing cause and set it to a specific value. Hence, the 
intervention analysis is done by removing 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|𝑃𝐴(𝑋𝑗)) from the above joint distribution. This amounts to 















intervention that disables all pre-existing causes of the act in a decision problem.3,4 This 
is because causal models represent the causal details relevant to a decision-making 
context in a rigorous mathematical language. Hence, when engaging with a decision 
problem, one should use causal models to clarify one’s assumptions about the causal 
structure of the problem, the information that one has available, and the question one is 
asking. More importantly, by making use of causal models, one can distinguish causation 
from correlation.5  
IDT instructs rational agents to choose an act x that maximizes the interventionist 
expected utility (hereafter, IEU. See below.). Let Y be a random variable that ranges over 
possible outcomes, P be a rational agent s’s subjective probability function, do(X = x) be 
s’s intervention to make s do x, V(Y = y) be the utility of an outcome y, and IEU(x) be the 
interventionist expected utility of act x.6 Here is Pearl’s definition of IEU:7  
 
IEU(x) =df ∑y P(Y = y | do(X = x)) V(Y = y) 
 
This definition asserts that s should assess the expected utility of an outcome y based 
on evaluating the effect of the intervention to make s do x.  
 
intervention on Xj is obtained by the new joint distribution: P’(X1, …, Xn) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝐴(𝑋𝑖))𝑖∉𝑗 .  
3 See Christopher Meek and Clark Glymour, 1994, pp. 1007-8; Pearl, 2009, p. 70 and pp. 108-112; 
Christopher Hitchcock, 2016, pp. 1158-9; Reuben Stern, 2017, pp. 4139-42; Stern, 2018, pp. 2-3. Meek and 
Glymour (1994) claim that we may conceive of our acts as interventions only when we believe that our 
actions are not caused by circumstances beyond our control. See Hitchcock, 2016, p. 1166, and Stern, 2018, 
pp. 7-8.  
4 Note that the notion of “intervention” in this paper is not the same as James Woodward’s (2003, pp. 94-
98). In this paper, “intervention analysis” is understood in terms of manipulating the probability distribution 
in a causal model where the causal Markov condition holds. See footnote 2.  
5 Meek and Glymour, 1994; Pearl, 2009, section 4.1; Hitchcock, 2015, p. 1175; Stern, 2017, p. 4147.  
6 Pearl uses the do-operator to denote “intervention.”  
7 Pearl, 2009, p. 108. For similar proposals, see Meek and Glymour, 1994, pp. 1009-10; Hitchcock, 2016, 















Nevertheless, Pearl (2017 and forthcoming) recently proposes a new definition of 
expected utility in terms of structural causal models (hereafter, SCM) as decision-making 
conditionals. Call the definition of expected utility with an application of SCM “the 
structural expected utility” (hereafter, SEU):8 
 
SEU(x) =df ∑y P(Yx = y) V(Y = y) 
 
Pearl entitles P(Yx = y) as a SCM defined counterfactuals.9 This definition declares 
that s should evaluate the expected utility of act x by using an SCM analysis of causality.  
IEU and SEU are methodologically different approaches. They instruct the agent to 
use different procedures in evaluating the causal information of decision problems. For 
instance, IEU tells the agent to obtain the probability distribution and the corresponding 
causal graph of each variable in a decision problem.10 In contrast, SEU requires 
delineating functional relations between relevant variables to attain the causal structure.11 
They are nevertheless different methodologies for the agent to approach decision 
problems. 
This paper attempts to assess the scope of SEU and IEU, their effectiveness in 
making explicit the causal structure of decision problems. Previous work has only 
focused on IEU’s implications for some controversial examples in CDT, such as 
 
8 Pearl, 2017, p. 1 and forthcoming, p. 1. Note that Pearl (2009, p. 108) originally endorsed IEU. Also, 
Pearl sometimes uses P(Y = y | do(X = x)) and P(Yx = y) interchangebly in his writings because the later can 
be translated and computed by the former under several strong assumptions. Such translation would fail in 
some examples. See Pearl, 2009, pp.245-7, 289-93 and Pearl et al., 2016, pp. 107-116. 
9 Pearl, forthcoming, pp. 2-6. For the comparison between the causal modeling’s and Lewis’s accounts of 
counterfactuals, see Eric Hiddleston, 2005, Woodward, 2003, pp. 133-145, and Pearl, 2009, pp. 238-41, 
and Pearl, 2017. 
10 See footnote 2. 














Newcomb’s Problem and Psychopath Button, or issues of uncertainty about causal 
dependency.12 To the best of my knowledge, the distinction between IEU and SEU has 
not been dealt with in depth. The example in next section demonstrates that it is SEU, 
rather than IEU, serves as a valuable formal tool for a range of realistic decision problems 
that involve mixed causal mechanisms. Therefore, SEU provides a more general 
framework for rational decision-makers.  
The following sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
example of the Spinner and explains why IEU fails to deliver an intuitive result. Section 3 
gives a brief overview of SCM. Section 4 employs SCM to analyze the Spinner and 
shows how SCM and SEU, but not intervention analysis and IEU, deliver an intuitive 
result. 
2. The Spinner 
An agent has a chance to win a prize (called the reward). There is a spinner 
(drawn below) and an arrow in the circle. The agent may choose between two options 
“SAFE” and “ADD-X.” If the agent plays SAFE, the agent flicks the arrow and gains the 
value where the arrow stops. Since 40% of the time the arrow stops in area Z =1, 20% in 
area Z = 2, and 40% in area Z = 3, the expected average gain for the agent is 2 units of 
money. In contrast, option ADD-X allows the agent to increase the reward by X unit(s) of 
money for a small cost (much smaller than X) with the following rule: if the arrow stops 
in area Z = 1, Z will not be contributive, and the reward will have only X unit(s) of 
money. If the arrow stops in area Z = 3, Z will be contributive so the reward will have 3 + 
 















X units. However, if the arrow stops in area Z = 2, Z will be deleterious so the reward will 
have X  ̶  2 units.  
 
Figure 1. The Spinner 
 
Now, assessing the expected gain of option ADD-X is a complicated task.13 The 
spinner is a mixture of areas of Z that react differently to the agent’s choosing ADD-X. 
For example, Z is contributive to the reward in Z = 3, not contributive to the reward in 
area Z = 1, and deleterious to the reward in area Z = 2. The causal mechanisms of these 
areas differ from area to area because they exhibit different dispositions that manifest 
given the presence of the agent’s acting on ADD-X. 
Since the spinner consists of the areas with different dispositional properties, the 
intervention analysis has difficulty in accurately predicting the causal effect of choosing 
ADD-X. Simply put, intervention analysis is mostly assessed by the theory of causal 
Bayes net with the assumption that the relevant causal model satisfies the causal Markov 
condition. However, the procedure of computing the effect of acting on ADD-X as an 
 
13 This example is a modified case of “additive intervention.” Namely, one evaluates the effect of adding 
some amount from X without removing a pre-existing causal process of X. (In Newcomb's Spinner, I use X 
as an instrument variable, Y as some amount, Z as a preexisting cause of Y.) See Bill Shipley, 2016, pp. 9-
11, 50-4 and Pearl, 2009, section 11.4.4. Pearl et al. (2016, pp. 109-111) confirm that the effect of additive 


















intervention amounts to computing P(Y = y | do(X = q)), which does not fix the level of Z. 
Since the level of Z is not fixed, we may estimate the value of Z by the 
expectation (𝐸(𝑍)), and 𝐸(𝑍) = 2 in the Spinner. Thus, the intervention analysis implies 
that the agent should predict that acting on ADD-X as an intervention will always result 
in the worst case scenario: Z will be deleterious so the reward will have X  ̶  2 units. 
Nevertheless, this is certainly incorrect. For only 20% of the time the value of Z is 
deleterious to the reward, but 80% of the time the value of Z is not deleterious to the 
reward. It seems that ADD-X does not always lead to the worst causal scenario of the 
value of Z being deleterious. Intervention analysis is limited when it is not possible for 
the agent to intervene on a relevant feature that has a mixture of different causal 
mechanisms.14 
In the Spinner, the agent cannot intervene to fix the amount of the reward. For doing 
so is an intervention that removes the pre-existing rule of the spinner, but the agent must 
flick the arrow, and it is not up to the agent to fix the arrow on the spinner that consists of 
areas that react differently to adding X. Thus, it seems that the intervention analysis of 
choosing ADD-X is unfitting if the intervention analysis is insensitive to the variant 
causal properties across the circle that is not intervenable. Hence, the agent’s intervention 
analysis of choosing ADD-X is inaccurate, and it remains unclear whether the agent 
should choose SAFE or ADD-X. 
How do we evaluate the causal efficacy of an act when the world is a mixture of 
variant mechanisms in which the act causes different outcomes? Presumably, if the agent 
 
14 One cannot evaluate the causal efficacy of ADD-X by the analysis of interventions P(Y = y | do(X = x, Z 
= z)), P(Y = y | do(X + Z)), and P(Y = y | do(X − Z)). As stipulated in the example, it is not possible for the 















knows each area’s causal mechanism, she should evaluate the causal effects of her 
interventions area by area. Since the issue is predicting the expected gain of ADD-X, the 
agent should average the causal effects in each area by its proportion to the whole circle 
to derive the desired quantity. 
This paper puts forward a justification for applying SCM to evaluate an act’s causal 
efficacy in decision theory. The last question of the above example—how we evaluate the 
causal efficacy of an act when the world is a mixture of variant mechanisms in which the 
act causes different outcomes—calls for a SCM analysis. For this purpose, the above 
example provides an independent reason for employing SCM to define an act’s expected 
utility in decision theory, namely, SEU. In what follows, I will introduce SCM, which 
may be of use to a rational agent to accurately predict what is causally downstream from 
her acts. 
3. Structural Causal Models 
SCM can formally represent causal relations in a rigorous mathematical language. 
They conveniently represent an agent’s belief about causal relationships among variables 
of interest and the causal effect of an intervention. A prior development of SCM includes 
the work of the economist Herbert A. Simon who specialized in decision-making. In his 
influential papers, Simon argues that we can define a causal system as some functional 
relationships in a structure—a specific arrangement of variables and equations in fixing 
the sequence of computing their solutions.15 I will begin with a brief account of SCM. 
 















A structural causal model M consists of a quadruple <U, V, f , P>, where U is a set 
of exogenous (or background) variables, V is a set of endogenous variables. Exogenous 
variables represent background factors in M and are only determined by factors outside 
the model, and their values do not depend on the other variables in the model. In contrast, 
endogenous variables are determined only by the other variables in the model. f is a set of 
functions that assign each endogenous variable in V a value based on the values of the 
other variables in the model. P represents a probability distribution over all variables in 
U. Specifically, each function has the form:16  
Xi = fi (PAi, Ui), i = 1,…,n 
where Xi is an endogenous variable in V, PAi (which stands for “parents of Xi”) is 
a set of variables in V, Ui is an exogenous variable in U, and PAi and Ui together 
determine the value of Xi. Moreover, by assumption, each variable in V can only have one 
distinct equation that determines its value. Hence, each function represents an 
autonomous causal mechanism that predicts what value nature would assign to Xi in 
response to every possible value combination of (PAi, Ui). They are autonomous in the 
sense that one function fi continues to hold or remains undisrupted by external changes to 
the other functions in f. Hence, the causal relations in M are deterministic given a value 
assignment of Ui. Since every Xi is (partially or wholly) determined by at least one Ui and 
every Ui is not determined by any Xi in V, a value assignment of all Ui in U determines a 
unique value distribution over all Xi in V based on f. If P is the probability distribution 
 















over all exogenous variables, the probability distribution for the endogenous variables is 
also P.17, 18 
A structural causal model M corresponds to a causal graph G. If the value of a 
variable Y depends on X according to the function fY, then there will be a directed path 
from X to Y.19  
For the sake of illustration of SCM and an explicit representation of the causal 
relationships in the Spinner, I will use SCM to represent the Spinner, and demonstrate 
that the agent can accurately predict what is causally downstream of her acts in SCM’s 
expressions in the next section.  
4. Additive Intervention 
I use the linear SCM M1: <U, V, f , P> to represent the causal relationships in the 
Spinner. Let X, Y, Z be endogenous variables in V, and I, UZ be exogenous variables in 
U.20 These variables range over possible values (denoted by lowercase letters). X 
represents how much value the agent adds to the prize, Y represents the value of the 
reward, and Z represents the value that the arrow points to. The intervention variable I 
represents the agent’s intervention, and it is an exogenous variable because only outside 
factors (for example, the agent’s free will) determine its value. 
 
17 Simon, 1957, pp. 40-3, 54-6; Pearl, 2009, pp. 27-32, 205-6; Pearl et al, 2016, p. 98. 
18 A consequence of a structural causal model M is that the probability distribution of every variable in M 
satisfies the causal Markov condition (CMC). CMC holds in SCM under these further assumptions: (a) 
there is no causal loop in M, namely, the associated causal graph is acyclic; (b) the exogenous variables in 
U are jointly independent; (c) M includes every variable that is a cause of two or more other variables; and 
(d) if any two variables are dependent, then one is a cause of the other or there is a third variable causing 
both. See Pearl, 2009, p. 30; Daniel Steel, 2005, p. 10. 
19 Pearl, 2009, p. 203. 














In the Spinner, X can increase the prize Y, and Z also causally affects Y’s value. 
The causal graph G1 of this model M1 is figure 2: 
 
Figure 2. The causal graph G1 of the Spinner with some exogenous variables omitted. 
The following functions represent the causal relations between these variables: 
fX: X = {𝑞, 0}  
fZ: Z = 𝑈𝑍  
fY: Y = { 𝑍 𝑖𝑓 𝑋 = 0𝑋  𝑖𝑓 𝑋 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍 < 2𝑋 − 𝑍  𝑖𝑓 𝑋 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 + 𝑋  𝑖𝑓 𝑋 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍 > 2 
UZ is an exogenous variable that determines the value of Z. The probability 
distribution of UZ is the composition of the spinner: P(UZ = 1) = 0.4, P(UZ = 2) = 0.2, and 
P(UZ = 3) = 0.4. Also, X = q represents the agent’s action to add q to the reward; X = 0 
represents the agent’s action to add nothing to the reward.  
Next, fX stands for the causal mechanism that specifies how the agent decides to add 
value to the reward: if she decides to add q amount of value, X will be set to q. If she 
decides to add nothing, X will be set to 0.  
fY stands for how X and Z determine the amount of the reward: if the agent adds no 
value (X = 0), then the value of Y will equal Z. If the agent adds some value (X > 0), but Z 















2, then the amount of Y will be X − Z. If the agent adds some value, and Z is larger than 2, 
then the value of Y will be Z + X. This function fY demonstrates different mechanisms in 
which Z reacts differently to the added value X in the process of determining the reward 
Y.  
Turning now to the question of how an agent predicts the overall causal effects of 
choosing ADD-X. The diverse areas have varied types of causal mechanisms represented 
by several levels of Z. In the Spinner, the circle consists of areas with three levels of Z: 
40% is Z =1, 20% is Z =2, and 40% is Z = 3. One can estimate the results in each level of 
Z and averages these effects by the probability distribution of Z.21 I now turn to explain 
how this sort of prediction is done in M1.  
One may use P(Yx = y| Z = z) to represent the probability that an outcome y would 
obtain conditional on the action X = x in a structural model updated by Z = z.22 Given a 
structural model M and observed information Z = z, one can evaluate the conditional P(Yx 
= y | Z = z) in three steps:23, 24 
(1) Abduction: Conditionalize on the evidence z to determine the value of the 
variables in U. 
(2) Action: Replace the equations corresponding to variables in set X by the 
equation X = x. 
(3) Prediction: Use the modified model and the updated value of the variables in 
U to compute the value of Y. 
 
 
21 In cases where experimental units manifest variant dispositional properties, Spirtes, et al. (2000, p.165-7) 
also cite similar calculations to obtain predictions.  
22 P(Yx = y) is a subjunctive conditional. “P(Yx = y)” stands for the probability that, had an intervention do(X 
= x) been performed, an outcome Y = y would obtain. 
23 The following procedure draws from David Galles and Pearl (1998), Pearl (2009, pp. 202-6), and Pearl et 
al. (2016, pp. 92-8). Joseph Halpern (2000) provide another detailed account of causal inferences in SCM. 
For the sake of simplicity, I will skip some unnecessary technical details. Note that this is different from 
Woodward’s notion of causality analyzed with counterfactual interventions.  














The first step uses the information Z = z about the situation to fix the values of the 
exogenous variables in U. In particular, each value assignment of variables in U is the 
defining characteristic of a single individual or situation. For example, in the model M1, a 
value assignment Ui = ui stands for the identity of the agent and the spinner. The second 
step stands for the minimal modification of the model M that replaces fX with X = x. The 
third step predicts the value of Y based on the modified M and the updated values of U.  
Returning to the question posed in the Spinner, it is now possible to answer the 
agent’s question of assessing SEU of choosing ADD-X by SCM. First, the agent updates 
her value assignment of U from the supposition that Z = 1, 2, or 3 and identifies UZ. Next, 
she carries over the updated value of UZ to the model M1 modified by X = q. Finally, she 
predicts the value of Y by finding a solution to the following equations: 
fX: X = q 
fZ: Z = 𝑈𝑍  
fY: Y = { 𝑍 𝑖𝑓 𝑋 = 0𝑋  𝑖𝑓 𝑋 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍 < 2𝑋 − 𝑍  𝑖𝑓 𝑋 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 + 𝑋  𝑖𝑓 𝑋 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍 > 2 
Next, she can predict that had she added q unit(s) to the reward when Z = 1, the 
reward would be q. Equally, she can also predict that had she added q unit(s) to the 
reward when Z = 2, the reward would be q   ̶ 2. Had she added q unit(s) to the reward 
when Z = 3, the reward would be q + 3. Given that 40% of the time Z =1, 20% of the time 
Z =2, and 40% of the time Z = 3, the SEU of “ADD X” would be q + 0.8 minus the fee 
that the agent has to pay. Recall that the expected value of the reward if the agent plays 














unit of money to add X > 1.3 to the reward, she will be quite confident that option ADD-
X is preferable to option SAFE. 
The implication is that facilitating SCM and deriving SEU in the Spinner and 
similar situations is more fitting than intervention analysis. As demonstrated in the 
Spinner, the approach of SCM captures the mixture of variant causal mechanisms 
specified by the probability distribution of Z and the function fy, and thereby obtains more 
accurate characterizations of each area’s causal property and the causal efficacy of 
choosing ADD-X. Hence, in cases where an agent observes different causal properties 
that are not intervenable across the population in the real world, the agent might more 
adequately make statements about her acts’ causal efficacy in SCM’s mathematical 
terms.   
The cases of mixed causal properties are realistic, but often not ideal for intervention 
analysis that is appropriate when most members of a population share invariant causal 
profiles. These cases are common when an act causally affects an extensive system. For 
example, a socioeconomic policy affects diverse citizens; an educational program affects 
numerous students; a business decision affects countless customers; an approved drug 
affects various patients. It would seem that these complicated situations are not rare in 
decision problems. 
In this paper, I have identified the example of the Spinner which underlines the 
importance of SCM and SEU. In that example, the characterization of the causal effect of 
the act delivered by IEU and the characterization delivered by SEU diverge and the 
latter—not the former—seems intuitively correct. Moreover, the language of SCM and 















to make necessary mathematical statements that relate directly to various causal 
dispositions in the real world.25 The theoretical implication of the Spinner is that SEU is 
recommended in similar situations, and that SEU might be a foundation for a more 
general decision theory. 
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Abstract
Models developed using machine learning (ML) are increasingly prevalent in 
scientific research. Because many of these models are opaque, techniques from 
Explainable AI (XAI) have been developed to render them transparent. But XAI is 
more than just the solution to the problems that opacity poses—it also plays an 
invaluable exploratory role. In this paper, we demonstrate that current XAI 
techniques can be used to (1) better understand what an ML model is a model of, 
(2) engage in causal inference over high-dimensional nonlinear systems, and (3) 
generate algorithmic-level hypotheses in cognitive science.
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1. Introduction
Models developed using machine learning (“ML models”) are increasingly prevalent
in scientific research. In neuroscience, ML-programmed classifiers are used to 
specify the representational contents of brain states and to predict human 
behavior from fMRI data (Ritchey et al. 2017). In astrophysics, classifiers trained on 
telescope imagery are used to determine the possible location of exoplanets 
(Datillo et al. 2019). In materials science, machine learning is used to discover 
stable materials and to predict their crystal structure (Schmidt et al. 2019).
Recent discussions have focused on the fact that many ML models are opaque 
(Humphreys 2009). Loosely speaking, a model is opaque when it is difficult to 
understand why it does what it does or to know how it works. Recent attempts to 
assess the impact of opacity generally agree that opacity prevents different 
stakeholders1 from achieving goals such as intervening on the system when it 
breaks down, or evaluating its behavior against ethical and legal norms (Burrell 
2016; Hohman et al. 2018; Zednik 2019).
In philosophy of science, the most important stakeholder is the scientific 
investigator. Scientific investigators are known to use ML models to achieve 
epistemic goals such as describing a phenomenon (e.g., distinguishing the fMRI 
signatures of fear and excitement), predicting new observations (e.g., determining 
the probable location of an exoplanet), and explaining observed data (e.g., 
identifying a causal link between smoking and lung cancer). Opacity can negatively 
impact scientific research by preventing investigators from using ML models to 
achieve some or all of these epistemic goals.
That said, little is known about the positive impact of recent attempts to overcome
opacity through Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). This nascent research 
program aims to develop analytic techniques with which to render opaque models 
transparent by answering questions about why they do what they do or how they 
work.2 Whereas these techniques’ importance for industry and governance is 
becoming increasingly apparent (Doran et al. 2017; Wachter et al. 2018), their 
utility for scientific research remains uncertain.
This paper argues that Explainable AI can play an invaluable but hitherto 
unrecognized role in scientific exploration. Recent discussions of exploration 
distinguish at least four distinct but not mutually exclusive aspects (for discussion 
see e.g., Gelfert 2016): identifying a starting point for future inquiry; providing a 
proof-of-principle demonstration; providing a potential explanation of a specific 
(type of) phenomenon; and assessing the suitability of a particular target. Whereas 
previous contributions have considered the exploratory role of ML models in their 
own right (e.g., Cichy & Kaiser 2019), little is known about the unique exploratory 
utility of Explainable AI.
1 Tomsett et al. (2018) provide a helpful taxonomy of stakeholders in the ML ecosystem, 
distinguishing between creators, data-subjects, operators, executors, decision-subjects, and 
examiners.
2 Although Humphreys (2009) and several others claim that some ML models are essentially opaque,
the present discussion is agnostic with respect to this claim. That is, it only concerns models that 
can in fact be rendered transparent through Explainable AI, however numerous these may be. 
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The following discussion describes three ways in which Explainable AI facilitates 
scientific exploration. Section 2 shows that some XAI techniques are well-suited 
for determining what ML models are models of, and thus, for assessing a model’s 
suitability for a particular target. Section 3 shows that other XAI techniques can be 
used for causal inference, and thus, for specifying starting points for future inquiry 
into the causes of a particular event. Finally, section 4 shows how Explainable AI 
can be used to generate novel hypotheses about the algorithms that are 
implemented in biological brains, and thus, to provide potential explanations. 
Importantly, in each one of these ways, XAI techniques’ exploratory contributions 
can be distinguished from the contributions of the ML models to which these 
techniques are applied. Thus, more than just being a solution to the problem that 
opacity poses, Explainable AI enhances the overall exploratory potential of 
machine learning and data-driven scientific inquiry.
2. Determining What a Model is a Model Of
In a recent commentary, Emily Sullivan (2019) examines the use of ML models in 
scientific research. Although she denies that opacity negatively impacts these 
models’ scientific utility, Sullivan argues that their link uncertainty does. Sullivan 
defines link uncertainty as “a lack of scientific and empirical evidence supporting 
the link that connects the model to the target phenomenon” (Sullivan 2019: 1). In 
other words, link uncertainty arises when it is unclear what a model is a model of. 
As an illustrative example, Sullivan considers Deep Patient: a DNN that learns to 
map patients’ features onto likely diseases (Miotto et al. 2016). Her point is to 
argue that, although the network issues reliable diagnostic predictions, the 
understanding that medical scientists can acquire from this model is limited. This is
because it is unclear whether the model tracks genuinely causal relationships 
between patient features and likely diseases, or whether it is merely exploiting 
spurious correlations grounded in (for example) the fact that patients with certain 
features are tested more frequently than others.
Although Sullivan distinguishes link uncertainty from opacity, it is more 
appropriate to consider link uncertainty a special kind of opacity. Recall that a 
model is opaque when it is unclear why the model does what it does or how it 
works. Sullivan’s discussion only concerns a lack of knowledge about how a model 
works. In particular, it is concerned with a lack of knowledge about a model’s 
implementation in some particular programming language—an epistemic state 
that is all but guaranteed by the software-engineering practice of encapsulation 
(Mitchell 2002). This “implementation opacity” is problematic for expert creators 
(e.g., software developers) tasked with intervening on a model to improve its 
performance or to fix a bug. However, it is unproblematic for non-expert decision-
subjects (e.g., medical patients) and examiners (e.g., governmental regulators), 
neither of which would know what to do with knowledge of a model’s 
implementation even if they had it.
That said, stakeholders such as decision-subjects and examiners are also affected 
by opacity, albeit one that centers on questions about why a model does what it 
does, rather than on questions about how it works. Questions of this kind are 
answered not by specifying details of the model’s implementation, but by 
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justifying the model’s behavior through reasons (Zerilli et al. 2018). Unlike a 
model’s implementation details, which concern the syntactic structures specified in
a computer program, reasons in this context are individuated semantically, by 
reference to the environmental features and regularities that the model has 
learned to track (Zednik 2019). Thus, the reason why Deep Patient predicts that 
type-2 diabetes is likely to develop in a particular patient may be that the patient is
overweight (a good reason), or that she is of advanced age (a bad reason). When 
Sullivan writes about link uncertainty, she is referring to a particular kind of 
opacity: an inability to understand the reasons for an ML model’s predictions.
Given this analysis, Sullivan’s claim that “implementation opacity” does not 
negatively impact scientific research is unsurprising: Scientific investigators are 
more like examiners than creators. They do not generally require knowledge of 
how a model works. Rather, they are interested in understanding why it does what 
it does. For this reason, although a lack of implementation knowledge is no 
obstacle to scientific research, link uncertainty is.
But of course, exposing link uncertainty as a special kind of opacity is little more 
than a verbal clarification. Far more important is the question of whether (and if so
how) this particular kind of opacity might eventually be overcome. Can Explainable 
AI help scientific investigators determine what a model is a model of? Moreover, to
what extent does overcoming this kind of opacity contribute to scientific 
exploration?
Many XAI techniques specialize in providing semantically-individuated reasons for 
a particular model’s outputs. Most notably, these include techniques for 
identifying the input elements—be they pixels in an image or values in a table—
that bear a high responsibility for a particular output. For example, visualization 
techniques such as Prediction Difference Analysis (PDA, Zintgraf et al. 2017) allow 
investigators to understand the regularity that is being tracked by visually 
inspecting a heatmap. Do the highlighted pixel regions for a model of cancerous 
melanoma generally look like the features that are actually characteristic of 
cancerous melanoma, or do they look more like irrelevant (but nevertheless 
correlated) features such as freckles? Moreover, do the highlighted pixel regions of
the model look like features that are already known to be indicators of cancerous 
melanoma, or do they depict hitherto unknown (but causally relevant) indicators?
Analogous non-visual techniques may be required for models trained over tabular 
data. For example, Shapley Additive Explanation (SHAP, Lundberg & Lee 2017) ranks
a model’s input variables by their relative importance for producing specific 
outputs. Do Deep Patient’s predictions of type-2 diabetes depend more on 
(causally relevant) factors such as a patient’s weight and family background, or on 
(spuriously correlated) factors such as age? Moreover, do the predictions depend 
on factors whose relevance for type-2 diabetes is already known, or do they 
depend on factors whose relevance has thus far gone unrecognized? Notably, 
because the model’s input elements (e.g., pixel regions and table values) 
correspond to features of its environment (e.g., skin discoloration and patient 
features), they can be viewed as semantically-individuated reasons for the model’s 
outputs. Insofar as techniques such as PDA and SHAP let investigators understand 
these reasons, they allow them to understand what an ML model is a model of. In 
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this sense, these techniques can be used to combat link uncertainty.
Notably, Sullivan herself mentions some of these techniques in passing. 
Nevertheless, she stops short of recognizing their full significance for scientific 
exploration. In particular, although Sullivan argues that heatmaps are useful for 
“determining the suitability of the model” (Sullivan 2019: 25) because they can 
allow investigators to determine which regularity it has learned to track, she does 
not recognize that these techniques can also be used to identify such regularities 
in the first place. Indeed, ML models are renowned for their ability to uncover 
subtle and unintuitive regularities that would be difficult to uncover otherwise. By 
using techniques such as PDA and SHAP to better understand what ML models are 
models of—that is, to identify the regularities they have learned to track—
scientific investigators can discover previously unknown regularities in the 
environment.
3. Enabling Causal Inference
The examples of link uncertainty mentioned by Sullivan are ones in which it is 
unclear whether the model has learned to track causal relationships as opposed to 
spurious correlations. But although XAI techniques such as PDA and SHAP allow 
investigators to determine which particular regularity is being tracked, they do not 
help determine whether any particular regularity is in fact a causal regularity. Put 
differently, these techniques do not enable causal inference.
Other XAI techniques can be used for exactly this purpose. Consider techniques 
that provide what Wachter et al. (2018) call counterfactual explanations. 
Counterfactual explanations specify possible worlds in which variations in a 
model’s input yield non-actual (and possibly, desirable) outputs. A recent software 
tool for providing counterfactual explanations is the Counterfactory.3 Given a 
model and input, this tool generates counterfactuals of arbitrary closeness 
(distance to actual input values) and complexity (number of input variables) to 
produce a desired but non-actual output. Thus for example, given a bank’s credit-
scoring model, the Counterfactory might generate counterfactuals for achieving 
an improved credit score: increasing income, decreasing monthly expenses, or 
some combination of both.
XAI techniques for counterfactual explanation can be used for causal inference, 
that is, for inferring the cause(s) of a particular effect. To understand how, it is 
worth briefly reviewing the close connection between counterfactual reasoning 
and causal inference. Consider an actual scenario in which event C (e.g. the striking 
of a match) precedes event E (e.g. the match catching fire), over an arbitrary 
number of background conditions B (e.g. the surrounding temperature being 19°C, 
there being oxygen in the air, etc.). Assuming that all B remain constant, one can 
infer that C is causally relevant for E if and only if a counterfactual change in C co-
occurs with a change in E.
Causal inference can serve the purposes of many different stakeholders. Decision-
subjects can assume a degree of control over model-driven decisions if they can 
3
 Proprietary technology currently being developed by the neurocat GmbH: 
https://www.neurocat.ai/ (retrieved August 18th, 2020).
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infer the changes to make so as to effect a different model output (e.g., whether 
they need to earn more to improve their credit score). Examiners can assess a 
model’s compliance with ethical or legal norms if they can determine the causal 
relevance of certain key variables (e.g., whether credit scoring causally depends on 
gender or ethnicity). More relevant in the present context, scientific investigators 
can engage in causal inference to determine whether the regularity being tracked 
by a model is in fact a causal regularity. If a software tool can generate 
counterfactuals in which a change in E is predicted from a change in C, 
investigators might infer (assuming all B remain equal) that the learned 
relationship between C and E is genuinely causal as opposed to merely correlative.
Of course, the differences between the industrial and scientific contexts are 
significant. In industry, what matters is (typically) the model itself. In such contexts,
XAI techniques for counterfactual explanation are perfect guides to causal 
inference: If the Counterfactory generates a counterfactual in which a higher 
income yields an improved credit score, then a higher income will actually yield an 
improved credit score. In science, by contrast, what matters is (typically) the 
domain that the model is a model of. Accordingly, in these contexts, XAI 
techniques for counterfactual explanation are imperfect guides to causal 
inference: If the Counterfactory generates a counterfactual in which losing weight 
yields a reduced probability of type 2-diabetes, then it is still possible that losing 
weight does not actually reduce the probability of type-2 diabetes. Because 
scientific models can be false, the causal inferences grounded on these models are 
insecure.
That said, the insecurity of XAI-driven causal inference does not render it useless 
for scientific research. On the contrary, it can serve an invaluable exploratory 
purpose. In particular, XAI techniques for counterfactual explanation can be used 
to refine extant causal hypotheses as well as to generate new ones. Consider the 
hypothesis that excessive weight is causally relevant for type 2-diabetes. This is a 
well-confirmed hypothesis, despite the fact that many overweight people never 
actually become diabetic (Wu et al. 2014). Nevertheless, it may be desirable to 
subsume the exceptions under a more-refined hypothesis. Indeed, applying the 
Counterfactory to Deep Patient might suggest suitable refinements. For example, 
counterfactuals generated for a desired outcome of less-probable diabetes might 
combine weight-loss with an additional factor, such as an absence of sleep apnea. 
Motivated by these counterfactuals, scientists might conduct further experiments, 
and if necessary, refine the original hypothesis so that excessive weight is only 
deemed causally relevant when it co-occurs with sleep apnea. In this (admittedly 
hypothetical) scenario, XAI-driven causal inference identified a starting point for 
scientific inquiry: generating new hypotheses, devising potential explanations, and 
inspiring new experiments.
Notably, XAI-driven causal inferences can perform this exploratory function in 
almost any scientific domain in which ML models have been developed for 
predictive purposes. In synthetic biology, for example, investigators may deploy 
such inferences to identify and test genetic modifications that are likely to yield 
desirable phenotypic traits (Ma et al. 2018). Analogously, in chemistry they might 
use XAI techniques for counterfactual explanation to discover new compounds 
with desirable (e.g., pharmaceutical) properties (Zhavoronkov 2018). Given the 
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increasingly important role that machine learning plays in many different scientific 
domains, the exploratory promise of XAI-driven causal inference is tantalizing.
Before moving on, it is worth dwelling briefly on the kinds of domains for which 
XAI-driven causal inference might be particularly useful. Software tools such as the
Counterfactory are remarkably efficient even for high-dimensional nonlinear 
DNNs, can be applied to any model-type and a wide variety of use-cases, and can 
generate counterfactuals even for intrinsically high-dimensional data-types such as
naturalistic images. Given that ML models are capable of tracking high-dimensional
and nonlinear regularities in complex systems such as the brain or the climate, such
tools (assuming the relevant model is approximately true) might facilitate causal 
inference even for systems of such high levels of complexity. If true, this would be 
a significant achievement indeed: high-dimensionality and nonlinearity are among 
the biggest obstacles for traditional causal inference methods, which tend to work 
well only when the variables are few and the relationships are linear (Bühlmann 
2013). Insofar as ML models can be trained to replicate the behavior of ever larger 
and more complex systems, and insofar as XAI techniques can be used to 
counterfactually explain the behavior of these models, Explainable AI is poised to 
significantly extend the limits of causal inference.
4. Generating Algorithmic-Level Hypotheses
Techniques from Explainable AI can perform at least one more exploratory role: 
generating algorithmic-level hypotheses that serve as potential explanations. The 
notion of an algorithmic-level hypothesis requires elaboration. Some physical 
systems—most notably biological brains—are computational systems insofar as 
they perform computational tasks in their surrounding environments (Shagrir 
2006). Although these systems can be described at a physical level of analysis, by 
specifying the spatiotemporal structures and processes that underlie their 
behavior, it is often more insightful to describe them at an algorithmic level of 
analysis, by specifying the algorithms they execute in the service of the task (Marr 
1982). Indeed, cognitive science is to a large extent in the business of formulating 
testable hypotheses about the structure, efficiency, and representational content 
of algorithms that biological organisms use to accomplish cognitive tasks such as 
perception, categorization, memory-formation, and language-learning. Notably, 
although many such hypotheses have been articulated and evaluated in the past, 
there is no general agreement about the way in which new algorithmic-level 
hypotheses should be developed in the future. To a certain extent, cognitive 
modeling remains an inscrutable “dark art”.
Explainable AI may help transform this “dark art” into a semi-autonomous 
exploratory process. Specifically, XAI techniques can facilitate the specification of 
algorithms to test as possible explanatory hypotheses. Indeed, given that many ML
models are trained to perform tasks that closely resemble the ones that are 
performed by biological cognizers, and given that these models are often trained 
on naturalistic datasets that mirror the real-world environments in which those 
cognizers develop and learn, it is at least not wholly unreasonable to assume that 
ML models might implement algorithms that bear at least some similarity to the 
algorithms that are implemented in biological brains (see also Zednik 2018). 
Insofar as XAI techniques allow cognitive scientists to understand and describe the 
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algorithms that are learned by a particular model, they can also be used to 
articulate new and hitherto unconsidered hypotheses about the algorithms that 
are learned by biological brains.
At this point, it may be necessary to clarify why XAI should be necessary at all, 
within the context of understanding the algorithms that are learned by ML-
programmed models. Although human programmers typically decide on a model’s 
learning algorithm, they have limited influence on the structure and function of 
what might be called the learned algorithm. For example, although they might 
train a DNN using some variant of the backpropagation algorithm, they do not 
determine the values that this algorithm (when applied to a particular learning 
environment) eventually assigns to individual network parameters (e.g., 
connection weights). Since it is these parameters that govern the model’s output 
for any particular input, they implement a learned algorithm for computing a 
particular function. But what exactly this algorithm is, and how it might be 
characterized in a concise, understandable (and potentially modifiable) way, is 
obscured by the fact that the number of network parameters is high and their 
interdependencies are nonlinear. 
Notably, whereas the XAI techniques considered in previous sections serve to 
answer questions about why an ML model does what it does by specifying reasons, 
the techniques to be considered here answer questions about how such a model 
works by uncovering algorithms. One way of uncovering algorithms is by using any 
one of a diverse family of surrogate modeling techniques. These techniques specify 
(relatively) simple algorithms to replicate (to an arbitrary degree of precision) an 
opaque model’s overt behavior and internal processing. In particular, rule-
extraction methods (e.g., Zilke et al. 2016) produce rule lists that approximate the 
input-output behavior of any high-dimensional DNN. Similarly tree-extraction 
methods (e.g., Wu et al. 2018) produce decision-trees that replicate the internal 
decision-structure of complex and (even recurrent) neural networks.
Intriguingly, these surrogate models bear a structural resemblance to classic 
“symbolic” models that were used widely in cognitive science throughout the 
1960s, 70s and 80s. Because some of these models remain in use today, it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that surrogate models for explaining the behavior of 
trained ML models might be advanced as candidate hypotheses for explaining the 
behavior of biological cognizers. That said, many areas of cognitive science have by
now moved on to “subsymbolic” methods that more closely resemble the methods 
commonly used by neuroscientists. Indeed, some of these methods may even serve
double-duty, simultaneously explaining the behavior of biological brains and of 
artificial neural networks.
Consider, for example, representational similarity analysis (RSA, Kriegeskorte & 
Kievit 2013; Kriegeskorte et al. 2008). RSA is an integrative technique for data-
analysis that lets neuroscientists relate multi-channel brain-activity data to each 
other, to behavioral data, to data produced by conceptual and computational 
models, and to stimulus descriptions by comparing (representational) dissimilarity 
matrices (RDMs). Cichy et al. (2016) have recently deployed this technique to 
compare temporal and spatial brain representations with representations in a 
deep feed-forward neural network trained for object categorization. That is, they 
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aim to use RSA to identify a DNN’s learned representations for object-recognition, 
and to determine whether these representations bear a structural similarity to the 
brain’s representations in an analogous task.
How exactly is this aim achieved? First, for each signal space (DNN, fMRI, and MEG) 
Cichy et al. estimate the representational activity patterns associated with 118 
experimental stimuli (images of natural objects over real-world backgrounds). 
Second, for each signal space of every pair of experimental stimuli, they compute 
the activity pattern dissimilarity. This yields 118-by-118 RDMs (each one of which 
contains the dissimilarity values for all experimental stimuli-pairs) for every DNN 
layer, every fMRI region-of-interest or searchlight, and every millisecond in the 
MEG signal. Third, DNN RDMs are directly compared to fMRI or MEG RDMs by 
calculating the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between them, yielding a 
relatively easy measure of brain-DNN representational similarity. In this way, RSA 
permits a specification of the representations that are used by both the DNN and 
the brain, and a subsequent comparison of these representations at the level of 
RDMs.
Indeed, the comparison reveals that “the DNN captured the stages of human visual
processing in both time and space from early visual areas towards the dorsal and 
ventral streams” (ibid.: 1). Moreover, a close analysis of the representational 
structures in the DNN supports a series of specific empirical predictions:
“Our results demonstrate the explanatory and discovery power of the brain-
DNN comparison approach to understand the spatio-temporal neural 
dynamics underlying object recognition. They provide novel evidence for a 
role of parietal cortex in visual object categorization, and give rise to the 
idea that the organization of the visual cortex may be influenced by 
processing constraints imposed by visual categorization the same way that 
DNN representations were influenced by object categorization tasks.” (ibid.: 
9)
Overall, although (or perhaps because) RSA was originally developed by 
neuroscientists to investigate representations in the brain, this technique may not 
only be used to explain the behavior of trained neural networks, but also to 
generate and test algorithmic-level hypotheses about biological brains. Notably, in 
this particular case, the generated hypothesis seems likely to be confirmed, 
suggesting that XAI may not only facilitate exploration, but also explanation.
5. Conclusion
Models developed using Machine Learning are assuming an increasingly prominent
place in scientific research. Many recent discussions recognize the problem that 
opacity poses to the use of such models, and some of these discussions have 
begun to reflect on the possibility of solving this problem through the use of 
Explainable AI. However, Explainable AI appears to be more than just a solution to 
a problem. This paper has sought to show that XAI techniques can serve an 
invaluable exploratory role in their own right, over and above the ML models to 
which these techniques are applied.
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In particular, tools such as PDA and SHAP have been shown to answer questions 
about why a model does what it does. Thus, they allow scientific investigators to 
better understand what a model is a model of, and to assess its suitability for a 
particular target. Moreover, XAI techniques for counterfactual explanation have 
been shown to enable causal inference—perhaps even over domains that are at 
once high-dimensional and nonlinear. In this way, these techniques reveal new 
starting points for scientific inquiry: new hypotheses to test, and new experiments 
to conduct. Finally, surrogate modeling techniques and analytic techniques such as 
RSA can be used to better understand the algorithms and representations that are 
learned by models to accomplish particular tasks. Insofar as there is reason to 
believe that these algorithms might also be implemented in biological brains, they 
can be advanced as potential explanations in cognitive science. For all of these 
reasons and more, Explainable AI is a promising new tool for scientific exploration.
6. References
Burrell, J. (2016). How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine 
learning algorithms. Big Data & Society, 3(1), 205395171562251.
Bühlmann, P. (2013). Causal statistical inference in high dimensions. Mathematical 
Methods in Operations Research, 77(3), 357–370.
Cichy, R. M., Khosla, A., Pantazis, D., Torralba, A., & Oliva, A. (2016). Comparison of 
deep neural networks to spatio-temporal cortical dynamics of human visual object 
recognition reveals hierarchical correspondence. Scientific Reports, 6, 27755.
Cichy, R. M. & Kaiser, D. (2019). Deep neural networks as scientific models. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 23(4), 305–317.
Dattilo, A. et al. (2019). Identifying exoplanets with deep learning II: Two new 
super-earths uncovered by a neural network in K2 data. arXiv, 1903.10507.
Doran, D., Schulz, S., & Besold, T. R. (2017). What does explainable AI really mean? A
new conceptualization of perspectives. arXiv, 1710.00794.
Gelfert, A. (2016). How to do science with models. A philosophical primer. Springer: 
Dordrecht.
Hohman, F. M., Kahng, M., Pienta, R., & Chau, D. H. (2018). Visual analytics in deep 
learning: An interrogative survey for the next frontiers. IEEE Transactions on 
Visualization and Computer Graphics.
Humphreys, P. (2009). The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods. 
Synthese, 169(3), 615–626.
Kriegeskorte, N., Mur, M., & Bandettini, P. (2008). Representational similarity 
analysis – connecting the branches of systems neuroscience. Frontiers in Systems 
Neuroscience, 2(4), 1–28.
Kriegeskorte, N. & Kievit, R. A. (2013). Representational geometry: Integrating 
cognition, computation, and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 401–412.
10
Baltimore, MD; 18-22 Nov 2020 -665-
Lundberg, S. M. & Lee, S. (2017). A unified approach to interpreting model 
predictions. arXiv, 1705.07874v2.
Ma, W., Qiu, Z., Song, J., Li, J., Cheng, Q., Zhai, J., & Ma, C. (2018). A deep 
convolutional neural network approach for predicting phenotypes from 
genotypes. Planta, 248(5), 1307–1318.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation 
and processing of visual information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miotto, R., Li, L., Kidd, B. A. and Dudley, J. T. (2016). Deep patient: An unsupervised 
representation to predict the future of patients from the electronic health records.
Scientific Reports, 6(1), 1–10.
Mitchell, J. C. (2002). Concepts in programming languages. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Ritchie, J. B., Kaplan, D.M. & Klein, C. (2019). Decoding the brain: neural 
representation and the limits of multivariate pattern analysis in cognitive 
neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70(2): 581-607.
Rudin, C. (2019). Stop explaining black box machine learning models for high stakes
decisions and use interpretable models instead. Nature Machine Intelligence, 1(5), 
206–215.
Schmidt, J., Marques, M. R. G., Botti, S. et al. (2019). Recent advances and 
applications of machine learning in solid-state materials science. npj Computational
Materials, 5, 83.
Shagrir, O. (2006). Why we view the brain as a computer. Synthese, 153(3): 393–416.
Sullivan, E. (2019). Understanding from machine learning models. The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, axz035.
Tomsett, R., Braines, D., Harborne, D., Preece, A., & Chakraborty, S. (2018). 
Interpretable to whom? A role-based model for analyzing interpretable machine 
learning systems. arXiv, 1806.07552.
Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. & Russell, C. (2018). Counterfactual explanations 
without opening the black box: Automated decisions and the GDPR. Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology, 31(2).
Wu, Y., Ding, Y., Tanaka, Y. & Zhang, W. (2014). Risk factors contributing to type 2 
diabetes and recent advances in the treatment and prevention. International 
Journal of Medical Sciences 11(11): 1185-1200.
Wu, M., Hughes, M. C., Parbhoo, S., Zazzi, M., Roth, V., & Doshi-Velez, F. (2018). 
Beyond sparsity: Tree regularization of deep models for interpretability. arXiv, 
1711.06178v1.
Zednik, C. (2018). Will machine learning yield machine intelligence? In V. Müller 
(ed.) Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. PT-AI 2017. Studies in 
11
PSA2020: The 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -666-
Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 44. Springer: Cham
Zednik, C. (2019). Solving the black box problem: A normative framework for 
explainable artificial intelligence. Philosophy & Technology.
Zerilli, J., Knott, A., Maclaurin, J., & Gavaghan, C. (2018). Transparency in 
algorithmic and human decision-making: Is there a double standard? Philosophy & 
Technology, 32(4), 661–683.
Zhavoronkov, A. (2018). Artificial intelligence for drug discovery, biomarker 
development, and generation of novel chemistry. Molecular Pharmaceutics,15(10), 
4311-4313.
Zilke, J. R., Mencia, E. L., & Janssen, F. (2016). DeepRED – Rule extraction from deep
neural networks. In T. Calders, M. Ceci, D. Malerba (Eds.): Discovery Science 19th 
International Conference (pp. 457–473).
Zintgraf, L. M., Cohen, T. S., Adel, T,. & Welling, M. (2017). Visualizing deep neural 
network decisions: Prediction difference analysis. The fifth International 
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR).
12
